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Abstract
This inquiry describes an attempt to teach ethics to police leaders and managers 
within the unique institutional context of 'Bramshill' - the site of the Police Staff 
College within the National Police Training organisation. It shows how the subject 
’ethics' was re-introduced to the curriculum of the middle-manager programmes of 
study and sets this re-introduction in the context of the wider strategic priorities and 
culture change aspirations of the police service in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland.
The study identifies a sequence of'action research' stages each reflecting a search 
to secure a positive evaluation for the emerging educational designs.This part of 
the account will illustrate how difficult it was to secure, consistently, a positive 
evaluation of and response to the learning designs from the client group. Finally, 
though, after a number of set-backs and disappointments it became possible to 
claim some degree of success for the educational project.
The thesis presented here is a post-modern text in three senses; first, its 
construction is an example of a ‘transitext’ built up over time; second, it is post­
modern in its content including materials from eclectic and diverse sources; third, 
it is ‘local’, contextually specific and highly personal. In this latter respect it 
recognises that a different author would create a different style of account and a 
different theoretical structure in the course of making sense of the inquiry and the 
facts o f the inquiry.
The first part of the thesis establishes the background to the project and foundations 
for the study. The second part charts the unfolding stages of the inquiry from the 
re-introduction of 'ethics' until its removal from the middle-management 
programme. The third part of the thesis develops a number of theoretical 
interpretations and concludes with the presentation of information concerning the 
'moral world' of police leaders and managers. The concluding chapter re-affirms 
the significance of 'ethics' in police strategic discourse, summarises the main 
findings of the study and concludes optimistically by noting how 'ethics' has, at last, 
come to be positively valued by a consistent majority of the client group at the 
dawn of the new millennium.
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1Culture change: an attempt to teach ethics to police leaders and managers within 
a traditional institution and changing social milieu
Introduction
The inquiry I shall describe here drew inspiration from both simple and complex 
writings and other forms of action concerned with the struggle to achieve social 
justice, the promotion of human rights and the protection of civil liberties.
In the course of his dialogues, Socrates had set out stringent criteria for human 
conduct to meet if it were to be considered 'ethical'. Compared with the urbane 
sophistication of late modern socially constructed persons, his conception of the 
nature of the 'good' life and 'right' action was stunning in its moral absolutism. 
Kant's moral philosophy was similarly striking and confronting; How, I wondered, 
would the world be organised if we were to follow one version of his categorical 
imperative and 'act only on that maxim which we could at the same time will to be 
a universal law'? Mill, too, had shaped a part of my thinking. He had observed, for 
example, that the history of the development of socio-political systems 
conspicuously featured the struggle between liberty and authority. He sought to 
curb the exercise of tyranny over the individual subject by asserting that a large 
measure of liberty was necessary if individuals were to enjoy the 'good' life. 
Without 'liberty' there would be no guarantee of the freedom to plan a life to suit 
individual character; nor would there be a guarantee that the individual could 
associate with the company of his or her choice. Mill's ideas support and defend 
'difference', 'otherness', variety, the unusual and the unexpected.
Yet whilst Socrates, Kant and Mill stand as major figures in the intellectual 
traditions of western moral philosophy it was, perhaps, more humble, 
commonplace or evocative writing which served to provide equally important 
foundations for my study.
So, for example, Arendt's (1964) economical and iconoclastic phrase 'the banality 
o f evil'had suggested to me how readily and casually individual human goodness 
and moral sensitivity can be over-ridden by ordinary, everyday social influence 
processes. The title of Fanon's (1965) work, 'The wretched o f  the earth ' somehow, 
in itself, had cast a critical shadow, like a film of varnish, over my picture of the 
world. Freire (1976) in the course of his ‘education-as-the-practice-of freedom’had 
included a reference to the response of a street sweeper in Brasilia, who on 
rediscovering the value of his own person, had said: Tomorrow, I'm going to work 
with my head held high'. Freire’s simple note had continued to remind me of the
2need to respect, always, the basic dignity of each and every person. And, maybe 
because I worked in a place of the 'haves', it was the remarkable bold lettering I had 
seen on the playground wall of a school in the deprived, disadvantaged part of 
Pittsburgh that 'moved' me most. It read: 'Our mission, every child, every day, in 
every way, achieving academic success’. Often, I would find myself saying: 'If they 
can set this as their goal then, surely, we can do the equivalent at the Police Staff 
College'.
Greene (1993) makes reference to a range of literary and philosophical works that 
she uses as educational resources in the exploration of multiculturalism and 
pluralism. She takes Whitman's (1931) 'Song o f  m yself as an emblem of the ethos 
of democracy and uses his work as an entree to the study of'the many long dumb 
voices' and of 'the rights of them the others are down upon'. I, too, had found in 
Whitman's work a profound and reassuring moral message commending the rich 
possibilities in human life. Greene also mentions Morrison (1972), Anzaldua 
(1987) and Kincaid (1990) who help to tell the stories o f'the  many long dumb 
voices' - the voices of the excluded and marginalised. These writings had 
influenced and educated and inspired me. They told of'local knowledge' (Geertz, 
1983), of the ‘tyranny’ to which Mill had reacted, and, of the subtle charms of 
diversity.
In his poem, ‘The great lover \ Brooke (1946) identified several of his many loves 
- such things as ‘wet roofs beneath the lamp light’, ‘the blue bitter smoke of wood’ 
and ‘the keen unpassioned beauty of a great machine’; he also includes the phrase: 
‘And voices that do sing’. What other voices had ‘sung’ to me throughout the 
progress of this study?
They included Achebe’s (1986) excoriating critique of colonialism tersely captured 
at the conclusion of his ‘Things fa ll apart’. There, Achebe deftly portrays 
something of the resolute ‘District Commissioner’ who, as he makes plans to write 
a book on his efforts ‘to bring civilisation to different parts of Africa’, reduces the 
life of Okonkwo, ‘one of the greatest men in Umuofia’ to a morcel of ‘interesting 
reading’. The District Commissioner reflects upon his future oeuvre and the dead 
Okonkwo as follows:
"One could almost write a whole chapter on him. Perhaps not a whole chapter but 
a reasonable paragraph, at any rate. There was so much else to include, and one 
must be firm  in cutting out details. He [the District Commissioner] had already 
chosen the title o f  the book, after much thought: The Pacification o f  the Primitive 
Tribes o f  the Lower Niger'. ” (Achebe 1986: 149,150)
3I imagined that a study of ethics might have some part to play in helping to avert 
callousness and insensitivity. I imagined, too, that a study of ethics could help in 
appreciating the fullness of life itself. Skvorecky (1980) in his ‘Red music ’ 
identifies the essence of jazz as:
“... an elan vital, a forceful vitality, an explosive creative energy as breathtaking 
as that o f  any true art, that may be fe lt even in the saddest o f  blues. Its effect is 
cathartic. ” (Skvorecky 1980: 7)
The creative energy of the ‘elan vital’ finds itself pitted against the intolerance of 
ideologues. So, he continues:
“Totalitarian ideologists don 7 like real life (otherpeople’s), because it cannot be 
totally controlled; they loathe art, the product o f  a yearning fo r  life, because that, 
too, evades control -  i f  controlled and legislated, it perishes. But before it perishes 
— or when it finds refuge in some kind o f  samizdat underground — art ...becomes 
protest. Popular mass art, like jazz, becomes mass protest. That’s why the 
ideological guns and sometimes even the police guns o f  all dictatorships are aimed 
at the man with the horns. ” (Skvorecky, 1980: 8)
I found , a link between Skvorecky’s irrepressible creative energy and the 
remarkable ‘manual of escape, of liberation’ presented by Gide (1949) in WisLes 
Nourritures terrestres ’. In this work, Gide was able to capture the potential for joy 
in the most basic experiences of life where ‘mere being became an immense 
delight’. Oftentimes, it had occurred to me that compared with Skvorecky’s ‘elan 
vital’ and Gide’s joie de vivre, something was missing from the general outlook of 
many police. Their defensiveness and scepticism - their readiness to find fault, to 
complain and to criticise - their lack of trust, and, their fixation with human 
weakness and fallibility signified the loss of their ability to wonder at the fruits of 
the earth and to marvel at the facts of human achievement. Surely ‘ethics’ could 
help restore an enchantment with human life and experience, with human projects 
and products. And, as I constructed something called ‘ethics’ as a subject for study, 
I was reminded of an approach to education voiced by Montaigne in an observation 
he had made concerning the appropriation of knowledge:
“We are not under a king: each man should look after himself Let him know -what 
he know’s at least; he must imbibe their ways o f  thought, not learn their precepts; 
and he may boldly forget, i f  he will, where he has learnt his opinions, so long as he 
may make them his own. Truth and reason are common to all men, and no more
4belong to the man who first uttered them than to him that repeateth them after him. 
It is no more a matter o f  P lato’s opinion than o f  mine, when he and I  understand 
and see things alike. The bees steal from this flower and that, but afterwards turn 
their pilferings into honey, which is their own. It is thyme and marjoram no 
longer. ” (Montaigne 1958: 56)
How might I design an educational experience where my students could turn their 
‘pilferings’ into a honey that was their own? My commitment to this ethos would 
remain a basic value throughout the inquiry.
Thus, from the outset, I should declare that my work was fired by hope and ideals.
It was also cast against the backdrop of ethical relativism. This specific backdrop 
inevitably raises questions about the morality of law, the morality of the wider 
society and the moral foundations of educational decision making. Warnock 
(1978) in her postscript to her survey of the contemporary study of ethics remarks:
".. it seems to me there is one outstanding problem in ethics at the present time and 
that is the problem o f  relativism." (Warnock 1976: 143)
It follows, she suggests, that the central problem of ethics is to find a justification 
for asserting that anything is 'positively and absolutely right or wrong', or 'to be 
pursued or to be avoided'. She continues:
"... i f  we agree with Mill that questions o f  ultimate ends, questions about what is 
fundamentally desirable, are not susceptible o f  proof, then somehow, the question 
has got to be settled as to who is entitled to impose a moral code on his (sic) 
neighbours. Ethics thus spills over into law (if the law enforces morality, what 
morality> should it enforce? The confident view that each society has just one moral 
code which it wants enforced does not look veiy plausible any more). It spills over 
into politics (whose right is it to impose on other people what everyone has to do?). 
It spills over into sociology> (who, when we come to analyse it, actually controls 
what people are told?) and into education (who ought to decide what children 
should be taught?).” (Warnock 1978: 143)
Warnock's observations struck right to the heart of my practice. Rightly or wrongly, 
I found myself in the position of being able to decide - to some degree - what police 
leaders and managers could study on development programmes at the Police Staff 
College, Bramshill. I thought that, for good reason, 'ethics' should be a topic they 
examined during their visit to the national centre for higher police training.
5My study, though, was formally stimulated by the publication of a draft statement 
of ethical principles for the police service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
The statement was published at the National Police Staff College, Bramshill, 
Hampshire on 8 December 1992. The ethics of police had become an explicit 
concern for those police strategists who were focusing upon the quality of policing 
services that were being provided for the people of the nation. A rigorous ’service' 
philosophy for police had been (and was being) articulated by police leaders. This 
was reflected in the Association of Chief Police Officers' (ACPO) strategic policy 
document, 'Setting the standards for policing: meeting community expectations' 
which had been published in 1990. This document advocated that all police and 
civilian members of staff within the police organisation adopt and abide by the 
professional principles set out in ACPO's (1990) Statement of Common Purpose 
and Values and it noted that:
"The success o f  the traditional system o f  policing in England and Wales is 
dependent on public confidence in the police and in the style o f  policing.... Good 
relations with the community, the prerequisite o f  public confidence, require the 
highest standard o f  courtesy, integrity, and fairness by the Police service. In 
addition, they require an acknowledgement by the Police that they recognise and 
respect the policing needs o f  the community." (ACPO 1990: 2)
The authors of the strategic policy document made reference to the value priorities 
they wanted to see expressed in police 'training' as follows:
"Everyone, chief officer, patrolling constable and civilian employee can improve 
their relationship with the public and give a better service by adopting the 
statement o f  common purpose and values and by taking fu ll responsibility fo r  their 
own behaviour. Training will need to emphasise the need fo r  this commitment at 
all levels." {ACPO 1990: 13)
At the same time, and despite this stress upon the importance of police 
professionalism, the subject 'ethics' and the study of the ethics of police scarcely 
featured on the middle management programme of study at Bramshill. Moreover,
I think it reasonable to argue that the study of ethics by police should not have to 
wait for legitimation from emerging strategic emphases. As Ker Muir (1977) has 
pointed out, policing deals with the 'big insistent problems' of existence. He 
indicates that beneath the 'small phrases' police officers might use as they discuss 
their work - such as 'role' and the sorts of things that make them 'feel good' - are the 
'big' questions concerning how, in the face of choice and circumstance, to live out
6a life. He notes that:
"The policeman was beset by the same profound questions o f  moral philosophy as 
any other member o f  mankind." (Ker Muir 1977: 190)
Those questions, for Ker Muir, include; ’What is the meaning of life?', 'Do the risks 
I take and the privations I suffer matter to society or mankind?', and, 'Are the 
sacrifices I make and the hurts I inflict justified in God's eyes, or mine?'
Ker Muir goes on to suggest that these questions - which are more or less moral in 
character - emerge as a result of our existential condition. He writes:
"Out o f  hope that life has some meaning, we create bench marks to measure the 
moral distance we have thus fa r  traversed. Such milestones may be public in 
nature: How many people have I  "helped”? How many potential victims have I  
savedfrom harm? How much better have I  made a community? On the other hand, 
our measures may be more private ones: How much have I  improved myself? How 
fa r  have I  moved my children toward knowledge, security, or happiness? How 
closely have I  adhered to God's law? " (Ker Muir 1977: 189)
'How many people could I have helped?' and 'How much better have I made a 
community?' are questions connected to the basic purposes and functions of police. 
They are also questions concerned with justice and benevolence, liberty and order, 
security, fellowship, hope, and, the ordinary everyday ways we transact with our 
fellows. We do, I believe, measure a life in terms of the 'moral distance' a person 
has 'traversed'.
I thought that those 'big' questions Ker Muir identifies were too important to be set 
aside, passed over and ignored - especially in an institution supposedly constituted 
to provide 'higher training' for the police. I decided to take the opportunity provided 
by the renewed interest in 'police ethics' and make it possible for police leaders and 
managers to examine the subject during their course(s) of study at Bramshill.
My account will show how, as a member of the tutorial staff at the Police Staff 
College, I designed a form of'ethics education' (for police leaders and managers 
attending middle-management programmes of study at Bramshill) and how I re­
introduced the subject to the middle-management curriculum. After the initial re- 
introduction I was able to include an 'ethics unit' on the 'Managing People' module 
of the Police Management Programme. Successful completion of this programme 
led to the award of the Institute of Management's 'Diploma in Police Management'.
7A paramount concern for me, from the outset of the project, was that I should find 
a way to provide an educational experience that would be given a positive valuation 
by my client groups.
As I embarked upon the inquiry I had no idea that this objective would prove to be 
quite so elusive.
So, five years after I had taken the first tentative steps to teach 'ethics' to large 
groups of middle-managers at Bramshill, I was still engaged in re-thinking and re­
formulating the learning design in order to try and attract a genuine and consistent 
positive response from the client group(s). Then, and quite suddenly, as I shall 
relate in the forthcoming pages, a decision was taken not to include my work on 
'ethics' within the content of the 'Managing People' module constituting part of the 
middle-management programme run by the college. Moreover, despite the 
temporary 'stay of execution' the subject enjoyed (as it was renamed 'principled 
leadership' and included on a different module, 'Managing Operations') it ultimately 
failed to win a reprieve and was soon discontinued on that module.
However, a subsequent change of staff resulted in a re-appraisal of the earlier 
decision. So, in October 1999, the subject was included as one of the six core topics 
addressed on that component of the programme dealing with leadership and 
‘people’ skills. Moreover, the course critiques indicate that the ‘ethics unit’ has 
come to be positively valued by a large majority of the client group.
The account as a \'perseverance, struggle and adventuref narrative
The dissertation presented in the following pages might have been read as a 'defeat' 
narrative if the project and inquiry had been abandoned in the spring of 1998 -  
following the decision not to include ‘ethics’ as a topic on the Police Management 
Programme. However, because action research is intrinsically a continuing process 
of strategic action and reflection I persevered in advocating the need to include the 
subject on the management development curriculum. Ultimately this proved fruitful 
and the struggle -  as well as the adventure -  of the preceding years was rewarded.
During my study an institutional change occurred within Bramshill which gives 
added impetus to the inclusion o f ‘ethics’ as a topic of study for police leaders and 
managers. Thus, in the late summer of 1999, a 'Human Rights' unit was established 
within National Police Training's newly formed 'Leadership and Management' 
faculty. The 'Human Rights' unit takes as a part of its work not only the study of 
rights-based ethics but also the contexting of human rights within traditions of
ethical discourse and moral philosophy. To the extent that the specific study of 
human rights will feature on all the leadership and management development 
programmes offered by the Leadership and Management faculty at Bramshill and 
that this study will draw from an appreciation both of 'ethics' and the 'rule of law' 
then ethics, directly or indirectly, is set to take on a relatively high profile across 
the police leadership development curriculum.
However, the relationship between the inquiry reported here and this recent 
development is tenuous. Without the enactment of the Human Rights Act in 1998 
it is doubtful whether the study of ethics and human rights would have been 
included as topics on the middle-management programmes. This illustrates, in part, 
how decisions concerning the nature and content of higher police training are made 
within National Police Training and, therefore, Bramshill. The Human Rights Act 
requires police to conform to its provisions; in consequence, the programmes of 
study at Bramshill adjust themselves in order to forewarn police of the newly 
emerging rules and procedures they must observe. (I should add, of course, that the 
programmes of study might also attempt to suggest or illustrate how the police 
organisation may approach the implementation of new directives and strategic 
emphases.) Decision-making within National Police Training reflects a hierarchy 
of values - at the apex of which is the need to ensure that police practices reflect 
Government legislation and Home Office directives. The development of police 
professional knowledge is a secondary consideration. A wider 'critical' analysis of 
police occupies an even lower position in the values hierarchy.
Notwithstanding the impetus given to the study of human rights and ethics by the 
Human Rights Act, it might have been the case that the report into 'Police Integrity' 
published in 1999 by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary could, itself, have 
provided backing and support for the ongoing 'ethics education' at Bramshill. 
However, even though the Inspection team, in the course of their study, did visit the 
institution, their report makes no reference to the actual ethics teaching that had 
taken place there. Thus, the content of the Inspectorate's report failed to include any 
discussion of the learnings that had emerged in relation to teaching ethics to police 
leaders and managers as a result of my inquiry. Some of these learnings had even 
been published in academic journals. Nor was any mention made of the work of 
two other Bramshill tutors, one of whom serves as an advisor to the Council of 
Europe on police ethics, whilst the other directs the executive seminar programme 
- included upon which are examinations of the moral aspects of policing in the 
United Kingdom. So, any encouragement that might have been given to the study 
of human rights and ethics through the publication of the HMI report is unrelated 
to practitioner development and the specialist knowledge wrought from years of
9study by the tutorial staff at Bramshill.
Nonetheless, the fact that the inquiry I shall describe here existed and had, in 
different ways, involved several members of the teaching staff, meant that I was 
perceived as having some knowledge in relation to the ethics of ‘police’ and the 
teaching of ethics to police. It was, therefore, possible to include me as a core 
member of staff in the newly established ‘Human Rights Unit’. The unit itself has 
been constituted to help support the work of the recently constituted ACPO 
‘Human Rights Working Group’ through, for example, the provision of training and 
development materials concerned with 'human rights' and the implementation of 
the Human Rights Act. This remit necessarily entails strengthening and developing 
training resources embracing, for example, the concept of equal opportunities, the 
valuing of diversity, the need to exercise the duty of care, the continuing struggle 
against racism, sexism, homophobia and xenophobia, and, the protection of 
individual human rights and civil liberties.
This account constitutes a ‘struggle’ and ‘adventure’ narrative in the sense that I 
tried to find a way of presenting ‘ethics’ to police leaders and managers that would 
do justice to the complexity of a subject area which itself remains relatively 
underdeveloped in the field of policing and criminal justice. In fact, Kleinig and 
Leland Smith’s (1997) survey of materials available to the criminal justice ethics 
educator (in the specific field of teaching police ethics) identifies only fifteen 
papers devoted to issues connected with the teaching of police ethics. Furthermore, 
their bibliography contains no reference whatsoever to teaching ethics to police 
leaders and managers. To the extent that I had to construct materials for this 
particular client group my inquiry approximated an adventure into the unknown. 
I will tell a story which often resulted in enormous personal disappointment on my 
part. I hope, though, that my recent ‘successful’ design, allied to the existence of 
the Human Rights Unit and the continuing concerns about police integrity will 
ensure that ethics and the moral dimensions of policing will become a natural 
feature of police professional development.
The account as individual educational action research
The dissertation might also be read as individual educational action research. I shall 
indicate why I think that this inquiry qualifies as this form of action research when 
I turn to examine the methodology of the inquiry. There are grounds, however, for 
conceptualising my work as a 'case study' which investigates strategies for teaching 
'ethics' to police leaders and managers. In fact, in one major phase of the research 
I adopted a 'case study' approach to my inquiry as I attempted to become as
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receptive as possible to the presenting characteristics of the client group(s). Stake's 
(1995) analysis of the art of case study research includes an insistence that the case 
researcher should make the case 'come alive'. This has served as an important 
principle to me - especially in the middle and latter periods of my inquiry. In this 
introduction I shall 'open my account' with an illustrative vignette (involving 
educational practice at Bramshill) which is designed to begin the process of making 
the case 'come alive'.
In the third section of this dissertation I shall, following Stake, try to 'make the case 
understandable.' I have, though, been alert to his observation that:
"The researcher is the agent o f  new interpretation, new knowledge, but also new 
illusion. Sometimes the researcher points to what to believe, sometimes facilitating 
reader understandings that exceed the comprehension o f  the researcher. " (Stake 
1995: 99)
This observation by Stake helps to raise a fundamental question about the 
presentation and re-presentation of 'reality' in research accounts and the research 
story. Recently, for example, in the field of action research Lomax (1997) has 
defined and described a 'crisis of representation'. She recognises, for example, that 
action research - especially collaborative action research - takes place in social 
settings involving a number of persons. Therefore, if it is to be communicated 
authentically it should try to include the voices and perspectives of those persons 
involved in the situations of practice. How, though, might disparate voices and 
expressive styles be brought together? How might the complexities of individual 
experience including, for example, Dadds (1993) 'feeling of thinking' be written 
into the narrative?
I have tried to resolve some of these problems by writing both a relatively personal 
account -  which includes some ‘close to the grain’ experiential disclosures -  and 
by including, where appropriate, the ‘voices’ of several programme participants. 
The issue of ‘writing style’ in the field of action research and its representation has 
been discussed by Christensen and Atweh (1998) who themselves build on the 
earlier work of Cloake and Noud (1991). Christensen and Atweh point out that 
different researchers have a preference for, and expertise in, certain styles of 
writing. Their analysis of how best to communicate the ethos of action research 
includes the reflections of Kemmis (1998) who contends that action researchers 
should ‘tell the story of their projects’. He moves on to say:
11
“The idea is that we [action researchers] try to convey that our projects are 
grounded in the lives and experiences o f  particular participants (not the universal 
subject, the impersonal ‘academic’ style)... At the same time, we want to show that 
we are critical practitioners, able to stand back from our work and think about it 
as a basis fo r  re-orienting ourselves and our action (not people whose perspective 
is immutably fixed  by our location as i f  we could never see beyond the boundaries 
o f  our prejudices or points o f  view). Different authors will want to tell the story o f  
their projects in different ways. "(Kemmis, in Christensen and Atweh 1998: 338)
The very fact of participating directly in real-life social action projects necessarily 
engages the ‘whole-person’ of the action researcher. Something of the actual reality 
is left out of the account if no reference is made to affective responses -  and the 
account is rendered misleading if it is presented in an exclusively impersonal style. 
This constitutes a part of the justification for my choice of presentational style.
Hanrahan (1998) provides a recent and concise example of this ‘personal’ way of 
presenting an action research report. She discusses how, over a period of thirty 
months she experienced a number of transitions (or ‘revolutions’) in her thinking 
about the nature of research, how best to conduct research and who should actually 
‘do’ research. Her account illustrates how she came to jettison a positivist approach 
to generating knowledge but she also shows how the research journey is fraught 
with uncertainties, doubts and simple human frailties. In short, she demonstrates 
the importance and salience o f ‘personality’ in action research. This suggests that 
a part of the representation of action research should include an investigation of the 
role the researcher’s personal history may play in the planning, conduct and 
theorising which constitute the unfolding inquiry process.
But this constitutes only a part of the problem: the account presented here has been 
written against the backdrop of post-structuralism and postmodernism - which has, 
inter alia, heralded the 'death of the author'. Thus, as Barthes (1966) began to 
suggest, all literature - i.e. anything which is scriptable - is 'intertextual' - in the 
sense that every word, phrasing or segment of writing is a reworking of other 
writings which precede or surround the individual work. Eagleton (1996) 
summarises his appreciation of post-structuralist insight in relation to 'text' as 
follows:
"A specific piece o f  writing .. has no clearly defined boundaries: it spills over 
constantly into the works clustered around it, generating a hundred different 
perspectives which dwindle to vanishing point. The work cannot be sprung shut, 
rendered determinate, by an appeal to the author, fo r  the 'death o f  the author' is
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a slogan that modern criticism is now confidently able to proclaim. The biography 
o f  the author is, after all, merely another text, which need not be ascribed any 
special privilege: this text too can be deconstructed. It is language which speaks 
in literature, in all its swarming polysemic plurality, not the author himself (sic)." 
(Eagleton 1996: 119, 120)
Eagleton’s remarks highlight the difficulty of ascribing authorship to any piece of 
writing. Momentarily at least, it is the reader who produces the text's meaning - and 
who remains free to find irreducible plurality in the work.
This observation continues to raise a number of questions for me concerning the 
text presented here. What will the reader 'do' to this text? How will the reader 
'produce' the story? Should I (could I) have worked harder to provide a defence of 
the work as individual educational action research? How important is it for an 
inquiry to be located within a genre of research? Have I properly emphasised the 
strangeness of Bramshill? Is Bramshill any more strange than anywhere else? Why 
did I want to subtitle this text, 'The feeling of practice' and then choose not to do 
so? What has had to be suppressed and/or left out of my account? How do I 
explain the seeming paradox of writing in the first person when I remark upon the 
'death of the author' and the de-centring of authorship?
These problems have been addressed, obliquely, by MacLure (1996) as she 
reflected upon the biographies of ten individuals who had become action 
researchers. In the course of her discussion she includes an observation about the 
identity of action research itself. She thinks action research illustrates a kind of'in- 
between-ness' or 'hybridity'. In other words, action research reflects a restless 
movement in the space between boundaries. MacLure notes that action research 
'rehearses' a number of oppositional dilemmas - such as those between 'theory' and 
'practice', between the 'personal' and the professional' and between the 'sacred 
languages of science, scholarship or research' and the 'mundane dialects of practice 
and everyday experience'. MacLure, therefore, categorises action research as 
follows:
"Action research is itself a boundary dweller. It has always drawn its power (and 
also, o f  course, its problems o f  legitimation within the institutional discourses o f  
theory and research) from its challenge to the customary dispositions of'privilege' 
in the iinec/nal relations o f  dualism - between theory and practice, subjectivity and 
objectivity, academic and practitioner. It has developed a powerful critique o f the 
academic discourses o f  positivist science and scholarship and the tyrannies that 
theory and expertise have exerted upon the teacher as the other. "(MacLure 1996:
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282)
The identification of action research (and the action researcher) as ’boundary 
dweller' means that action research can be viewed as an embodiment of the 
transgressive figure such as the 'trickster' or 'cyborg' discussed by Haraway (1982). 
In consequence, action researchers are able, in principle, to break free from 
conventional genres of method and of representation. Nonetheless, MacLure finds 
that the action researcher 'seems still to be concerned with transcending those 
opposites from which it draws its power'. Thus, action researchers either try to 
reverse the poles of those opposites so that one is 'privileged' over the other or they 
try to seek some form of reconciliation in which differences might be 'resolved or 
dissolved'. This allows her to contend that a part of the action research 'project' is 
built upon the idea of triumphal progress. Therefore, as Lather (1994) points out, 
action research is presented as a victory narrative. MacLure moves on to question 
whether the stories of action research should be constructed as 'victory' narratives 
or whether they might gain something by resisting this temptation:
"Thepoint might be to resist resolution, to live 'at the hyphen' as Fine (1994) puts 
it, between those boundaries that are inevitably implicated in narratives o f  
becoming an action researcher. Might we be cyborgs, hybrids or tricksters, whose 
business is to prevent solutions to the problem o f  getting safely across the 
boundaries ofteacher/academic, personal/professional...? "(MacLure 1996: 283)
MacLure, albeit indirectly, hints at the power that might, therefore, lie within 
'struggle' narratives which remain cautious about claiming victory. I failed to 
create a 'design' for ethics education that resolved the tensions between police and 
civilian, the 'practical' man or woman and the 'intellectual' or between contrasting 
value frameworks. Moreover, my account might show how I failed in 'getting 
safely across the boundaries of teacher/academic' as well as the 'personal' and the 
'professional'. To that extent, it may be that this account constitutes an example of 
the 'hybridity' and 'in-between-ness' to which MacLure refers.
Whatever else I might have intended to do in the course of presenting my work I 
have wanted to follow Elliott's (1990) suggestion - (which was based on his 
concern about the quality of research that was being generated within universities)
- that research should culminate in the researcher saying something 'new and 
interesting'. I hope, for the reader, this proves to be so. The inquiry absorbed my 
attention for the best part of a decade and, just when I thought I had reached a 
plateau of'success', I found, instead, that my work was not wanted. For this reason,
I wondered whether it would be more accurate to describe this as a 'crash' or 'exile'
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narrative. However, in spite of the sadness I felt, these 'facts' o f 'failure' remain 
educational, illuminating and provocative. Moreover, the data I shall present does 
not suggest that my work was ineffective. Thus, for example, my inquiry seems to 
reveal, more clearly, the nature of decision-making at Bramshill and the way in 
which Bramshill is itself nested within a wider consumer culture which insists that 
'service providers' should 'please the customer'.
Several o f the findings emerging form my inquiry help to make a contribution to 
the educational knowledge concerning teaching ethics to police and to the gathering 
anthropological knowledge of police themselves. Thus, for example, quite 
independently of the work conducted by American teachers of criminal justice 
ethics, I found that most police leaders and managers positively valued their 
opportunity to create and enact ‘ethics plays’. The plays constituted a type of 
creative case study. I was to discover that the American criminal justice ethics 
educators reported in Kleinig and Leland Smith’s (1997) collection of papers 
examining strategic issues in ‘ethics’ teaching showed particular support for the use 
of case studies (and their variants).
Other important knowledge emerging from my inquiry lay in the data patterns 
revealed by various versions of an instrument I called the ‘Bramshill Ethics 
Questionnaire’. The successive versions of this instrument generated a wealth of 
new information about the ‘moral world’ of police officers. This data was used to 
support my educational practice and the very fact that I was able to cite the pattern 
of responses to the various questions in the questionnaires helped me to feel 
confident and to present myself as an informed practitioner.
Before presenting an opening glimpse concerning educational practice at 
Bramshill I should add that a small number of publications generated from within 
the ’community' of action researchers have provided an extensive array of criteria 
concerned with judging and assessing action research reports. I shall refer to these 
criteria in some detail as the narrative unfolds. The opening glimpse I am about to 
present is designed as a description which should, as Clarke, Dudley, Edwards, 
Rowland, Ryan and Winter (1993) remark lead to 'appreciation' as a prelude to 
'analysis'. This illustrative vignette hints at the dramaturgical nuances that make the 
practice of higher police training at Bramshill a somewhat peculiar and distinct 
phenomenon.
Opening the account: 'I'd have liked to know what ethics is .f
It was early October 1992. I was 'co-facilitating a 'syndicate' of fourteen Chief
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Inspectors who were attending a 'Junior Command Course'. This was a seven-week 
long leadership development programme for middle-managers in the police service 
of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The course, officially, attempted to review 
how effective participants were in relation to a competency model o f police 
management. It also claimed, through the provision of a number of learning 
opportunities and structured experiences, to help develop the course participants in 
relation both to the 'core competencies' of that model and the more intangible 
attitudes and values commensurate with police leadership and management in a 
'learning' society.
In practice the curriculum emerged as a result of the interaction between the staff 
facilitators and the student group.
My partner was an experienced and senior police officer who brought a particularly 
idiosyncratic approach to educational practice. He wanted his syndicate to have a 
'good time'. For him, this would be achieved, in large part, through the team spirit 
engendered as the student group set about raising money for charities. At our first 
meeting, a few days before the course began, he had told me, proudly, o f the 
achievements of his previous syndicate. It was th e ’best syndicate' and it was the 
'best syndicate' because 'it had donated more money to charity than any o f  the other 
seven syndicate groups'. Some of that money had been raised as a result of securing 
sponsorship relating to the distance syndicate members could travel in twenty four 
hours (starting with just £5). This had led to the complete dispersal of the group - 
with two ingenious (and persuasive) members managing to cross the Atlantic 
before arriving in the United States of America.
This latter activity took place during that phase of the course when students had the 
responsibility for 'managing their own learning'. Self-managed learning had taken 
on a very particular character at Bramshill. Thus, towards the latter phase o f the 
programme, the syndicate directors withdrew from having contact with the student 
group. For a while, at least, the syndicate was left leaderless. In consequence, 
students were free to do whatever they wanted to do. To fill the hiatus, th Q'best 
syndicate' busied itself raising money for charity.
My co-facilitator was rather scathing about concepts such as 'self-development' and 
even more scathing about some of his colleagues (police and civilian tutors) who 
believed that self-awareness and the study of one's self were important. He was not 
schooled in the theory and practice of facilitation but led  from the front' and kept 
his syndicates occupied by 'dishing out tasks' and telling them to 'get on with it.'He 
was a large and imposing man who loved - and had played - rugby union. He
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thought I was acceptable because he knew I played various sports and he had read 
a piece I had written describing a model for facilitating adult learning. This had 
helped him with a Masters degree he was pursuing. He said that because of the help 
my writing had given him, he 'owed' me something.
I had rejoined the staff at Bramshill in August 1992 after spending three years 
practising organisational development within a multi-national information 
technology company. During those three years I had witnessed, first hand, how 
Handy's (1989) concept of the 'triple I' organisation ('information', 'intelligence' and 
'ideas' for 'added value') was becoming a reality and, in the course of so becoming, 
was turning people into disposable information carriers permanently liable to 
obsolescence (and hence, redundancy). Brownhill (1999) has remarked how 
organisations in themselves do not have agency - and therefore are non-moral. 
However, the business ideology producing people and produced by people in 'the 
age of the smart machine' (Zuboff, 1988) had disturbed me. It appeared that 
persons had come to have only 'instrumental' value. They were, despite all the 
rhetoric to the contrary, reduced to 'means' in the service of corporate 'ends'. People 
were not valued in their own right. It had become clear to me that the public service 
sector needed to be extremely vigilant as it sought to embrace facets of business 
ideology if it were to preserve its integrity and its professional standards. I had 
come to understand more clearly the forms of society that the public service sector 
helps to make possible and I thought it important to support the best possible 
provision of those services.
Simultaneously my work within a 'high-tech' global corporation had involved 
examining the way such corporations and their technologies underpinned and 
shaped some of the major features of postmodernity. They participate, massively, 
for example in creating hyper-reality and the simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1981, 1990, 
1992) the consequences of which remain unclear. As Best and Kellner (1991) 
argue, the present moment contains both utopian and dystopian aspects that point 
to an uncertain future. They argue that the 'information explosion', 'computerisation 
processes', and, 'new media technologies' could work to 'multiply and pluralise 
information' or 'anaesthetise meaning in a self-neutralising noise', could 'facilitate 
new learning skills' or 'perpetuate class inequalities' and, could stimulate diversity 
or crush difference under the press of homogenisation. I was beginning to ask how 
one was to make sense of police in postmodern times. Were they condemned to 
support and embody a relentlessly increasing programme of surveillance? Were 
they types of sign in a mere play of signs? Did they simply 'learn their lines well' 
and play out games in the larger game of social control? Were they postmodern 
types - cyborgs - or, even, virtu(al)cops? And, behind all this I wanted to know if
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'ethics’ - in the sense of thinking seriously about moral values - mattered to police 
any more.
After three days of the seven-week residential course my co-facilitator was taken 
ill and was unable to take any further part in the course delivery. I was left with the 
group.
It was composed of men aged between 33 and 49. Amongst the group was an 
individual who wanted to be paid overtime for having to come to Bramshill, a 
number officers who were planning for their retirement, one individual who wanted 
to take the opportunity the college offered to prepare himself for taking a Master's 
degree, two officers who had earnestly tried to introduce some 'management ideas' 
to their part of the organisation and one individual who wanted the police service 
to adopt the idea of'meeting the needs of the customer'. Within the group there was 
also an egregious character (I shall call him F. P.) who, whenever he interjected 
told memorable (if apocryphal) tales and anecdotes about himself, his colleagues, 
policing and the nature of his police force. He had, for example, so hated a 
superintendent within that force, that he, along with some colleagues, had 
surreptitiously put the drug 'LSD' into the unfortunate man's mug of coffee. The 
syndicate remained impassive as F. P. finished his story by saying that it had 
'served the bastard right' when he (the superintendent) had to 'go o ff sick from  
work because the effects of the drug had 'made him fee l so weird'.
As the weeks unfolded, the group talked about itself as 'gelling'. F. P., though, 
revealed another aspect of himself. He seemed to fall asleep at quite unpredictable 
and often inappropriate times during classroom activities. Thus, even when turn- 
taking events were occurring (where everyone shared their learnings or 
observations - or were giving feedback to others in the group) F. P. might find 
himself taking a nap. In general, his colleagues did not disturb him. He also 
absented himself from the group from time to time and missed a number of course 
activities. I sensed he was, in some way, 'adrift'.
However, he did decide to attend an hour-long 'elective' session on 'ethics' that was 
presented by a member of staff who had become interested in the ethics of policing. 
A part of my role as a syndicate director was to explore issues raised for the 
officers in the group as a result of their attending such 'elective' sessions. It 
transpired that those members of the syndicate who had gone along to the focus on 
ethics reported that they had not benefited from the endeavours of my colleague. 
At the conclusion of the 'exploring the learning' session F. P. declared that, 
notwithstanding the fact he had wasted his time, he had liked the person who was
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presenting the topic 'ethics'. He then said:
"It was disappointing though. I'd  have liked to know what ethics is."
His fellow officers agreed. They, too, would have liked to know what ethics was 
really about.
As a result of this exchange, I began to wonder if police leaders and managers had 
been adequately familiarised with the study of ethics and policing. I also wondered 
if F. P. was ’adrift', in part, because he had no perspective on police practice that 
drew from the ethics of public service.
As the course entered its final phase I had grown exasperated with some of the 
conduct shown by syndicate members. Put most simply, there was, as I saw it, 
insufficient rigour. Rarely, for example, would the group spend time reviewing 
'learning activities' against even the most rudimentary models of the experiential 
learning cycle. I was not convinced that the course was effecting much learning. 
I confronted the group and identified some of the specific actions that were causing 
me concern. Amongst these I mentioned some patterns of behaviour displayed by 
F. P. and I talked about the impact, on me, of his conduct. The group turned against 
me. I was told that F. P. had his problems and it was none of my business to 
interfere. In fact I was 'well out o f  order'. I was accused of 'trying to break up the 
group'. I countered this by saying that I thought it important to consider how we 
should use the resources entrusted to us in the public sector to serve best the public 
interest and that I did not think that we were using these resources properly. At this 
point one member acknowledged that he agreed with me - and that he had not 
realised, initially, where I was 'comingfrom'. F. P. relished the hostility. He said 
that it was the 'most memorable moment o f  the course'.
The course moved on towards its conclusion. At its end, I was thanked warmly by 
the syndicate and presented with a farewell gift. F. P. was unable to come to the last 
farewell session. He was 'indisposed'. I was told that, on the final night of his stay 
at Bramshill, he had remained alone, drinking whisky, in one of the college 
drawing rooms, after everyone else had decided to retire to bed. F. P., I was 
reminded by one officer, had 'his problems'.
F. P. was a generous man. When I thought of him 1 would find myself smiling. 1 
liked him.
Six years later, F. P. was sentenced to a lengthy term in prison. He had been found
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guilty o f corruption and conspiring to pervert the course of justice whilst he was 
still a serving police officer.
Throughout those six years I had conducted an inquiry concerned with teaching 
ethics to police leaders and managers. As I learned of the sad fate that had befallen 
F. P. I was reminded of his remark, 'I'd have liked to know what ethics is ' and I 
wished that, in the course of his professional development, he could have spent 
more time exploring the subject. Donahue and Felts (1993) might well be correct 
in contending that the study of ethics cannot make people more ethical. But the 
study of ethics can help to make salient the ethos and core values characterising 
organisations and it can promote forms of discourse which enable more 
consideration to be paid to the moral content of policing. A cultural context within 
which ethical concepts were made explicit and confidently deployed in the process 
of practical decision-making might have provided, for F. P., a more helpful and 
appropriate occupational milieu.
Part One
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The foundations o f  the inquiry
Chapter One describes the institutional context in which the inquiry took place. The 
first Appendix to this dissertation contains a number of photographs of 'Bramshill'; 
these serve to illustrate, pictorially, some features of the institution - and help to 
underline the 'local' and particular nature of the study.
Chapter Two examines the specific factors that generated the research project; it 
refers to the wider strategic emphases calling for culture change in the police 
service - as well as the first attempt, in 1982, to introduce 'ethics' to ‘command’ 
programmes at Bramshill.
Chapter Three states the research question and identifies the philosophical ideas 
underpinning the inquiry.
Chapter Four reviews the nature of'action research' and locates the methodology 
of the inquiry within an 'individual educational action research' approach.
Chapter Five is divided into two parts; Part one discusses the developing scholarly 
literature on police and police ethics as a basis for constructing the content of an 
'ethics education' for the police themselves; Part two discusses the educational 
emphasis that was chosen for the project.
Together, these chapters refer to the foundations that were created for the 
subsequent research inquiry.
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Chapter One
Context: The background to the study
"The judges o f  normality are present everywhere. We are in the society o f  the 
teacher judge, the doctor judge, the educator judge, the 'social-worker'judge; it is 
on them that the universal reign o f  the normative is based; and each individual, 
wherever he may fin d  himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behaviour, 
his aptitudes, his achievements. The carceral network, in its compact or 
disseminated forms, with its systems o f  insertion, distribution, surveillance, 
observation, has been the greatest support, in modern society, o f  the normalising 
power." (Foucault: 1991:304)
The study reported here took place in a particular and distinct location, the Police 
Staff College, Bramshill. This constitutes a unique institutional context and the 
symbolism of'Bramshill' played a significant role in the educational process I shall 
come to describe.
In this chapter I shall 'set the scene' for my inquiry by identifying the official role 
of the Police Staff College. I shall also describe, briefly, the character and nature 
of'Bramshill'. Finally, I shall provide an outline of the 'ethics' package that was 
introduced by Richards (1982) to programmes of study at the College.
The role o f  the Police Staff College
The first National Police College (later to move to Bramshill, and, later still to be 
renamed the Police Staff College) was set up at Ryton-on-Dunsmore, a village near 
Coventry, on 1 April 1948. The College was established following the 
recommendations of the Police Post-War Committee published in 1946. In the first 
report of that committee (HMSO, 1946) the case for a Police College was made. 
It also included some details concerning the recommended syllabus for developing 
police leaders. The committee asserted that the police service should be 
commanded by persons who joined as constables and not by 'outsiders' promoted 
into the higher ranks. However, the committee was concerned that, without some 
form of college experience, there would be nothing to counteract the influence of 
long service in a subordinate capacity. Whilst such service could provide invaluable 
experience- especially in relation to building the 'craft knowledge' of policing - it 
could not be assumed that it would always help in generating the qualities 
necessary for effectiveness in senior management and/or administration. It would 
not guarantee the 'growth of the broad outlook, the quality of leadership and the
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independent habits of mind' - which the committee took to be essential if a senior 
police officer was to command the respect of his or her subordinates and the 
confidence of all the community policed.
Thus, from its inception, the Police College was established to train and develop 
the present and future leaders of the police service. The Police Committee 
recommended that the Police College should run five courses, of which the two 
main ones were to be a 'junior' course for Inspectors and a 'senior' course for 
Superintendents. The suggested syllabus for the 'junior' course included the 
following groups of subjects:
A) Police principles: historical - political - ethical - legal
B) Police organisation and administration
C) Legal (including, legal history and constitutional law; the principles of law etc., 
and, criminal law and procedure)
D) Science and police work
E) Semi - or non-professional lectures (In this latter category, the committee 
suggested subjects such as penal systems, government services, commerce and 
industry)
It is plain, therefore, that the committee recognised, inter alia, the study o f ethics 
and the ethical dimension of policing was a necessary and an important element in 
police leadership development.
Whilst the 1946 committee set some broad parameters concerning the appropriate 
content for the development of police leaders, the 1948 White Paper on police 
training went further and stated that police leaders would need the virtues of a 
liberal education. The committee took the view that police leaders needed to have 
some appreciation of the value frameworks lying at the core of a liberal democracy. 
In his study of the history of the Police Staff College, Villiers (1998) asks:
"Does that imply a need to turn our leading police officers into political theorists 
or moralphilosophers?" (Villiers 1998: 45)
He immediately answers:
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"By no means. The role o f  the police is to police. They are the executive and not the 
legislature or judiciary; and it is their primary responsibility to enforce the law. 
However, the law has to be enforced and order maintained by thinking men. and 
women; and the Police College makes a valuable contribution to the way those 
processes are carried out." (Villiers 1998 : 45)
Villiers' contention draws sustenance from the Home Affairs Committee Report 
(1989) into 'Higher Police Training and the Police Staff College'. This committee 
noted that in the 1960s the College moved to Bramshill House in Hampshire and 
in 1979 the name of the institution was changed to 'reflect more accurately its 
function in providing higher training for the present and future leaders of the police 
service'. The committee added:
"Nevertheless, the role and aims o f  the o f  the Police S ta ff College remain broadly 
the same today as in 1947. ” (Home Affairs Committee, Third Report, 1989 : vi 
para. 6)
The committee reported that:
"We share the view o f  the Home Office and the Commandant o f  the Police S ta ff 
College that the central role o f  the college should remain the provision o f  higher 
training fo r  the present and future leaders o f  the police service. " (Home Affairs 
Committee, Third report, 1989 : xi para. 28)
The Home Office submitted a memorandum to the committee - which was 'taken 
before' them in January 1989 - within which it (the Home Office), defined the role 
of the Police College at Bramshill. The role was made up of nine different 
components. The first three are described as follows:
-T o  provide a higher training for the present and future leaders of the police 
service. To this end, to provide a coherent and comprehensive pattern of courses 
for officers at key levels of command which develop the potential of those who 
attend, increase their professional and managerial knowledge and skills and 
broaden their outlook and equip them with a comprehensive understanding o f the 
context in which they operate, especially in relation to the community which they 
serve and protect.
- In addition, to present a wide variety of short courses, complementary to the 
Command courses, which reflect the police service's priorities and the career needs 
of individual officers. These short courses principally focus on matters of current
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importance, management and the development of specialist skills and knowledge.
- To foster the teaching and dissemination of good practice, by encouraging the 
study of the central issues of policing, and the cultivation of professional police 
ethics
The Home Affairs Committee (1989) also reported that the Commandant of the 
college had stated that the college aimed to teach 'key management principles' and 
sought to encourage officers in the use of effective management techniques. They 
added however:
"Training can help to disseminate the findings o f  operational experience and 
research. It can reinforce earlier training in the ethics o f  policing and thus help to 
preserve the integrity and reputation o f  the police service" (Home Affairs 
Committee, Third Report, 1989 : vii, para. 14)
Thus, and again through the explicit mention of the term 'ethics', attention is drawn 
to the fact that a part of the College function is to provide some form of education 
dealing with the study of ethics on the police leadership development curriculum.
The police service itself made plain the moral foundations of police leadership 
through the Association of Chief Police Officers (1990) Statement of Common 
Purpose and Values. The actual wording of that statement is as follows:
"The purpose o f  the police service is to uphold the law fairly andfirmly; to prevent 
crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to keep the Queen's 
Peace; to protect, help, and reassure the community; and to be seen to do all this 
with integrity, common sense, and sound judgement.
We must be compassionate, courteous and patient, acting without fear or favour or 
prejudice to the rights o f  others. We need to be professional, calm and restrained 
in the face o f  violence and apply only that force which is necessary to accomplish 
our lawful duty. We must strive to reduce the fears o f  the public and, so fa r  as we 
can, refect their priorities in the action we take. We must respond to well-founded 
criticism with a willingness to change. " (ACPO 1990)
This statement clarified the valued ends and the socially acceptable means of 
policing and describes much of the moral content (and moral requirement) of 
policing and its leadership. The enduring demands of policing in a liberal 
democracy mean that, wherever possible, police officers need to be 'cool, calm and
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collected' under pressure, quick to assist and help the citizenry and slow to 
condemn their fellow citizens. Clearly, if the Police Staff College was charged with 
the responsibility of developing the present and future leaders of the service then 
at least a part of its curriculum should be devoted to some form of ethics education 
as well as the development of what Kleinig (1990) has referred to as 'moral 
expertise'.
However, Bramshill as an institution reflects not only cultural diversity but cultures 
that stand in uneasy relationship to each other. In consequence, the official function 
of the College is refracted by and filtered through complex cultural patterns and 
processes.
Bramshill as 'context1 fo r  the study
The Bramshill site of National Police Training (NPT) most usually and typically 
strikes the visitor as impressive. Villiers (1998) argues that Bramshill exists as a 
symbol of the past within the present. It is a traditional institution. He attempts to 
capture some of the sensations connected with coming to Bramshill in the 
following way:
"You come to the old porter's lodge, red-brick and impressively mottoed. You drive 
through its archway, and pause at the barrier whilst the friendly and efficient 
security guard who has emerged from his unhistorical but dry porta cabin checks 
your pass and exchanges the time o f  day. And you look up the mile-long, oak-lined, 
deer-bordered, bridge-crossing avenue to the massive house on the ridge in wonder 
and amazement." (Villiers, 1998 : 39)
The 'massive house on the ridge', to which he refers, is the mansion or 'Bramshill 
house'. This, as he observes, is now known around the world and is synonymous 
with higher police training in the United Kingdom. Although the actual history of 
the mansion house is complex it was built in the tradition of the Elizabethan 
prodigy houses with, in part, the intention of entertaining the monarch. It is now a 
'Grade One' listed building. Nothing about it can be altered without the agreement 
of English Heritage. The mansion itself, its contents and the various cultural 
artifacts adorning the other buildings within the Bramshill estate suggest tradition, 
continuity, order, hierarchy, conservatism, as well as patriarchy and colonialism. 
These terms have emerged as descriptions of Bramshill following culture audit 
processes conducted by students at the College.
Throughout the history of the Police College, different people have given it objects
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of historical interest or curiosity. In addition to these offerings both students and 
visitors have, for various reasons, presented hundreds of gifts and tokens of 
appreciation. In consequence, the Police College has become not only a centre for 
the development of police leadership but also the representation of - and, in some 
ways, the emblem of - police culture. Villiers notes:
"The extent o f  our acquisitions has to be seen to be fu lly appreciated. The list 
maintained by the procurement department gives some idea o f  its range. It includes 
badges, batons, big-game busts, candelabra, colours and flags, cups and sports 
trophies, dummies, furniture, glassware, handcuffs, maps, medals, paintings,
plaques, rattles, rose bowls, shields statues, tableware, tankards, timepieces,
tipstaves, truncheons, uniforms, vases and weapons.” (Villiers 1998 : 59)
Bramshill, then, carries complex and powerful symbolism. In consequence, it 
evokes for its clientele, mixed and varied emotions; often it provokes an ambivalent 
response. It is seen as simultaneously reassuring and oppressive. It is perceived as 
reflecting the 'official' line - the 'centre' in which both Government policies and the 
policies of senior police officers are disseminated throughout England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, and, as 'slow moving', somewhat antiquated and elitist. These 
features of the context appear both to support and subvert the educational 
enterprise. They support the teaching design because it is assumed to be legitimated 
by appropriate authorities. They subvert it because 'Bramshill' is perceived to be 
located in the 'old' world, insulated from the contemporary, and set apart from 
'reality'. The photographs included at the end of this dissertation in the Appendix 
entitled, ‘A picture of Bramshill’ illustrate, pictorially, some of the main features 
of the institution.
No research study has been conducted which investigates the extent to which 
Bramshill is a total institution (Goffman, 1961). However, two studies help to 
clarify the cultural milieu of professional practice at Bramshill. Thus, Plumridge 
(1988), following two decades of work as a management tutor within the college, 
provides an account of the way curricular emphases evolved in the 1970s and 
198Qs. His account gives an insight into some of the factors that make the practice 
of education problematic for the tutorial staff. Howell (1997), working as an insider 
researcher whilst resident at Bramshill, illustrates some of the typical ways 
Bramshill is construed from across the police service as a whole.
Plumridge (1988), in a discussion concerning the role of Bramshill in relation to 
management and organisational development in the police service, helps in the 
process of constructing a picture of the institution. In the course of his narrative, he
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shows how the concept 'manager' was gradually accepted by the more senior 
ranking police officers and how programmes of study were influenced by the 
theory and practice of organisational development. Plumridge explores the 
changing context of policing and a range of factors and pressures enjoining the 
police organisation to change. His contends that only through becoming 'learning 
systems' could police organisations respond effectively to these pressures. He goes 
on to record how, by the late 1980s, an ethos of learning and development 
gradually came to be positioned at the core of the learning structures, learning 
opportunities and programmes of study that were provided by the college.
However he concludes his extensive discussion by surfacing a number of 
Bramshill's 'unresolved issues'. He believes that amongst the most important of 
those unresolved issues is the lack of clarity concerning the mission of the 
institution. Plumridge is able to show that despite the official role (i.e. to produce 
from within the service its own leaders) a whole series of developments (especially 
in the 1980s) - including the short course programme and consultancy support to 
police organisations - had meant a 'moving away' from a narrow interpretation and 
obvious enactment of that official role. In its place, the new developments were 
concerned to address a different agenda which Plumridge thought was the central 
issue for 'most chief officers':
"... namely, 'where and how can I  obtain help to enable me to develop a more 
effective and efficient organisation?' " (Plumridge 1988: 129)
The fact that he was able to highlight the unclear mission of the institution simply 
draws attention to the elusive and apparently unstable character of the Police Staff 
College. In virtue of the competing claims upon Bramshill, Plumridge himself 
asks:
"... what is Bramshill to be - a sta ff college, the policeman's (sic) university, the 
centre o f  higher police training, a management and organisation development 
centre, or a resource centre? " (Plumridge 1988: 129)
Plumridge had mounted an impressive rationale for sustaining and enhancing a 
'developmental' approach and yet ten years later Villiers (1998) was able to 
announce that Bramshill had seen the rise and fall of 'facilitation' - i.e. an 
abandonment of the paramountcy of a developmental educational philosophy. In 
the place of learner-centred courses were 'faculty-based' programmes delivered 
under the quality assurance and quality control frameworks of National Police 
Training. How can such a change be explained?
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A part o f the explanation lies in a phenomenon made explicit in Plumridge's text. 
That phenomenon concerns an ongoing feature of police organisations which 
emerges from research data - in part supplied by Plumridge himself. He reports 
how the police organisation was characterised by police managers as an admixture 
of power and role cultures. Based on his own work (Plumridge 1983) and Males' 
(1983) he summarises the defining characteristics of the police organisation as 
follows:
- a rigid structure; hierarchical valuing deference and confonnity; effort and energy 
spent on preserving roles, departments, rules, procedures, committees and tradition
- an atmosphere of formality and suspicion that was impersonal and action-centred. 
Communication was restricted in its flow, was downward - and feelings were 
hidden and repressed
- decision-making and policy-making stemmed from the top with little participation 
from below
- management values and attitudes concerned with controlling personnel through 
the sanctions of coercive power etc.
The disciplined 'control' culture of police described by Plumridge means that 
decision-making is very susceptible to the ideological preferences and the personal 
preferences of its leadership. The Police Staff College - dominated as it is by police 
officers - is not exempt from this broadly patterned cultural feature. It is significant 
that Plumridge names three successive Commandants at Bramshill and hints at the 
major influence that was brought to bear on the organisation through their 
particular personalities and agendas.
Whilst Bramshill is also responsive to far wider developments leading to major 
changes in its emphases - such as the creation of National Police Training in 1993
- the idiosyncratic value preferences of its most senior leadership exerts a 
substantial effect on what takes place in the name of higher police training. The 
very fact that the most senior personnel at Bramshill change regularly means that 
the educational 'paradigms' are, themselves, likely to be discontinuous.
Plumridge also obliquely hints at some of the discomforts that face the tutorial staff 
at the College. The features he identifies go some way towards accounting for the 
relatively defensive and insecure situation in which the staff find themselves.
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Thus, on the subject of the recruitment of police officers to serve on the staff, he 
writes:
conditions o f  service at Bramshill tend not to attract many applicants o f  the right 
potential calibre, and a period on the sta ff is often, very unfairly, seen as a setback 
to their careers." (Plumridge 1988: 129)
Of the civilian tutorial staff, he observes:
"The role o f  the academic (civilian) sta ff can all too easily be underrated, sneered 
at, or even dismissed by the more 'macho’ and pragmatic among police officers." 
(Plumridge 1988: 129)
In relation to the clients who have the opportunity to make use of the college he 
notes:
"The expectations o f  its clients are very varied, ambiguous, ambivalent and often 
conflicting." (Plumridge 1988: 128)
A corollary of this latter observation is the difficulty in finding ways of securing 
a positive evaluation for College learning designs that depart from the craft 
professional topics of crime investigation and managing (or learning more about) 
the varieties of police operation.
Villiers (1998) compares the situation at Bramshill before and after 1993 and finds 
that its status has ’changed considerably'. Prior to 1993 the Commandant's sole 
responsibility was to 'command' the Police Staff College; the role was 'finite and 
clearly understood' and the task was to provide 'higher police training'. Since 1993 
no longer have there been Commandants; instead, a National Director steers the 
newly formed organisation, National Police Training. The creation o f three 
faculties - a process known as 'facultisation - along with the official promotional 
materials of National Police Training - signals an increasing adoption of the 
rhetoric and rationales of professionalisation and the new 'managerialism'.
Howell's (1997) study of decision making and policy formation in hierarchical 
organisations includes a number of personal observations about the nature of 
Bramshill as well as an indication of the way it is perceived by officers at different 
levels in the hierarchical structure of the police service. Howell kept a record of his 
residential experience at Bramshill whilst conducting his research project in the 
newly-formed 'Strategy and Policy faculty'. His study can be read as a rare example
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of 'insider' research within the institutional framework of the centre for higher 
police training.
He reports that despite the fact he was employed by the faculty to discover more 
about policy formation and that he 'sat in' on courses in order to make contact with 
students at the college he had considerable difficulty in finding people to interview 
for his research. This contrasted with the willingness to be interviewed by him that 
police officers expressed in their own force contexts. Howell 'wondered' if this was 
connected with the way course attendance at Bramshill was conceptualised by 
police officers. He writes:
"After about three weeks it occurred to me that interviewing police officers in their 
own police stations [compared with Bramshill] was proving fa r  easier to arrange. 
I fe lt that they may view Bramshill as a form o f holiday from their routine jobs and 
be unwilling to go through the process o f  being interviewed whilst there." (Howell 
1997: 23,24)
Howell formed the impression that police officers on Bramshill are inclined to treat 
their experience as a complete break from the real world of everyday problem 
solving and, as a result, they had no wish to participate in a research process 
interested in their beliefs about 'policy'. I should note here that Bramshill has been 
likened by an external organisational development consultant (Johnson 1986, 
personal communication) to a 'medieval university'; it functions like an 'oasis in the 
desert'. A part of the meaning of Bramshill lies in its separation from the everyday 
and the familiar.
Howell developed his particular research to consider why a 'code of ethics' failed 
to be established within the police service. He sought the opinions of various 
respondents in relation to their beliefs concerning the impact of different bodies 
(e.g. Central Government, HMIC, the Police Federation etc.) on police policy and 
he devoted, in the course of his narrative, a short section on the possible 
contribution of Bramshill to policy formation. He writes:
"Whilst Bramshill and National Police Training claim not to teach policy or 
influence decision-making regardingpolicy-matters it does provide an excellent 
means o f  exposing police officers to ideas and best practices occurring in other 
forces. It provides an integrating focus fo r  information exchange in an informal 
atmosphere o f  recreation and learning." (Howell 1997: 47)
This is a subtle observation; first, Howell manages to indicate the ongoing
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distinction between 'Bramshill' and the National Police Training organisation; 
second, he notes the diplomatic need for the training organisation(s) not to 
encroach upon the strategic leadership of police organisations; third, he conjoins 
the terms 'recreation' and 'learning' in his description of the atmosphere at 
Bramshill.
He subsequently includes, in his narrative, some of the ways in which the police 
officers he interviewed referred to Bramshill:
"... many police officers used to call Bramshill, 'Never Never land' o r , 'The dream 
fac to ry '.... some officers I  spoke to commented that it was so relaxing fo r  them at 
Bramshill that 'it takes nine days to get used to - and then, unfortunately, the next 
day they go home.' " (Howell 1997: 18)
It appears that a reciprocal process is established involving mutually reinforcing 
moments of'separation from the everyday', 'remoteness', 'other worldliness', 'dream 
land', 'fantasies' - leading to an increasing 'separation from the everyday' and so on.
Finally, here I should note the fact that Howell presents evidence concerning pre­
judgements about Bramshill. As an institution it is associated with the privileges 
of status and power and therefore attracts resentments from the lower ranks. By 
way of example, Howell includes the following observation from one of his 
interviewees:
".. it [Bramshill] is ridiculed by the junior ranks as they don't come here and don't 
know what it does ... it is likely that people who come here [Bramshill] and then try 
to implement change are likely going to be perceived as doing it because they have 
been to Bramshill. "(Howell 1997: 68)
Howell's insider research provides a rough guide illustrating some of the 
interpretive frameworks deployed by police officers attending programmes of study 
at Bramshill. These frameworks place the civilian tutor at an initial disadvantage 
in the practice of education or 'higher training'. Nonetheless the inquiry presented 
here took place in the full knowledge of this disadvantage. It was concerned with 
'foregrounding' the study of ethics as a part of police leadership and management 
development.
Ethics and police: a preliminary note
Following a foundational discussion in Plato's 'Republic' - where it becomes
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possible to identify a first depiction of the police function in a complex society - 
and Locke's (1720) analysis of the appropriate separation of powers in a society 
committed to persons as the bearers of rights, police are constituted, in liberal 
democracies, to help sustain and secure the rule of law. That law is, in some 
fundamental sense, subordinate to the demands of morality. Moreover, in liberal 
democracies, the citizenry (the public) enjoy a certain form of relationship with the 
arrangements and organisations of the state. It is one of consent. In essence, the 
public consents to the presence and powers of police and tolerate their police. 
Police cease to be tolerated if the public is no longer able to place trust and 
confidence in them.
Prefiguring the concerns of strategic police leadership emerging in the 1990s 
Richards (1985) examines the quality of trust and confidence that is extended 
towards the police. He found it in decline. A host of reasons can be found for such 
diminishing trust and confidence. His concern however is that this situation 
presents a potential danger to the liberal democratic state:
"... policing a liberal democratic state is a demanding and delicate activity which 
must reflect the emerging value preferences o f  the citizenry." (Richards 1985: 17)
and that therefore
"... there is a continuous need fo r  police at the supervisory levels to possess high 
qualities o f  leadership and management.." (Richards 1985:17)
In liberal democracies, the people, through democratic political arrangements, 
bring into existence rules which are enacted by the Queen in Parliament and upheld 
by the courts. Under these same political arrangements the police service, as a 
public body, is entrusted, in the interests of the citizens, with upholding the rule of 
law, preventing crime, protecting life and property and preserving public 
tranquillity. For this purpose, individual police officers are invested with the rights 
and duties that prescribe and circumscribe their role, give them authority and 
provide them with the necessary powers to carry out their duties. In a liberal 
democratic state the institution of police is understood in these terms and the trust, 
confidence and respect the public extend to police is generally summed up by the 
notion of 'consent'. If trust in, confidence in, and respect for police are lost - or 
decline to low levels - then the notion that police are there by 'consent' becomes 
increasingly untenable.
Richards (1985) indicates that we doubly have reason to be concerned. First, at the
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macro-level, one of the essential elements of liberal democracy - policing by and 
with the consent of the people - is threatened. Second, because of the 
predominantly social scientific emphasis in police leadership development - 
concerned as it is with explanation and prediction, efficiency and effectiveness - 
the moral or ethical basis of policing and police leadership was becoming 
overlooked. To this extent Richards shares a concern voiced by Habermas (1970). 
Habermas argues that technology and the technical interest so dominate developed 
societies that the conditions for securing ethical development are obliterated.
Richards identifies certain key moral dilemmas in policing ranging from the use of 
discretion, the practice of deception and the use of power and authority. He builds 
a strong case indicating that without the language and concepts of ethics and some 
ethical theory the requirement of hard critical thinking which is necessary for the 
proper practice of police management and leadership will be diminished.
He concludes his work with the observation:
"... if, as I  have argued, the police, in order to enjoy the trust and confidence o f  the 
public, need to police towards worthwhile ends in a morally acceptable manner, 
then applied ethics, as well as such instruments as police codes, are a necessary 
requirement fo r  officers." (Richards 1985:31)
Richards highlights the need for the police in general to recognise the importance 
of ethical considerations. He was also responsible for designing the first 'ethics' 
education to be incorporated into the command courses at Bramshill.
Introducing the subject ,ethicst onto the police leadership development 
curriculum
In 1978 the Police Staff College recruited onto its staff a political and moral 
philosopher. A part of his initial brief (Richards, 1992, personal communication) 
was to create and introduce an 'ethics package' that would be included as part of the 
course content on the 'Command courses'. This package was presented to students 
attending the Junior Command Course in 1982. The Junior Command Course was 
an obligatory part of the training and development for all officers holding Chief 
Inspector rank in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Each of those Junior 
Command Courses lasted for several months and more than one hundred officers 
attended each course. The student body was constituted into syndicates. Typically, 
each course numbered eight syndicates with fourteen officers in each syndicate. 
Two members of staff, one a police officer (of Superintendent rank) and one a
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civilian member of the tutorial staff were cast in the role of'syndicate directors' for 
each of the eight syndicates.
The educational background of the staff directing the syndicates varied 
considerably. Whilst the majority of police staff held a first degree or a masters 
degree in a variety of subjects, some did not. The civilian tutorial staff had, in the 
main, a background in politics and/or the social sciences. Some had studied 
sociology, others politics, others psychology and others, again, economics. 
However, a major and extensive focus upon ethics and moral philosophy in their 
first degree or post-graduate studies had not been a feature of their formal 
education. Notwithstanding any lack of expertise or familiarity with the sorts of 
subject germane to police leadership and management development, syndicate 
directors at the college had to manage the process of helping their students learn 
from whatever content was presented at central level on the courses.
The programme for the Junior Command Course for the 'Police Ethics Exercise' in 
December 1982 lasted for two and one-half days. Its objectives were written down 
and distributed to each student. They were as follows:
- To make explicit values and principles the general pursuit and application o f  
which constitute the British way o f  life
- To present a concept ofprofessionalism and to explore its major implications fo r  
the Police Service
- To highlight the significance o f  the ethical requirements o f  professionalism by 
introducing a theory o f  normative ethics
- To provide students with the opportunity to engage in critical moral thinking
The programme itself consisted of a small number of central lectures to the whole 
student body following a 'general introduction to the programme' by the Deputy 
Commandant of the College.
Those lectures were:
- ' The character o f  the United Kingdom'
- ' The idea o f  professionalism'
-  ’Ethics: an introduction ' .
The lectures were delivered by an historian, a sociologist and an ethicist 
respectively. Following each of the first two lectures, a seminar was organised 
against a predetermined discussion agenda. The introduction to ethics was followed 
by a set of'exemplary moral tales' designed to explore moral conflicts. These were 
then followed by a series of police-related case studies. To illustrate the nature of 
these discussion agendas I have included extracts from the original documents. 
(Appendix A contains a selection of materials from the original ethics teaching in 
order to convey, as accurate a sense as possible the nature of the educational 
design) Thus, in relation to 'the character of the United Kingdom, syndicate 
members examined questions such as:
'Is the idea or theory o f  the Social Contract realistic?' 'Is it useful?'
'Does the character o f  the U.K. constitution depend ultimately on a basic consensus 
o f  the political parties?'
'Examine the distinction between power and authority.'
In relation to 'the idea of professionalism', some of the questions explored were:
'In what respects is the police service currently deficient in professionalism in each 
o f  the following areas: (i) autonomy, (ii) social esteem (iii) technical proficiency?'
'What are the main obstacles to the fuller attainment ofprofessional standards o f  
autonomy, social esteem and technical proficiency?'
'What can be done, realistically speaking, to enhance police professionalism?'
I think it is fair to argue that these kinds of questions, and, the concepts they 
involve, are intellectually demanding and relatively sophisticated. If, to these 
agendas, is added the content of the material presented on ethics itself, then I want 
to argue that course participants were confronted with something genuinely 
difficult. So, for example, under the heading, 'Towards a police professional ethic[ 
students read about the purpose of morality in the context of an analysis of the 
nature of human nature. Morality was conceptualised as a 'socially recognised 
device more pervasive and ubiquitous than the law designed to counter-act 
persistent limitations built into the human condition'. They moved on to explore a 
'normative ethic' and after learning that moral principles have three noteworthy
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features - i.e. they are 'prescriptive', 'universalisable' and 'over-ride other 
prescriptions' - finished their enquiry with the draft of a 'suggested police ethical 
code'.
I should add though that this first draft of an ethical code itself influenced the draft 
statement of ethical principles which came to be published a decade later by the 
Association of Chief Police Officers' Quality of Service Committee.
Snell (1993) has developed a useful typology of the different curriculum emphases 
within management development that trainers and educators have created for the 
subject 'ethics'. This design for police ethics education most clearly approximates 
a 'high culture - academic transmission' model identified and described by Snell.
In 1982,1 was a member of the directing staff at the Police Staff College and, with 
the help of a Superintendent, I co-directed syndicates of Chief Inspectors. I had a 
background in philosophical psychology - which proved to be invaluable to me - 
but I had only a modest familiarity with moral philosophy. My police co-director 
had no familiarity with the study of ethics whatsoever. Occasionally, amongst our 
syndicate group were officers who had studied political ideas, history or sociology 
- and sometimes this knowledge enabled them to enjoy a somewhat extended 
discussion of the seminar questions and the issues surfaced in the lectures. Mostly, 
however, the group struggled to sustain a reasoned and informed debate. Moreover, 
a number of students were openly hostile to the subject matter and, despite 
reassurances to the contrary, reasoned that because 'ethics' was being examined 
their own integrity was doubted by the 'college' - and therefore, its staff. Massey 
(1993) comments that this is not an unusual response shown towards the topic 
'ethics' when it is presented on the syllabus of police courses.
For my part, I was especially interested in the subject matter and very concerned 
that it should be a success. I struggled to master the content and, similarly, tried to 
intervene helpfully and from an informed base, in the different types of discussion. 
I was grateful to have the opportunity to develop my own appreciation of ethics and 
to be part of a process examining ethics and policing. Moreover, I thought that the 
quality of police exchanges with their public suffered because it was not 
sufficiently informed and guided by moral values such as justice, benevolence and 
tolerance. I agreed with Richards (1985) that the curriculum for police leadership 
development was dominated by police specialist discourse and by the language and 
concepts of the social sciences. Additionally, 1 sensed that Habermas was correct 
in his observation that ethics had become suppressed in contemporary 
consciousness. I was, therefore, committed to the success of our new educational
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enterprise.
However, despite the efforts of most of the staff, the student feedback was not 
sufficiently positive for the subject, 'ethics' to continue to be a part of the police 
leadership and management development curriculum. Several students were 
scathing about the particular educational experience that they had endured. To use 
their term, they 'rubbished' ethics. Although the staff involved with the design of 
the 'package' made various adjustments to try and secure a positive valorisation 
from the majority of the students, the student feedback continued to be negative.
Finally, the senior management team at the college decided to terminate 'ethics' 
teaching and the subject only featured as a peripheral option on any of the 
command courses at Bramshill.
In the next chapter I shall examine the more specific developments which led to me 
to develop an action research inquiry into the design and delivery of an 'ethics 
education' for police leaders and managers. However, I should add that I remained 
profoundly disquieted that the formal and/or named study of ethics had been 
removed from the curriculum. The grounds for its removal appeared to be based 
on the fact that it had failed to please the client group, despite the importance of the 
subject. The executive leadership of the college had not been willing or able to find 
a way to support and defend the inclusion of 'ethics' on the command courses at 
Bramshill. Prima facie this constituted a failure to adhere to a part o f the very 
constitution of the college.
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Chapter Two
An examination o f  the specific factors which generated the research project
"The most intractable struggles, political liberalism assumes, are confessedly fo r  
the sake o f  the highest things: fo r religion, fo r philosophical views o f  the world, and 
fo r  different moral conceptions o f  the good. We should fin d  it remarkable that, so 
deeply opposed in these ways, ju s t co-operation among free and equal citizens is 
possible at all. In fact, historical experience suggests that it rarely is." (Rawls, 
1996:4)
In this chapter I shall provide an account exploring the question: 'Why and how the 
research originated'. I shall begin by outlining some of the strategic emphases 
voiced by police leaders at the beginning of the 1990s. These emphases indicate 
that concerns with police ethics and culture change were at the core of police 
strategic thinking. I shall then provide a brief characterisation of the pattern of 
curriculum evolution at Bramshill and describe how 'ethics' made its first 
appearance as a named subject of study on Command courses at the College. Then, 
after indicating how the earliest design for an ethics education met with opposition 
from the client group and also from the emerging educational methodologies 
employed by the college, I shall move on to stress the long-standing ethical 
concerns involving the policing of a free and humane society and use this as an 
entree to introduce the rationale I developed for presenting an 'ethics education' to 
police.
My research project grew out of three mutually reinforcing streams of influence. 
First, in my role as course manager of the 'Leadership Development Programme' 
and subsequent 'Police Management Programme' at the National Police Staff 
College, Bramshill, I was aware of the need to understand, interpret and 
disseminate the strategic initiatives in policing. These initiatives took a particular 
focus in the last decade of the twentieth century under the umbrella concept of 
'quality of service'. It was these strategic emphases which catalysed the first stages 
of the research process.
Second, simply as an educator, I found the absence of the provision of an 'ethics 
education' for police management and leadership development unacceptable. By 
the last decade of the twentieth century its very survival on the police leadership 
development curriculum was in doubt. I faced a simple question: 'What form might 
ethics education take for it to be both valued by course participants and 'effective' 
in outcome?' I was, though, more concerned with creating a design for 'ethics
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education' that would secure a positive valorisation from the student group because 
of my knowledge of the decision-making processes at Bramshill. Typically the 
different forms of educational event would use 'end-of-course' rating scales and, if 
courses or elements of those courses were judged negatively then they would come 
under pressure to be altered or removed altogether from the programme(s) of study.
Third, informed and critical awareness of police in liberal democracies inevitably 
raises important questions concerning the 'moral health' of the police organisation 
and police management. In consequence, it is difficult to be 'involved' with police 
without taking questions of'ethics' seriously. The research sought, albeit modestly, 
to make a contribution to the 'moral health' of police in contemporary British 
society. Since, as I have indicated above, it is difficult to take the study of police 
seriously without reference to the moral basis of policing and the significance of 
ethics for police I conclude this chapter by outlining a set of reasons (a rationale) 
for the study of police ethics.
The immediate origins o f  the research inquiry
An immediate impetus to developing an effective ethics education for police 
officers was provided by a related set of strategic initiatives adopted by senior 
police officers at the beginning of the 1990s. Foremost among these were 
Woodcock (1991), (1992), Imbert (1992), the authors of the Quality of Service 
committee publication, 'Getting Things Right' (1993), Hirst (1992), Dear (1993) 
and Bunyard (1993).
Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Sir John Woodcock, in an address 
entitled, 'Trust in the police - the search for truth', given to the International Police 
Exhibition and Conference on 13 October 1992, focused the police service in 
general - and police leadership in particular - upon the central importance of 
appropriate professional ethics in contemporary police organisations serving liberal 
democracies. His first message was concerned with the nature of the occupational 
culture of the police. For him, features of that culture worked, in essence, against 
securing trust and confidence in the integrity of police. He noted:
"... the working culture o f  the police service is shot-through with corner cutting 
and expediency. "(Woodcock, 1992: 3)
His second message addressed the causal nature of such 'corner-cutting and 
expediency1. This happened, according to Woodcock, because police themselves 
mistrusted the workings of the criminal justice system. Woodcock's analysis was
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articulated as follows:
" Among police officers, there is a widespread mistrust o f  the current system, the 
mechanisms o f  which are seen broadly and unnecessarily to favour the accused at 
the expense o f  the rights o f  victims. As a result, some parts o f  the working culture 
o f  the police service have become distorted by a concern to get round the effects o f  
such mechanisms, which are, o f  course, in place precisely because there are doubts 
about the probity o f  the police." (Woodcock, 1992: 4)
In the same address, Woodcock moved on to propose ways of dealing with the two 
concerns he had identified - i.e. the integrity of police and the trust felt by police 
in the mechanisms and procedures of the criminal justice system - arguing that the 
police service needed to change its culture 'dramatically'. He wrote:
" The work place values o f  the modern police service have not yet fu lly  cut free o f  
the past and the police service faces a massive task, i f  it is to hold, as the 
community now demands, integrity andrespect fo r  human rights above all other 
considerations. "(Woodcock 1992: 7)
In the pursuit of such a culture change, Woodcock made five recommendations. It 
was his emphasis upon the importance of a developing code of ethics for the police 
service in the United Kingdom - as well as his broader call for culture change and 
different emphases in police management and leadership practices - that, together, 
provided an immediate strategic rationale for this research. The specific content of 
Woodcock's recommendations can be summarised as follows:
First, every effort must be made to make 'come alive' the strategic position 
articulated by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and published in 
1990 as the 'Statement of Common Purpose and Values'. That statement (which I 
have reproduced in Chapter One) reflected a mission shared by the strategic 
leadership of the police service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Second, the 'full weight' of the Inspectorate would be put behind the code of ethics 
for the police service. At the time of his address the 'code of ethics' was still in a 
developmental stage. It was published as a 'draft statement of ethical principles' on 
8 December 1992. Whereas the statement of common purpose and values makes 
clear the mission of the police service, the code of ethics is designed to provide 
individual officers with guidance as to their proper professional behaviour. In a 
brief discussion concerning the raison d'etre of such a code of ethics, as well as its 
specific purpose, Woodcock provides the following account:
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"It may well be asked as to why, 150years after the service was established, it has 
suddenly found itself needing a Code o f  Ethics. The answer is that 20th. century 
Britain is a multi-cultural society; while basic values alter little, different societies 
have different ways o f  approaching those values. For the last several decades, the 
police may have been complacent in assuming a shared set o f  values among those 
whom it recruits; the purpose o f  the new Code is to make manifest the values that 
the organisation demands from  those in its ranks.
That said, it is vital that the issue o f  the Code is not seen as expressing widespread 
dissatisfaction with the behaviour o f  officers currently serving. Its main purposes 
are, first, to confirm shared values among individuals and, secondly, to provide a 
method o f  decision making for individuals facing difficult moral choices." 
(Woodcock, 1992: 14)
Third, Woodcock thought that making such a code of ethics (or statement of ethical 
principles) work in the everyday life of operational policing required an alteration 
in the nature of supervisory practices. Rather than supervise in a ’post facto' manner 
- through checking upon the notes taken and prepared by police officers in the 
course of their duties - supervision needed to be focused on 'deeds' rather than 
words. Woodcock characterises the way he wanted to see supervision conducted 
as follows:
"Supervisors must fin d  out how their officers operate, must listen to their tape 
recordings, view their video recordings, manage by walking about, be available. 
The culture o f  the detective in sole charge o f  his or her case must end. '(Woodcock 
1992:18)
Fourth, the police must cease to believe that they are solely the agents o f the 
prosecution and become gatherers of evidence. In this respect, Woodcock is 
emphasising the need for police to act as dispassionate (or disinterested) 
researchers of social phenomena.
Finally, he notes that in criminal investigations there are generally only four types 
of evidence - that of chance witnesses, surveillance evidence, forensic evidence 
and, confession evidence - and that the latter, confession evidence, is a vital tool of 
justice. Plainly, any actions on the part of police which compromise the trust and 
confidence that might be placed upon confession evidence would have very 
problematic consequences for the criminal justice system itself. In short, it would 
be disastrous if police did not manifest the highest standards of integrity.
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The substance of Woodcock's address might be taken as setting a particular agenda 
for the development of police in the United Kingdom where an emphasis is placed 
both on meeting the demands of human rights considerations and sustaining high 
ethical standards. If the education, training and development of police officers were 
to be constituted to support such an agenda then some sort of explicit 'ethics' or 
'moral values' education should feature as an element in its programme designs. It 
is perhaps, significant, that Woodcock himself embraced concerns about the quality 
of ethics education for police when he noted in his address:
" .. I  look to the code o f  ethics to be ... uncompromising. It must contain a 
straightfonvard statement that, however worthy the end desired, no officer should 
believe that he or she has the moral authority to go outside the due process o f  law. 
I  hope that the teaching and explanatory materials which accompanies the code 
will explain how things have come to pass, how the police finally realised that they 
did not have responsibility to shore up the criminal justice system, how good 
intentions led to ill consequences, how discretion and innovation are essential but 
not in relation to the moral dilemmas o f  investigation.” (Woodcock 1992: 16,17)
Woodcock's second contribution to the 'reinvention' of police that was being 
advocated in the first part of the decade lay in his paper, 'Overturning police 
culture' (Woodcock 1991). He discerned a major change that was about to affect 
all aspects of police culture and identified three inter-dependent elements in that 
change. Again, central among these was his appreciation of human rights issues: 
he wrote:
"It will be a change o f  culture and that change will be threefold, each 
interdependent with the other. First, the rights o f  the customer o f  police services 
will be raised to the pinnacle o f  all police activity. Secondly, human rights issues 
rather than the control o f crime will come to the forefront ofpolice thinking, albeit 
that the human rights o f the majority can be deeply threatened by growth in crime. 
Thirdly, there will be a recognition that fa ir and equal treatment o f all police and 
civil sta ff is not an end in itself but additionally a mirror image by which the public 
discerns the nature ofpolice treatment o f minorities" (Woodcock 1991: 172,173)
For Woodcock, such a culture change was necessary to maintain the very nature 
of a police service based upon consent.
At the same International Police Exhibition and Conference, Sir Peter Imbert 
addressed conference delegates and included in his address a content
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complementary to that presented by Woodcock. Whilst Woodcock focused 
particularly upon the subculture of police, Imbert considered wider societal changes 
as well as concerns about the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system. He 
returned though to discuss the developments connected with police organisations 
(and the Metropolitan police in particular). Imbert emphasised changes within and 
without the police organisation as follows:
"We have been changing in response to the changing expectations o f  our public. 
In respect o f  our ideas fo r  an improved criminal justice system, we have made a 
lengthy and extremely detailed submission to the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice ...In  respect o f  maintaining the public's trust, we have put substantial 
efforts into keeping and enhancing what is still in the last analysis a high level o f  
public approval." (Imbert 1992: 22)
He then proceeded to outline the 'macro' level changes involving partnerships with 
other agencies and organisations in an attempt to deal with crime as well as the 
culture change programme (the 'Plus' programme) developed in the Metropolitan 
police. He wrote:
"... it would be meaningless to ask the community to enter into such a partnership 
unless it is founded upon a climate o f  mutual trust and understanding. The 'Plus' 
programme is the means o f  creating that climate, a process o f  cultural change 
within the organisation to ensure that all 44,000 employees, police and civilian, are 
pushing in the same direction - serving the people o f  London. This is what is at the 
heart of'Plus', a contract between the police and the public based on the Statement 
o f  Our Common Purpose and Values. I  have already referred to a change in our 
policing style. We have also seen changes to our planning process, our command 
and decision-making structures, our corporate identity, our paperwork, human 
resource management, and the way we communicate both internally and externally.
As well as the whole 'Plus'programme, other important attitudinal work has been 
going on fo r  some time within the Metropolitan Police ... We have also introduced 
an ethical dimension into the training programmes which strongly underlines the 
concept o f  the investigative process comprising a search fo r  truth rather than a 
search fo r  a prosecution." (Imbert 1992: 23,24)
The obvious overlap between Woodcock's recommendations and the issues Imbert 
chose to make salient indicated the consensus that was beginning to develop 
amongst police strategists concerning the need to secure an appropriate moral ethos 
within policing. This was to be underlined when, later that year, at the 'Quality of
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Service' seminar held on 8 December 1992 at the Police Staff College, Bramshill, 
both the draft statement of ethical principles and a document 'Getting Things Right’
- outlining a comprehensive formulation concerning the appropriate ways in which 
police managers and leaders should design their organisations and conduct their 
managerial practice - were published. The former document took the form of a set 
o f eleven ethical principles, that were aspirational in nature. The latter also pointed 
to the perceived importance o f ’ethics’ in achieving the goals of the police service. 
Earlier that year, the Quality of Service committee produced a document, "Strategic 
Priorities for 1992", identifying six major tasks which they thought the service 
’must undertake’ if it is to guarantee quality policing in the 1990s. Those tasks were:
- Setting standards and measuring performance
- Training
- Promotion of good practice and research throughout the service
- Meeting the needs and expectations of external customers
- Meeting the needs and expectations of internal customers
- Police ethics
’Getting things right’ included text detailing the kind of occupational culture 
considered appropriate for a police service concerned with value for money, quality 
management, achieving performance targets - whilst at the same time remaining 
informed and guided by police professional ethics. Its authors wrote:
"So what sort o f  culture should we aim fo r  over the next ten years to help make 
"quality” possible? The first thing to be said is that we must firm ly maintain high 
standards o f  business ethics and honesty. These will not be compromised. We do, 
however, need a culture which acknowledges that our major strength is our people: 
they must be openly valued not only fo r the skills they bring to the job, but as 
individuals, too. Our culture needs to be more comfortable with taking some risks, 
and needs to have more faith in the ability o f  the sta ff who are closest to the 
customer to make decisions about the service they provide - after all, they are 
usually the best informed. ” (Quality of Service Committee, 1993: 4)
Thus, if the Quality of Service committee's publication were to be read as a 
management manifesto for police leaders and managers, then concerns about
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maintaining 'high standards of business ethics and honesty' are placed at the top of 
a hierarchy of values. Again, it follows logically that some aspect o f police 
education generally - and police management education specifically - must be 
concerned with addressing 'police ethics' if these strategic positions are to be more 
than merely high-minded (but ultimately empty) pronouncements.
Another initiator of the concerted attempt to effect culture change in the police 
service was Hirst. From his perspective of chief constable, Hirst was one of the 
prime movers of the 'quality management' philosophy in the police of England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland. He was keen to begin to establish some definition of 
'quality' which might be used to gauge measures of public satisfaction with police 
services. Again, Hirst emphasises the need for a radical culture shift if the police 
organisation was to bring itself into line with professional service cultures. He 
writes:
"The pursuit o f  the quality o f  service issue and the identification o f  the changes 
which will have to take place, both internally and externally in order to realise the 
goal we have set begins to suggest a movement towards a different model o f  
policing. It may be that the coercive system o f  policing and police management 
valid in the immediate post-war era have had their day. We should perhaps, be 
pursuing a compliance model o f  policing and be seeking a more participative 
model o f  management. To try to change the ethos o f  the service and at the same 
time retain the former standards and values ofpolice management is unlikely to be 
successful" (Hirst 1991: 192)
Dear (1993) in the course of his work as one of Her Majesty's Inspectors of 
Constabulary extended the strategic analysis concerning culture change in the 
police service by surfacing a number of 'philosophical issues' confronting the 
service. He was concerned that the accountancy model - which stressed 'value for 
money' - was compromising a 'high quality of service to the public'. He wrote:
"Quality’, the human face, care, attention and putting the customer first are all 
requirements that are demanded as much from  the police as from  many other 
organisations in both the public and private sectors. " (Dear 1993: 2)
His concerns about the value priorities in policing continued to underline the fact 
that police leaders were participating in a fundamental debate about the proper style 
and manner of the police.
Lastly, I should mention Sir Robert Bunyard's (1993) paper, 'The future of
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policing'. Although setting out to consider the place of police in the wider criminal 
justice system, Bunyard stressed a choice facing police practitioners: either they 
could continue to be perceived as 'difficult artisans' by other groups of 
professionals and practitioners in the criminal justice system, or they could develop 
a differently perceived identity - that of'educated' professionals.
Whilst Woodcock, Imbert, Hirst, Dear and Bunyard all emphasised the need for 
culture change and development within which, inter alia, they advocated new value 
priorities for the police service, and the 'Quality of Service' committee outlined a 
'blueprint' for ways in which police managers should operate, it was the actual 
publication of the statement of ethical principles and a supporting commentary 
which served as the powerful immediate stimulus for me to try and develop an 
effective ethics education for police leaders and managers.
The draft statement of ethical principles was made public by Commander 
Dickinson, who - in the course of presenting the statement - emphasised that the 
police service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland already had a statement of 
common purpose and values which was to be complemented by the statement of 
ethical principles. The entire text of the police service statement of ethical 
principles - which was given wide coverage in the national press - reads as 
follows:
"I aspire to:
Act with fairness, carrying out my responsibilities with integrity and impartiality
Perform my duties with diligence and the proper use o f  discretion
In dealings with all individuals, both outside and inside the police service, display 
se lf control, tolerance, understanding and courtesy appropriate to the 
circumstances
Uphold fundamental human rights, treating every person as an individual and 
display respect and compassion towards them
Support all colleagues in the performance o f their lawful duties and, in doing so, 
actively oppose and draw attention to any malpractice by any person
Respect the fact that much o f  the information I receive is confidential and may only 
be divulged when my duty requires me to do so
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Exercise force only when justified and use only the minimum amount o f  force to 
effect my lawful purpose and restore the peace
Use resources entrusted to me to the maximum benefit o f  the public
Act only within the law, in the understanding that I  have no authority to depart 
from  due legal process and that no one may place a requirement on me to do so
Continually accept responsibility fo r  se lf development, continually seeking to 
improve the way in which I  serve the community
Accept personal accountability fo r  my own acts and omissions”
This statement of ethical principles makes reference to a very wide range of 
considerations which fall within the traditional province and subject matter of 
ethics (e.g. the virtues, notions of'rights', concepts of duty etc.). In order to develop 
a context in which to study and debate the principles, a commentary on the 
statements was also developed by the Ethics sub-committee of the Quality of 
Service committee. A central aspect of the commentary was its reference to 
international rights-based instruments such as the United Nations Declaration on 
Human Rights. It also attempted to help clarify and interpret the meaning of the 
different statements contained within the overall draft statement of principles. Thus, 
the commentary highlighted the fact that there was a need to provide an opportunity 
for police to debate and discuss the statement of ethical principles in an appropriate 
and disciplined educational context.
Ethics education fo r  police managers and leaders: the background and 
educational context
Whilst the strategic leadership of the police service provided a platform from which 
to develop an ethics education for police managers I have noted in Chapter One 
how an earlier initiative had taken place which had attempted to introduce 'ethics' 
to courses of study at the National Police Staff College, Bramshill. This earlier 
work provided me with some preliminary foundations for constructing a police 
ethics education for police leaders and managers. Here, though, I shall describe the 
background and context for the beginnings of a named examination of'ethics' (on 
the police leadership development curriculum) and then develop the discussion 
begun in Chapter One concerning the educational character of Richards (1982) 
design.
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It remains difficult to pinpoint the exact circumstances that led to the introduction 
of ethics education into the command (senior officer) programmes at the Police 
Staff College. The history of police leadership education, training and development 
has not yet been written. However, I think it possible to discern four distinct phases 
of emphasis characterising curriculum delivery at Bramshill. They are: 'liberal 
humanism', 'subject disciplines', 'self development and management development', 
and, finally, 'police professionalism and the new managerialism'.
Throughout the sixties, the educational model and its content was firmly based 
upon the enlightenment assumptions concerned with humanising individuals and 
with humanising the workplace. An admixture of police professional topics and 
liberal studies was offered to the senior and middle ranks of the police service. In 
the seventies, the formal curriculum focused upon key subject areas and topics 
which, together, were considered relevant to police: politics, sociology, economics 
and management dominated - along with strategic and operational policing matters 
such as 'police accountability' and 'major incident handling'. The eighties came to 
see a radical departure from conventional content and methodologies; the rise of 
self-development - and an emphasis upon the 'manner' rather than the 'matter' or 
'cognitive content' of education (Peters 1966) - and the negotiated curriculum, were 
salient features of the educational landscape shaping itself at the college.
Plumridge (1988) charts these developments and shows how the tutorial staff came 
to adopt the role of facilitators of learning and how they took as their goal the 
genesis of self-managed learners and the creation of police organisations as 
'learning systems. Heron's (1977) models of education and development provided 
a framework for training both new and established staff within the institutional 
context. The college attempted to implement the 'learner-centred' paradigm outlined 
by, for example, Claxton (1997).
Paralleling such an emphasis was the recognition of a dominant occupational figure 
in western societies: the 'manager'. The 1980s also saw the rise of the new 
managerialism and a gradual move towards creating the performance culture in 
organisations. Senior and middle ranking police officers were conceptualised and 
identified as 'strategic' or 'middle' managers respectively.
The 1990s has emerged as an era concerned with the professionalisation of the 
police and the struggle to embrace the new managerial litany of'business process 
re-engineering', 'culture by design', 'networks', 'partnerships' 'consultants and 
mentors', 'outsourcing', 'downsizing' and the 'business-ification' of the public sector.
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A part of that search for increased professionalisation has resulted in a series of 
partnerships between Bramshill and 'award granting' bodies (namely, the 
Universities of Cambridge, and Manchester, the Open University and the Institute 
of Management) such that programmes of study at Bramshill (and within the 
National Police Training estate) lead to nationally recognised qualifications. This 
era has brought an apparent new discipline and rigour to the educational 
opportunities and programmes of study, whilst, at the same time, providing the 
conditions within which distinct models of theory and practice for police 
management can emerge.
Ethics education, as a distinct field of learning was established on the overt 
curriculum in the early 1980s. As such, it vied for attention and acceptance with 
social science subjects, specialist police subjects, and the emerging discourses (and 
methods) of management education. It found itself amidst the gathering tide of self 
development and the view that the Staff College did not actually have a teaching 
function (Plumridge 1988) but offered 'learning opportunities' for 'self-directed' 
learners.
Certain events foreshadowed the appearance of ethics as a named subject of'study'. 
To some extent these events were essentially similar to those which had led to calls 
for ethics education for police in the United States of America. For Kleinig (1990), 
in his seminal exploration of police ethics teaching and learning, the increasingly 
articulate debate concerning the need for police ethics training drew its impetus 
from a number of sources. These included not only public concern over police 
corruption and misconduct, but also, wider social currents including a greater 
awareness of ethical diversity, increased media penetration, a decline of public trust 
in the police, a trend towards occupational 'professionalisation', technological 
changes and so on. More specifically, on both sides of the Atlantic, there has been 
a lifting of the 'corporate veil' of police organisations through the activities of 
researchers from different disciplines. As a result the ethical shortcomings o f the 
police were made visible. Thus, in a North American context, the authors of the 
Police Foundation report, 'The quality of police education' (1978) highlighted/wter 
alia, the need for police ethics education, writing:
"Every police education programme should include in its required curriculum, a 
thorough consideration o f  the value choices and ethical dilemmas ofpolice work 
..." (Sherman et al. 1978 : 4)
Richards (1985), in his 'plea for applied ethics', provides an account similar to that 
presented by Kleinig. He concluded that whilst the service had managed to
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combine a high order of public acceptance with the discharge of its duties, a 
combination of socio-cultural changes - such as an increased reluctance to defer to 
authority - combined with the increased critical scrutiny of the police - had led not 
quite to a 'crisis of confidence’ but to a 'dislocation' in the police/public relationship. 
Richards noted:
"From the mid 1960's onwards, incidents, investigations and inquiries cumulatively 
began to erode public confidence in the integrity and competence o f  the police 
service in general..." (Richards, 1985: 15)
He took the prime purpose of applied ethics to be the mending of such a 
dislocation. Against such a background 'ethics education' appeared on the formal 
curriculum at Bramshill.
The birth o f  an ethics education at the Police S taff College
The first attempt to launch an ethics education and to establish it on the police 
leadership and management development curriculum was marked by a commitment 
to a genuine investigation of the subject 'ethics'. In addition to academically 
grounded and expository accounts, students examined 'exemplary moral tales' 
(where they would confront and address moral dilemmas) as well as police-related 
case studies. These took the form of staff-led seminar discussions.
The manner of providing ethics education was an admixture of something 
approaching a university model featuring expert tutor delivery and small-group 
tutor-led discussion. There were, in addition, some student-led sessions. As one of 
the staff tutors assisting in this venture I found that it was necessary to have some 
formal philosophical training in order to cope with the material.
Although several tutors made valiant attempts to help participants move beyond 
just 'knowing about' the concerns with which the subject 'ethics' deals towards more 
sophisticated critical thinking, only a small minority of these participants seemed 
willing to embark on a personal and professional journey of inquiry. Yet, in 
retrospect, it is not difficult to account for this; Snell (1993) has provided a useful 
way of classifying the different curricular emphases in management ethics 
education: he identifies the formal purposes of management ethics
education/training as follows:
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Basic form al purposes Curricular emphases
Company/professional socialisation * Rules, procedures'
* Codes of ethics
* Stakeholder responsibility
* Trustworthiness in role
* Best practice
Cultural transmission; Academic 
grounding
*Timeless debates
* Philosophical paradoxes
* Rigour of argumentation
Organisation citizenship; Personal 
development
* Neighbourly responsibility
* Defending and promoting rights
* Values clarification
* Respecting others as oneself
Critical pragmatism; Social 
transformation
* Improving ethics in practice
* Detecting false consciousness
* Moral leadership
* Transforming moral ethos
(Source: Snell, R. 1993: 172)
The very fact that the first manifestation of an 'ethics education' included a 
relatively systematic examination of some of the basic concepts with which moral 
philosophers deal - as well as a consideration of the nature of normative ethical 
theories - constitutes a part of the reason why it can be placed in the 'cultural 
transmission/academic grounding' category of curriculum emphasis.
Critique - and the fate o f  ethics education:
Such a model and design for ethics education met with an occupational cultural 
outlook (Banton, 1964, Holdaway, 1981, Reiner, 1985, Brown, 1992) that has been 
described as 'anti-academic'. The obscure, arcane (and often technical) language of 
moral philosophy and the dense conceptual analyses that were presented elicited 
an antipathetic response from the client group. The educational background of the 
majority of police middle (and even senior) ranking officers had not prepared them
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for exercises in 'armchair anthropology' which were conducted during certain 
lectures. Nor had the student group familiarity with the academic practice of 
disinterestedness, conjecture and refutation.
More problematically, the tide of experiential learning was beginning to flood 
through the Police Staff College. The demanding intellectual, logical and cognitive 
requirements of a disciplined ethics education were set against a new ethos: the 
primacy of 'felt experience'. The challenging and self-confronting ingredients of 
'ethics' were less palatable than the blandishments of 'self-acceptance', 
'unconditional positive regard' and 'personal becoming'. After a brief attempt to 
create an 'experiential ethics' the subject gradually lost its place on the curriculum.
Richards (1985) foretold the fate of ethics in his analysis of ethics education and 
the rise o f the social sciences: 'Ethics', he wrote, 'is set aside'.
By the beginning of the 1990s apart from a specialist study course and the 
occasional study option on the senior management courses at Bramshill, ethics 
education scarcely figured on the formal curriculum at all. In the light of the 
emerging strategic emphases for police this was, in itself, a scarcely defensible 
situation.
As an educator, I imagined that there were alternative ways of developing the 
content and methods of 'ethics' such that it might be secured on the curriculum. A 
rationale for 'Police ethics education' might be constructed that was founded, in 
part, upon some of the long-standing analyses concerning ethics and the police.
Ethics and police: long standing concerns
From the earliest documented writing in political and social philosophy an interest 
and concern has been expressed by thinkers, in both the occidental and oriental 
worlds, with respect to the ways humanity - the generality of persons - might 
design and develop social arrangements within which the 'good' life might be 
pursued. Plato's 'Republic' offered one such vision. An alternative is reflected in the 
writing of Lao Tzu. The problems constellating around issues of power, authority, 
order, control and justice, have engaged the attention of philosophers, political 
theorists, sociologists and the historians of ideas throughout recorded history. Any 
reading of history indicates that power may be used in ways that cause enormous 
human hurt, suffering and injustice. Midgley (1988) has commented upon 'the 
reality of human wickedness', whilst Arendt (1969), as I have already noted, has 
described the 'banality of human evil'.
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The academic study of police has consistently reflected an emphasis upon ways in 
which police powers are used and abused.
At some level, it is probably true to say that ethicists and students of police are 
always concerned with the phenomena emerging in Nazi Germany during the 
1930s and 1940s, and, in particular, the rise of the Gestapo. Even if this is not a 
shared concern, it would be difficult to imagine developing a modem police service 
without acknowledging some of the 'lessons' from history. One hope for an ethics 
education is that it might play a preventive role in averting the horrors and 
atrocities visited by humans on humans.
The lessons of history served as the most general reason for sustaining my wish to 
re-introduce ethics to the police leadership and management development 
curriculum. However, the specific rationale for the present study derives from the 
three sources that I have described.
First, strategic police leadership has trenchantly called for a culture change within 
the police service. Raising the profile of'ethics' is a central element in this culture 
change. Part of the role of the Police Staff College, Bramshill, is concerned with 
disseminating strategic messages to its client groups. In consequence, discussion 
and debate concerning 'police ethics' is necessary.
Second, the actual place and position of ethics education on the police management 
and leadership development curriculum in the early 1990s was at best precarious 
and, at worst, in danger of extinction. That ethics should occupy such a marginal 
position was a reflection of a complex set of interacting forces but, in the light of 
both the responsibilities of educators and the purposes for which Bramshill, as an 
institution, had been established, I thought that this constituted an indefensible state 
of affairs.
Third, the study of police necessarily embraces the 'big' questions of law, morality, 
power, control, order, authority, justice etc. In consequence ethical debate, and the 
study of ethical issues and concerns, are central to those processes which take 
seriously the development of police officers. In consequence I set out to construct 
a specific rationale in order to help reintroduce ethics to the curriculum at the 
Police Staff College.
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Defining the rationale concerning ethics education fo r  police in general and 
police managers in particular
In answer to the question, 'Why the study of ethics for police?' I developed the 
following set of arguments:
1. The facts of policing
There are certain facts about policing which conspire to make it a morally 
vulnerable activity. These include: the use of force, the need to practice deception 
in order to attain valued ends, the pressures generated by emergencies and 
responses to threats. The experimental social psychological research by Milgram 
(1974) concerning 'obedience to authority' also highlights the readiness with which 
people working in hierarchical systems can acquiesce to malevolent authority and 
the banality of evil.
The social psychological features of the police occupational culture - with, for 
example, an emphasis upon loyalty and the separation of the police from the public 
policed - contain features that can counteract adherence to the highest standards of 
professional ethics.
2. The moral basis of policing
Police are a social creation. They are consented to by a public who grant them 
powers, including coercive powers, in return for a service concerned to achieve 
worthwhile ends (e.g. social peace) through the use of socially acceptable means. 
At the heart of the police/public relationship are the notions of trust, confidence, 
reciprocity and mutuality. Policing rests upon a moral foundation.
3. The legal basis of policing
Law, although separable from morality in certain respects, is nonetheless based 
upon a framework of moral values. Law stems from notions and ideas concerning 
the social order that supports the 'good life' (even though notions of the 'good life' 
vary enormously in time and place). In the United Kingdom, those moral values 
that directly influence law making and law enforcement include, justice, freedom, 
equality and respect for persons. Law must be applied impartially, and police, as 
law enforcers must act impartially. Moreover, police in virtue of their entrusted 
powers, must also act within the law. To do otherwise threatens all the 
achievements of the legal system.
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4. Constitutional obligations
The United Kingdom is a signatory to International and specific European 
instruments endorsing and enshrining fundamental human rights that have universal 
applicability. In addition, certain documents frame codes of conduct and define 
expectations of and for police.
5. Contemporary times - the argument from post modernity
Contemporary times bears witness to the delegitimation of authority, to moral and 
ethical pluralism, to the demise of certainty, to the age of mistrust, to a sense o f ’life 
as game'. Post-modern people have been likened to tourists living by the slogan, 
'Your value for my money'. It is an age of the 'end' of everything - the end of 
history, the end of the western world - even, the end of morality. Lipovetsky (1992) 
has conceived our times in terms of the 'twilight of duty'. In the face of such 
considerable uncertainties concerning the criteria that guide our decisions and our 
valuations, ethics emerges as a way of 're-enchanting' our personal and social 
being.
6. The argument from professionalism
The police might aspire to the status of a profession or wish to see their work 
characterised as 'professional'. Professions are characterised by explicit codes of 
ethics. These exist for good reason. They provide a firm contractual undertaking 
on the part of their membership to sustain standards and to provide services 
commensurate with those standards. Professional work is subjected by the clients 
of its services (or outputs) to evaluative judgments. These include the proper 
economic use of resources, concerns with the veracity and currency of advice and 
professional pronouncements, integrity, honesty, benevolence and justice.
7. The argument from history
Liberal democracy is both a creation and an achievement. Broadly speaking, liberal, 
democracies have managed to meet the wants, needs and interests of their citizens. 
Police, in part, protect the perimeters of societies within which the institutions of 
liberal democracy survive. These achievements reflect a moral tradition stemming 
from Greco-Roman cultures, a tradition concerned with articulating ethical 
frameworks and with the promotion of human flourishing as well as the curbing of 
human limitations. History indicates that potentially disastrous consequences
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emerge unless moral values are used as the criteria against which to test initiatives 
and socio-political practices.
8. The argument from within the police organisation
The original instructions determined by Sir Robert Peel to the police o f the 
metropolis enjoin its officers to adhere to high moral standards. Even in 
contemporary times, police studies include discussions and portraits of the 
'exemplary' police officer - the ideal standard or type to which police might aspire. 
But, even more recently, the representative bodies within the service such as 
ACPO, the superintendents association etc. have argued for and insisted upon the 
importance of conduct in line with ethical codes and have exhorted the service to 
follow the highest standards of ethical practice.
9. The argument from police/public relations
There is not a crisis of confidence between police and public but there is something 
of a dislocation in the relationship. The various recent explorations of this 
relationship - such as the Operational Policing Review (1990) -  acknowledges such 
a dislocation. If the public begins to doubt the integrity of their police and if that 
same public begins to doubt the 'value for money' which it perceives it is receiving 
from its police then the whole basis of policing by consent and the notion of a 
police of and for the people is untenable.
A police committed to and expressing, consistently, the range of moral values, and 
virtues, which ethics - especially applied ethics - is concerned to achieve, is one 
means to address such a dislocation.
10 The argument from human authenticity
Prior to the social programme within which we are specifically socialised it is 
possible to perceive an essential ethical ground to the human self. We might 
conceive the ethical ground to human being as a component of our birthright. This 
feature of our birthright is denied through distorting social experiences. The nature 
of these distortions has been analysed by Heron (1977a) in his discussion of the 
'non-cathartic' society. Ethics re-emphasises the conditions that help individuals and 
collectivities create worthwhile forms of life and organisations 'fit to house the 
human spirit'.
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11. The purposes of education
Education is, at bottom, a process of transmitting certain values. An educated 
person (following Peters 1966) 'comes to see the world differently' as a result of the 
educational process and experience. It always remains a possibility for educators 
to design educational events (whatever their specific nature) which have a larger 
or smaller moral or ethical content. The responsibilities and choices of the educator 
provide opportunities for an ethics education across time, place and curriculum.
12. The argument from a theory of justice
The first virtue of any social institution is justice (Rawls 1971). If we discover an 
unjust institution we are enjoined to reform it. Unjust institutions cause human hurt. 
Police, as a social institution must demonstrate that they are a just institution. If  not, 
they must be reformed.
Conclusion
I used this set of arguments as the basis for advocating that ethics should feature as 
a subject of study on the Police Leadership Development Programme, the content 
of which I was asked to develop in early 1993.1 also recognised that I was setting 
out to change a concrete situation of practice. Ethics, as a named subject of study 
and inquiry was not properly secured on the Police Leadership Development 
curriculum at the Police Staff College, Bramshill. I wanted this to change. These 
constituted the first and initial grounds for me to conceptualise my project as an 
action research inquiry.
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Chapter Three
The foundations o f  the educational inquiry
”There is no overarching totality, rationality or fixed  centre to human life ...ju st 
a plurality o f  cultures and narratives which cannot be hierarchically ordered as 
['privileged' and which must consequently respect the inviolable ’otherness' o f  ways 
o f  doing things which are not their own. Knowledge is relative to cultural contexts, 
so that to claim to know the world ’as it is’ is simply a chimera” (Eagleton 1996: 
201)
In this chapter I shall begin by stating the research question, discuss briefly what 
that statement implies and then turn to examine the philosophical foundations of 
the inquiry. I shall then illustrate how I thought it possible to locate 'action research' 
within a broader 'qualitative-interpretive' model of social research.
A statement o f  the research question
The situation presenting itself to me at the Police Staff College in the winter of 
1992 was paradoxical. On the one hand, certain major strategic emphases had 
called for ethics to be re-positioned so that a consciousness of ethics lay at the heart 
of police practice. On the other, the subject 'ethics' had become marginalised on the 
management and leadership development curriculum. I wanted to change this 
situation. I wanted to construct an 'ethics education’ that would, as a result of a 
positive valuation from those who experienced both its form and content, become 
a more secure feature on the curriculum. In consequence, the research question I 
came to formulate was: 'Could I create an 'ethics education' for police leaders and 
managers that would be positively valued by sufficient of the 'client' group such 
that the subject 'ethics' would be secured on the curriculum?'
By stating the research question in this way, it is important to examine what is 
implied in its particular wording:
First, it fails to be inclusive. I judged that it was not possible to ask, 'Could we 
create an 'ethics education' for police leaders and managers ....?' This was because 
of the institutional context. Bramshill did not have a research culture - as was 
highlighted by Reiner and Waddington in their evidence to the Home Affairs Select 
Committee's (1989) inquiry into higher police training - and there was a great deal 
of evidence (e.g. from the sociological study of police) pointing to the antipathy 
police managers might feel towards certain types of research endeavour. I would
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begin, instead, with a personal inquiry and aim to incorporate co-researchers as the 
project developed.
Second, I chose the term an ’ethics education’ rather than, for example, 'ethics 
training', 'ethics package', or some other wording, because I wanted to avoid 
providing apparently easy solutions to complex problems. Donahue and Felts 
(1993) had mounted a powerful critique of the implications of the 
'technocratisation' of society (and its organisations) and believed that the typical 
ways of trying to promote 'ethics' (e.g. codes of ethics) failed to provide those 
conditions of symbolic interaction necessary to develop ethics in practice. In 
consequence, I wanted to create an educational learning design which made some 
form of symbolic interaction possible - on the assumption that such a design might 
help participants develop their ethical sensitivities and, perhaps, their ability to 
make that part of the world around them an 'ethical place'.
Third, I include a reference both to police leaders and police managers. This was 
because a small number of the participants in my client groups were graduates from 
the Accelerated Promotion Course and, therefore, were likely to fill, in the future, 
the senior strategic leadership ranks of the police service. I also recognised that 
leadership can be manifested at all levels of an organisation (Egan 1988) in the 
sense that innovation and change can, in principle, be driven by any organisational 
member. In this latter sense it is not incorrect to assume that all persons attending 
programmes of study at Bramshill have the possibility to be leaders.
Fourth, by acknowledging the need to secure a 'positive evaluation' I was not 
attempting to bring about institutional change in relation to how educational and 
training events were evaluated at Bramshill. There were two reasons for this: I did 
not think that the curriculum management processes at Bramshill could ever remain 
stable for very long because of the turnover of the police staff and because of the 
regular 'paradigm shifts' which overtook the college programmes. In consequence, 
I judged that even if I were to be successful this would only be a short term gain. 
I also thought it was, in principle, possible to obtain the necessary positive 
evaluation that I was seeking. I imagined that with sufficient hard work, design skill 
and competence - coupled with including the careful justification for taking ethics 
seriously (which had been developed by police leaders and ethicists) I would 
achieve my goal.
The philosophical foundations o f the inquiry
Harre (1981) has worked out a philosophical basis for social inquiry that illustrates
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how a model of science may continue to serve in the process of generating social 
and/or educational knowledge. He alerted social researchers to the analytic schema 
used by physicists - which, for example, conceive of sub-atomic phenomena in 
terms of centres of energy - and thereby helped social researchers to unshackle 
themselves from the reductionist 'experimental science' approaches of positivism.
Harre contrasts the limitations of the 'positivist-empiricist' approach to scientific 
exploration with its alternative, 'realism'. For the realist, scientific theories contain 
descriptions of mechanisms that might account for the observable patterns and the 
apparent properties of things. Harre notes that most realists take 'facts' and 
'theories' to be linked. He writes:
"Facts are revealed to a human observer who uses a theory to identify significant 
items from  the complex flux  o f  experience." (Harre 1981: 3)
In this way, Harre begins to emphasise the role played by the conceptual 'apparatus' 
of the inquirer in the process of generating any description and explanations of 
'reality'.
He goes on to show how a theory functions for a realist in two distinct ways. On 
the one hand it is involved in the creation and experiencing of facts. This is so 
because concepts or 'analytics' are brought to bear on the 'experiential matrix of 
observable particulars of various kinds'. On the other hand, theory functions to 
anticipate reality 'by carrying our conceptions beyond the empirically given'. So, 
for example, a 'family tiff - which, from a purely 'empirical' reading might appear 
to be an aggressive conflict - can be shown, if it reproduces a regular pattern to be 
more an expression of solidarity.
Harre moves on to illustrate what psychology might look like if constructed 
according to the realist tradition. (It might be objected that education reflects a 
different domain of study in comparison with psychology and therefore, Harre's 
discussion is irrelevant. However, I think it is possible to redescribe Harre's focus 
such that it takes account of social phenomena in general - and to include amongst 
social phenomena the practice of education.) In Harre's subsequent discussion he 
first examines the role of theory in generating fact via the use of'analytic schemata' 
and then he examines the role of theory in the 'transcending of experience'. By way 
of clarification he writes:
"Any science deploys two interrelated conceptual systems. There is an analytic 
scheme required to reveal, identify, partition, and classify the items which make up
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a fie ld  o f  interest. ... Then there is an explanatory scheme required to formulate 
theories descriptive o f  the mechanisms productive o f  the items under analysis." 
(Harre 1981: 5)
Harre illustrates how analytic schema function by discussing episodes in social life. 
If we observe social life the ordinary common sense concepts that we deploy - such 
as ’woman', 'man', 'waiting', and 'shopping' - help us to find order, pattern and 
meaning in the on-going flow of human activities and encounters. However, he 
points out that 'much activity remains mysterious and some goes unnoticed'. New 
analytic concepts are needed in order to perceive better the nature of reality. So, for 
example, students of social interaction have introduced concepts such as 'barrier 
signals', 'relic gestures', 'tie signs' and 'status displays' and, as a result more o f the 
'texture' of social life becomes available for empirical study.
Whilst analytic schema help to reveal non-random structures - ordered patterns of 
action which are interpreted as the performance of social acts or the enactment of 
a social drama - Harre thinks that we are then moved to ask: 'How is such 
orderliness produced?' At this point in Harre's discussion he points out that natural 
sciences always proceed in the same way as they seek to find an answer to this kind 
of question. They try to discover the mechanism that produces the pattern. 
However, because the generative mechanisms are believed to be hidden from view 
'natural scientists try to find a simulacrum of the real but unknown pattern 
generator'.
He recognises that the creative scientific imagination is constrained because the 
imagined generative mechanisms must conform to 'some general description of 
how scientists of the period believe the world really is' - or, as Harre calls it, a 
'source model'. He writes:
"Any explanatory method must he based on a source model, since we must be able 
to have some confidence in the mechanisms that we imagine to be in nature might 
be real. " (Harre 1981: 6)
This observation prompts the question, 'What is (are) the source model(s) currently 
in use in the fields of social and educational studies?' It appears that there are, in 
fact, two main categories of source model. The first category employs a machine 
metaphor of persons and the universe whilst the second category employs a power 
metaphor of persons and the universe. New paradigm researchers such as Reason 
and Rowan (1981) have agreed on the need to stress the active capacities of human 
inquirers and the co-existence of multiple points of view.
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Harre summarises his analysis of the scientific method by saying:
"The account o f  the scientific method I  have ju st laid out involves structural 
concepts fo r  revealing and describing the patterns discerned by an 'educated' 
observer. It also involves a presumption that we can think beyond given experience 
to the imagined and hidden processes that could produce observed patterns, the 
presumption that we can think in depth." (Harre 1981: 7)
He contends that psychology (and therefore, I think, social inquiry generally) could 
benefit from a borrowing of the methodologies actually used by physicists and 
chemists - which are based upon the need to get 'active agents to reveal their 
capabilities and to identify the invariants upon which the integrity of natural 
structures depends'. Harre's exposition suggests that a twofold onus is placed upon 
social inquirers. First, they need to be alerted to the nature of the analytic schemata 
they use to apprehend the unfolding of social reality. They also need to record the 
order or structure of the reality so apprehended. Second, they must acknowledge 
the creative and inventive nature of producing explanatory models - the generative 
mechanism(s) that they believe are responsible for the patterns observed, and of the 
wider and constraining source model(s).
Reason and Rowan (1981) attempt to outline many of the characteristics of the 
source model(s) informing the nature of explanations in new paradigm research by 
cataloguing the following sources of influence: humanistic and clinical psychology, 
phenomenological and ethnomethodological approaches to sociology and 
anthropology, the applied behavioral sciences including action research, Marxism, 
existentialism and Hegelian dialectics. However, they build upon Heron's (1981) 
elaboration of the philosophical basis of a new research paradigm to stress its 
fundamental feature: it is based upon the recognition of a 'subject-subject' rather 
than a 'subject-objecf relation between persons - including 'researching persons'.
If it is the case that social research necessarily entails encounters between human 
subjects then it seems important to consider some broad features of the human 
subject which might have significance for the inquiry process.
In recent times, the nature of the human subject has been conceptualised as a bearer 
of powers: thus, for example, Nietzsche (1973) has asserted that humans are 
simultaneously united as creature and creator. He writes:
"In man (sic) there is matter, fragment, excess, clay, mud, madness, chaos; but in
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man there is also creator, sculptor, the hardness o f  the hammer, the divine 
spectator and the seventh d a y ...." (Nietzsche, 1973: 136)
Another major theme - intimately connected with the recognition of powers - lies 
in a capacity for choice-making.
So, Heidegger (1962) in his analysis of our 'being in the world' finds that amongst 
the everyday characteristics of that being lies the ever-present possibility of death. 
This fact of our existence can be responded to in a number of ways; we can, for 
example, suppress this awareness and find ways to distract ourselves or we might 
face up to it and ask, 'What meaning does my life have?' Heidegger therefore points 
to the choices we are able to make when we confront the facts of our existence and 
to the related capacity to give meaning to life. He also emphasises 'Geworfenheit' 
or 'thrown-ness'. We find ourselves thrown into a world that we did not choose to 
enter. We did not choose our genetic structure, our temperament, our parents or the 
environing culture. However, from these we have to fashion a life. Heidegger 
therefore points to both the 'press' of circumstance and the choices we make in 
relation to those circumstances.
The 'active powers', 'choice potential' and 'meaning-making' attributes of persons 
were conceptions embraced by theorists and practitioners of humanistic psychology 
(after e.g. Shaffer 1978). Humanistic psychologists consistently resisted the 
'persons-as-machine' metaphor of positivism, and, particularly through the work of 
Heron (1981) His model of the person includes the following observation:
"[We have] intellectual capacities fo r  understanding our world and ourselves, 
affective capacities fo r  caring and delighting in other persons and ourselves, 
conative capacities fo r  making real choices about how we want to live, relate to 
others and shape the world." (Heron 1981: 7)
In virtue of the fact that we possess intellectual capacities for understanding the 
world we are, to some extent, researchers and inquirers. Our search for meaning 
and understanding differs in terms of degree and in terms of rigour. I assume that 
whenever we 'research', we embark on a process - using various procedures or 
methods - o f finding out something. We want to develop our knowledge - and that 
knowledge as Torbert (1981) remarked - is 'gained through action and for action'.
Epistemology, the theory of knowledge, deals with the questions concerning 
whether we are justified in claiming to know anything, and if so, what. Currently, 
and especially within the human and social 'sciences' there is no single dominant
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position from which to arbitrate over researching methodologies and strategies. 
This is because, at the most fundamental level of belief or assumption, i.e. the level 
o f worldview or ’paradigm' there are competing positions vying for 'dominance'. 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) understand paradigms as:
"Basic belief systems based on ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
assumptions" (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 107)
They go on to describe a paradigm as follows:
"A paradigm may be viewed as a set o f  basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that deals 
with ultimates or first principles. It represents a worldview that defines, fo r  its 
holder, the nature o f  the"world", the individual’s place in it, and the range o f  
possible relationships to that world and its parts, as, fo r  example, cosmologies and 
theologies do." (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 107)
Guba and Lincoln examine the content of paradigms so defined in terms of the 
answers given to (or the positions taken in relation to) three fundamental questions, 
the 'ontological' question, the 'epistemological' question, and, the 'methodological' 
question. The inquirer is understood, therefore, to conduct his or her inquiry from 
the basis of a paradigm (or a set of basic beliefs) concerned with the way that 
particular inquirer has (more or less awarely, and, more or less genuinely) 
answered questions to do with the nature of reality, the nature of the relationship 
between the knower and the known, and, the way(s) in which the knower can go 
about finding out whatever can be 'known'. Thus, as Guba and Lincoln write, 
inquiry paradigms define for inquirers:
" ... what it is they are about, and what falls within and outside the limits o f  
legitimate inquiry" (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 108)
The ontological question deals with the form and nature of reality itself. 
Assumptions about the nature of reality define what can be known about it. There 
may, for example, be some 'real' reality or the very term 'reality' may be recognised 
to stand for no tangible 'something' at all. In Western philosophy it is probably true 
to say that the single most important contrast in relation to assumptions about the 
nature of reality is that between the idea that there is a real world - and that what 
can be known about it is 'how things really are' - with an alternative idea that reality 
is a subjective construction always reflecting the nature of inquirers themselves in 
specific times and places.
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The epistemological question is concerned with the nature of the relationship 
between the knower and what can be known. If a 'real' reality is assumed - i.e. that 
there are facts to be discovered which just 'are* then the posture of the knower must 
be one of objectivity unadulterated by interests, biasses, preferences etc. 
Metaphorically speaking answering epistemological questions in this way suggests 
that inquirers could, as it were, point a pair of neutral binoculars at the world and 
view the objective facts. If, by contrast, the very conceptual apparatus of the 
inquirer is understood to shape the possible forms of knowledge, and that there is 
always a possible contrast between the world as it might be (or worlds as they 
might be) and the world as it is apprehended and known, then 'objectivity' is not 
considered a possibility.
The methodological question asks, 'How can the inquirer go about finding out 
whatever he or she believes can be known?' If a 'real' reality can be 'got at' by an 
objective inquirer then control must be exerted over possible confounding factors, 
whether the methods are qualitative (e.g. observational) or quantitative (e.g. the 
experimental method). But if there is not assumed to be a 'real' reality and that 
which is known is always a function to some degree of the knower or inquirer then 
the research methodology has to be understood not as a controlling and purifying 
process but one where versions of reality or descriptions of realities are uncovered, 
negotiated, conjectured and made more explicit, understood as they must be, as 
temporary pictures in time.
The inquiry methodology, will, whatever the methods, be cast in a mood of 
'openness to revision' and acceptance of a multiperspectival state o f affairs. 
Moreover, if the methodology acknowledges that the inquirer necessarily is a 
prominent (if not the prominent) feature in the story that comes to be told, then the 
inquirer's own interests, intentions, social and personal constructions and values 
will need to be made explicit.
A personal position
How have I come to answer these three questions? Before providing a brief answer,
I should note that I accept Guba and Lincoln's contention that my answers will 
remain articles of faith. Thus, they observe:
"The beliefs are basic in the sense that they must be accepted simple on faith  
(however well argued); there is no way to establish there ultimate truthfulness" 
(G uba  and  Lincoln  1994: 107)
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In relation to the ontological question i.e. 'what is the form and nature of reality?' 
my answer reflects a fundamental uncertainty. If there is not a 'real' reality as the 
positivists had assumed (and which, presumably remains an assumption held by 
many scientists exploring the physical and inorganic world), what would a world 
of endless multiple realities look like? Logically, it seems we could never know 
because there would, as it were, be no certainty concerning any 'final' conclusion.
Rogers (1980) represents the stance I have come to adopt. He asks the question, 
'What is this 'real' world?' and then proceeds to demonstrate that there can no longer 
be certainties concerning the real or true nature of an objective reality. He does this 
by showing that reality is not to be naively understood as that which is given to us 
by our senses, nor are we to take our own self conceptions as 'realities' (we may be 
self deceiving), nor can we find certainties in our interpersonal judgments nor in 
the any socially organised forms of organisation or culture. Rogers asks again:
"Where have my thoughts led me in relation to an objective world o f  reality?
It clearly does not exist in the objects we can see and feel and hold. It does not exist 
in the technology we admire so greatly. It is not found in the solid earth or the 
twinkling stars. It does not lie in the solid knowledge o f  those around us. I t is not 
found  in the organisations or customs or rituals o f  any one culture. It is not even 
in our own known personal worlds. It must take into account mysterious and 
currently unfathomable 1separate realities', incredibly different from  the objective 
world" (Rogers 1980: 103)
Logically, my 'resolution' of the ontological question was determined by my answer 
to the epistemological question, 'What is the nature of the relationship between the 
knower and what can be known?' Here, I have been directly influenced by the 
Kantian approach to epistemology. Prior to Kant's major philosophy, a revival of 
scepticism in our ability to access external reality had led to two broad sorts of 
answer to the question, 'How can we know what things are truly like?' On the one 
hand, we knew through 'sensation' and the data given through our sense, or, on the 
other, we knew through pure reason, or 'purified' reason, a reason acting 
independently of our senses.
The first view had been given renewed vitality through the writings of Hume whilst 
the latter had been explored with relentless precision by Descartes. Kant took 
against both these views and argued for a synthesis. For Kant, the world and the 
world as it is experienced were two sides of the same coin. They were distinct but 
not separate, just as a face and its expressions are both distinct and separate. How 
did Kant effect such a synthesis?
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He argued that we knew things through the action of sensation and judgment. Kant 
understood the nature of our knowledge in terms of the metaphor of a 'compound'. 
The compound of sensation and judgment was the way the very world itself was 
apprehended. In Kant's view all our perceptions and experiences come to us 
through our sensory and mental apparatus in forms which are sense dependent and 
mind dependent.
His resolution to the epistemological question has been captured in the two 
expressions:
'Intuitions without concepts are meaningless' 
and
'Concepts without content are empty'
Kant argued that for anything to be experienced at all, it would need to be 
substantial, existing in space and time. Scruton (1982) clarifies Kant's epistemology 
as follows:
"He [Kant] came to think as follows. Neither experience nor reason are alone able 
to provide knowledge. The first provides content without form  - intuitions without 
concepts are meaningless, the second, form without content - concepts without 
content are empty. Only in their synthesis is knowledge possible; hence there is no 
knowledge that does not bear the marks o f  reason and o f  experience together." 
(Scruton 1982: 17)
Lest knowledge be seen as 'merely subjective' or 'purely personal' and therefore, 
arbitrary, Scruton continues:
"Such knowledge is, however, genuine and objective. It transcends the point o f  view 
o f man (sic) who possesses it, and makes legitimate claims about an independent 
world. Nevertheless, it is impossible to know the world as it is in itself independent 
o f all perspective. Such an absolute conception o f  the object o f  knowledge is 
senseless, Kant argues since it can be given only by employing concepts from which 
every element o f  meaning has been refined away. While I can know the world 
independently o f  my view o f it, what I know (the world o f  appearance) bears the 
indelible marks o f  that point o f  view. Objects do not depend for their existence on 
my perceiving them: but their nature is determined by the fact that they can be
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perceived ... Experience contains within itself the features o f  space, time and 
causality. Hence, in describing my experience I  am referring to an ordered 
perspective on an independent world." (Scruton 1982: 17)
In this way, the ontological question concerning the form and nature of the world 
is, in part, answered through a conception of the relationship between the knower 
and that which can be known. There is a world 'out there' but it cannot be 
apprehended independently of the sensory and conceptual operations of the 
knower. Kant opened up the distinction between the world in itself which we can 
never know and the world that we experience through sensation and judgment. 
Thus, he provides a model to account for both physical and social realities; 
sensation and experience combine with concepts and judgment. In this way he 
paves the way for an examination of the nature of the judgments that the sensing 
subject can bring to bear on the content of perceptions. Thereby, we are led to 
explore, examine, understand and be acutely aware of the concepts we live by. This 
itself opens the way to three sorts of analysis:
First, we can take inventory of the way in which shared concepts structure our 
realities. We can attend to and examine the social construction of reality.
Second, we can examine unique personal realities and achieve greater 
understanding of the way in each individual brings personal conceptualisations to 
their particular way of apprehending the world. That is, we can examine personal 
constructions of reality.
Third, we can explore who 'gets' and who 'sets' the nature and type of concepts that 
are, in potentia, available to all. In other words we can examine the way power and 
persuasion functions to produce stories and accounts which are produced and 
sustained in communities of discourse. In this way, we enter into a more clearly 
defined socio-political arena.
A Kantian point of view implies, for the researcher, a particular need to uncover the 
concepts that he or she brings to bear on the 'raw thought feels' of experience.
In relation to the methodological question, since I assume that the world cannot be 
apprehended independently of the knower and that the knower interacts with the 
that-which-is-to-be-known in ways immediately impacting on those very same 
phenomena to be known such that they are always and necessarily a product of that 
interaction, then, an objective positivistic or even post-positivistic stance is 
untenable. Methodologically I assume that the metaphor most accurately describing
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myself and persons with whom I interact is in that of'person as inquirer'. I should 
add that the idea of 'person-as-inquirer' refers to a potential in human being that is 
not always activated. I prefer this to the metaphor 'person as scientist' because 
'inquirer' suggests that persons are less wedded to a standardised and rigidly 
disciplined methodology. Guba and Lincoln (1994) describe methodologies 
commensurate with four different paradigms - the 'positivist', the 'post-positivist', 
the 'critical theorist' and the 'constructivist'. It would be an oversimplification to say 
that I have adopted either that methodology which they associate with the critical 
theory paradigm or that which is associated with the constructivist paradigm.
My methodology reflects my position with regard to ontological and 
epistemological questions but adopts its specific form - which will be developed 
below - because of the context of practice in which the research was situated. To 
the extent that I recognise our social constructions of reality are influenced by the 
temporariness of prevailing power/authority relations and definitions of the 'way 
things are' then, I embrace a perspective sympathetic to the framework of critical 
theory. To the extent that I am disinclined to assume any ultimate social reality or 
personal reality upon which one might converge, I reflect the constructivist position 
of ontological relativism.
For me, it seems possible to argue for a 'critical constructivist' position to be taken 
seriously. On this account, I acknowledge the realities of existing power relations, 
themselves reflecting historical processes of persuasion, conflict management and 
control which subsequently determine and limit the range of possible identities and 
valuations provided in any one society and culture. However, I also acknowledge 
that there always remains the freedom to see things differently and the freedom to 
dissent. Although sets of social programmes exist, they are not complete. They 
cannot prevent individuals imagining that the world and their place in it could be 
otherwise. There is, as it were, always room for dissent, divergence and difference. 
So, there is always simultaneously, a general way of'seeing' and a personal way of 
seeing. If a critical theorist stance requires that the inquirer accept that somewhere 
there is 'the reality' then I cannot endorse such a position. If the constructivist does 
not acknowledge that the processes of social construction reflect the constructions 
of those who have enjoyed dominance in time and place then I could not endorse 
their position.
In the next section, I shall return to more general considerations concerning 
paradigms or 'models' of inquiry in order to justify the emphases I have taken in my 
inquiry methods.
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Contrasting models o f  inquiry - an elaboration o f detail
Following Denicolo and Lathlean (1995) - who accept that it is currently possible 
to speak of an old (positivist and post-positivist) paradigm and a 'new' paradigm (as 
well as a 'third position' - which might be a critical theorist paradigm or an 
alternative 'post-modern' paradigm or even a paradigm drawing together the themes 
of'old' and 'new' paradigms), it is useful to draw out the contrasts between inquirers 
who proceed in their explorations of social and personal phenomena with the 
central inquiry metaphor, 'Person as object' with those who pursue their inquiries 
under a different conceptual umbrella with the central inquiry metaphor: 'Person 
as scientist'. Denicolo and Lathlean refer to these two methodologies and their 
attendant methods as the 'Quantitative model' and the 'Qualitative-interpretive 
model' respectively.
Their analysis corresponds to Guba and Lincoln's (1994) separation between 
paradigms that answer the ontological question in favour of some 'real' reality with 
those that understand 'reality' as a human construction.
At the heart of the two different research models lie the two different metaphors 
concerning the nature of persons. It is from those metaphors that conceptions of 
truth, questions of methodology, the purposes served by the research, and details 
of procedures are all derived.
The 'Quantitative' model, with its central metaphor, 'persons as objects', 
understands knowledge to be the accumulation of facts. Since humans are viewed 
as if they have objective properties, the task of the researcher is to develop ever 
more detail concerning the nature of those properties. The 'Qualitative' model, with 
its central metaphor, 'persons as scientists', understands knowledge as constructions 
of reality.
Criteria o f  truth: Correspondence and coherence
Within the quantitative model, the criterion used for calling a statement true, where 
true statements are those which assert the existence of some actual state-of-affairs 
(or any fact about the world) reflects a correspondence theory of truth. 
Correspondence, here, is understood in the sense: 'A statement is true if it 
corresponds with the facts' or 'A statement is true if it corresponds with some actual 
state of affairs in the world'. Thus, a criterion of truth is correspondence with 
reality.
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Plainly, a major difficulty with such an approach is connected with an increasing 
realisation by even those scientists working in the physical sciences that the Tacts' 
o f the world e.g. sub atomic 'particles' actually reflect conceptual metaphors 
deriving from the particular world of human experience at particular moments in 
cultural space and time. Thus, for example, the facts, 'particle' or 'wave' are actually 
reflecting conceptualisation derived from a broader experiential world i.e. the 
waves of the sea or, the particles of substance in the deserts. Analysis of our ways 
of making identification of 'facts' indicates that they are bounded by linguistic 
categorisations which are human constructions.
In the qualitative model, the criterion for calling a statement true is 'coherence'. A 
body of beliefs is said to be true when, first, none of them is inconsistent with any 
others, and, second, when they mutually support one another. Hospers (1990) 
exemplifies the coherentist criterion of truth in the following way:
"We constantly use [the] coherence test in daily life, even though we may not know 
that it goes by this name. Suppose we wonder whether Smith is the murderer; i f  we 
believe she was, our belief may be true ("correspond to the fa c t”), but we have no 
way o f  knowing this since there were no witnesses. However, detectives place the 
time o f  the murder at 11 p.m.; a neighbour saw Smith leaving the murdered man's 
house at 11. 05 p.m.; blood o f  Smith's blood type was found on the murdered 
person's clothing; the fingerprints on the furniture exactly resemble Smith's 
fingerprints; Smith was absent from her house between 10 and 12 as her husband 
noticed; and so on. We have a pretty good case against Smith, and it consists 
largely o f  a number o f  observations that cohere, or f i t  in with each other; we can 
explain them all on the hypothesis that Smith was the murderer. Juries often convict 
on evidence such as this. The evidence consists largely o f  mutually cohering bits 
and pieces." (Hospers 1990: 184)
The coherence theory (or criterion for determining a statement to be true) is 
applicable to situations in which no direct evidence is possible. Whenever we talk 
about, on the one hand, unobservables in the material world, e.g. neutrons or 
intangibles in the social world e.g. the experience of ethics education, or personal 
ethical systems, we are not discussing phenomena such as books on the table that 
we can see for ourselves. In the case of the former, we watch for various chemical 
combinations in the laboratory, see what combines with what, what happens when 
we add some of this to some of that etc. Then we devise a theory of different kinds 
of atoms with different structures, and we devise it to be consistent with everything 
we know or believe we know to be 'true'. In other words, we adopt a coherentist
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approach to truth. In the latter case, we might discover that it is both the case that 
police officers conceive of themselves as adhering to ’high' ethical standards, and 
also conceive of themselves as consistently following ethical principles. 
Simultaneously, one might observe that police officers are 'judgmental' and 
interpersonally 'punitive' i.e. they are not especially tolerant, nor compassionate nor 
benevolent.
Moreover, they may make these observations concerning themselves i.e. they may 
be fully aware of these apparent contradictions. A psychodynamic theory might be 
developed around which all the statements and observations concerning police 
cohere. In the absence of any concrete, tangible and straightforward access to 
'reality' as Hospers succinctly remarks 'it is coherence that does the trick, for in the 
realm of unobservables the correspondence test is useless'.
Questions o f  methodology
The quantitative model embraces a traditional conception of science and 
researchers aspire to an objectivity that is defined as free from subjectivity and 
researcher bias. Error elimination, i.e. the control of confounding variables is a 
central requirement in the research methodology. The researcher, from their 
detached and disinterested position takes the neutral facts and builds an explanatory 
theory. In terms of their relationship with the phenomena researched, the researcher 
occupies a position of unilateral control. They design the research and they collect 
the data. In the human and social world, those upon whom the research is done are 
the research 'subjects'. Such research is essentially 'reductionist'. Phenomena are 
taken apart in order to uncover their constituent parts and to understand how things 
work.
By contrast, the qualitative model embraces a different conception of science. 
Science is what we are. Researchers aspire not to any objectivity but to securing 
social agreement for ways of seeing and conceptualising and accounting for the 
phenomena under review. Researchers are reflexive in their approach, reflecting 
back their learnings to others who were more or less centrally involved in the data 
gathering and data analysis processes. 'How does this seem to you?' might be one 
of the questions an inquirer asks of interested parties, or 'Does this seem to square 
with your experience?' as s/he tests out a description.
Researchers under this model do not consider that there are neutral facts to be 
gathered. 'Facts' and 'theory construction' are co-operatively developed and 
negotiated. Participants play at least some part in designing the research itself. Such
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research is essentially holistic in nature where an attempt is made to 'get at it in all 
its complexity'.
Purposes served by the research
The quantitative model aims to produce generalisations that will apply to all 
populations or populations of phenomena as a whole. It is nomothetic in nature. 
The research is in the service of explanation, prediction and control.
By contrast, the qualitative model aims to produce descriptions of individual and 
particular cases. It is ideographic in nature. The essence of the work is to aim 
towards a practical outcome where, especially, more information can guide 
decision-making processes, enlighten, provoke appreciation and understanding, and 
so on.
Details ofprocedures - preliminary considerations affecting choice o f  research 
methods
The quantitative model aspires towards using those procedures e.g. the 
experimental method which conform to a methodology which presupposes that 
there is a 'real' reality which can be known independently of the conceptual 
apparatus of the knower. Questions of validity and reliability are very important.
The qualitative model uses those methods congruent with the notion of verstehen 
i.e. the 'in-depth' understanding of a 'situation'. Questions of reliability and validity 
are less significant than questions of authenticity and utility.
The central metaphor, 'person as scientist' from which all the details and 
characteristics of the qualitative model can be deduced is, in its main details, 
equivalent to the metaphor, 'person as inquirer' which remains one of the central 
assumptions about the nature of persons guiding the research reported here. That 
central metaphor aligned with the inquiry paradigm reflecting a synthesis between 
critical theory and constructivist positions took on concrete shape as action 
research.
However, on each of the four facets of the contrasting inquiry models discussed 
above, action research has no difficulty embracing the logical requirements of the 
qualitative-interpretive model. In that model, the criterion for calling a statement 
true is 'coherence'. Since action research is not, in itself, a method but, rather, an 
approach consisting of intentional action (interventions) designed to achieve an
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approximation to a more valued state of affairs, knowledge claims may be 
generated as a result of their cohering with the views of others. A part of action 
research can (or should) include an 'audit trail1 where the inquirer(s) make(s) public 
the emerging understandings and subject those understandings to critique and 
revision from interested parties.
In the qualitative-interpretive model, researchers aspire to securing social 
agreement for ways of seeing, conceptualising and accounting for the phenomena 
under review. The basic action research cycle allows researchers to make public 
their reflections and to subject any conclusions they might wish to draw to some 
form of consensual validation. Action research makes public its 'findings' and 
accepts the potentially illusory nature of any conclusions.
The purposes served by action research are not exclusively concerned with 
explanation, prediction and control. Action research-as-an-approach acknowledges 
the uniqueness of the social situations in which interventions designed to secure 
particular valued outcomes take place. Action research can itself lead to designs to 
study and change the very forms of institutional power, control and legitimation 
that control the definitions of knowledge and status in the social contexts.
The qualitative-interpretive model uses those methods congruent with the notion 
of 'verstehen' - the 'in-depth' understanding of a 'situation'. Action research, in 
virtue of the fact that it allows a choice of methods and techniques judged 
appropriate to the concrete situation of practice, emancipates the inquirer(s) from 
having to adopt any method or technique in particular. Action researchers are, in 
a certain sense, emancipated. Harre and Gillett (1994) suggest that we have to 'get 
inside' the forms of life and the norms, conventions, rules and so on in which any 
individual's activities take shape. They write:
"This requires the kind o f  understanding Weber calls verstehen. It is based on an 
empathic identification with the other that helps the observer make sense o f  what 
the other is doing. Such an approach to the understanding o f  behaviour can be 
sensitive to the subtleties o f  the situation o f the other in a way that an attempt to 
identify and isolate a surveyable number o f objective independent variables cannot 
be. " (Harre and Gillett, 1994: 20)
They continue:
"We would say that we need to know what a situation means to a person and not 
ju st what the situation is (say, according to a description in terms o f  physical
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characteristics as these are seen by an observer) i f  we are to understand what that 
person is doing. Imagine, fo r  example, the markings on a bush trail that a 
European tourist might ignore but that instantly would be read by an Aboriginal 
tracker and would guide him immediately to his quarry, here the marks are, in a 
certain sense, the same for each observer - a bent twig, a crushedflower - but their 
meaning differs according to their place in the current perspective o f  each 
traveller” (Harre and Gillett, 1994: 20,21)
Harre and Gillett's conclusion is double edged for the action researcher. On the one 
hand, action researchers have to uncover the meanings that are given to 'concrete' 
situations by those who participate in their enquiries. At the same time, the action 
researcher (her or himself) is positioned in a complex structure of rules and 
practices within which they, themselves, move and from which they give the 
neutral facts of the world meaning.
In the next chapter, I shall illustrate how the philosophical foundations I developed 
for my inquiry were given concrete form as I began to develop an action research 
framework to guide the project.
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Chapter Four
The methodological approach: action research as a framework fo r  the inquiry
"We needed our clowns, and we used 'em to help us all learn the best ways to get 
along with each other. Bein' an individual is real good, but sometimes we're so 
busy bein' individuals we forget we gotta live with a lot o f  other people who all got 
the right to be individuals too, and the clowns could show us i f  we were gettin' a bit 
pushy, or startin' to take ourselves too serious. Wasn't nothin' sacred to a clown. 
Sometimes a clown would fin d  another clown taggin' along behind, imitatin', and 
then the first one knew that maybe somethin' was gettin' out o f  hand, and maybe the 
clown was bein' mean or us in' her position as a clown to push people around and 
sharpen her own axe fo r  her own reasons." (Cameron, 1984: 90)
My research into the teaching and learning of police ethics drew from an 'action 
research' framework. A research methodology derives from the most fundamental 
assumptions embraced by a researcher and in particular those concerning their 
views of the nature of knowledge itself (epistemology) and their understandings of 
the nature of reality (ontology).
In this chapter I shall present a brief and selective account of the nature of action 
research as it has been depicted in the academic literature. I shall use an argument 
borrowed from Wittgenstein to suggest that different forms of action research bear 
a family resemblance - one to another. From this it follows that action researchers 
need not be chained to any formulaic prescriptions or creedal dogma. I shall then 
follow Carr and Kemmis (1994) and contend that emancipatory action research 
constitutes the enactment of a 'critical educational science'. A critical educational 
science would be consistent with the philosophical position I adopted and which I 
outlined in the previous chapter.
Research fo r  practical action: the presentation o f action research in the 
academic literature
Adelman (1993) examines the origins of action research by focusing upon Lewin's 
(1946) reflection on how to effect social change. He also draws from the writings 
of Marrow (1969) - who was Lewin's biographer. Adelman points out that action 
research:
" . .  gives credence to the development o f  powers o f  reflective thought, discussion, 
decision and action by ordinary (sic) people participating in collective research on
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"private troubles" . " (Adelman 1993: 8)
This characterisation of action research picks out a number of its typical features. 
So, it includes the cognitive processes occurring during periods of reflection and 
forms of conduct informed by those deliberations. Moreover, Adelman highlights 
the collective, participatory and inclusive nature of action research.
Adelman moves on to note the relatively positivistic assumptions undergirding 
Lewin's work; it is clear that Lewin's epistemology reflected a faith in the authority 
of science and objectivity.
Yet, even as the work and writing of Lewin is standardly taken as the 'origin' of 
action research, others such as Gunz (1995) detect 'many' sources that have led to 
the practice of this inquiry approach. Gunz specifically identifies Moreno - the 
founder of psychodrama - as a figure of major significance because of his 
(Moreno's) emphasis upon group methods and active performance in coming to 
understand and effect personal and social change. So, whilst Lewin is credited as 
the 'founder' of action research, the applied practices of the human sciences can all 
claim to have an action research character or essence.
Lewin's (1946) paper has especial significance for action researchers because it 
constitutes an early clarification of certain issues fundamental both to social 
research and to practitioners working in complex social settings. He begins by 
citing the predicament of persons who were working to improve inter-group 
relations but who remained unclear as to whether or not any real progress was 
being made and which, if any, intervention techniques were effective. In the light 
of this, Lewin reports that there is a demand for 'action research, for research which 
will help the practitioner'. So, at the outset, the idea of action research is 
immediately linked with helping the endeavours of the practitioner.
Lewin recognised that if the practices of social management and social engineering 
were to be effective they needed to acknowledge the fact that the situation 
confronting practitioners were multi-variable and multi-layered. Moreover, only an 
interdisciplinary knowledge base could adequately reflect the complex dynamics 
at play in the 'actual side and end streets' of specific large and small towns where 
attempts to effect social change were being conducted. This knowledge would also 
need to be organised into three forms; general laws (concerning the nature of 
persons and the explanation of their conduct) expressed in 'if so' propositions, 
knowledge about the characteristics of specific situations, and, knowledge about 
the effectiveness of'change techniques'.
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When Lewin turned from considering the contribution that social research in 
general could make in helping to achieve positive social change to a more specific 
examination of research for social planning and action he articulated what was to 
become the classic rendition of the sequence of activities in action research. He 
arrived at this outline (which was not labelled 'action research') by examining the 
process of planning in the more general practice of social management. However, 
he embraced an extended concept of planning that included executing the plan and 
evaluating the success of that action. Lewin's basic action research model consists 
of a) a planning stage b) an action stage and c) a fact finding or 'reconnaissance' 
stage - designed to determine how effective the action had been. In his discussion 
of the planning stage he includes the following points:
"Planning starts usually with something like a general idea. For one reason or 
another it seems desirable to reach a certain objective. Exactly how to 
circumscribe this objective, and how to reach it is frequently not too clear. The first 
step then is to examine the idea carefully in the light o f  the means available. 
Frequently more fact-finding about the situation is required. I f  this first period o f  
planning is successful, two items emerge: namely an "overall plan" o f how to reach 
the objective and secondly, a decision in regard to the first step o f  action. "(Lewin 
1946: 37)
This is an important passage because Lewin points to the fact that values are at play 
in the detennining of an objective. He underlines the need to investigate further the 
contours of the situation in order, better, to circumscribe the objective and he 
recognises that this stage does not necessarily lead to a comprehensive and 
complete set of action steps. Lewin does not provide any more detail on this stage 
and continues:
"The next period is devoted to executing the first step o f  the overall p lan." (Lewin 
1946:37)
The third stage involves fact-finding or 'reconnaissance' designed to determine as 
accurately and objectively as possible the new situation. This reconnaissance stage, 
has, for Lewin, four functions:
- it should evaluate the action and examine whether what has been achieved is 
above or below expectation
- it gives planners a chance to learn. Thus, for example, insights can emerge
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concerning the strengths or weaknesses of different types of action
- it provides a basis for planning the next step
- it serves as a basis, if necessary, for modifying the overall plan
This third stage in the process therefore includes uncovering the facts o f the 
situation after the action as well as sense-making or meaning-making. It allows the 
basic action research model to involve four moments: planning, acting, observing 
and reflecting. Lewin immediately moves on to say that the next step involves 
another circle of planning, executing the plan (acting) and fact finding - which 
leads to a third cycle and so on.
His paper emphasises the need for research both to help practice and to generate 
research findings from practice. It includes an outline of the circle (or cycle) of 
action research and it indicates the categories of knowledge relevant to 'social 
management' and social change.
Adelman traces the chequered history of action research since it was initially 
conceptualised by Lewin and observes that by the end of the 1960s it had 'lost its 
coherence in the USA.' He writes:
"Instead o f  empowering ordinary people in their own communities, action research 
had become incorporated as part o f  the armoury o f  managerial development 
fo r  "corporate excellence"." (Adelman 1993: 16)
Adelman moves on to cite Sanford (1970) who ruefully observed that action 
research 'was never accepted as bona fide research in the USA' and therefore 'never 
really got off the ground'. Later, Sanford (1981), found himself anxious to address 
a trend in social research which had overlooked the value of action research.
The basic action research model: an elaboration
Sanford believed that his own work had improved upon Lewin's model but he 
recognised that this would not have been possible without the earlier foundations 
that had been established by Lewin. In answer to the question, 'What was Lewin's 
model?', Sanford finds that it was well-expressed in Lewin's (1947) paper on 
'Group decision and social change.' The model consisted of a repeating cycle of 
activities; those activities were summarised by Sanford in the following way:
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"Action research consisted in analysis, fact-finding, conceptualisation, planning, 
execution, more fact-finding or evaluation - and then a repetition o f  the whole 
circle o f  activities; indeed a spiral o f  such circles." (Sanford 1981: 174)
Here, Sanford sustains the sequence of activities, 'planning, execution and fact­
finding (reconnaissance) but includes certain steps additional to the actual 
'planning' stage. He also links the Lewinian concepts to a common-sense model of 
solving problems and learning new skills. Sanford finds there to be a need for 
social science to re-consider the importance that should be given to the 
investigation of practical problems and commends alternative ways to those which 
had come to dominate social science (i.e. the detached, artificial and unrealistic 
conditions established by the use of the experimental method in the laboratory). To 
assist in this process Sanford provided a 'sketch' of a contemporary model for 
action research - although he preferred to call it 'research-action'. The model that 
Sanford suggests is founded upon his idea concerning the major questions with 
which social science should deal. This form of question is less concerned with the 
accumulation of more and more detailed knowledge about specific features of 
human beings but with how to create social arrangements that help to promote the 
development of all individuals concerned. His model has three main features. First, 
'analysis' - to determine what kinds of question are to be asked. Second, a 
'comprehensive approach to individual development' which goes far beyond 
Lewin's formulation. Third, a 'more contemporary approach to planning' that 
involves the very people who will be affected by any proposed changes to their 
circumstances.
It is possible to find in Sanford's work a refining of Lewin's original action research 
model and an acknowledgement that it approximates a generic problem-solving 
process. I should add the important caveat that the involvement with and study of 
practical problems was a continuing source of theoretical ideas. It is also possible 
to find an emphasis upon the sorts of questions important for the researcher. These 
are 'how' questions - such as 'how to improve teaching? ' or 'how to promote the 
development of individuals in specific special contexts?'. This form of question - 
as a fundamental focus for educational action research inquiries - has also been 
emphasised by Whitehead (1989) and the several researchers who have, 
subsequently, adopted his inquiry emphasis.
Sanford also thinks that if action research takes as its aim the promotion of 
individual development then it has to extend Lewin's original model. It must 'fill 
in' his scheme with 'particular kinds of needs, dispositions, values, conflicts and so 
forth'. He writes:
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"An approach that is concerned with individual development must be 
comprehensive. An interest in changing one aspect o f  behaviour... must take into 
account the implications o f  such change fo r  the total person. To understand the 
person we must see him (sic) in his total setting. Research action is properly multi­
disciplinary ..." (Sanford 1981: 178)
This observation, by implication, attaches to the practice of action research, where 
relevant, the knowledges that have accumulated in the human sciences. It also 
intimates the significance of cultural knowledge in determining how best to 
intervene in situations of practice. He also suggests the holistic nature of action 
research.
Effectively Sanford calls for action research to stand as an alternative to 
established and institionalised social science. In a damning passage he likens the 
output of social science to the polluting outputs of industry:
"Like other industries, social science has been polluting its environment, not only 
by treating its research subjects as means rather than ends and disseminating a 
rather monstrous image o f  researchable man, but also by creating an enormous 
amount o f  waste in the form  o f  useless information." (Sanford 1981: 179)
In this way, another aspect of action research is foregrounded: the knowledge it 
generates should be useful.
Action research has also been included amongst the technologies of 'mainstream* 
organisational development.
The basic model o f action research: an approach to organisational development 
- and the inclusion o f  'systems level' thinking
Beginning in 1972, Pfeiffer and Jones published a series of annuals designed to be 
used as resources for professionals working in human relations contexts. These 
annuals contained both learning designs (in the form of structured experiences) and 
a variety of theoretical resources including a range of conceptual models and 
frameworks. At the beginning of the 1990s many of the models that had appeared 
in the annuals were organised into four volumes - the last of which featured models 
for organisational development. Included in this volume was a short section entitled 
'Action research'. The discussion in that section is devoted to considering action 
research as an organisation-development' intervention. It also includes reference
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to French and Bell's (1984) classic text on organisation development. The action 
research inclusion in Pfeiffer (1991) begins by saying:
"Action research is a time-honoured procedure fo r  systematically improving 
organisations." (Pfeiffer (ed.) 1991: 5)
Its author (or authors) continues:
"To this day, action research is an essential tool fo r  behavioural scientists who are 
conducting organisational improvement interventions." (Pfeiffer (ed.) 1991: 5)
Subsequently, action research is represented as more than actions to solve problems 
and more than abstract research. It is a 'hybrid' of both.
French and Bell (1984) from a process perspective define action research as 
follows:
"Action research may be described as a process, that is, as an ongoing series o f  
events and actions. Used in this way, we define action research as follows: action 
research is the process o f  systematically collecting research data about an ongoing 
system relative to some object, goal, or need o f  that system; feeding these data back 
into the system; taking actions by altering selected variables within the system 
based both on the data and on hypotheses; and evaluating the results o f  actions by 
collecting more data. " (French and Bell 1984: 84,85)
Their depiction of action research is nuanced towards a systems approach. It also 
suggests an emphasis upon a rigorous and disciplined problem-solving method. 
Immediately following their definition they provide a lucid account of the 
activities constituting the process. It is in this account that one finds resonances 
with Egan's (1988) models for change management. They write:
"This definition characterises action research in terms o f  the activities comprising 
the process: first a static picture is taken o f an organisation; on the basis o f  "what 
exists", hunches and hypotheses suggest actions: these actions typically entail 
manipulating some variable in the system that is under the control o f  the action 
researcher (this often means doing something differently from the way it has always 
been done): later, a second static picture is taken o f  the system to examine the 
effects o f  the actions taken." (French and Bell 1984: 85)
The first 'static picture' co-incides with Egan's 'where are we now?' Implicit in 
French and Bell's text is the desire to 'improve' or change a situation. This is
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equivalent to Egan's 'where do we want to be?' The actions (and manipulation of 
variables) are concerned to 'move from here to there' - from the actual to the ideal.
French and Bell highlight the potential for action research to be an effective 
approach for system-wide or 'whole' organisation change and development. This 
harmonises with the collectivist ideals of action research. However, in educational 
settings more individualised practices of action research have emerged - and it is 
here that the 'personhood' of the inquirer(s) has been included as a central and 
unavoidable part of the research endeavour.
Adelman (1993) records how, in the United Kingdom, the 'Humanities Curriculum 
Project' (Stenhouse, 1975, 1980) - which benefited from the innovative approach 
to education embraced by Stenhouse - 'engaged participating teachers in the 
discussion of issues they identified from classroom practice'. A member o f the 
Humanities Curriculum Project team was Elliott - who subsequently was to author 
a text devoted to action research for educational change (Elliott, 1991). Adelman 
shows how action research has established itself within a number of university 
locations - and he also distinguishes between those 'who concentrated on individual 
reflective practice’ such as Schon (1983) and those 'who try to carry on Lewin's 
group discussion' methods and commitments. Adelman thus introduces his 
readership to a bifurcation in the development of the practice of action research.
Action research in educational settings: contrasting orientations
Elliott (1990) in the course of advocating the need to sustain the creative ethos of 
'conversational research communities' begins by stating his concern that the 
Government (of the 1980s) was forcing a model of resource management on the 
British higher education system that endangered the pursuit of worthwhile research. 
For him, such 'conversational communities’ were capable of being repositories of 
excellence in research because they fostered various qualities in their membership 
such as:
- intellectual creativity
- the courage to say new and interesting things to audiences
- a tolerance of intellectual deviance
- m e thodo log ica l  plura lism
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If these qualities mean anything at all they must mean the expression of'difference'
- in the sense that the conversational community enjoys a plurality o f voices and 
a diversity o f inquiry methods.
In order to illustrate the character of a 'conversational educational research 
community' Elliott draws heavily from his own experience as a researcher and, in 
particular, the view of educational research shared by staff at the Centre for 
Applied Research in Education located in the University of East Anglia. He 
summarises that view by making five points and, in so doing, he invites his 
readership to ask themselves if their inquiry meets the criteria so advanced. Elliott 
orders his points as follows:
- the over-riding purpose of educational research is to bring about worthwhile 
educational change
- research is only educational when it is directed towards realising educational 
values in practice. It cannot be dissociated from conceptions of worthwhile 
educational practices
- teachers and students have an important and significant role as participants in the 
educational research process
- since attempts to realise educational values in practice shape up differently in 
particular situations, educational research is grounded in the qualitative study of 
cases
- since educational values are infinitely contestable, educational researchers should 
adopt a reflexive attitude towards their biases by entertaining alternative views of 
the situation
The principles articulated by Elliott permit considerable discretion on the part of 
the individual researcher - underlined by the fact that 'educational research' finds 
itself dealing with the 'qualitative study of cases'.
He moves on to argue that one of the biggest constraints on the development of the 
researcher is the presumption that there is a right method or set of techniques for 
doing educational research. He notes that this presumption 'dominates the training 
of educational researchers in higher education institutions' and that it:
" ... results in a situation where the development o f  educational researchers is
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viewed as an initial 'tooling-up 'phase, after which they are deemed competent to 
undertake research. "(Elliott 1990: 5)
However, for Elliott, this is a recipe for mediocrity because:
"Excellence in educational research depends upon the continuous participation o f  
researchers in a reflective conversation about their practices against a background 
o f  fundamental research principles. "(Elliott 1990: 5)
He immediately adds:
"Within such a conversation there is no closure or constraint on the methodological 
possibilities entertained."(Elliott 1990: 5)
Elliott is more concerned that research be educational than it should slavishly 
follow methodological routines and he moves on to provide a criterion for an 
inquiry process to be called 'action research1. First though he defines educational 
research (rather than research-on-education) in terms of its primary aim. That 
primary aim is the promotion of worthwhile change by influencing the practical 
judgements of teachers and/or policy makers. The definition is elaborated in order 
to clarify what is entailed in the making of improved practical judgements. 
Improved practical judgements rest upon the development of practical wisdom. 
Practical wisdom is itself defined in terms of the ability to discern what can be 
changed in a situation to improve it. For Elliott, the ability so to discern, is based 
upon a very complete and integrated grasp of the factors at play in the situation of 
practice. Having thus defined (and elaborated upon) the nature of educational 
research, Elliott finds it to be identical with that activity categorised as action 
research. In short, educational (or action) research is that which promotes or takes 
as its quest the achievement of, practical wisdom.
If the criterion for something to be called 'action research' is a research activity (or 
activities) which takes as its goal the genesis of 'practical wisdom' (or some 
contribution to the expression of practical wisdom) then researchers who claim that 
they are conducting action research must indicate how their endeavours are related 
to the achievement of such a goal.
This  concep tua l isa t ion  o f  action research a llows it to be unders tood  as a re la tive ly  - 
inc lusive  ra ther than exclus ive  activity. Elliott not only  a ck n o w led g es  that  'h igh ly  
spec ia l ised  forms o f  inquiry from with in  part icula r a cad em ic  d iscip lines '  can  
const i tu te  intr insic e lem ents  within the action research process  but he  a lso
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emphasises the fact that the researcher who is conducting educational research must 
be free to ’choose the methods to fit’ the complex practical problem. Elliott also 
refers to Midgley's (1989) observation which itself reflects something we already 
know from common-sense experience - that the quality of teaching and other 
practical activities 'is heavily dependent upon the personalities of the individuals 
involved’. Since research is, itself, a complex practical activity then it too will be 
heavily influenced by the dispositions of, and, the decisions taken by, the 
researcher. Here, it seems that Elliott recognises the centrality of the person of the 
researcher to the action research process.
Implicit in Elliott's stance is a permission for action researchers to develop methods 
of research appropriate to their context.
However, Kemmis and McTaggart (1988) and, more recently, Aspland, 
Macpherson, Proudford and Whitmore (1996) and, Kemmis and Wilkinson (1998), 
stipulate a number of features that a research approach must meet if it is to be 'full' 
action research. These writers are concerned to sustain the genuinely collaborative, 
participatory or collectivist aspects of action research - which make it possible to 
understand action research as the essential method for developing a critical 
educational science. Kemmis and McTaggart (1988) contend that action research 
is 'participatory, collaborative research’ which typically arises from the 'clarification 
of some concerns generally shared by a group’. They provide a schematisation of 
the process - which is reproduced in Kemmis and Wilkinson (1998). Whilst 
Stringer (1996) developed a method for conducting action research that is 
appealingly (and deceptively) simple - he shows how community based action 
research can involve three broad steps which he describes as 'look', 'think' and 'act'
- Kemmis and Wilkinson's (1998) outline of the practice of participatory action 
research is more clearly located within the tradition of critical theory. They begin 
their paper by mentioning that, for them, action research is 'inadequately described 
in terms of a mechanical sequence of steps’. From their position of considerable 
experience in the theory and practice of action research they note that it is generally 
thought to involve a spiral of the activities: planning a change; acting and observing 
the process and consequences of the change; reflecting on these processes and 
consequences; and, re-planning.
Whilst this description approximates that which is standardly advanced they qualify 
this description by attempting to convey a more accurate picture of what actually 
happens in actual practice:
"In reality the process may not be as neat as this spiral o f self-contained cycles of
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planning, acting and observing, and reflecting suggests. The stages overlap and 
initial plans quickly become obsolete in the light o f  learning from  experience. In 
reality the process is likely to be more fluid, open and responsive." (Kemmis and 
Wilkinson 1998: 21)
In this way Kemmis and Wilkinson recognise the openness of the researcher (or 
researchers) to the data and information revealed in the field of practice. Clearly, 
at least a part of this data will be grasped and made sense of in terms of the 
conceptual frameworks embraced by the researcher - and this latter point links in 
to their subsequent argument concerning how to define ’success’ in action research. 
They write:
"The criteria o f  success is not whether participants have followed the steps 
faithfully, but whether they have a strong and authentic sense o f  development and 
evolution in their practices, their understanding o f  those practices, and the 
situations in which they practice." (Kemmis and Wilkinson 1998: 21)
Whilst Kemmis and Wilkinson remain faithful to the value framework that was 
developed by Carr and Kemmis (1986) this 'success' criterion provides action 
researchers with a potential set of questions (or issues) against which they can test 
their practice.
So they can ask:
- Am I confident that I have learned, developed and/or changed both in relation to 
myself and to my identity as a practitioner?
- Can I point to an enhanced understanding of my practice?
- Have I a more sophisticated grasp of the nature of my situation of practice?
Kemmis and Wilkinson themselves present, at the conclusion of their chapter a set 
of questions to help participatory action researchers reflect on their projects 
processes and outcomes - which themselves could be used as a set of guidelines for 
managing an action research inquiry. A number of those questions relate to their 
contention that participatory action research has 'six other key features' which are 
as important as the basic action research cycle. They note each feature and 
accompany each with a short explanation. Participatory action research is: a social 
process; participatory; practical and collaborative; emancipatory; critical; and, 
recursive (reflexive, dialectical). The short explanations make explicit the link
between participatory action research and Carr and Kemmis' (1986) earlier 
ambitions to develop a critical educational science. Thus, for example the 
'emancipatory' character of participatory action research includes the following 
description:
".. it [participatory action research] aims to help people recover, and unshackle 
themselves from the constraints o f  irrational, unproductive, unjust and unsatisfying 
social structures which limit their self-development and se lf determination. It is a 
process in which people explore the ways in which their practices are shaped and 
constrained by wider social (cultural, economic and political) structures, and 
consider whether they can intervene to release themselves from  these constraints 
...." (Kemmis and Wilkinson 1998: 24)
This form of expression has unmistakable links with the radical forms of education 
and development reflected in, for example, the writings of Freire (1976), Ernst and 
Goodison (1981), Randall and Southgate (1986) and Lyons (1976). It also resonates 
with the more radical aspects of Heron's educational models. Thus, for example, 
Heron (1989) identifies inter alia the following targets for 'confronting 
interventions':
"... rigid norms and values, rigid social structuring and allocation o f  roles in the 
wider society ....restrictive attitudes and behaviour such as: patriarchy and rigid 
gender roles; authoritarianism and widespread subtle oppression in the work­
place; rigid stereotyping o f  children, the elderly, the physically ill, the mentally 
distressed, ethnic minorities, socio-economic classes; unaware political impotence 
and passivity in the street, in the neighbourhood, in the nation ... " (Heron 1989: 
49)
In addition, Kemmis and Wilkinson underline the fact that action research deals 
with actual practice. Their language illustrates how fundamental the study of 
practice is to action research:
"It [action research] involves learning about the real, material, concrete, 
particular practices o f particular people in particular places." (Kemmis and 
Wilkinson 1998: 24)
In their view, action researchers need feel no shame about the fact that their work 
is 'mundane and mired in history’. This is entirely consistent with their more 
general socio-political theory concerning the genesis of the social world and the 
making of its inhabitants. Whilst their participatory approach to action research
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necessarily is inclusive in the sense that it involves numbers of persons, most of the 
points they make about the collective endeavour can be appropriated by the 
individual educational action researcher. Thus, for example, when they turn to 
suggest the positive outcomes of participatory action research they write:
"Action research is a learning process whose fruits are the real and material 
changes in : what people do, how they interact with the world and with others; 
what they mean and what they value; the discourses in which they understand and 
interpret their world. " (Kemmis and Wilkinson 1998: 25)
This statement can serve as a way of extending the previous 'success' criterion. 
Thus, action researchers can examine their 'achievements' by asking:
- What, if any, real and material changes can I point to in my practice?
- How might I be different in relation to the way I interact with the world and with 
others in the world?
- How have I come to define myself and what, now, is important to and for me?
- How has my language (my conceptual frameworks) developed in relation to the 
way I engage with my world, my practice and my relationships?
I should note here that at a later stage of my inquiry I focused more intensely on the 
details of the criteria that had appeared or were to appear in the research and 
academic literature concerning how to present and 'quality assure' action research 
projects. I shall draw from those ideas in subsequent chapters.
Recurring themes adhering to discourses on action research
I think it helpful to conclude this discussion of the nature of action research by 
summarising some recurring themes that appear in the academic literature. They 
include:
- a focus on a basic action research model involving a number of stages
- an emphasis upon the study and improvement of a practice
- a concern to generate practical knowledge and/or practical wisdom
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- an explicit articulation of values - at both an individual and collective level
- a flexibility in relation to methods for effecting change in situations of practice
- a recognition of the complex 'holism' of situations of practice
It is also clear that each writer who begins to present an account of'action research' 
leaves it with their own distinct imprint. Wittgenstein (1997) helps, I think, to 
consider the nature of action research in a particular kind of way if we build upon 
his way of examining the nature of'games'. In his analysis of their nature (i.e. the 
nature of games), he writes:
"Consider, fo r  example, the proceedings that we call "games”. I  mean board 
games, card games, ball games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to 
them all? - Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be 
called 'games' " - but look and see whether there is anything common to all. - For 
i f  you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but 
similarities, relationships, and a whole series o f them at that. To repeat, don't think, 
but lookl" (Wittgenstein 1997: 31)
So, as we look at clusters of games we find that one board game resembles another 
board game but then if we compare board games with card games we find new 
kinds of similarity whilst other features drop away. Thus, Wittgenstein introduces 
us to the idea that the concept 'game' is a concept with 'blurred edges' - where no 
precise definition of the nature of a game can be given.Mutatis mutandis, action 
research also has blurred edges. There is no single best way to conduct action 
research.
Nonetheless, at the beginning of my project, two sorts of writing helped to provide 
me with guidelines informing and guiding the development of the inquiry. These 
consisted of a) published case studies in the action research literature and b) 
methods for conducting action research. The latter are detailed in Kemmis and 
McTaggart (1988), Elliott (1991), McKernan (1991) and Hopkins (1992). The 
former provide a variety of models for conducting action research. Appendix B 
includes details of two contrasting case studies reported in the literature on action 
research; one case study (Reid, 1994) approaches the idea of a ‘critical educational 
science’ whilst the other (Armstrong, 1981) represents an excellent example of 
careful observation and description in a classroom setting.
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The idea o f  a critical educational science
A critical educational science has been mapped by Carr and Kemmis (1994) and 
its research methodology (the enactment of a critical educational science) has been 
developed on the basis of Lewin's (1946) early action research formulation. Carr 
and Kemmis conceive of educational research generated by a critical social science 
paradigm (or tradition) in the following way:
" ..it [critical educational science] envisages a form o f  educational research which 
is conducted by those involved in education themselves. It takes a view o f  
educational research as critical analysis directed at the transformation o f  
educational practices, the educational understandings and educational values o f  
those involved in the process and the social and institutional structures which 
provide frameworks fo r  their action." (Carr and Kemmis 1994: 156)
Throughout the subsequent development of their account, Carr and Kemmis return 
to emphasise a) the centrality of the practitioner in his or her own situation working 
collaboratively and democratically with others and b) the focus of the 
practitioner/enquirer in terms of:
- the improvement of a social practice
- the improvement of the understanding of the practice
- the improvement of the situation in which the practice is conducted 
Thus, for example, Carr and Kemmis write:
"A critical educational science must then be a participatory science, its participants 
or 'subjects' being the teachers, students and others who create, maintain, enjoy 
and endure educational a rra n g em en ts(Carr and Kemmis 1994: 158)
and
"The fu ll task o f  a critical educational science requires participants to collaborate 
in the organisation o f  their own enlightenment, the decision-making by which they 
will transform their situations, and continuing critical analysis in the light o f  the 
consequences o f  those transformations which can sustain the engagement o f  
scientific discourse, processes o f  enlightenment and practical a c t i o n (Carr and 
Kemmis 1994: 159)
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This last sentence echoes Habermas’ three functions in the critical social scientific 
process - the creation of critical theorems, the organisation of enlightenment and 
the organisation for action. Again, in relation to the threefold interest of a critical 
educational science, Carr and Kemmis, for example, write:
"Put simply, the contribution o f  educational research to educational practice must 
be evident in actual improvements o f  concrete educational practices, o f  the actual 
understandings o f  those practices by their practitioners, and in the improvement 
o f the concrete situations in which these practices occur" (Carr and Kemmis 1994: 
160)
To show how educational practitioners can develop forms of work which constitute 
a reformed practice of educational research, Carr and Kemmis turn to the idea of 
action research. They define action research as follows:
”Action research is simply a form o f  se lf reflective enquiry undertaken by 
participants in social situations in order to improve the rationality and justice o f  
their own practices, their understanding o f  these practices, and the situations in 
which the practices are carried out." (Carr and Kemmis 1994: 162)
One way of reading this definition would be to note that an individual participant 
in some social process could become a lone and singular explorer engaged with 
trying to understand a very social and participative situation peopled with co­
practitioners - who simply happen not to adopt a way of conceiving their activities 
as action research. However, Carr and Kemmis move on to delineate the minimal 
requirements that an activity has to meet if it is to be described as action research. 
Here, the 'collective' rather than the individual nature of the practice is defined. 
Thus they include the definition of action research generated by participants at a 
seminar on action research held at Deakin University in 1981. For these 
participants, educational action research is:
"A term used to describe a family o f  activities in curriculum development, 
professional development, school [college] improvement programmes, and systems 
planning and policy development. These activities have in common the 
identification o f  strategies o f  planned action which are implemented and then 
systematically submitted to observation, reflection, and change. Participants in the 
action being considered are integrally involved in all o f these activities. (Carr and 
Kemmis 1994: 164)
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Moreover, two essential aims of action research are identified; to improve and to 
involve. The minimal requirements for action research, according to Carr and 
Kemmis, need three conditions to be fulfilled. Failure to meet these, for them, 
means that claims to action research cannot be taken seriously. Those conditions 
are:
" ....firstly a project takes as its subject matter a social practice, regarding it as a 
form o f  strategic action susceptible o f  improvement; secondly, the project proceeds 
through a spiral o f  cycles ofplanning, acting, observing and reflecting, with each 
o f  these activities being systematically and self-crideally implemented and 
interrelated; thirdly the project involves those responsible fo r  the practice in each 
o f  the moments o f  the activity, widening participation in the project gradually to 
include those affected by the practice, and maintaining collaborative control o f  the 
process." (Carr and Kemmis 1994: 165)
My intention was to develop an inquiry that would meet these criteria. My project 
took .'as its subject matter a social practice' - i.e. the design and delivery of an 
'ethics education' - something I could conceive as a 'form of strategic action 
susceptible of improvement'. I imagined that I would develop the project 'through 
a spiral of cycles of planning, acting, observing and reflecting' and, lastly, I wanted 
the 'clients' attending courses of study at the Police Staff College, to collaborate in 
as many aspects of the educational process as possible. In this way, I hoped to 
create a form of action research that constituted a manifestation of critical 
educational science.
However, as I have noted I was not working in an institutional context that 
embraced a research culture. Nor was I working with client groups drawn from an 
occupational culture that was familiar with forms of collaborative or co-operative 
inquiry. Nonetheless, I thought (and hoped) that I would be able to develop my 
research such that I would, eventually, meet the criteria for action research 
stipulated by Carr and Kemmis. At its inception, my inquiry was a relatively lone 
venture.
Placing the person o f the researcher at the heart o f  the inquiry and the alignment 
o f  action research with 'new paradigm' inquiry
A ' foundat ional '  princ iple  has  continued  to inform and gu ide  m y  resea rch  (or 
' searching ')  process .  T here  is (at least for me) a rhy thm  in l iving and  w o r k  - a 
con ten t ion  be tw een  oppos i tes  - cyclical  processes  o f  action  and  re flec tion,  o f  
inte llect  and  feeling, confronta t ion  and support ,  creativ ity and receptiv i ty  and, o f
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encounter and silence. These processes, in relation to the practice of effective 
leadership, have been beautifully described by Heider (1987). By way of example, 
he writes:
"The leader can act as warrior or healer. As a warrior, the leader acts with power 
and decision. That is the Yang or masculine aspect o f leadership. Most o f  the time, 
however, the leader acts as a healer and is in an open, receptive, and nourishing 
state, That is the feminine or Yin aspect o f  leadership. This mixture o f  doing and 
being, o f  warrior and healer, is both reproductive and potent. There is a third 
aspect o f  leadership: Tao. Periodically, the leader withdraws from  the group and
returns to silence being, doing, being.... then Tao. I  withdraw in order to empty
m yself o f  what has happened, to replenish my spirit." (Heider, 1987: 55)
Gibran (1980) also captures the expression o f ’opposites’ in his discussion on 
'reason' (intellect) and 'passion' (feeling):
"Your soul is oftentimes a battlefield, upon which your reason and your judgment 
wage war against your passion and your appetite. Would that I  could be 
peacemaker in your soul, that I  might turn the discord and the rivalry o f  your 
elements into oneness and melody. But how shall I, unless you yourselves be also 
the peacemakers, nay, the lovers o f  all your elements? .... I  would have you 
consider your judgement and your appetite even as you would two loved guests in 
your house. Surely you would not honour one guest above the other; fo r  he who is 
mindful o f  one loses the love and faith o f  both." (Gibran 1980: 59,60)
Rowan's (1981) 'dialectical paradigm' describes these 'moments' in the inquiry (or 
learning) process in somewhat different terms - but his basic idea seems isomorphic 
with the idea of moving between poles of energy. Rowan argues that it is possible 
to consider a research cycle that characterises all research; it has four phases: 
'Being', 'Project', 'Encounter' and, 'Communication'.
Understood experientially, 'Being' refers to that phase of the process where a social 
inquirer 'rests in his or her own experience' and recognises at some point, that 
existing practice seems to be inadequate. There is some gap between the actual and 
the ideal. Movement from this phase entails a process of thinking and conjecturing 
from which, a 'project' emerges. Such a project embodies a plan of action. Of this 
phase, Rowan writes:
"This is where I lake a risk, and form an intention. It will involve some form of 
bridging distances - to another person, to a new field, to a different theory or
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whatever... it essentially involves plans and decisions. " (Rowan 1981: 99).
At some point in the cycle, plans have to be translated into action. ‘Action’, as 
Rowan states, is 'the thing to get into'. However, Rowan sees this form of action as 
involving participation with others. Hence, this phase is one of 'Encounter'. This 
goes on until the researcher gets to the point of saturation. Some sort of withdrawal 
is necessary in order to find out the meaning of what has occurred.
This inner process of making sense builds towards another outward moment, 
'Communication'. Here, the researcher wants to share, discuss, debate and clarify 
his or her conclusions. Rowan conceptualises four stages and, two distinct 
processes of mentation: the first, I call 'Thinking and conjecturing'; the second, 
'Making sense and conceptualising'.
That tradition of inquiry, to which I refer to above, is expressed in the plastic arts 
and particularly in the work of painting (Gombrich, 1995). We see, in the work of 
the artist, something of genuine research; we see each work as an experiment - as 
a position, or, a point in time which the artist has reached (Rewald 1976), (Camp 
1981). Research is a process of coming to new awarenesses, discovering new 
forms, understanding one's limited points of view, and, moving on.
Traditional action research can be re-described in Rowan's terms. First, the 
researcher arrives at a personal point of puzzlement or ignorance. This is the point 
prior to the 'Planning' stage of action research. Then, the researcher determines 
some form of intervention designed to secure a valued outcome. The planning stage 
of action research constitutes the 'Project'. Plans are translated into action. The 
'acting' stage of action research takes place in an interpersonal context. It is 
therefore, an 'Encounter'. The 'Encounter' generates data (which is transformed into 
information) as the inquirer both 'Observes' and 'Reflects' upon the outcomes of 
their interventions. Re-described in these terms it becomes clear that action 
research is not amenable to a technical problem solving process. The action 
researcher - he or she - is located at the heart of the process.
Laidlaw (1997) provides a highly personal account of her educational practice and, 
in the course of exploring the 'paradigm' of action research contrasts 'technical' 
action research with 'emancipatory' action research. She claims that technical action 
research emphasises the method of modifying processes and, whilst adhering to the 
method of systematic and cyclical enquiry, nonetheless is 'without a grounding in 
a particular set of values'. By contrast, emancipatory action research requires that 
every stage of the systematic and cyclical enquiry adhere closely towards the
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realisation of'democratic and emancipatory values in action'. Emancipatory action 
research, in virtue of the values it expresses is necessarily collaborative and 
participatory. The emerging 'collaborative' or 'participatory' action research is 
heavily focused upon the processes of working together on issues which are 
negotiated and explored by all concerned with the processes. So construed, such 
action research approximates 'co-operative inquiry' (Heron 1989).
Laidlaw identifies some of the reasons why collaborative action research can be 
viewed as 'superior' to other forms of action research. She points out that by 
'sharing our knowledge we devolve the power implicit in the creation of 
knowledge' and that:
"By working collaboratively ... we share the responsibility and power o f .. 
knowledge creation." (Laidlaw 1997: 43)
Moreover, Laidlaw points out that:
"A prime motive o f  working together in an educational action research context is 
the potential to negotiate meanings that may lead to educational improvements. " 
(Laidlaw 1997: 43)
Laidlaw also suggests that an 'individual orientation' to action research is 'not a 
universally held principle within the action research communities'. She cites Elliott 
(1991) who is concerned that individual action inquiries can lead to 'mere technical 
rationality'.
However, whilst Elliott is properly concerned to encourage collaborative action 
research - as a matter of principle - the earlier writing of Habermas recognises that 
action researchers are also embedded in political contexts and have to 'organise' for 
the 'political struggle'. In certain contexts - especially those where levels of trust 
are low - it is not always possible to initiate collaborative action research. 
Moreover, other writers recognise that action research, in virtue of the fact that one 
or more human beings set out to learn more about a human social situation, is 
intimately related to the development of 'personal knowledge'. Laidlaw's own 
remarkably personal account was itself influenced by Whitehead's (1985) support 
for the individual's right to determine the nature and course of his/her inquiry. This 
same emphasis is made explicit (and legitimated) in the work of McNiff, Lomax 
and Whitehead (1996), who in response to 'numerous requests from practitioners 
over the years' provide 'a basic guide to educational action research'. Each of these 
authors has been involved in the actual practice of action research projects and a
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particular feature of their work lies in their emphasis upon the 'person' of the action 
researcher him or herself. They write:
"... in our opinion, one should not tell others how to do action research. The term 
embodies a whole set o f  principles, processes and procedures that one has to 
experience personally fo r  the whole process to make sense. We fe lt that any book 
that legislated would in fact deny the essence o f  action research. "(McNiff, Lomax 
and Whitehead 1996: 1)
From the outset, McNiff, Lomax and Whitehead are careful to compare and 
contrast action research with other research approaches. They contend that action 
research shares with other approaches the following four characteristics:
- it leads to knowledge
- it provides evidence to support this knowledge
- it makes explicit the process of enquiry through which knowledge emerges
- it links new knowledge with existing knowledge
However, they distinguish action research from other research in the following 
three important ways:
- it requires action as an integral part of the research process itself
- it is focused by the researcher's professional values rather than methodological 
considerations
- it is necessarily insider research, in the sense of practitioners researching their 
own professional actions
In this way, McNiff, Lomax and Whitehead locate the practitioner at the centre of 
the action research process. In consequence, concepts such as agency and processes 
such as decision-making are central to action research (and, thereby immediately 
distinguish action research from positivist assumptions and methodologies). 
Atwood (1996) has her narrator make the following observation concerning her 
(the narrator's) imaginings about the future reconstruction of her lived experience:
"It is impossible to say exactly how a thing was, because what you say can never
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be exact, you always leave something out, there are too many parts, sides, 
crosscurrents, nuances ..." (Atwood 1996 : 144)
Undeniably Atwood is correct. The task of the constructivist researcher is to try to
minimise the significant elements - the 'parts, sides ' - which are left out and to
be aware of the way their own psychology exerts a massive influence throughout 
the whole of the research process. My account acknowledges that my own values, 
preferences, energies and limitations (of intellect, knowledge, will and rationality) 
determined, to a very significant degree the design, delivery and development of 
an ethics education for police leaders and managers.
Embarking upon the action research inquiry: the initial emphasis
As I began preparing to re-introduce 'ethics' as a named topic of study to the police 
leadership development curriculum I faced a first primary and priority task. I had 
to organise the design and delivery of some form of ethics education experience for 
large groups of police middle managers who were attending leadership 
development programmes at the Police Staff College, Bramshill. As the project 
began, I drew the following small number of points from the research literature:
- action research inquiries are based upon a research model involving a series of 
steps, stages or activities including planning, acting and then reflecting upon the 
results o f those actions, as well as the way the process has been managed
- action research inquiries appreciate the uniqueness of the situation of practice
- action research inquiries have the potential to serve as methodologies for a critical 
educational science
- action research inquiries approximate to the artist's search for understanding and 
communication
As Rowan (1981) observed, action is the 'place to get into'. It is to this I now turn.
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ChapterJive
Constructing an 1ethics educationf fo r  police leaders and managers: preparing 
to reintroduce ‘ethics’ to the police leadership and management development 
curriculum
".. the police literature says nothing about the professional policeman's sense o f  
place, time, and purpose, or how he cultivates an awareness o f  the trends o fpast 
andfuture, or o f  his development o f  a standard o f  success fo r  his individual actions 
in keeping with both the limits o f  his individual capacities and his impulse fo r  
public service. The literature points to the necessity that a policeman have such a 
social, historical and ethical perspective and how it would be useful in 
compensating fo r  the unique distortions o f  information which befall the policeman 
- distortions resulting from a steady diet o f  life's pathologies, from  the 
organisational necessities o f  maintaining intensely high morale (to overcome fear, 
hardship and frustration), and from the authority o f  office. The literature simply 
has not described the means o f  acquiring such a perspective." (Ker Muir, 1977: 
296)
Action research (after Lewin 1946) begins with a 'general idea' where 'for one 
reason or another it seems desirable to reach a certain objective'. The long term 
goal (or objective) of the inquiry was to secure ethics education on the police 
leadership and management development curriculum. My more immediate goal 
was to re-introduce ethics to the curriculum of the middle-management 
programmes. Already, I had participated in the presentation of Richards (1982) first 
and original 'ethics package' for the development of the inspecting and 
superintending ranks of the police service. In Lewinian terms, I had witnessed at 
first hand the 'action' stage of an educational intervention and the subsequent 
'reconnaissance' - the latter revealing the gulf between the hoped for outcome and 
the actual outcome. I had made sense of the short-lived nature of that original 
venture by contending that the 'academic transmission' curriculum emphasis 
conflicted with the pragmatic interests and values that were shared by the majority 
of the student group. This first experience constituted a starting point for the 
preliminary stage of my inquiry.
T h e  p repara to ry  process  began  in the w in te r  o f  1992. Yet,  even  in 1996 w h e n  
K le in ig  in t roduced his readership  to the s tudy o f  pol ice  ethics,  he w as  still ab le  to 
recogn ise  that  there  w as  a lack o f  any  reasonab ly  c o m p re h en s iv e  and  scho la r ly  
d iscuss ion  on the  subject .  He also thought  it accura te  to no te  tha t  readers  o f  part  
three  o f  his text w ou ld  find that  it offered the 'beginnings '  o f  w h a t  he s a w  as a
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crucial area of police ethics - 'problems that are largely managerial or 
organisational in character'. In part, this was the very area upon which I was 
choosing to focus my attention.
Kleinig imagined that students of police ethics would, in the course of studying the 
subject, progress from a focus on the ethical issues at street-level to those topics 
dealt with at managerial level; he added that those latter topics would be 'well- 
suited to an advanced course in police ethics'. Kleinig's observations serve to 
highlight the fact that in this preliminary stage of the action research inquiry there 
remained considerable scope for determining the content and methods of the 
.learning design.
In this chapter I shall come to describe the nature of the educational design that I 
developed in the first half of 1993 and subsequently presented to the leadership 
development programme (after a brief trial in June 1993 - see Appendix C) in the 
autumn o f that year. In ‘Part One’ I shall discuss how I approached the task of 
determining the content for a police ethics education. Specifically, I drew my ideas 
(concerning content) from the relatively extensive literature on the police and the 
emerging writings on police ethics - including those sources concerned with 
'teaching ethics to police'. I also reviewed, selectively, literature on management 
and organisational ethics. Inevitably I also drew from certain works concerned with 
'ethics and the professions' as well as sources commenting on the teaching of ethics. 
I conclude the first part of the chapter with a brief summary of those topics that 
appear to have justifiable claim for inclusion on an 'ethics education' for police 
leaders and managers.
I shall then move on in ‘Part Two’ to focus on the challenge of designing for the 
actual educational process. This latter task involved 'filling out' the details of the 
concrete educational design and involved making decisions concerning each of the 
major elements comprising any learning design. Here I drew from my professional 
training in the theory and practice of humanistic education and the facilitation of 
adult learning. I was also concerned to clarify the type of educational emphasis I 
would adopt - especially if I were trying to create a 'critical' ethics education 
experience. I shall suggest that educational designs embracing the principles of 
critical pragmatism, inquiry models based on emancipatory action research and the 
radical possibilities of humanistic psychology are markedly similar in terms of the 
way they guide and inform conduct. I shall also indicate why the institutional 
context in which I was working did not permit me to adopt, straightforwardly, the 
principles of an emancipatory education. In the beginning, my action research 
inquiry could best be described as a complex 'problem solving' process.
101
Part One
Police ethics: issues and themes in the developing academic literature
Kleinig (1990) contends that morality is concerned, essentially, with humans in 
their relations with each other. He adds that:
"Morality is concerned with being and doing at the most basic level, with people’s 
common standing as human beings. For that reason there can be no distinctive 
police ethic but only a human ethic applied to police situations." (Kleinig 1990: 
2)
This view of ethics places it at the heart of human being and doing. Ethics is not 
some desirable 'add-on* but exists in propria persona. It follows that the content 
of the study of police ethics must be both specific and general. Specifically, there 
must be included some analysis of the morally challenging aspects of police work. 
More generally, a wider study of police contributes to understanding the making 
and shaping of police 'being and doing'. Kant (1956) in his critique of practical 
reason carefully drew our attention to the necessary connection between obligation 
and freedom. Thus, 'ought' implies 'can'. It follows that the development of the 
subject 'police ethics' cannot proceed independently of the knowledges revealed by 
a social psychology and social anthropology of police. Here I shall begin by 
exploring the relatively scant literature on police ethics before noting the more 
general works on police that help provide some of that social psychological and 
social anthropological knowledge.
My own grounding in the study of police ethics began with Ker Muir's (1977) 
inquiry into the nature of the 'good' police officer. His work had helped me to make 
some informed contribution to the early presentation of police ethics education at 
Bramshill. In consequence, I shall begin the review of those published works 
helping to organise the content of an ethics education for police managers by 
referring to his pathbreaking work.
A t the  ou tse t  he asks: 'W hat is a good po licem an (sic), and  w ha t does he th in k  and  
do  d if fe ren tly  from  a bad one? ' 'D oes  po lice  w o rk  corrupt, o r does  it e x p an d  a 
p o licem an 's  ho rizons  and m agn ify  his soul?' 'Can  any th in g  be done  to av er t  the  
po ten tia l for his m oral b reakdow n? ' K er M uir  w as influenced  by W eber 's  
co n v ic t io n  tha t people  w ho  let them selves  in for 'politics ' (and police  are  's treet- 
co rn e r  po litic ians ')  con trac ted  w ith 'd iabolical ' pow ers  liable to be m o ra lly
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corrupting.
In the early part of the 1970s, Ker Muir studied the psychological development of 
twenty eight young men who were serving police officers in a West Coast North 
American city. As a result he concluded that a good police officer becomes so to 
the extent that he (or she) develops two virtues. On the one hand, to become a good 
police officer one has to grasp the nature of human suffering. He elaborates this in 
terms of the 'tragic perspective' - as contrasted with its opposite, the 'cynic 
perspective'. He conceptualises the development of either tragic or cynic 
perspectives as the development of'understanding' - an understanding of the nature 
of humanity.
On the other hand, Ker Muir reasons that the good police officer has to develop 
morally in a specific way: he (or she) has to resolve the contradiction of achieving 
just ends with coercive means. He writes:
"A patrolman who develops this tragic sense and moral equanimity tends to grow 
in the job, increasing in confidence, skills, sensitivity and awareness." (Ker Muir 
1977: 4)
Subsequently, Ker Muir provides a relatively detailed analysis of the constituent 
elements of cynicism. He traces the cynic point of view from its historical roots in 
Greek philosophy instancing Diogenes as 'its major figure'. Diogenes' cynicism was 
characterised by three themes. The first entails a view of humankind as 'dualistic' 
rather than 'unitary' - the cynics and the fools:
"... mankind was not unitaiy, but dualistic. Mankind was divided into two kinds o f  
people - friends and enemies, cynics andfools, the strong and the susceptible, those 
with and without "virtue”. Virtue was the awareness o f  the advantages o f  
amounting to nothing and having nothing. Cynicism denied the brotherhood o f  man 
and insisted on dividing the world into two classes: the susceptible, made so by 
their ambitions and possessions, and those who were smart enough to know how 
to become invulnerable by dwarfing themselves. That was the cynic's starting 
point." (Ker Muir 1977: 175)
T h e  second  aspect w as 'fault-finding'. A necessary  part o f  hum an  experience is that 
o f  pa in  and  su ffe r ing  - for coun tless  reasons  - bu t for the  cyn ic , 'su ffe r ing  w as 
a lw ay s  a m atte r  o f  personal choice '. C ynics  to o k  the v iew  tha t i f  anyone  suffered  
it w as  because  o f  their failure to detach them selves from any emotional connections 
w ith  'c iv ilisa tion '.  R efe rr ing  to D udley 's  (1937) scho larly  w o rk  on the na tu re  o f
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cynicism, Ker Muir quotes him pithily, as follows:
"The fau lt is always in ourselves " (Dudley, 1937: 67)
Ker Muir goes on to say that, for the cynic, if an individual experienced suffering 
that was a matter of personal choice. It resulted from striving to ’be' someone or 
'have' something:
"Ifan individual chose to forego the cynic's virtue he had only himself to blame. 
Anyone who suffered simply lacked the self-discipline to train himself in self-denial, 
indifference and renunciation o f  the false currency o f  civilisation - its common 
materialistic sense and its dainty civilised values." (Ker Muir 1977: 175)
The third theme was that of individualism where the cynic sheered (or sheers) off 
attachments to other individuals. Socrates has observed in Plato’s ‘Republic’ that 
'mutual need' was one of the basic principles at the foundations of human society. 
However, the cynic denies this and does not recognise any need for mutuality and 
interdependence. As Ker Muir puts it:
"In other words, the praiseworthy cynic was the one who refused all human ties 
....I t was the ultimate in self-defense." (Ker Muir 1977: 176)
In summary, Ker Muir captures the distinctive outlook of the cynic as follows:
"... the dualistic conception o f  mankind as two warring camps, a simple causal 
theory presupposing the individual's absolute control over his (sic) fate, and the 
defensive virtue o f  complete indifference" (Ker Muir 1977: 176)
He contends that three factors can arrest the development of cynicism: leadership, 
learning and language. The role of the 'chief and of superordinates in the 
organisation was to cultivate an appreciation of the nature of humanity. In addition 
the role of police leaders was to develop an organisational ethos marked by a rich 
conceptual language designed to capture and order the experiential facts of 
policing. He also stressed the importance of an organisational ethos which valued 
learning more about the nature of the human condition.
T he  three  poin ts  m ade by K er M uir  p rovide  a potentia l s tarting  po in t for an  e th ics  
education  experience  oriented tow ards actual practitioners. It suggests  the need  for 
police  m anagers  to clarify their role priorities and it reco m m en d s  that they  exp lo re  
and a r ticu la te  ethical concepts . In short, it underlines  the  need  for po lice  to be
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skilled at giving their work an 'ethical reading1. It also, through its emphasis on 
learning, suggests the importance of both a personal inquiry (i.e. asking questions 
such as 'What have I become?) and the genesis of an environing 'learning culture'.
Ker Muir (1977) concludes his study saying that there remained a lack of 
scholarship concerning the development of professional police officers:
"The police literature does not contain descriptions o f  how policemen (sic) come 
to reconcile the sometimes necessary extortionate practices o f  authority with their 
previously fe lt obligations to be reasonable, kind empathetic and creative. It 
provides no explanation o f  how the professional policeman maintains a complex 
sense o f  right and wrong without a loss o f  self-esteem or a belief in civility. The 
literature does not tell us how a policeman can develop a morality enabling him to 
be mean opportunistically without becoming mean compulsively. "(Ker Muir 1977: 
296)
The police literature had, though, begun to grow and, at the same time as the 
publication of Ker Muir's work, had begun to include the first discussions on police 
ethics. Police training courses could, in principle, draw from Kooken (1957), 
Hansen (1973) and Bristow (1975) all of whom had produced commentaries on 
police ethics. However, the work of Elliston and Feldberg (1985) and Heffernan 
and Stroup (1985) heralded a more detailed, sophisticated and extensive discussion 
of ethical dilemmas and challenges specific to police work.
Elliston and Feldberg (1985) provide a relatively early introduction to the subject 
'police ethics'. They trace a brief history of its development and underline the fact 
that 'police ethics is still in its infancy'. It was only in 1981, through their own 
endeavours, that the first conference was organised to address, comprehensively, 
the full array of ethical issues in police work. The essays published in their volume 
constitute the output from that early conference. They group the collection of 
fifteen papers concerned with moral issues in police work under four headings:
- Authority, discretion and the police function
- Deception
- Force and deadly force
- C o rru p tio n
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These groupings indicate some of the main conceptual categories used to structure 
and order the study of police ethics. Elliston and Feldberg in common with most 
students of police in America begin their work with an emphasis upon police 
powers and claim that the police are among the most powerful agents o f the state. 
Police, they point out, are empowered to disrupt the daily routines of citizens if 
they so wish (and have reason or cause so to do). They also, like other writers, 
point to the comparative recency of the scholarly studies on police. Their work 
takes as its audience the police themselves, police trainers and educators, 
researchers and philosophers. They contend that ethics is 'another tool' in the hands 
of police academy instructors 'to build the character a good cop needs' and, with 
allusions to MacIntyre and Plato, they add:
"The virtues, which have recently become philosophically fashionable, are seldom 
more important to society than in the guardians o f  the state. Police ethics re­
emphasises the significance o f  honesty, loyalty, integrity, and obedience. Indeed, 
such virtues are more than useful; in many situations, they are a matter o f  life and 
death." (Elliston and Feldberg 1985: 1)
They note the importance of ethics to effective police administration and assert that 
moral reasoning enables police leaders to achieve a better quality of decision­
making and problem-solving. They also pick out a feature of police work that 
highlights the significance of moral values in policing. They note that those who 
study police 'quickly realise their largely unsupervised and unstructured discretion' 
and precisely because police enjoy considerable latitude in their decision-making 
the values - both moral and non-moral - become determinative.
Elliston and Feldberg also remind their readers that the more developed area of 
professional ethics has shown how simplistic and misleading the application of the 
principles derived from abstract ethical theory can be. Thus, in fields such as 
bioethics it has not been possible to take a standard ethical principle (such as the 
rule utilitarian 'always act such as to bring a greater balance of good over evil into 
the world') apply it to a specific case and allow it to determine action. This 
approach has 'failed to capture the complexities and nuances of the values at stake'. 
Their text provides a link with the more specific discussion concerning the teaching 
of police ethics when they move on to suggest what the teaching of police ethics 
may achieve. Their discussion helps to form the basis of Kleinig's (1990) later more 
detailed examination. For them police ethics teaching might have four objectives. 
First, police officers, police managers and leaders may be sensitised to the moral 
dimension of their work. Second, police ethics can help develop a richer 
articulation of ethical issues. It can provide, through language, an extensive and
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clear set of ethical concepts such as ’conscientiousness’, ’rights’ and ’obligations'. 
Third, a study of police ethics presents the opportunity to test ethical arguments. 
Fourth, the study can help in the search for optimal solutions to some of the 
complex problems faced in policing the human condition.
Elliston and Feldberg’s work is linked to that of their work to Heffernan and 
Stroup (1985). They note that, in 1982, another conference concerned with the 
study of police ethics led to the publication of a second set of scholarly works. 
Heffernan and Stroup's (1985) collection of papers can, itself, be taken as a 
complementary way of conceptualising the main concerns of police ethics. They 
organise the eleven essays comprising their volume under five headings:
- Fidelity to law
- Discretion
- Undercover operations
- The use of deadly force
- The future of policing (In this latter category they include works on police and 
electoral politics, affirmative action and the police and sexual integration in 
American law enforcement)
These topic areas begin to illustrate the ethical demands arising from the role and 
function of police in a democratic society and lay the foundations for a subsequent 
maturing of professional and personal ethics for police.
The reference by Elliston and Feldberg to ’virtue’ is made central in Delattre's 
(1990) study of'character' and police. Delattre himself has played a very major role 
in shaping the content of police ethics presented at the FBI academy in Virginia. 
Delattre examines the idea of an 'excellent' character in an analysis which 
emphasises the need to acquire habits and qualities that 'become integral' to a 
person's life. How does he conceive the 'excellent' police officer? He writes:
"They respect and even love honesty, which has become second nature. Such 
persons behave in the same way as the self-controlled or self-disciplined person in 
that they do their duty but they enjoy peace o f  mind in knowing who they are and 
what they stand for. Such persons can be said to be truly incorruptible, with no 
temptation to steal because money is "only green paper" (sic). Persons o f  such
107
character are f i t  to bear the trust o f  public office in law enforcement. " (Delattre 
1993:63)
This idealised portrait of the moral exemplar is subsequently developed by Delattre. 
In an account which reprises Aristotle's analysis of the moral virtues he includes 
'temperance' and 'self-control' as well as 'courage'. He also argues that 'two kinds 
of'wholeness' are related to excellence of character. The first consists of the ability 
to 'make best use of circumstances' whilst the second consists of'integrity' - which 
he defines as 'wholeness, being one thing through and through'. Delattre also adds 
to his sketch the importance of'service' and 'trustworthiness'. Since ethics is not just 
concerned with questions concerning how we ought to act but with questions 
concerning what we might be, Delattre's emphasis on moral virtues underlines the 
significance of theories of moral value in the study of police ethics.
As Elliston and Feldberg (1985) and Heffernan and Stroup (1985) were pioneering 
the study of police ethics (and distinguishing the categories of study upon which 
a police ethics might focus) in America, Richards (1985) was beginning to develop 
the study of police ethics in the United Kingdom. Simultaneously, Laughame and 
Newman (1985) were advancing an analysis of the duties o f police officers in a 
work explicitly designed to enhance the integrity of police practitioners. (I shall 
discuss the major contribution to the teaching of police ethics that was made by 
Richards when I turn to examine the very first publications devoted to its teaching).
Laugharne and Newman's work might be taken as a forerunner of the many 
strategic emphases concerned with the moral values in policing that were to be 
articulated from within the police service of England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. Their work influenced the culture 
change programmes that were advocated and attempted by police; it also influenced 
the subsequent statement of common purpose and values for the police service and, 
the tone of the draft statement of ethical principles.
T h e  fo rew o rd  to  L au g h arn e  and  N ew m an 's  w o rk  u n d e r l in e s  th e  p u rp o se  o f  th e  
h an d b o o k . It ( the  h an d b o o k )  w as d es igned  to  p ro v id e  an  ex ten d ed  d esc r ip t io n  o f  
the  p r in c ip le s  th a t  shou ld  g overn  po lic ing  and to  exp lo re  h o w  the  po lice  se rv ice  
cou ld  b e co m e  m ore  responsive  to  the  needs  o f  the  c i t izen ry  ra th e r  than  re m a in  
so m ew h a t  de tached  and insular. L augharne  and N e w m a n  base  the ir  ana lys is  bo th  
on an ex am in a tio n  o f  the role requ irem ents  o f  the co n s tab le  and  the in tim a te ly  
re la ted  co n cep t  o f  the Rule o f  Law. T hey  derive  n ine  du ties  tha t they  b reak  d o w n  
into tw o  m ain  categories . T he  first five are 'du ties  o f  func tion '-  w h ich  ind ica te  
’w hat' po lice  should  do - w hils t the rem ain ing  four are 'du ties  o f  m ethod ' - w h ich
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outline 'how' police should comport themselves as they seek to attain their ends. 
The code itself restates the primary function of the police, emphasises human rights 
considerations and the Rule of Law, urges police to respect the dignity of the 
individual and to 'treat every person of whatever social position, race or creed, with 
courtesy and understanding', restates the doctrine of minimum force and underlines 
the duty to 'befriend and assist citizens'. It stipulates that police should be brave and 
selfless, should always act for the public good and should exercise their powers 
without undue peremptoriness.
Underlining their concern that police should be irreproachable public servants 
Laugharne and Newman conclude with a final duty of method:
"To guard the good reputation o f  the Force, to work constantly to maintain its high 
ideals, to encourage others to do so by good example and leadership, and to 
contribute to its excellence by showing resolution and honesty i f  faced with police 
malpractice." (Laugharne and Newman 1985: 61)
Laugharne and Newman's work was echoed in Imbert's (1989) cultural design for 
the Metropolitan Police Service in the 1990s. This included a statement of the 
common purpose and values of the Metropolitan police which, significantly was 
no longer referred to as a 'force' but as a 'service'. Imbert acknowledged the 
financial cost of policing services in London and added:
"They [the people o f  London] have every right to expect, and we have a duty to 
provide a cost-effective, non-discriminatory service that works well at every level" 
(Imbert 1989: 2)
Imbert outlined his ideal for the Metropolitan Police organisation. This included:
- a force experienced by its membership as united and acting upon a common 
purpose
- a commitment to providing a quality of service to the public
- fairness, equity and justice throughout the organisation
- a cc o u n tab il i ty  th ro u g h  p e rfo rm an ce  m easu rem en t
Im bert 's  p rescr ip tions  (and culture  change  initiative, the 'Plus P rog ram m e')  ex tend 
the  d iscu ss io n  o f  po lice  e th ics  into m a n ag em en t and o rgan isa tional e th ics. I shall
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examine this area after first considering the nature of the police themselves.
Police ethicists had gradually begun to articulate the ’oughts’ of policing. What 
features of police psychology, police socialisation and police culture might be 
relevant in the determination of police conduct?
Police 'personality' and the social construction o f police officers
Ker Muir (1977) at the culmination of his study of the psychological development 
of police officers turns to consider the sources a teacher mounting a course on 
’police' might include on their study programme. For a study of philosophy and 
police, Ker Muir suggests Packer (1968); for history, Lane (1967); for description, 
Rubinstein; for social science, Westley (1970) and for policy, Berkeley (1969). 
Each has the status of a classic work on police and each has a claim to inclusion on 
a thorough course in police ethics. Ker Muir also believes that courses on police 
would benefit if they were to include Chevigny's (1969) study of police from the 
perspective of the victims of abusive police power and Sykes' (1966) study of 
police in unconventional settings.
He makes specific mention of the importance of Wambaugh's novels including 'The 
New Centurions', (1970) 'The Blue Knight’ (1972) and 'The Onion Field' (1973). 
Significantly, another student of police, Klockars (1983) - who, like Ker Muir, has 
shown a particular interest in the moral aspects of policing - also refers to the 
educational value of reading Wambaugh when he, Klockars, turns to examine how 
to develop an understanding of police and police work. Wambaugh's novels all 
explore 'the big expansive truth' (as Klockars puts it) that policing is a morally 
dangerous occupation - ultimately so because of the police officer's right to use 
coercive force. The moral issues raised by the fact of police power occupy a 
dominant, if not central, place in scholarly discussions on police ethics.
Ker Muir also considers that the works of Banton (1964), Skolnick (1966), 
Neiderhoffer (1967) and Wilson (1968) all contribute towards an 'understanding of 
the modern police officer'. Banton's work illustrates some of the psychological 
difficulties experienced by police officers as initial motives and their subsequent 
work come into conflict. Skolnick presents a cartography of the 'policeman’s (sic) 
working personality' finding that 'certain outstanding elements in the police milieu' 
namely danger, authority and efficiency combine 'to generate distinctive cognitive 
and behavioural responses in police'. Skolnick goes on to say:
"The process by which this "personality" is developed may be summarised: the
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policeman's role contains two principal variables, danger and authority, which 
should be interpreted in the light o f  a "constant" pressure to appear efficient. The 
element o f  danger seems to make the policeman especially attentive to signs 
indicating a potential fo r  violence and lawbreaking. As a result, the policeman is 
generally a "suspicious"person. "(Skolnick 1966: 44)
Neiderhoffer (1967) explores a somewhat different aspect of the psychological 
development of police officers. He examines some of the pressures intrinsic to 
policing which incline police towards cynicism. Wilson (1968) discovered that 
whilst police organisations were sensitive to their political environment they 
remained relatively immune to governance from the 'outside'. He found that police 
view most issues as a struggle for control of their department by 'outside' forces. 
In addition, Wilson notes that whilst all organisations resist change, factors such as 
the perceived low esteem of the police role, render the police especially resistant 
to change.
The issue o f a 'police personality' has received some attention in social scientific 
writings on police. The earliest of these writings were American although the 
pioneering sociological study by Banton (1964) in the United Kingdom also refers 
to the complex psychological development of police officers. Balch (1972), in an 
extensive review article, focused upon the hypothesis that police could be 
distinguished by their 'authoritarian' personality (after the original work on 
authoritarianism by Adorno, Levinson, Frenkel-Brunswick and Sanford) but found 
the data to support this view, at best, inconclusive. He indicated that the research 
findings - many of which suffered from methodological weaknesses - revealed that 
there appeared to be little to distinguish the American police officer from the 
average middle- or working-class white citizen. However, whilst Balch emphasised 
the apparent similarity of the police officer to groupings in the wider population, 
Lefkovitz (1975) contended that the weight of research and opinion did point 
towards a non-pathological 'modal police personality' comprising two trait 
syndromes. He called 'Trait syndrome 1': 'Isolation and secrecy; Defensiveness and 
suspiciousness; Cynicism' and introduced his discussion of this trait as follows:
"The relevant literature makes it difficult to resist forming an image o f  a close 
group o f  men (sic), sharing a life style and general outlook on the world which 
includes intense feelings o f  being misunderstood and misrepresented by outsiders, 
hence requiring absolute secrecy as well as suspicion towards all such outsiders." 
(Lefkovitz, 1975: 9)
C erta in ly  it is d ifficult to find police officers w ho  w ould  d isagree with the fact that
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they are 'suspicious* and police are also likely to characterise themselves as 
'cynical'. Lefkovitz described 'Trait syndrome 2' as 'Authoritarianism, Status 
concerns, and Violence'. However, immediately having identified this 'trait 
syndrome' he emphasises the equivocal nature of any supporting data:
"Possibly the most tendentious issue, and one about which there is considerable 
inconsistency among the empirical findings is whether policemen (sic) may be 
validly described as "authoritarian personalities." '(Lefkovitz, 1975: 11)
He goes on to underline the uncertainties concerning whether or not police do 
'possess' an authoritarian personality but he does provide evidence that police have 
status concerns and a proneness to use violence in order to assert their authority.
In addition to these 'trait syndromes', Lefkovitz highlights the tendency for police 
to presume that they are viewed more negatively by the 'public' than, in fact, they 
are so viewed. Moreover, police tend to be a 'conservative, conventional group' 
concerned with maintaining the status quo. Lastly, he suggests that whilst the 
empirical evidence is 'disorganised':
"... it is probably accurate to conclude that a considerable residue o f  ill-will, fear, 
distrust, and lack o f  respect permeates both the police community and nonwhite 
ethnic communities vis a vis each other "(Lefkovitz, 1975: 16)
He concludes his review of over eighty studies with the assertion that the 
preponderance of available evidence does suggest a modal police personality 
although there is virtually no data to support the idea that those modalities are 
pathological.
Ker Muir (1977) notes that the studies he cites agree of one aspect of police work:
"... police work in the fie ld  is frightening. Danger lurks unpredictably in every 
encounter" (K e r  M u ir  1977: 292)
C au tio n  and  susp ic ion , inevitab ly , as a resu lt  o f  the  m ilieu  o f  po lic ing , b e c o m e  a 
p ar t  o f  the  po lice  officer 's  d isposit ion . A  co ro lla ry  o f  th is  d isp o s it io n  is a  lack  o f  
trust. T h e  s tudy  o f  the  p sycho log ica l  a ttr ibu tes  o f  po lice  o ff icers  b e ca m e  m o re  
ex ten s iv e  inc lud ing , for exam ple , the  s tudy  o f 'p s y c h o lo g ic a l  types ' b ased  on  the  
Ju n g ian  f ram ew o rk  o f  the M yers  B rigss  T y p e  Ind ica to r (H anev icz , 1978) as well 
as E ysenck 's  P ersona lity  Q uestionna ire  (G u d jo n sso n  and  A d lam , 1983).
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In my own experience, (and in relation to my study) I found that police leaders and 
managers brought scepticism, suspicion and defensiveness to the classroom 
context. There was, for example, plenty of non-verbal evidence to justify this 
observation. They also brought the habitual patterns of conduct that have been 
identified by the more anthropological studies. They were more likely to be 
interested in the person they were encountering rather than the rational processes 
o f appreciating and evaluating their discourse. This would need to be taken into 
account during the actual presentation of an 'ethics education1 experience because 
the audience would be silently asking itself the question: 'How ethical is this 
person, here, in front of me?'
The scholarly study of the British police beginning with Banton (1964) tells a story 
that differs from the American accounts in terms of degree - although there remains 
a broad similarity in relation to the way particular social psychological factors are 
identified and taken to generate a distinct occupational culture and mode of 
apprehending reality.
Reiner (1985) basing his views on an extensive period of studying police 
summarised police culture as 'very pragmatic, concrete, down to earth, and anti 
theoretical'. Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) in a work designed to help with the 
actual practice of managing police, examine the set of determinants or causes by 
which police come to share views about their work and their organisation. In 
common with many writers on the police they recognise the power of the 
'occupational subculture' within which probationary constables are 'soaked' from 
the moment of entry and that therefore:
"... such things as courses in anthropology, 1human awareness1 or group dynamics 
may simply exist as isolated currents and eddies whose impact will be negligible 
against the force o f  a veiy strong tide. ” (Bradley, Wilkie and Walker, 1986: 195)
Bradley, Wilkie and Walker identify three features common to police work that 
influence the 'subjectivity' - the practical reasoning and behaviour - of officers. The 
three features are:
- the moral dilemmas and dangers of policework
- the  in fo rm atio n a l constra in ts  inheren t in po licew o rk
- the  co n tra s ts  in po lice  w o rk  be tw een  the  rou tine  and the p red ic tab le
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They emphasise the significance of the moral dimension of policework and the 
development of strong group cohesiveness in their analysis of the social 
construction of police officers. In relation to the former, they, in common with 
many other students of police, explore the consequences for police, of power 
wielding. For them:
"The basis o f  the police officer's authority consists o f  a legal licence to compel 
others to refrain from  using illegitimate force or engaging in other legally 
prohibited acts. He (sic) is blessed - or cursed - with the attribute o f  coercive 
power, the legitimate capacity to control the conduct o f  others by threatening them 
with harm ... this capacity to apprehend, to arrests, to armlock, to handcuff, to take 
into custody, is always present." (Bradley, Wilkie and Walker 1986: 166)
To examine the dilemmas this creates for police they turn to discuss Ker Muir's 
(1977) work concerning the paradoxes of power thus re-affirming the moral 
dangers to which police are exposed.
Their analysis of police socialisation - which draws heavily from Van Maanen's 
(1973) study of the making of police officers - recognises that police have to learn 
their jobs within a pre-existing system and therefore, however, individual, 
idiosyncratic or 'different' they may be, the simple necessity of taking part in 
organised collective activity ensures participation in a common form of life and the 
appropriation of the norms and values of fellow officers. In fact, Bradley, Wilkie 
and Walker link the initial police training designs with the genesis of a 'total police 
personality' and find that it encourages 'widespread conformity to the ongoing 
organisation and its values'. They also recognise the corollary of group cohesion: 
group exclusivity. They write:
"... there is a definite ’all in the same boat' philosophy, which does not discriminate 
by department, rank or any other criteria. The police are insiders, the public are 
outsiders, and this notion has consequences in terms o f  style and substance. 
Stylistically certain postures require to be struck, whose aims and effects are to 
unify the seiwice and distance it from the public ... it is an attitude o f  clannishness, 
o f strength through unity, o f  group loyalty, one which is most obviously manifested 
in the closing o f  ranks in public." (Bradley, Wilkie and Walker 1986: 196)
T he  features w hich  m ake polic ing  unique w ere  analysed  by the 'Q uality  o f  Serv ice  
com m ittee ' (1992) and d iscussed  u nder  nine headings:
- the w id e  m enu  o f  responsib il it ies
114
- the large degree of discretion
- the uncertainty about the role of the police
- the need for instant decisions
- the reliance upon individual skills, judgement and initiative
- the emotional demands of policing
- the physical dangers of policing
- the influence of the police officer's image
- the exacting demands of the criminal justice system
The authors provide a convincing case that these features of policing have certain 
broadly predictable outcomes which culminate both in creating and sustaining a 
powerful occupational culture. In the course of their analysis, for example, the 
authors of the report make the observation:
"The emotional stress o f  policing cannot be underestimated. Constant exposures 
to suicides (sic) assaults, disputes and conflicts - and in extreme cases ...to  the 
distress o f  physically and sexually abused children - is bound to have serious 
psychological effects. Most police officers gradually develop an automatic defence 
barrier so that they can cope with the frustration o f  not being in a position to solve 
the problems they deal with. In the absence o f  an effective support system ... the 
"canteen culture” is given room to thrive, and the idea that "they", their leaders 
and society in general "do not understand" takes firm  root. ” (Quality of Service 
Committee, 'Getting Things Right' 1992: 25)
A number of patterns emerge from the academic literature which point to the 
distinct psychological development of police officers, to an occupational culture 
marked by solidarity and loyalty, and, to structural features of police work - 
including its historical traditions - which, together, provide an appreciation of the 
way the 'oughts' of police might be attenuated by the 'can'. Richards (1993) 
acknowledges this when, in criticism of his earlier writing (which assumed 
autonomous rational agents), he notes that the social psychological circumstances 
of police are such that the exercise of clear, independent judgement is difficult and
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'the freedom to exercise moral choice is circumscribed in ways that are complex'.
From this discussion it follows that the content of an ethics education, for it to be 
appropriately sensitive to the police condition, should include an appreciation of 
the major dynamics at play in shaping the conduct of police officers. Ethics 
education for police leaders and managers also needed to include an appreciation 
of the specific issues facing those same leaders and managers. As the new 
millennium approached the area of management and organisational ethics had 
received renewed and serious attention. My design for an ethics education needed 
to reflect developments in this field.
Management and organisational ethics
The more recent literature on management and organisational development has 
shown an increasing concern with the ethics of organisations - and some well- 
established concepts such as 'organisational culture' necessarily invite 
considerations of the value structure of organisations.
Maclagan (1991) remarks that there has been a marked rise in interest in business 
ethics in the United Kingdom. He suggests that this emergence of concern could 
be the result of a more general disquiet about values in society and in professional 
practice. He thinks that considerable emphasis has been placed on the function of 
codes of ethics. He finds this consistent with the idea of the professionalisation of 
management (for, as many writers on 'the professions', point out one of their 
distinguishing features is an explicit code of ethics). Maclagan thinks that there is 
a significant difference however, between 'code ethics' that are laid out in 
professional codes and personal moral judgement - which, he believes, is enhanced 
through management development programmes. Maclagan's views are important 
because they reflect a recurring theme in writings on ethics. Thus, he is concerned 
with the question of how moral ideals become integrated into the day-to-day 
practices, conduct, style and manner of individual persons (and/or organisational 
members).
He p recedes  h is  d iscuss ion  concern ing  the practice  o f  m an ag em en t e d u ca tio n  and  
dev e lo p m en t by debating  how , i f  m anagem ent can  be seen as a m oral prac tice , th is  
fea tu re  o f  m an ag e m e n t  is incorpora ted  w ith in  com p eten ce  fram ew o rk s .  H e 
d ism isses  as 'too narrow ' som e current de fin it ions  o f  m an ag em en t c o m p e ten c e  
unless  they  are b roadened  to include moral behav iour . H e adds tha t w h ils t  so m e  
w riters  (no tab ly  B oyatsis , 1982) have included the notion  o f 'm o r a l  m atu rity ' in 
the ir  ana lyses , m any  m ore  techn ica lly  o rien ta ted  com p eten ce  m o d e ls  have
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overlooked the moral dimension. Maclagan continues by discussing the nature of 
moral maturity - and, adhering closely to Kohlberg's (1969) work on moral 
development, he notes that it entails not only a commitment to ideals but also the 
capacity to act accordingly. Building upon Kohlberg’s recognition that there is a 
difference between the capacity for moral reasoning and actual commitments to the 
values and expression of ethical conduct, Maclagan asks what this might mean for 
management and organisational development specialists. He thinks it highlights the 
need for those specialists to identify the 'blockages' that prevent people living up 
to their ideals. Thus, a part of the design for helping managers with the expression 
of ethical conduct entails, in the first instance, the careful identification of those 
barriers and blockages.
When Maclagan turns to consider the actual design of an ethics education for 
managers he argues that if consistent moral conduct is only made possible when a 
person becomes personally committed to the expression of moral values then some 
form of 'experiential' learning design is needed. He thinks that the process of 
management education and development should comprise two phases. The first 
should help learners acquire the capacity for moral reasoning. The second should 
help develop qualities such as 'empathy' and 'the strength of character' to act, if 
need be, against the majority opinion.
He then moves on to provide a more detailed specification of the aims or outcomes 
of programmes aimed at facilitating moral behaviour in organisations. Here, he 
includes cognitive understanding, affective qualities, interpersonal skills and self- 
knowledge. He also includes a reference to the need to address the nature of the 
prevailing occupational culture. Thus, Maclagan begins to frame some of the major 
dimensions that needed to be addressed on any management development 
programme which appreciates the moral dimension of management. His relatively 
holistic model is extended by Snell (1993).
Snell presents an analysis of that range of skills and qualities which he believes 
would equip managers to build and sustain organisations characterised by a 
commendable moral ethos. It follows that a management ethics curriculum would 
have to provide coverage of those areas he details. His specification has similarities 
with some of the ideal practitioner accounts presented by Heron (1989, 1993) - 
illustrating the overlap between radical humanistic education and critical theory.
Snell d iv ides  his model into the cognitive, perform ative and affective. He then finds 
four fu r ther ca tegories :
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"Strategic skills are a blend o f  the cognitive and performative domains. Self-insight 
entails using conceptual skills (cognitive) to make sense o f  emotional experience 
(affective), so is a blend o f  these two domains. Emotional management is a blend 
o f  the performative and the affective, entailing the control or expression o f  
emotions fo r  practical purposes. Core ethical qualities draw on and integrate all 
three domains, necessary when managers face ethical dilemmas and conflicts." 
(Snell, 1993: 182)
He then fills out the details of his scheme and includes more than sixty 'elements' 
under the separate headings. To illustrate its breadth and depth, here, I shall include 
some of its content below:
Cognitive
- developing stage-five or stage-six ethical reasoning capacity (after Kohlberg 
1969)
- distinguishing the ethical from the aesthetic or prudential
- appreciation of wider institutional barriers to ethical conduct
Performative
- assertiveness in taking a moral stand
- capacity to handle conflicts
- presenting oneself as a moral actor
Affective
- emotional integrity
- ethical will and commitment
- spiritual awareness; transcending materialistic 'having' (after Fromm)
Strateg ic
- k n o w in g  h o w  to read the  m oral e thos  o f  o rgan isa tions
- ap p ro ach es  to im p ro v in g  system s and  cu ltu res  for be tte r  m oral co n d u c t
- read ing  the  m icropolit ica l forces in play
E m otional m an ag em en t
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- maintaining critical receptivity to reasoned ethical; arguments
- handling anger and conflict constructively
- remaining resolute in the face of adversity, failure and duality
Self-insight
- understanding one's own values
- appreciating the extent of one's own ethical will/emotional integrity
- identifying and setting aside ulterior motives
Core ethical
- knowing personal stakeholdings (what can be sacrificed and what cannot)
- integrity and authenticity
- ability to detect, understand, act on and learn form ethical dilemmas
- capacity for clear-headed-reasoning under pressure
The comprehensiveness of Snell's framework is related to his concern to develop 
an approach to management ethics that is both pragmatic - in the sense that it 
addresses, sympathetically, the real-life ethical dilemmas of managers - but also 
critical in 'cutting through the comfort zones of conventional business ideology 
with sharp questioning'. Snell's model presents itself as a ready made diagnostic 
structure helping managers and professionals in any organisation ask the question: 
'How well do I 'shape up' in relation to all this?'
His work also includes the detailed elaboration of different types/levels of moral 
ethos as they apply to organisations. In arriving at the concept of a moral ethos he 
asks:
" Is there a 'something'permeating an organisation which constrains or otherwise 
affects the ethical reasoning and actions o f  the individuals within it? I f  this 
'something' exists, what might it be called? What are the salient dimensions o f  this 
'something'?" {Snell,  1993: 67)
W hils t  Snell, inter alia, draw s from  the w ork  o f  Jackall (1988), Jackson  and  C arter  
(1 9 8 3 ) ,  S r ivas ta  and  C o o p err id e r  (1986) and  K ahn  (1990), as he  tracks  d o w n  the  
na tu re  o f  th is  'som eth ing ',  he chooses  to set the tone for his analysis  by referring  to 
Jacka ll (1988) . Jackall observes:
"The moral ethos o f  managerial circles .. is .. most notable fo r its lack of fixedness.
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In the welter o f  practical affairs in the corporate world, morality does not emerge 
from some set o f  internally held convictions or principles, but rather from ongoing, 
albeit changing, relationships with some person, some coterie, some social 
network, some clique that matters to a person. Since these relationships are always 
situational contingent, and in flux, managerial moralities are always situational, 
always relative." (Jackall, 1988: 101)
Snell, then, answers his first question by conceptualising that 'something' which 
permeates an organisation as its 'moral ethos'. He defines it as "a force residing 
outside individuals yet something that individuals may bend to and become part of." 
(Snell, 1993: 71)
Basing his approach upon a critique of Kohlberg's stage model of ethical reasoning 
as well as Lavoie and Culbert (1978), Bird and Walters (1989), and Petrich and 
Wegley's (1992) analyses of the moral climate of organisations, and informed by 
the reasoning of Maclagan (1991), Snell proposes an 'original' model not only 
composed of six types of moral ethos but also featuring sixteen dimensions which 
he describes as the 'salient properties of a moral ethos within organisations'. He 
believes that these sixteen dimensions may be regarded as variables which are not, 
however entirely separate and discrete. The six types of organisational moral ethos
- all based upon the Kolhbergian stages of ethical reasoning - are:
- Fear ridden (stage one)
- Advantage seeking (stage two)
- Members only (stage three)
- Regulated (stage four)
- Quality seeking (stage five)
- Soul sea rch in g  (s tage  six)
Im portan tly , the  s tra teg ic  em p h ases  vo iced  by sen io r  po lice  o ff ice rs  at the  
beg inn ing  o f  the 1990s coincide particularly w ith the  characteristics o f  s tage 5 (and, 
to so m e  ex ten t, s tage  6) o rgan isations. T hus , at least a part o f  m y design  fo r  an 
ethics education  could explore the level o f  organisational deve lopm en t ach ieved  by 
police.
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How though has the ideal police organisation been represented?
Delattre (1993) outlines the characteristics of an 'ethically ideal' police institution. 
He recognises that because of the inevitability of human imperfections it remains 
an impossibility to create such organisations. The ideal remains an aspiration. 
What, for Delattre, would the ideal organisation look like? He answers:
"An ethical organisation would be one with integrity; that is, one where policies 
and practices were forged by consideration o f  morally relevant reasons - such as 
the dignity o f  human beings - rather than from impulse, whim, desire fo r  personal 
gratification, and the like. There would be no 'us against them' attitudes against the 
public and no disrespect fo r  the limits o f  the law . . . In such an organisation, 
policies and conduct would be informed by considerations o f  justice, not only in 
dealing with the public but also in all reward and accountability structures ..." 
(Delattre 1993: 54)
Delattre's model for the ideal police organisation appears to be an extension of his 
notion o f the exemplary police character. Both Snell - in an extended sense and 
Delattre - in a more circumscribed way - offer images of the ideal organisation. In 
educational terms, this specification of the ideal could be used to catalyse 
reflections on the 'moral health' of the police organisation. Through this work I was 
able to develop a 'Moral ethos' questionnaire designed to 'audit' the moral health of 
the police organisation.
Teaching and learning police ethics: The work o f Sherman, Pollock-Byrne, 
Richards and Kleinig
Whilst the academic study of'police' provided a fairly extensive coverage of ethical 
issues, few sources examined the more specific area of the teaching and learning 
of police ethics. In this section I shall concentrate on some of those few published 
and unpublished sources which comment in a direct way upon the teaching and/or 
learning of police ethics. Richards' (1985) paper, 'A plea fo r  applied ethics' 
provides the starting point for the development of ‘ethics’ teaching to police in the 
United Kingdom. However, before examining the work of Richards and that of 
Kleinig - who has certain claims to be credited with authoring the first 
comprehensive and integrated text on police ethics (Kleinig, 1996) - 1 shall refer, 
briefly, to Sherman’s (1982) monograph, ‘Ethics in criminal justice education\ 
and, Pollock-Byrne’s (1993) paper, ‘Teaching criminal justice e th ics .’Sherman’s 
work can be taken as a beginning of the scholarly examination of key issues in 
teaching ethics to criminal justice professionals whilst PollockByrne provides an
121
indication of the state of the art (of teaching ethics to those same professionals) 
shortly after my study had begun. Pollock-Byrne’s paper is, in part, based on his 
reflections following five years worth of teaching criminal justice ethics -  and 
therefore constitutes a very rare account of this form of specialised practice.
Sherman’s text benefited from comments and advice provided by the staff of the 
Hastings Centre, Hastings-on-Hudson, New York. This centre was established in 
1969 to address the ethical problems stemming from rapid developments in 
medicine, biology and the behavioural sciences. It subsequently became concerned 
with professional ethics and with the teaching of ethics to undergraduates and to 
actual (or would be) professionals. Sherman organises his text into a number of 
short chapters each of which addresses a key area in the curriculum design process. 
He first makes the case for teaching ethics to criminal justice professionals, then 
considers the aims of ethics education and, after discussing course content, he 
concludes with an examination of some of the major ‘teaching issues’ such as ‘who 
should teach ethics?’
He underlines the need for ‘ethics’ in the professional training and development of 
the criminal justice professional by making the following observation:
“Few vocations offer as much moral complexity as criminal justice. Few 
occupations are as ethically demanding or as fu ll o f  moral conflicts. No other 
occupation requires its members to make moral judgements about how other people 
have behaved, and then to make and implement moral judgements about how 
society should respond to them. ” (Sherman 1982: 1)
He continues:
“Measured solely by the volume o f moral confrontations andjudgements, it would 
seem that the moral boundaries o f our society are set not by organised religion, not 
by the schools, but by the agents o f  criminal justice. ” (Sherman 1982: 1)
T h en  he observes:
“ Yet it is hard to find an occupation so poorly prepared for its moral tasks. ” 
(S h erm an  1982: 1)
So, S herm an  builds his case  for teach ing  ‘e th ic s ’ to police  and o th e r  ro le-fillers  in 
the crim inal ju s t ic e  system . T he  overall a rg u m en t he subsequen tly  dev e lo p s  in his 
tex t can be su m m arised  as fo llows:
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- There is a serious need for teaching and research on the applied ethics of 
criminal justice because of the powerful and significant effect criminal justice 
personnel can have on the lives and livelihoods of others
- The goals of such courses should include the five general goals identified by the 
Hastings Centre for all teaching (of ethics) in higher education -  as well as three 
that are specific to criminal justice ethics courses. The five general goals are: 
stimulating the moral imagination; developing skills in the recognition of ethical 
issues; developing skills of analysis; eliciting a sense of moral obligation; and, 
fostering an ability to tolerate - and resist -  disagreement and ambiguity. The 
three goals specific to police and other professionals in the criminal justice 
system are: understanding the morality of coercion (especially in the light of 
Ker Muir’s (1977) work; integrating technical and moral competence; and, 
becoming familiar with the full range of moral issues in criminology and 
criminal justice -  such as justice versus law, the use of discretion, rights and 
freedoms.
- The scope of ethical issues is broad; and yet courses should teach students how 
to deal with issues generally rather than what is right for each issue
- Some formal ethical framework is necessary for a rigorous analysis of any 
difficult ethical problem. (Shennan specifically mentions four such frameworks: 
Utilitarianism, Kant’s ethics, Sartre’s existentialism and aRawlsian deontology)
- Professional codes of ethics provide little guidance, creating an even greater 
need for teaching formal ethical frameworks
- Any course or attempt to teach ethics needs to give careful consideration to the 
‘unique’ teaching issues for ethics
S h e rm a n  iden tifies  s ix  such  ‘u n iq u e ’ te ach in g  issues. First, he in tim ates  th a t  
e ffec t ive  teach e rs  o f  ‘e th ic s ’ are  rare. G o o d  teach in g  requ ires  an  in teg ra tion  o f  
e th ica l an a ly s is  w ith  the  concre te  cond itions  and  specific  p rob lem s faced  by  a 
p rac tice  (such  as polic ing). Second, students will have  diverse backgrounds as well 
as d iffe ren tia l  abili t ies  and  capacities. T h ird , the re  rem ained  a dearth  o f  useful 
read in g  m ateria ls  to support  the learning designs. In fact, at the tim e o f  publica tion
- w h ich  occurred  in the sam e year that R ichards introduced has ‘ethics p a ck a g e ’ to 
the  co m m an d  course at Bramshill, Sherm an rem arks that there is a ‘general absence 
o f  the  righ t kind o f  m a te r ia ls ’.) Fourth, it rem ains unclear how  best to sequence  the
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course materials and content. He contended that the teacher of ‘ethics’ faced a 
dilemma; was it best to start with specific ethical dilemmas and build towards an 
awareness of normative ethical theories or was it better to provide the frameworks 
first and then apply them to specific cases? Fifth, Sherman noted that ethics 
teachers or educators needed to consider deploying a wide range o f teaching 
methods and tactics; finally, he simply observed that student evaluation (and the 
evaluation of the course by students) posed a distinct problem. (Here, I should note, 
that Kleinig and Leland Smith’s (1997) admit that the area of ethics teaching which 
has received least attention is that of its evaluation.)
Sherman’s early work provided a basic template helping me consider some of the 
critical issues in teaching ethics. Despite the comparative thoroughness of his 
monograph - and the powerful case he made for the importance of ‘ethics’ in the 
development of criminal justice professionals - a decade later Pollock-Byme (1993) 
reported that there remained real difficulties in assembling appropriate content 
resources for students attending such ‘ethics’ courses. Pollock Byrne acknowledges 
that whilst the pioneering works of Heffernan (1982), Elliston and Bowie (1982) 
as well as Schmalleger and Gustafson (1981) formed the core of a body of 
literature ‘there is a difficulty in adapting the material available to a classroom’. 
Nonetheless Pollock Byrne began teaching criminal justice ethics in 1987 and he 
remarks that:
“ ...it is probably crucial to introduce such concepts as justice versus law, moral 
relativism versus absolutism, teleological versus deontological philosophical, 
approaches and so on. ” (Pollock Byrne 1993: 288)
He goes on to advocate using as wide a variety of teaching methods as possible -  
and concludes by claiming that ‘the most problematic theme of an ethics course 
moral relativism versus moral absolutism’. Pollock-Byrne suggests that the lapse 
into moral relativism - whilst commendable to the extent that it reflects increased 
tolerance - should be countered by pointing out some of its (relativism’s) 
fundamental problems. Here, and especially in the light of Singer’s (1993a) 
repudiation o f moral relativism, I should declare my support for Pollock Byrne’s 
argument.
W hils t the  founda tions  for teach in g  ethics  to police  w ere  b e ing  laid in the  U S A , 
R ichards  had s im u ltaneous ly  constructed  an approach  to te ach in g  c o m m a n d  
personnel in the  police  o rgan isa tion  in the U nited  K ingdom
In his paper, ‘A plea for applied ethics' R ichards ' m ain  o b jec tive  w as  to
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recommend that it (applied ethics) be given 'more attention' in the police service. 
He contrasts the fact that whilst the social sciences have an established place within 
police training, the questions with which ethics deals, i.e. those related to how 
officers should act, are not the subject of any substantial training or educational 
focus. Richards argues that applied ethics holds out certain 'promises' for the 
police. These he identifies as follows:
- the possibility that moral problems will be more fully understood, analysed more 
carefully and made more tractable
- the fact that questions about the values served by an occupation will be addressed 
and the ways in which those ends or values will be legitimately achieved
- the encouraging of reflection on one's personal obligations, the rights and 
obligations of colleagues and the appropriate virtues that should be cultivated
- securing the trust and confidence of the people policed
Whilst Richards' paper discusses each area his initial focus examines the quality of 
trust and confidence that is extended towards the police. He writes:
"The British police service, which was diffidently introduced into a libertarian 
political and social climate, has, throughout the one hundred and fifty years or so 
o f  its existence, managed to combine a high order o f  public acceptance with the 
discharge o f  its duties. Indeed, from its beginnings, its relationship with the public, 
that vast and amorphous body, has been governed by the principle that only by 
gaining its co-operation and trust could it hope to secure the objective o f  helping 
to uphold social order. That it has generally managed, in pursuit o f  this objective, 
to police in a mild and unaggressive (sic) way says much fo r  both police and 
public. However, during the past twenty years there have been considerable social 
changes in British society which have affected all sections o f  it and hence both 
parties to the police-public relationship. Many o f  them undoubtedly made the task 
o f the police in seeking the support o f the public more difficult." (Richards 1985: 
14)
H e m oves  on to exam ine  not only a range o f  social trends and changes in the w ider  
so c ie ty  w h ich  have  altered, in part, the a ttitude  o f  the  pub lic  to police  bu t a lso  
' inc iden ts ,  in ves t iga tions  and inquiries ' that, cum ula tive ly , began  to e rode  pub lic  
c o n f id e n ce  in the  in tegrity  and co m p eten ce  o f  the  po lice  serv ice  in general. H e 
notes:
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" ..The Soho pornography scandal, Operation Countryman, the riots o f  Summer 
1981, the Yorkshire Ripper investigation, Michael Fagan, Grunwick, Lewisham, 
Southall and Blair Peach and similar happenings lent credibility to the growing 
accusations about abuse o f  suspects while in custody, racism, corruption, the 
excessive use o f  force in effecting public order, and scepticism about police 
effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with crime." (Richards, 1985: 15)
Richards contends that the study of applied ethics might assist in mending the 
dislocation in the police/public relationship.
He continues by identifying certain key moral dilemmas in policing - including the 
use of discretion, the practice of deception and, the use (and abuse) of power and 
authority.
He concludes his work with the observation:
if, as I  have argued, the police, in order to enjoy the trust and confidence o f  the 
public, need to police towards worthwhile ends in a morally acceptable manner, 
then applied ethics, as well as such instruments as police codes, are a necessary 
requirement fo r  officers." (Richards 1985: 31)
Richards contends that a study of ethics undertaken by police - and especially 
police managers and leaders - can lead to a range of outcomes including improved 
police/public relationships and the heightened expression of moral values in action.
His earlier design (Richards 1982) for an ethics education included a range of 
background materials that attempted to secure certain of these outcomes. Thus, his 
'police ethics exercise - towards a police professional ethic' concluded with a 
suggested police ethical code, itself intended to supply the governing principles and 
values sustaining and shaping the relationship between the police professional and 
his or her clients. The fact that Richards both articulated and then presented a 
'suggested ethical code' to officers attending the Junior Command Course at the 
Police Staff College indicates his ultimate aspiration for a study of police ethics i.e. 
to guide (or prescribe) conduct. His 'suggested ethical code' was articulated as 
follows:
"As a British police officer and citizen I will, on behalf o f  my fellow citizens:
- detect and prevent crime, apprehend offenders, protect persons and property, and
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by preserving public tranquillity, maintain the queen’s peace
- do my duty and, when situations demand it, be a credit to the Police Service by 
doing it to the limits o f  my capacity
- be fa ir  and impartial to all people, no matter what their social position, race or 
creed, and actively seek the support and goodwill o f  my fellow-citizens
- have a compassionate respect fo r  the dignity o f  the individual and behave to all 
with courtesy, self-control, human understanding and tolerance
- never use more force than is necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose nor 
subject anybody to any form  o f  cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
- strive continually to increase my professional skills so that I  can exercise my 
discretion with ever greater skill and judgement
- uphold the law, observe due legal process and obey orders which conform to such 
law and process
- keep matters o f a confidential nature degree unless the performance ofpolice duty 
requires otherwise
- act with honesty and integrity towards colleagues and fellow-citizens and be 
mindful o f  the reputation o f  the Police Service
The code is deliberately presented in this form to resemble an oath. It is also 
intended to be reasonably memorable and to foster professional pride and self- 
respect in any officer who endeavours to apply it. All the principles in it have the 
quality o f  overridingness; they override non-moral principles .... Thoughtful 
consideration o f  the principles should reveal that they meet the requirements o f  
critical moral thinking, provide moral guidelines for the police code and qualify as 
a professional ethic. ” (R ichards , 1992: 8,9)
T h e  re sem b lan ce  o f  th is  'sugges ted  ethical code' w h ich  rem ained  unpub lished  and 
the  su b se q u e n t  'd raft s ta tem en t o f  ethical princip les ' pub lished  in D e ce m b e r  1992 
is s trik ing . H o w ev er ,  w h ils t  R ichards  genera ted  and  clarified  his a im s for 'po lice  
e th ics ' he did not e lab o ra te  upon  the m ajo r questions  tha t could  be asked  o f  any 
a t tem p t to  crea te  a spec if ic  e th ics  education . H e  p rov ided  a sophistica ted  analysis  
o f  the  'ethics o f  polic ing ' and then relied upon the intelligence o f  s ta f f  and students
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alike to 'progress’ his work both into the classroom and then into practice.
By way of contrast, Kleinig (1990) deals authoritatively and comprehensively with 
the problem of 'teaching and learning police ethics'. In consequence, I shall devote 
some extended attention to his work. The abstract, at the beginning o f his paper, 
points to the issues which he sought to address:
"There is still much confusion over the teaching o f  police ethics, a confusion rooted 
not only in uncertainty about the specific character o f  police ethics but also to the 
varied audiences and contexts fo r  which the teaching is intended" (Kleinig, 1990:
i)
Kleinig's paper attempts to separate out the main questions that the teaching of 
police ethics needs to confront and then proceeds to evaluate, critically, the options 
to which these questions give rise. His paper constitutes a detailed and finely 
argued account identifying and dealing with the main issues facing ethics educators 
in the context of police education. Specifically, Kleinig asks, and then answers 
seven questions:
- In what way is it appropriate to speak of "police ethics"?
- Why ought police ethics be taught?
-T o  whom ought police ethics be taught?
- Where ought police ethics be taught?
- What should police ethics training seek to achieve?
- How should police ethics training be integrated into a curriculum?
- What should be the focus of a police ethics syllabus?
B ecau se  the  resea rch  to  be reported  here, s tar ted  from  such  a frag ile  an d  u n d e r ­
re so u rced  position , the  d iscuss ion  w h ich  K le in ig  advances  in re la tion  to  each  
q u es t io n  is pa r ticu la rly  im portan t. In a sense, these  questions  rep resen t a logical 
s ta r t ing  po in t for bu ild ing  a police  eth ics  educa tion .
In w h a t  w ay  is it appropria te  to speak  o f  "police  e th ics"?
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Kleinig argues that although there are good grounds to conceive of police as 
distinct in social and cultural ways, to speak of something distinctive and particular, 
i.e. ‘police ethics’ is to fail to grasp the nature of ethics itself. Just as Mackie (1977) 
understood ethics to be connected with examining the nature of 'good life' so, 
Kleinig endorses the view that ethics is to do with what we are as human beings.
More recently, Kleinig (1996) has defined ethics in the following terms:
".. ethics is the most fundamental currency o f  human interaction. The language o f  
ethics is the universal coinage that enables us to relate to each other as human 
beings. It's what distinguishes us from robots, animals, and mere functionaries. I f  
I  can try a compact but general definition: Ethics is concerned with what we are, 
in our relations with each other, whether we conceive o f  those relations 
individually, collectively, or institutionally. Note where the emphasis lies: not ju st 
on what we do, but with what we are in what we do. Ethics is concerned with 
character, with attitudes, with reasons and with intentions as they fin d  expression 
in our dealings with others.." (Kleinig 1996: 3-4)
So, Kleinig is keen to argue that morality is concerned with 'being' and 'doing' at 
the most fundamental level. It is concerned with people's shared humanity. 
Therefore, discussions on ethics need to begin with understanding the nature of 
ethics - and humanity - itself.
Nonetheless, there is something distinctive about police work which places police 
in positions that most ordinary humans are spared. Kleinig puts it as follows:
"Police, by virtue o f  their function either on the borderlands o f  sociality or in 'in 
extremis' circumstances, are frequently faced with decisions that most o f  us are 
spared, decisions rarely confronted in the regular rhythms o f  life. A police ethic 
must be concerned with decision making under those circumstances, with a human 
response to situations that are often structured by the subhuman and misanthropic 
and that tend to invite the same from those who investigate them. "(Kleinig 1990:
3)
K le in ig  accep ts  tha t  the re  is a case  to unders tand  po lice  e th ics  in te rm s o f  ro le  
o ccupancy  but he prefers to understand  role occupancy as a m orally  significant fact 
ab o u t a person 's  c ircum stances  rather than to see it as genera ting  a particu lar ethic. 
In consequence , since police ethics is sim ply a dom ain  characterised by a particular 
focus  ra ther than  a d is tinc t set o f  va lues  it, police e th ics, can n o t be d ivo rced  from  
social and  political ethics.
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Why ought police ethics be taught?
Whilst it is not too difficult to argue for and justify the teaching of ethics in general 
precisely because the interpersonal and institutional world is 'shot through' with 
ethical concerns - meeting and greeting, making reparation for wrongs, concerns 
to achieve impartiality and fairness etc., - what further need is there that something 
called ‘police ethics’ be developed and 'taught'? The answer is to be found in the 
distinct, specific and particular nature of police work. Kleinig describes six features 
of such work which suggest that an ethical awareness might be helpful to police 
personnel in the quest for worthwhile objectives achieved through morally 
acceptable means. Those six features are:
- The authority and discretion which police are given and possess
- Operating in contexts of abnormality where the ordinary constraints of morality 
have little meaning i.e. dealing with the psychopathic, the sociopathic, the 
irrational, the insane, the hopeless, the sad and the dispossessed
- Responding to crisis and emergency situations
- The legal and organisational imperatives to intervene in situations that others may 
have only a moral, and not a 'mandatory' responsibility in which to become 
involved
- The fact that police officers are subject to much greater temptations than others. 
Kleinig gives this latter point an interesting twist indicating that whilst some social 
currency can be earned by most of us if we adopt a 'nice/O.K.' persona this might 
well constitute a dereliction of duty on the part of a police officer
- The high degree of peer pressure to conform to group norms.
On this latter point, Kleinig writes:
"If this is not to be destructive o f  moral autonomy, a very high degree o f  moral 
courage may be required." (K le in ig  1990: 4)
In the light o f  this distinct set o f  social psychological features, Kleinig's v iew  is that 
it can n o t  be p re su m ed  that those  w ho  en ter  police  w o rk  will be p repared  for its 
m oral cha llenges . He seem s to suggest tha t because  the  na ture  o f  po lice  w o rk  is
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sufficiently distinct and atypical it requires an engagement with a distinct subject, 
‘police ethics’. Thus he writes:
"Even though police ethics is continuous with ethics and police are called to 
respond in an appropriately human way to the situations that are their 
responsibility, those situations are sufficiently atypical to demand responses fo r  
which the ordinary affairs o f  life provide no adequate preparation. "(K le in ig  1990:
4)
To whom ought police ethics be taught?
A first response to this question is simple; police themselves must be the primary 
recipients and beneficiaries of an ethics education. But all sorts of questions 
concerning the timing, level, content and depth of such an ethics education are 
more difficult to answer. Moreover, at certain loci of the police organisation - e.g. 
supervisory and managerial ranks, it is difficult to establish when and what ethics 
education to impart.
Where should police ethics be taught?
This is difficult to answer. Whilst it is in the ’academy* that conditions are likely to 
be most facilitative for considered and undisturbed ethical investigation and 
reflection, it is in the workplace itself that the main influences creating the ethical 
dilemmas issues and problems reside. In this sense, those educational programmes 
committed to action research and action learning might well be stronger candidates 
for an effective ethics education than programmes more detached from the 
problems o f ’practice’.
What should police ethics training seek to achieve?
This stands as one of the more basic and fundamental questions influencing this 
research inquiry. Plainly, since part of the research process has been concerned to 
develop an ethics education for police managers and leaders, a detailed analysis of 
the aims of an ethics education has constituted a significant part of the inquiry 
process. Here, only the initial statements and discussion by Kleinig will be 
reported. Kleinig argues that a police ethics course might have three general aims. 
These he describes as:
- T h e  re in fo rcem en t o f  m oral reso lve
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- Moral sensitisation
- The imparting of moral expertise
Kleinig subjects each area (or aim) to a moderately extended discussion. Implicit 
in his analysis is a recognition of the importance of concepts and the language of 
ethics in providing the frameworks through which to view and understand the 
moral world as well as providing, through the use of language, the speech acts 
serving to make moral encounters more manageable and tractable.
Before examining each of the three aims Kleinig posits for a police ethics training, 
he notes that, whilst a variety a purposes may be served by such training, the 
educational process and its outcomes should not be concerned to 'deliver' a general 
moral education. He writes:
"What I  think needs to be assumed about all contexts in which police ethics is 
taught is that its teaching is not intended to provide a general moral education. Not 
only is it inappropriate to expect any course to do that, but it must be presumed that 
those who undertake a course in police ethics will come to it with reasonably well- 
developed moral personalities and dispositional goodwill." (Kleinig 1990: 8)
What does Kleinig mean by 'the reinforcement of moral resolve'? It means that, 
because police work subjects officers to pressures that are unusual in nature and 
especially morally demanding, an engagement with police ethics may, as it were, 
'inoculate' officers against some - or all - of those stresses and pressures; in short, 
it may reinforce their moral resolve. Kleinig writes:
"The purpose o f  a course in police ethics may be seen to promote the closer 
correspondence between belief and action, between commitment and conduct, 
between intention and behaviour. Its goal will be to counter akrasia - weakness o f  
will, the failure o f  moral nerve, susceptibility to temptation, loss o f  se lf control." 
(Kleinig 1990: 8)
In th is  sense , the  idea o f  re in fo rc ing  m oral reso lve  is to he lp  o ff icers  su s ta in  an d  
m aintain  the ir  standards o f  decency  and their endorsem ent o f  moral princip les  such  
as co m p ass io n , b enevo lence , to le rance  and ju s t ice .  M ora l sens it isa tion  is m o re  
co n ce rn ed  w ith  the  d ev e lo p m en t o f  moral capacities. It canno t be a ssu m e d  tha t 
peop le  en te r in g  the po lice  occupation  have ach ieved  full m oral d e v e lo p m en t.  
Indeed, it cou ld  be argued  that such persons will have  so m eth in g  o f  a co n tex t-  
specific  m oral ou tlook  reflecting the particular values o f  a social class and  cultural
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tradition. This might not be the best preparation for a career where moral diversity 
is inevitable. So, one of the major goals of police ethics may be seen as the 
development of moral sensitisation where moral depth and breadth is nurtured.
"It will be acknowledged that although police recruits have been morally trained, 
individually they will reflect the influence o f  diverse and partisan moral traditions, 
traditions from  which, in certain respects, they need to be freed. A police ethics 
course may have as its purpose fostering the acceptance o f  certain "culturally 
universal" moral understandings, suited to the work recruits will be undertaking. 
The various police codes o f  ethics might be seen as providing that universal moral 
core in which respect fo r  the persons o f  others will be articulated in a manner 
relevant to police work." (Kleinig 1990: 9)
However, whilst Kleinig advocates moral sensitisation as one of the most important 
aims of police ethics training, he does not regard it as the most important aim. It is 
here that he intimates his concern to help officers develop, through language, the 
ability to articulate existing moral sensibilities and appreciations:
"... moral sensitisation ought not to be seen as the primary focus o f  a programme 
in police ethics. For the most part, a lack o f  moral sensitivity is not the problem  
firs t experienced by police officers. It is, rather, an inability to articulate and 
express sensitivities already acquired. It is a lack o f  expertise in reflecting 
creatively on the complex circumstances o f  police decision making that is most 
lacking, a lack that subsequently expresses itself in a form o f  moral desensitisation 
and cynicism. "(Kleinig 1990: 10)
T hus , K le in ig  ushers  in tha t aspec t o f  police  ethics tra in ing  and  educa tion  to  w h ich  
he  w ish es  to  g ive  m o s t  w eigh t, the  'im parting ' o f  m ora l expertise . M o ra l exper tise  
re fe rs ,  in part, to  the  ab ility  to  u n d e rs tan d  an d  re f lec t  im ag in a tiv e ly  an d  
sy s te m a tic a l ly  ab o u t p o lic in g  an d  its s itua tional dem an d s . A  p r im ary  c la im  
a d v a n c e d  by  K le in ig  is th a t  th ro u g h  the  im p artin g  o f  m ora l exper tise  - v ia  
p ro g ra m m e s  in po lice  e th ics  tra in ing  and  ed u ca tio n  - those  tw o  o ther  goa ls  o f  
in c reas in g  m ora l reso lve  and  d ev e lo p in g  m oral sens it isa tion  w ill  'be e ffec t ive ly  
pu rsu ed '.  T h e  no tion  o f  m ora l expertise  m igh t be tak en  to  lie at the  h ear t  o f  
K le in ig 's  co n cep tu a lisa t io n  o f  the  a im s for police  e th ics  tra in in g  and  educa tion . 
U n p a c k in g  the  m ean ing  o f  m oral expertise  is no easy  m anner , and , sadly , K le in ig  
does  not im m edia te ly  exam ine  h ow  such moral expertise  m ay be acquired  th rough  
c o n s tru c t in g  an e th ics  ed uca tion  in general (or a po lice  e th ics  ed uca tion  in 
particu lar). H ow ever, he does set out to answ er the question, 'w hat is m ean t by the 
d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  moral expertise? ' His answ er raises questions  co ncern ing  the very
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nature of human nature, as well as issues concerned with the fundamentals of 
human psychology. He writes:
what is meant by the development o f  moral expertise[?]. Morally significant 
conduct is probably the peculiar preserve o f  human beings. It is assignable to them 
because o f  their capacity fo r reflective self-evaluation, whereby their behaviour is 
rendered subject to choice and is not characterizable as the merely instinctive - or 
even learned - reflexive response to some stimulus. The ability to make such 
choices and to make them well is learned. Though it includes much more than the 
development o f  rational skills - even in a broad sense - the development o f  those 
skills does encourage and provide fo r  an ever expanding and deepening 
appreciation o f  (at least) the world o f  human transactions. Moral expertise deepens 
and shapes respect fo r  persons that is at the heart o f  moral sensitivity." (Kleinig 
1990: 11)
In relation to the task of developing an ethics education for police this passage 
might stand as one of the most significant foundational statements identifying as 
it does, certain critical issues which police themselves (and especially police 
leaders, managers and administrators) need to engage with, examine, and explore. 
Although he does not commit himself to the specific means and methods which 
might impart moral expertise, Kleinig points, implicitly, to some clear ‘candidates’ 
in his final section entitled, 'What should be the focus of police ethics syllabus?'
More recently, Kleinig (1996) in a personal communication, has illustrated his 
methodology by presenting a clear articulation of certain key concepts - 
professionalism, accountability, loyalty and cynicism - the consideration of which 
and, the understanding of which, provide (in this case) police leaders with a 
scaffolding to support their choices, reflections and decisions, as well as the 
positions they might take, in relation to individual, collective and institutional 
actions.
H o w  sh o u ld  po lice  e th ics  be in teg ra ted  into the  cu rr icu lu m ?
K lein ig  asks: Should  it be com pulsory  or optional? Should  it be taught as a separate  
course  o r  inc luded  as an ing red ien t in m an y  co u rses?  H o w  does  th e  o v e rt  
cu rr icu lu m  in po lice  eth ics  re la te  to the covert  cu rr icu lu m  o f  po lice  tra in in g ?
Since po lic in g  is, at bottom , concerned  with es tab lish ing  cond itions  w ith in  w hich  
h u m an ity  m ay  en joy  m eeting  its w ants, needs  and in terests  it is d iff icu lt  to a rgue  
aga ins t  the  co m p u lso ry  nature  o f  e th ics teach ing . It rem ains  d iff icu l t  to  d ec ide
134
whether ethics should be separated from the remainder of police courses content 
and given a separate focus or whether it should be threaded throughout the 
curriculum. In reality, it seems that it is more problematic to sustain an integrated 
focus and that a separate course enables detailed and sustained attention to be given 
to the recurring ethical problems confronting police.
What should be the focus of a police ethics syllabus?
Kleinig decides that there should be four elements or aspects:
- A general introduction to moral philosophy
- Examining codes of police ethics
- Case studies
- Middle level inquiries
Taking each of the above in turn, the purpose of a general course in moral 
philosophy is to identify the basic content of ethics such that, provided the course 
is well presented, order, comprehension and connectedness are brought to bear on 
the otherwise confused and inarticulate experiences and capacities of inexperienced 
police officers which are demonstrated when confronted with the unexpected, 
unusual, or, quite simply, the more complex of moral issues. Because moral 
'education' largely takes place in a context of habitualised social practices and 
conventions - i.e. we do not hold up to a critical or conceptual eye either our own 
social and psychological development or the moral principles and the content of our 
ethical systems - the generality of people (and police officers) simply have not 
decisional control over ethical deliberation and action.
T h e  p u rp o se  o f  ex am in in g  codes  o f  e th ics  is, in part, to avo id  the  p ro b le m  o f  
re m o te n ess  th a t  co u rses  in m ora l p h ilo so p h y  can  engender. C odes  o f  e th ics  fo r  
p o lice  re p re sen t  genera l  s ta tem en ts  o f  po lice  e th ical responsib il i ty  ta ilo red  to  the  
con tex ts  o f  policing. T hey  also prov ide  som e articulation o f  the  issues w hich  police 
are to take especially  seriously and can act as a  guide for practical decision m aking. 
N o n e th e le ss  they  have  a set o f  particular w eaknesses  both  i f  they were to constitu te  
the  sole focus for an e th ics education and because  they  tend  to be treated as i f  they  
w ere  legal dev ices ;  in co n seq u en ce  they  tend  no t to invoke and excite  the  
m o tiv a t io n a l  factors w h ich  are at the  heart o f  gen u in e  ethical decis ion  tak ing .
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Case studies root the examination of police ethics education in 'real life'. Case 
studies enable learners to appreciate the complexities of real life and the host of 
factors and considerations which must be taken into account to achieve a morally 
sophisticated and wise decision. Kleinig is relatively emphatic on this point:
"I  am convinced that i f  a course in police ethics is to be o f  real assistance and 
value to law-enforcement personnel, it will need to make a judicious use o f  case 
studies. Only so will the skills o f  decision making in complex and morally 
ambiguous situations be realistically developed. Only via the concrete 
circumstances ofpolice work will students be able to trace the forms o f  inquiry that 
lead ultimately to the most general questions o f  moral theory. I f  those ties to the 
lived world can be established, then students will be initiated into an ongoing 
enterprise o f  reflective deliberation, focused enough fo r  the practical purposes o f  
their lives, yet open to the continual reevaluation that characterises the mature 
and autonomous moral personality. "(Kleinig 1990: 15)
Finally, 'Middle-level inquiries' refers to the investigation of those issues such as 
authority, discretion, deception, coercion, resource allocation etc. which should be 
focused in terms of the way they present themselves in police work. They are 
referred to as 'middle-level inquiries' because, pressed in one direction they give 
rise to the more general questions in ethics to do with justice, freedom etc. and to 
the abstract debates of ethical theory, pressed in another, they manifest themselves 
in particular and concrete situations. As such, middle-level inquiries present 
themselves as sensible candidates to include in programmes of police ethics.
Thus, Kleinig provided both a comprehensive framework and a tightly argued 
rationale for determining, inter alia, the content of an ethics education for police 
in general.
All th ese  au tho rs  h ad  d iscussed  the  a im s for e th ics  educa tion . T h e y  h a d  d ra w n  
a t ten tion  to  the  po ss ib il i ty  tha t eth ics  ed u ca tio n  m ig h t  lead to  m o re  p r in c ip le d  
conduct and  to securing  a p roper re lationship betw een the police  and  those  policed . 
A s th is  inqu iry  p ro g ressed  I learned  (K le in ig  and  L e land  S m ith  1997) th a t  so m e  
subtly  different am bitions  were to be articulated for ethics education. H o w ever , m y  
first ta sk  w as  to  d e te rm in e  the  a im s o f  an e th ics  educa tion  ex p er ien ce  th a t  I w as  
co n s tru c tin g  for the  Po lice  L eadersh ip  D ev e lo p m en t P ro g ram m e. S ince  it w as  
unrea lis t ic  to expec t tha t a short experience  w ou ld  lead to ch an g es  in c o n d u c t  I 
th o u g h t  it sens ib le  to try and ach ieve  an aw areness  o f  the  na ture  o f  the  su b jec t  
eth ics  and to 'b ring  it alive ' for police  officers.
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In addition to Richards’ (1985) and Kleinig's (1990) discussions concerning the 
’promise’ o f applied ethics and the aims that a study of ethics might attain, other 
materials relevant to constructing an ethics educational experience had also been 
produced in the United Kingdom. These included a range of historical writings on 
police beginning with Colquhoun's 'A treatise on the Police of the Metropolis’ and 
continuing through the work of a number of police historians such as Reith (1938), 
Critchley (1967) and Palmer (1988). I thought it sensible (because many police 
officers are interested in ’history') to include a reference to Colquhoun’s work in my 
first presentation of 'ethics' to police as it represents a major starting point for 
discussion concerning the priorities of the police function. Writing in an evocative 
and persuasive style, Colquhoun (1806) articulates a moral basis for police 
stemming in part from a traditional concern with law and order but also from a 
’scientific' concern with the prevention of crime and those conditions facilitative of 
crime and delinquency. It is also possible to discern, in his writing, an appeal to the 
moral status and dignity of the policing function.
He wanted to see proper rewards and emoluments for constables, appropriate 
numbers constituted to carry out their functions, and, proper management and 
training. The latter recommendation included the following counsel:
" .. it should be the business o f  the parochial Chief Constable ...to  impress upon 
their minds the necessity ofpurity, vigilance, and attention to orders - and o f  being 
humane, prudent and vigorous, in the execution o f  such duties as belong to their 
functions." (Colquhoun, 1806: 407, 408)
Thus, Colquhoun's text illustrates less a reliance upon a contractarian rationale for 
police but a recognition that the office of constable is central to the wellbeing of the 
citizenry, an office which must be animated through the expression of a set of 
characterological virtues. (The excerpts from Colquhoun’s work that I provided as 
a resource for police are included at Appendix D.)
T h is  e m p h as is  u p o n  'character ' w as  m ade  exp lic it  in S ir  R ich ard  M ay n e 's  
ins truc tions  to the  M etropo litan  Police  in 1829 w herein , for exam ple  he  s ta ted  tha t 
th e re  w as  n o th in g  m o re  im p o r tan t  for a po lice  o ff icer  th an  a 'perfec t c o m m a n d  o f  
tem per '.  It finds i tse lf  re-v iv if ied  in the w ritings o f  L augharne  and N e w m a n  and is 
re flec ted  in the  co n ten t  o f  the  draft s ta tem ent o f  e th ical p rinc ip les .
A concluding comment
T h e  scho la r ly  li te ra tu re  re levan t to co ns truc ting  an e th ics  educa tion  for police
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suggests that many subjects have a rightful claim to be included amongst its 
content. The social psychological and sociological writings highlight the 
significance of personality and character development, as well as the implications 
stemming from identifications with an 'in group' and group cohesiveness. Problems 
of loyalty and impartiality are an inevitable consequence. This, and more general 
literature on police, also points to the importance of questions concerning their role 
and its attendant duties, and, the demands of'professionalism'. The emerging study 
of police ethics highlights questions concerning the uses and abuses of power and 
authority, the nature of discretion, the use of deception, problems emerging from 
specific police practices such as undercover work and the use of informants, 
tensions between due process and crime control, and, a number of ethical issues 
connected with the police organisation - such as equal opportunities.
When some writings in the field of management and organisations are applied to 
police a number of questions emerge concerning the ability of police leaders and 
managers to deploy ethical skills. In addition, that literature indicates possible ways 
of auditing the 'ethical health' of the police organisation.
In consequence I had a considerable resource base from which to draw as I 
developed the actual content of an ethics education.
Part Two
Clarifying the educational emphasis
A new course of study, 'The Leadership Development Programme' was being 
planned to replace the existing 'Junior Command Course' in the Autumn of 1993 
and I was asked by the Dean of Studies at the College, in the spring of 1993, to 
develop the curriculum for the new course. The first three weeks of the seven-week 
programme were to be devoted to 'self-development' whilst the latter four weeks 
would be given over to 'focused modules' of study such as 'Human Resource 
Development', 'Financial Management' and 'European integration'. I decided to use 
the authority invested in my role to include a one and one-half day 'Ethics' module 
on the Leadership Development Programme. In consequence, in addition to 
providing materials for the new course as a whole, I had the specific task of 
creating an 'ethics' educational design for the middle managers of the police 
service. Prior to this development I would have the opportunity to develop two 
lectures on ethics and present them to the Junior Command Course.
Richards (1985, 1993) and Kleinig (1990) had begun the task of providing a clear
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indication of the subjects that could be included in a police ethics education as well 
as pointers to the way such an education might be conducted. Snell (1993) had 
developed an analysis and critique of the form and content of different curricula 
emphases in management ethics education. After clarifying Snell's 'critically 
pragmatic' approach to a management ethics education I shall suggest that this 
model shares many of the features of emancipatory action research. In 
consequence, Snell's design co-incided with my long term aspiration to conduct 
emancipatory action research.
He begins his discussion of the different types of curriculum by highlighting the 
way learning designs convey powerful and significant messages:
"Much socialisation is implicit and unconscious, taking place day-to-day through 
conversations and incidental observation andfeedback. There may also be a formal 
training or educational element [ the management development programme etc.], 
involving instruction, demonstration and possibly testing. Within this form al 
element there will be implicit socialisation currents as well as explicit ones, since 
the moral ethos is expressed in the nature o f  s ta ff learner, s ta ff  sta ff and learner- 
learner interactions and transactions ...” (Snell 1993: 172)
Snell's appreciation of the significance of interactions taking place throughout 
management development courses resonates with Peters (1966) earlier analysis of 
'education'. Peters argued that if something were to count as education then it 
needed to meet criteria concerning its matter, its manner and its cognitive content. 
Its matter had to be considered worthwhile by those committed to it. Its manner 
needed to be contrasted with conditioning or indoctrination. Finally, its cognitive 
content needed to be directed at helping a person transform their outlook. Thus, 
both Peters and Snell are alert to the value-paradigm that lies embedded in the 
overall enactment of the curriculum.
B efo re  he  ou tlines  the  p rac tice  o f  severa l p rinc ip les  o f  a  crit ica lly  p rag m a tic  
e d u ca t io n  he  d iscusses  the  sh o r tco m in g s  o f  o ther cu rr icu la r  em phases . Snell 
suggests  tha t the  presen ta tion  o f  m anagem en t ethics w hich  takes  as its basic  form al 
p u rp o se  so c ia lisa tion  into the  co m p an y  (or occupa tion ) em p h as ises  ru les  and  
p ro ced u res ,  codes  o f  ethics, s tak eh o ld e r  responsibility , tru s tw orth iness  in ro le  and  
bes t  prac tice . H e recognises  tha t  the  m ajo r concern  w ith  th is  app roach  is to m ould  
the  c o m p a n y  m e m b e r  to the  p rev a il in g  norm s, a ttitudes and  perspec tives  w ith in  a 
p a r t icu la r  g roup . He be lieves  tha t th is  type  o f  learn ing  design  reflects  ’s tage  four' 
p rincip les  (i.e. rules and procedures) although the actual course  content can suggest 
c o n ce rn s  w ith  p lura lism , u tili ta r ian ism , ju s t ice  and the R aw ls ian  'm ax im in '
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principle. He moves on, however, to capture a major problem likely to be 
encountered in this kind of programme and writes:
"Some company socialisation programmes, where what the company wants is 
clearly spelt out may, however, turn out to be counter productive in ethical terms. 
This is because the moral ethos o f  the programme may have a much greater impact 
on participants' ethical conduct than any formal message or learning agenda. An 
emphasis on conformity may simply tap into stage-three ('be nice') urges among 
participants to be seen to f i t  in with what is wanted, or even stage-two (’get the 
most fo r  yourself)  mentality: it is to their advantage to appear to care about ethics. 
Medium and message need to be aligned..." (Snell 1993: 174)
Snell finds that the fundamental problem with the socialisation approach is that it 
can merely hope that the moral ethos (including the course itself) will support the 
ideals espoused on the programme. There appears to be little evidence that this is 
the case.
The 'cultural transmission/academic grounding approach relies on disseminating 
that body (or those bodies) of knowledge grown from within the academic 
communities. Snell thinks that:
"Management ethics education moulded and delivered in this tradition presents 
students with a selection o f  theories about ethics in a management context which 
have earned respect in academic circles. The preoccupations, issues and dilemmas 
(among academics) that have given rise to the theories also figure in the 
curriculum... "(Snell 1993: 175)
Perhaps a little unfairly, Snell contends that the 'academic grounding' approach 
remains 'deliberately inward looking' and is unconcerned with practical problems 
such as 'how to run a company on a sound ethical basis'. Nonetheless, the 
esoterically technical and obfuscatory language of'high culture' does mean that this 
approach simply remains too inaccessible for most practitioners. It is probably 
unhelpful in relation to making a difference to practice.
Snell has k in d e r  th ings  to say abou t a cu rr icu lu m  em p h as is  tha t  s tresses  'c i t izen  
educa tion  and personal developm ent'.  He be lieves  tha t 'citizen educa tion ' sets  out:
"... to encourage other-centredness. sensitivity to social and communal phenomena 
and a general ability to enact stage five [Kohlbergian] principles. " (Snell 1993: 
176)
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To be a good citizen entails personal development - and so citizen education is 
linked to a focus upon the personhood of the individual. Here, according to Snell, 
there is a major emphasis on a respect for one’s rights rather than on the wider 
questions about collective responsibilities, communal obligations and civil liberties. 
Snell distances himself from the person-centred approach he perceives in 
Maclagan's work, writing:
"While the curriculum supported by Maclagan (1992) is extensive ...a t least one 
key element is missing. Education for citizenship and personal development focuses 
exclusively on the problems o f  individuals. The shortcomings o f  a typical moral 
ethos - a collective problem i f  ever there was one - tend not to be addressed. '(Snell 
1993:177)
Here, as Snell leads his readership to consider the appeal of 'critical pragmatism1 
he raises the question ignored by the ’citizen education/personal development' 
approach: 'Why are things as bad for us as they are?'
In contrast to all these different emphases, education based upon a critically 
pragmatic perspective takes as its ultimate aim the removal of the barriers to the 
creation of better collective arrangements.
Snell takes the starting point for critical reflection the 'creative examination' of 
one's own day to day experience. Freire's (1972) pedagogy of the oppressed 
provides an example of a form of critical education. Here, using drawings of 
everyday encounters Freire was able to generate open discussions of 'power 
dynamics within an oppressed community'. Snell also cites Postman and 
Weingartner's (1969) work as illustrative of a critical approach to education. They 
enunciate one of its major principles in relation to the purpose of schools as 
follows:
"Our intellectual histoiy is a chronicle o f the anguish and suffering ofmen(sic) who 
tried to help their contemporaries see that some part o f  their fondest beliefs were 
misconceptions, faulty assumptions, superstitions and even downright lies." 
(P o s tm a n  and  W ein g a r tn e r  1969: 16)
H e a lso  cites  W alk e r  and  B oud  (1992) w ho  advoca te  the im portance  o f  critical 
re f lec tion  in the  p rocess  o f  unve il ing  u nconsc ious  restra in ts  and  de te rm in ed  
p a tte rns  o f  behav iour .
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Critical reflection as part of a critically pragmatic education moves from a focus 
on the limitations to which a self has been subject to a focus on the collectivity - 
and hence the possibility of social transformation. Snell writes:
"Educating fo r  the purpose o f  social transformation entails helping participants to 
draw connections between what appear, without critical reflection, to be a set o f  
individual problems. This paves the way fo r  the creative design o f  collective 
innovations and fo r  the development ofpolitical skills. The underlying aim is to 
equip social activists with the ability to envisage direction fo r  their community and 
openly negotiate ways forward with other members. " (Snell 1993: 179)
The fact that critical pragmatism promises to help initiate processes of social 
transformation links managers to forms of moral leadership. If  the educational 
process is concerned to examine limiting perspectives and the limiting social milieu 
generating these perspectives and then moves on to examine how to remove these 
limitations it is engaged in a process of exposing injustices. If persons who 
experience this mode of education and development subsequently act to reduce 
injustices then they are engaged in the practice of moral leadership.
He finds, however, that a critically pragmatic education is atypical in management 
development programmes. Citing the work of Anthony (1986) it appears that, at 
best, a critical approach to management might appear on MBA electives. The 
situation in 'staff colleges' is even worse. Indeed, of these contexts Anthony 
remarks:
"What cannot be permitted is the sort o f  rigorous analysis that would expose the 
company’s policies as platitudinous and its objectives confused. It is often not 
corporate good that is pursued through management education, it is a particular 
view o f  the corporation and o f  its 'goals’, generated by its chief executive and 
protectedfrom critical attention by its management trainers. "(Anthony 1986: 137)
Snell moves on to explain the practice of several principles in a critically pragmatic 
education. These principles include:
- advocating and defending the philosophy of critical pragmatism
- s ta f f  as gu ides, su pportive  s tew ards, and critical, re flex ive  co-learners
- re co g n is in g  peer expertise
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- grounding discovery in personal experience, subjecting it to critical reflection and 
reflexivity
- collective choice, responsibility, management and support
- maintaining a stage-five or stage-six moral ethos/learning climate
These principles illustrate the similarities between Snell's critical pragmatism and 
emancipatory action research. They can both be re-described as a form of inquiry 
emphasising a way of learning and developing which seeks both to release persons 
from restrictive psycho and social dynamics and to create social arrangements 
governed by robust ethical principles such as justice, benevolence, autonomy and 
pluralism.
Design constraints
Immediately having articulated the principles of a critically pragmatic education, 
Snell adds that these principles do not apply to short, 'one-off workshops, seminars 
or conferences for managers because, at best these could only be 'tasters' for the 
more extensive educational processes attempting to make the principles come alive. 
I shall return to consider the implications of this observation when I note the 'design 
constraints' below.
Significantly, for the design of my inquiry, at the very conclusion of his text Snell 
recognises the 'institutional challenge' facing any design which embraces the 
principles of critical pragmatism and a stage-five moral ethos. Why does he make 
this assumption? He answers this by referring to five pre-suppositions. They are:
- The moral ethos in which management educators and developers work is typically 
at stage four or lower
- The moral ethos of a course is typically at stage four or lower
- The prevailing educational philosophy is typically very different from one of 
critical pragmatism
- T h o se  a sp ir ing  to stage-five conduct will be under pressure  to 'level dow n', i.e. to 
act in a cco rd an ce  w ith  the  p reva il ing  m oral e thos  w hich  is at a low er s tage
- C ritica l p ragm atis ts  will be u nder  p ressure  to con fo rm  to 'norm al' educa tiona l
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principles and practices
In response to his challenge, ’If these assumptions do not ring true in your situation, 
ask your self: Am I seeing the world through rose-coloured spectacles?' I 
considered the extent to which his pre-suppositions accurately reflected the realities 
o f the Police Staff College.
Was the moral ethos in which the management educators and developers worked 
a stage four (or lower) ethos? To the extent that the dominant culture within the 
Police Staff College was a police culture and that this culture was perhaps best 
characterised by a stage four moral ethos then this first pre-supposition is 
supported.
Was the moral ethos of the management development course itself at stage four or 
lower? No straightforward answer can be given to this question. The emphasis on 
’facilitation and student centred learning' was on the wane. The competence 
framework of the Management Charter Initiative was serving as a backdrop to the 
middle management programme(s) and the 'new managerialism' with its emphasis 
upon performance indicators and performance management was creating a new 
atmosphere of discipline and rigour, as well as control and conformity. Together 
these factors made it difficult to see how the course milieu genuinely rose above 
stage four.
Was the prevailing educational philosophy very different from one o f critical 
pragmatism? The course philosophies were admixtures of occupational 
socialisation, rites de passage, and holistic personal development. There was, in 
fact, almost a complete absence of any critical perspective voiced by Snell with his 
question; 'Why are things as bad for us as they are? or by action researchers in the 
emancipatory tradition of Carr and Kemmis with their concerns to help unshackle 
people from the rigid bonds of restrictive social and political structures.
Did those aspiring to stage-five conduct find themselves under pressure to 'level 
down', i.e. to act in accordance with the prevailing lower-stage moral ethos? To the 
extent that staff were gradually losing their autonomy and were being required to 
deliver an increasingly standardised 'quality controlled' curriculum then they were,
I th ink , u n d e r  p ressu re  to ’level dow n'. T h is  w as  ex ace rb a ted  by  p ressu res  from  
course  partic ipan ts  w ho  were unfam ilia r  w ith tak ing  a p roac tive  s tance  in re la tion  
to m an ag in g  the ir  ow n learn ing  and he lp ing  o thers  ach ieve  the ir  learn ing  goals.
W ere  'w ou ld  be' critical p ragm atis ts  u nder  p ressu re  to con fo rm  to 'no rm al '
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educational principles and practices? Three facts suggest that the tutorial staff were 
not encouraged to be critical pragmatists. First, the tutorial staff were expected to 
deliver a standardised curriculum and were subject to bureaucratic assessment 
processes. Second a training rather than educational emphasis had come to 
dominate at Bramshill. Third, the curriculum privileged the techniques of 
management and leadership and suppressed any sustained analysis concerning the 
interests served by these technologies.
In design terms I recognised that launching a full 'critically pragmatic' design was 
unrealistic. I was, after Habermas, about to 'conduct a political struggle' and I 
thought it naive to jeopardise the new venture by introducing an approach that was 
alien to the institution. In addition, I could not afford to overlook the findings 
reported by Plumridge (1988) concerning the organisational milieu of police - a 
power and role culture - and his observations concerning the difficulties of 
introducing changes to the college curriculum. In an institutional context dominated 
by police officers I would need to conduct the political struggle by finding a 
content and methods that were sympathetic to the needs and interests of the client 
group.
I also recognised that the work of ethicists such as Richards and Kleinig inclined 
towards the 'cultural transmission/academic grounding' curriculum emphasis. In the 
light of the earlier experiences concerning ethics education - some ten years 
previously - 1 thought it more sensible and educationally defensible to position the 
design of ethics education on the boundaries of the 'organisation 
citizenship/personal development' and 'critical pragmatism/social transformation' 
models. I wanted to appeal to that aspect of the police service and its officers 
concerned with the pursuit of social justice and the joint solving of social problems.
I was situated in a particular context with limited resources and limited 
opportunities. Precisely because of this it was unrealistic for me to offer a full­
blown 'course of study' in ethics. I would have the opportunity of operating partly 
in the 'workshop' mode exemplified by Jackson (1993). Jackson had asked; 'How 
can ethics be taught?' and had suggested a 'workshop' design 'the chief goal' of 
which was 'to accustom participants to thinking in terms of ethics by making them 
comfortable with the term, linking it to other people and words with which they are 
more comfortable'. This goal contrasts with the goals stated for a course in a typical 
degree programme which Jackson, building upon the work of Steinfels (1977), 
Fleishman and Payne (1980), Worthley (1981) and Rohr (1989) summarises as 
follows:
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- The recognition of ethical issues
- A deepened comprehension of ethics
- Sustained ethical analysis
- Contact with exemplary instances of ethical analysis
My task was problematic because I did not have the opportunity to develop 
relationships with students over time and thereby enjoy any special rapport that 
might come emerge. Perhaps, at best, I could create an extended workshop form 
of design and hope that those more profound goals that Jackson identifies would 
be attained as a result of commitments by individuals to their own professional 
development. I could, however, call upon the support of a range of colleagues who, 
in different ways had expressed a willingness to support me in the new venture.
The nature o f  my educational emphasis
I had clarified the links between critical pragmatism (and social transformation) 
and emancipatory action research. I had also recognised the contextual factors 
which militated against the immediate full adoption of these approaches. However, 
the educational culture at the Police Staff College did have familiarity with Heron's 
(1977b, 1989) models of holistic education - which had come to stress the values 
of authentic hierarchy, co-operation and autonomy in the design of educational 
interventions.
I decided, therefore, to suggest to staff that the first three weeks of the leadership 
development programme should focus on reproducing the learning community 
designs pioneered by Heron during his association with the University o f Surrey 
and then allow this emphasis on self-and-peer managed learning to be carried 
through into the second phase of the course when the series of focused modules 
would, in turn, be offered to the course.
A t the  level o f  m y  o w n  p ersona l prac tice  I w as in f luenced  b y  the  insp ira tiona l 
acco u n ts  o f  p ractice  tha t  I had  en coun te red  in the  scho la r ly  litera ture  on  teach e rs  
and  teach ing . Q uite  spec if ica lly  K ohl's  (1967 ) w o rk  served  to  gu ide  m y  o w n  
practice . In 'Thirty  six ch ildren ',  Kohl investigates  h o w  he ap p ro ach ed  te ac h in g  
thirty  six black children (aged ten and fourteen) in H arlem , N e w  Y ork  City. Kohl 
had received  a single 'orientation ' session at the school the  day  before  he p rov ides  
this accoun t:
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"I remembered my barren classroom, no books, a battered piano, broken windows 
and desks, falling plaster, and an oppressive darkness.
I  was handed a roll book with thirty six names and thirty six cumulative record 
cards, years o f  judgements already passed upon the children, their official 
personalities .... Then I  locked away the record cards in a closet. The children 
would tell me who they were. Each child, each new school year, is potentially many 
things, only one o f  which the cumulative record card documents. It is amazing how 
'emotional'problems can disappear, how the dullest child can be transformed into 
the keenest, and the brightest into the most ordinary when the prefabricated 
judgements o f  other teachers are forgotten.
The children entered at nine and filled up the seats. They were silent and stared at 
me. It was a shock to see thirty-six black faces before me. No preparation helped. 
It is one thing to be liberal and talk, another to face something and learn that 
you're afraid." (Kohl, 1967: 10)
After personal and professional struggles, learning and inspiration, Kohl was able 
to develop the children, and, to achieve, in comparison with the expectations of the 
educational system, exceptional results. He was concerned to appreciate the 
experience, interests and energies of those children. Kohl used Greek mythology, 
history, newspapers, dance music and lyrics, and the concerns facing the children 
in Harlem, rather than the inappropriate texts, curricula and learning structures of 
the mainstream system. Subjects, in short, were made to 'come alive'.
This is what I hoped for with ethics education. I wanted it to 'come alive'.
I wanted to include in the design, a range of learning opportunities marked by 
variety and contrast and in which texts, presentations and learning structures made 
'ethics' come alive. In this way, I began to lay down the preliminary framework 
which served as a precursor to the subsequent action research inquiry. I had also 
been influenced by Rogers (1961) declaration on teaching and learning as well as 
his subsequent development of the practice of humanistic education and I adopted 
these principles as a backdrop to my work.
I prepared at outline of these principles (which is included at Appendix E) and 
which I made available to any interested student attending courses of study at 
B ram shill.
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The radical possibilities in humanistic education
The radical possibilities in humanistic education are not apparent in some of the 
major anthologies of writings on an humanistic approach to education. Thus, for 
example, Roberts (1975) and, Eiben and Milliren (1976) include many discussions 
which explore the practice of humanistic education but these promote the pursuit 
of individualism and focus on the person and self-centred development. However, 
Shaffer (1978) and Graham (1986) had recognised that humanistic psychology 
addressed the nature of human being and human becoming and, in virtue of this, 
acknowledged the reciprocal dialectical nature of social arrangements and persons.
The political, critical and emancipatory aspect of humanistic psychology is made 
salient in Heron's (1977a) critique of the 'non-cathartic' society. In that work Heron 
focuses upon the nature of human distress. He states his main 'theoretical 
suggestion' concerning personal distress by contending that there is, in human 
beings, not only the anger, fear and grief - whose equivalents are found in animals
- but also anger fear and grief that is the result of interference with personal needs
- both in the infant and the adult.
Heron asserts that, sui generis, human beings have needs for love, understanding 
and choice. He finds though, evidence to suggest that these needs are systematically 
unmet in the 'rigid society' and that the consequences of this are widely apparent 
in our culture. He contrasts the types of behaviour which emerge when personal 
needs are fulfilled with 'distorted human behaviour' and of the latter he writes:
"When personal needs are interfered with or suspended in some way and their 
proper fulfilment occluded and suppressed, then behaviour is distorted into half­
conscious, quasi-mechanical, repetitive, maladaptive forms. Humans become the 
confused victims o f  disrupted psychological processes that play themselves out in 
behaviour in a relatively unaware and uncontrolled way. The point about distorted 
behaviour is that it is ... blind, repetitive, unproductive, dissatisfying to the person 
who is not in charge o f  i t .." (H eron  1977a: 7)
He then adds:
"Distorted behaviour is above all compulsive. It appears to be very widespread 
throughout the culture" (H eron  1977a: 7,8)
From  his analysis , it fo llow s tha t co m p u ls iv e  and conven tiona l peo p le  m a k e  up  a 
substan tia l part o f  the rigid socie ty  and perpe tua te ,  unaw are ly , its d y s fu n c tio n a l
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character. He writes:
"The personal needs o f  a great number ofpeople can be systematically interfered 
with in rigid organisations and societies in which there is political oppression, 
economic exploitation, denial o f  human rights. Personal needs here may be almost 
totally negated, or their fulfilment may only be tolerated up to a point and in 
certain restricted social areas ..." (Heron, 1977a: 14)
Heron exemplifies the nature of the repressive society by describing the 'external 
oppressor's voice'. It expresses itself with injunctions such as:
"Don't do this, don't do that; don't be this, don't be that. You should/ought/must 
do/be other than you are doing/being" (Heron 1977a: 30)
He notes that the correlate of this is 'the conformist's voice' which says:
"I'm no good. I  should be other than I  am. I  should and shall behave in ways that 
they demand and expect. This is the correlate o f  [the external oppressor] so that 
the person becomes her own internal moralistic oppressor, putting herself down 
and thereby sustaining the suppression both o f  her deeper human needs and the 
resultant distress." (Heron 1977a: 31)
This analysis points to the fundamental and dialectical link between collective 
social forms and the making of persons. Here Heron makes a connection between 
the social and the personal.
Following Heron (1977b) I was attempting to move away from 'prescriptive 
education and training' towards a process which was more holistic and 'catalytic'. 
A prescriptive education and training is characterised by the tutor making all the 
decisions concerning the purposes, content, methods and evaluation of the learning 
process. This is the 'traditional' expert-driven model of education. As Heron points 
out, it may also be called the 'authoritarian' model since it excludes any genuine 
educational democracy. By this he means that on all significant matters of 
educational substance the student is not consulted nor given a voice in the design 
and 'delivery' of the educational events.
H ero n  su m s  up p rescr ip tive  ed uca tion  and tra in ing  by h ig h lig h tin g  the  'un ila teral ' 
na tu re  o f  its educa tiona l d ec is io n -m ak in g  ab o u t all the  m ain  c o m p o n en ts  o f  an 
e d u ca tio n a l  d esign  i.e. s tu d en t  learn ing  goals, the  te ach in g  and learn ing  m e th o d s  
to be used , the  w ay  the top ics , teach in g  and learn ing  m e th o d s  etc, are  a ssem b led ,
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student assessment and, the evaluation as well as the selection of students for the 
'course'.
Since one of my overall objectives for the ethics education experience was that 
participants become involved and reflect the characteristics of educated persons 
(i.e. are self-determining, self-monitoring and self-adjusting) as they develop 
towards autonomous professionals, prescriptive education and training seemed to 
be an inappropriate way of securing these outcomes.
An alternative is characterised in Heron's scheme as 'catalytic education and 
training'. Heron conceives of catalytic education as reflecting education in its 
original sense:
"Catalytic education is education in the original sense o f  drawing the student out: 
facilitating information-giving, independent thinking, self-directed problem solving, 
self-discovery, self-insight."(Heron, 1977b: 10)
In catalytic education and training the tutor consults students about programme 
design, learning methods and facilitates some measure of self and peer assessment 
and collaborative assessment with staff.
Heron briefly and concisely outlines the features of catalytic education and training 
as follows:
"The following list sketches out some o f  the many possibilities fo r  catalytic 
education and training.
1. The tutor and student conjointly make decisions about, or the tutor invites the 
student individually or with his (sic) peers to make decisions about:
a) Student learning objectives in terms o f  knowledge, attitudes, skills - in relation 
to data, things, persons
b) Teaching and learning methods to be used
c) Course design: topics and their sequencing, interrelated with teaching and 
learning methods, time available and pacing o f  learning, human resources, 
material resources such as books etc.
d) Assessment o f  student work: criteria to be applied, method o f  applying them,
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applying them
e) Evaluation o f  teaching and o f  the course as a whole: criteria, methods, 
application
I f  the students are involved in decision-making in all these areas then we have the 
full-blown peer learning community, the tutor merely being a special facilitative 
resource among peers." (Heron 1977b: 18)
The complex of a critically pragmatic educational designs, emancipatory action 
research and a radical humanistic psychology constituted the foundational ideas 
upon which I wanted to base an ethics education for police leaders and managers.
I wanted the first trials of 'ethics education' to begin the long process of building 
support for the subject. To do this, I needed sufficient of the student group to 
express a positive response to their experience with the educational processes and 
events. I also needed the staff to support the venture. It was possible to sustain the 
delivery of a topic on the curriculum if staff thought it valuable and necessary - but 
there were never guarantees that such support could be relied upon.
This review of the areas of the content areas and educational designs enabled me 
to conclude my preparations for re-introducing the subject ethics. The action 
research inquiry would begin by emphasising the 'problem-solving' cycles of action 
research and take as its ambition emancipatory action research.
Concluding the preparatory stage
Emerging from the foundational stage of the inquiry were the following 
achievements:
- a developing rationale for police ethics education (see chapter two)
- an appreciation of the major issues and problems with which police ethics deals
- the establishment of an explicitly stated purpose and aims for ethics education
- f irs t  sk e tch es  c o n ce rn in g  an appropria te  'e th ics educa tion ' con ten t for po lice  
leaders  and  m an ag e rs
- the  b e g in n in g s  o f  an in teg ra tion  w ith  eth ics  and o ther  areas in m a n ag e m e n t
development (e.g. quality management, counselling, the duty of care, the moral 
basis o f leadership etc.).
- the first experiences connected with the actual re-introduction of ethics onto the 
police leadership and management development curriculum
It is to this first experience that I shall now turn.
Part Two
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Cycles or phases o f  action research
The second part of the dissertation traces the unfolding stages of the action research 
inquiry from the initial re-introduction of'ethics’ to the police middle-management 
programme in the Summer and Autumn of 1993 until its termination in the Spring 
of 1998.
Chapter Six describes the nature of the educational design constituting the re- 
introduction of the subject 'ethics' to the Leadership Development Programme. This 
phase o f the project was considered a 'preliminary' stage.
Chapter Seven outlines the first full action research cycle entitled: 'In search o f  the 
perfect design'.
Chapter Eight describes the second full action research cycle characterised as 
'Eclecticism and pragmatics'.
Chapter Nine examines the 'Case study' emphasis adopted in the third full cycle of 
action research.
Chapter Ten elaborates on the event provoking a final attempt to secure a positive 
valuation for the 'ethics education experience', adumbrates the nature of the final 
design, and notes how, despite the foregoing stages of research and learning, 'ethics' 
was removed from the content of the police middle-management programme.
Part Two of this dissertation concludes with an indication that the ‘story’ was not 
yet over and that 'ethics' came to feature again, at a later date, as a named area of 
study on the middle-management programme.
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Chapter six
Action research and a developing ethics education fo r  police leaders and 
managers: the preliminary stage
"In the not so distant days when Auvergne farms were virtually self-sufficient, the 
kitchen garden lived up to its name, providing a wide variety o f  vegetables fo r  the 
stewpot. Things have not changed much today: most gardens, both in the 
countryside and, more surprisingly, in towns, are given over almost entirely to the 
growing o f  vegetables and f r u i t .... As the climate is often harsh because o f  the 
altitude, pride o f  place is given to hardy vegetables such as cabbage and Swiss 
chard, both o f  which occupy an important place inAuvergnat cuisine. Potatoes are 
also a staple. They are often imaginatively combined with cheese... This was not 
always so: potatoes were viewed with suspicion when first introduced towards the 
end o f  the eighteenth century. Garlic, shallots and onions are all widely grown ... 
Courgettes, which appeared inAuvergnat shops only some twenty years ago, have 
since caught on as gardenvegetables.... UsuallyAuvergnat culinary conservatism 
repels all intruders. Basil, fo r  example, despite promotion on countless radio and 
television programmes and in magazine and newspaper recipes, has totally fa iled  
to gain a foothold in the Auver gnat kitchen garden, where the only herbs generally 
to be found  are parsley, chives and, sometimes, tarragon." (Graham, 1999: 
142,143)
The foundations for my inquiry had been established. I had constructed a rationale 
for including the teaching of ethics to police leaders and managers, identified 
themes and issues concerning ’police ethics’ in the literature and, reviewed 
educational approaches commensurate with my epistemological framework. In this 
chapter I will describe the actual re-introduction of'ethics’ to the police leadership 
development curriculum, comment on the development of an ’ethics module' and 
conclude with a summary of the main learnings I had begun to derive from the 
experience.
Re-introducing ethics to the police leadership development curriculum - the first 
trials
I rea lised  tha t  it w as unw ise  to risk  em p loy ing  a fu ll-b low n  app lica tion  o f  H e ro n 's  
catalytic education model because I needed to avoid  an outright rejection o f 'e th ic s ’. 
B ecause  o f  the d ec is io n -m ak in g  realities a tB ram sh il l ,  I had to try and  secu re  a 
pos it ive  reaction  to any  first a t tem pt to re -in troduce  the  sub jec t  at 'w h o le  course ' 
level. 1 a lso realised that I did not have suffic ien t tim e, experien tia l o r in te llectual
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resources to facilitate an authentic student-centred inquiry - beginning with 
individual participants establishing their learning goals. I had sufficient evidence 
that the police occupational cultural experience did not sit comfortably with the 
complexities of an emergent curriculum necessarily entailed by such an approach.
I would try to establish an accurate introduction to ethics and then include a 
sufficient variety of learning activities in order to provide a content that would, 
hopefully, engage the interest of the majority of the participants.
I actively solicited support from all those members of staff who had some expertise 
in or sympathies for the subject of ethics and by November 1993 I was able to 
produce an 'ethics' module for the Leadership Development Programme. Here, I 
shall reproduce the outline details of that module. Full details were distributed on 
1 November 1993 to the seventy four officers attending the course. In addition, 
they were instructed to review a preliminary package containing an overview of 
police strategic emphases for the 1990s.
This included a precis of Woodcock's (1992) paper, 'Trust in the police - the search 
for truth' as well as a summary of the four themes constituting the new 'quality of 
service' philosophy:
- quality management
- professional ethics
- value for money
- performance indicators
The questionnaire referred to in the briefing notes was the first version of an 
instrument later to be entitled the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire'. The idea behind 
the inclusion of such an instrument was for it both to catalyse debate amongst 
participants and to discover the data patterns emerging from the responses to the 
questions. These patterns could then be reflected back into succeeding modules and 
thereby strengthen the content of'ethics education'.
T h e  m e m b e rs  o f  s ta f f  inc luded  Neil R ichards  w h o  had  first in troduced  e th ics  as a 
n am ed  area  o f  s tudy to the  co m m an d  courses a tB ram sh ill  and Peter Villiers, w ho , 
la ter c am e  to w rite  the  b o o k  'Better Police Ethics'. In add ition  Jam es  D ick in so n  
w h o  d e l iv e red  the  p resen ta tion  to  the  'Q uality  o f  Service ' sem in ar  in D e c e m b e r  
1992 o u t l in in g  the  d raft s ta tem en t o f  ethical p r inc ip les  for the  Po lice  S erv ice  had
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agreed to participate. A number of police officers seconded to the tutorial staff of 
the college were also willing to help with the content of'ethics' on the Leadership 
Development Programme.
Was this a design for a 'critical education'? Habermas had mentioned both the 
development of the organisation for enlightenment and the subsequent conducting 
of the political struggle. The design for an ethics education attempted to be 'critical' 
in the sense that it presented an answer to the question, 'How ought one to act?' 
(and thereby sought to provide a critique of the contemporary ways persons are 
constrained and organised) and I understood my work with both staff and students 
to reflect an attempt to create basic forms of an 'organisation for enlightenment'. I 
was also conducting a political struggle which involved securing the support and 
participation of my colleagues and I was consciously exploiting my role and status 
within the college. However, tested against the principles advanced by Snell, the 
criteria for emancipatory action research in Kemmis and McTaggart, and, Heron's 
catalytic education model, the design was staff-led - and only provided a freedom 
to learn within the staff-determined structures.
Did the design include a content aligned with Kleinig's (1990) recommendations 
for a police ethics syllabus (i.e. a general introduction to moral philosophy; 
examining codes of police ethics; case studies; and, middle-level inquiries)? The 
programme was designed to include some reference to the nature o f moral 
philosophy, a consideration of the police service statement of ethical principles, a 
case study - through the examination of crime investigation, and, middle level 
inquiries - which were raised in the course of the lectures and the workshops. Thus, 
at least to a minimal degree, all Kleinig’s recommended content areas were to be 
addressed.
An outline o f  the 'ethics module^ that constituted a reintroduction o f  fethicsf to 
the Police Middle Management Development Programme
The details of the ethics module, entitled 'practical ethics' (the original full 
document is included at Appendix F), were presented at a briefing to the staff of the 
Leadership Development Programme on 1 November 1993. The information 
included the following:
The Ethics programme
Here is the ethics programme together with an example o f  the ethics questionnaire 
which all course members will be given on Thursday morning. We suggest that you
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use part o f  the time between 1100 hrs and 1250 hrs on Thursday 4 November to 
push your syndicate well forward on this questionnaire, which must be completed 
and handed in by the following morning at 0830 hrs.One way o f  achieving this is 
to make one member o f  the syndicate responsible fo r  leading a discussion on each 
o f  the five sections o f  the questionnaire, i.e. Moral development; Moral dilemmas; 
Self-perception o f  personal ethical standards; the moral character o f  the police 
organisation; and, Your response to the statement o f  ethical principles
Practical ethics
Aim: To bring ethics to life 
Objectives:
To explore and understand the nature o f  ethics and the relationship between ethics 
and morality
To explore and grasp the need fo r  a code o f  ethics in the police service 
To explore and resolve ethical dilemmas arising as practical difficulties 
Part One (the morning o f  Thursday 4 November)
Lecture: 'Ethics introduced' - Robert Adlam
- The subject o f  ethics introduced and defined
- The nature o f  obligation; How ought we to act?
- The nature o f  moral value; What is an exemplary person?
- Barriers to ethical behaviour
- Reference to research questionnaire
Lecture: 'Professional ethics' - Peter Villiers
- Authority and obedience explored
- What does it mean to say 'no'?
- Ethics, values and loyalty
- Professional ethics 
-Importance o f  the questionnaire
Syndicate rooms - Initial analysis and completion o f  questionnaire
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Part Two (All day, Monday 8 November)
Talk: 'Ethics and the pursuit o f  the good life' - Robert Adlam 
Questions and reference to the research questionnaire - Robert Adlam 
Talk: 'Ethics and crime investigation' - Brendan Gibb-Gray 
Syndicate rooms - A choice o f  workshops 1400 hrs - 1730 hrs 
These included:
- The Police service statement o f  ethical principles - what do we think o f  it - are we 
happy with it? - Paul Forrester
- Ethics, integrity and choice - Neil Richards
- Ethics in Public life - Bernard Sleigh
Part Three: Lecture Room D - Whole course 
Summary o f  research findings - Robert Adlam 
The code: developments - James Dickinson
As a staff we were all anxious about the outcome. I was especially worried because 
I had instigated this re-introduction and had risked exposing my colleagues to the 
critical scrutiny of the student body.
In the following illustrative vignette, I have attempted to communicate the 
atmosphere and 'essence' of the educational event.
An illustrative vignette: 'I suppose we're going to be ethically cleansed'
To an extent we had all become a little more sensitised to 'ethics': news broadcasts 
and programmes had told us that British peacekeeping troops had been sent to 
Bosnia in October 1992. The United Nations Protection Force was operating in the 
former Yugoslavia and the shocking horrors o f ‘ethnic cleansing’ had entered the 
national consciousness.
The atmosphere, in the amphitheatre, (Lecture Room D) where I was about to give 
the first lecture of the 'ethics module' was simultaneously expectant and sceptical.
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There was an animated buzz in the air. The seventy four chief inspectors on the 
programme had spent three weeks devoted to ’self-development and personal 
awareness', 'interpersonal skills', 'group and team effectiveness' and the study of a 
range of management skills - from ‘assertiveness’ to ‘conflict-management’ in 
syndicates. Those six syndicates had developed different operating norms (and 
localised cultures); they had also developed different valuations of the content and 
educational methods. For some groups it was a relief to end the 'navel-gazing airy- 
fairy world ofBramshill speak’. Anything different promised to be a relief from the 
'whale music and bean bags'. For other groups the shift to a structured 'input' - 
where tasks were predetermined and students were expected to adhere to a 
patterned educational design was an unwelcome imposition.
Ethics was also something 'new'. ’What’s this going to be about, Rob? 1 was asked 
by an officer seated close to me - as I was about to begin my first presentation.
'You'll see', I replied: 7 hope it will be interesting fo r  you'.
A passion overtook me as I began. Momentarily I remembered the images of the 
Nazi death camps and the mutilated bodies of the Rwandans and Bosnians. And I 
remembered the scathing critique of'totalitarian man' that Skvorecky, had written 
in his novelette, 'Emoke':
"Naturally there is no such thing as a superman, but it always seemed to me that 
there is such a thing as a subhuman, he exists, he is among us fo r  all the days o f  the 
world, like Jesus' poor, except that the submen aren't p o o r ... who with no qualms 
assert the absolute priority o f  their bellies, their imagined (but to them 
indisputable) rights and broadcast their own inanity in speeches about their 
infallibility, always ready to judge others, to condemn others, not fo r  an instant 
doubting their own perfection, not fo r a moment contemplating the meaning o f  their 
own existence, deriding morality as outdated ... they never realise that they are 
simply a terrible emptiness bounded by skin and bones, leaving in their wake traces 
o f  lesser or greater pain, ruined lives, wrecked existences jobs spoiled, tasks 
undone ... and dull and sordid cynicism." (Skvorecky, 1980: 68)
Wisely or not, 1 dedicated my opening lecture to 'the people ofSarajevo and 
Srebrenica, of Vitaz and Mostar'.
7 suppose we're going to be ethically cleansed', observed a confident wag - from 
the far end of the amphitheatre.
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I had become accustomed to police humour and, silently, I reminded myself: 
'Thesepeople haven't asked to come here'.
As I developed my presentation and paused occasionally to include pieces of video 
in an attempt to underline or illustrate my points, the audience listened - some 
patiently, others thoughtfully and some again, earnestly. I imagined the contrast 
between my delivery and the careful, analytic and deliberate development of 
empirically based or rational/conceptual argument in the university lecture theatre 
or seminar group. Mine was an educational process close to ’theatre* and close to 
a form of gladiatorial combat. The verdict could be equally clear-cut and damning. 
I tried to use my passion to get me through to the end.
My colleagues' presentations also evoked metaphors of combat and cabaret: Peter 
Villiers drew from the dramas of his experiences as an intelligence officer in 
Northern Ireland; Brendan Gibb-Gray discussed the police role in the criminal 
justice system and, using as a backdrop slides of the blood-spattered body of a 
murdered prostitute, (taken during the investigation of a murder inquiry in which 
he was a senior detective) urged the audience to jettison their ’cultural baggage' and 
become disinterested impartial seekers of truth. James Dickinson presented a vivid 
case study involving misplaced loyalty and the propensity for police to ’cover up’ 
for their colleagues. The atmosphere became chilly.
Once the demands of ’performance' were over, the workshops revealed different 
and important phenomena. I had decided to work with the energy in the group. 
They had heard a great deal from me. But, what had they to say about 'ethics'? I 
suggested that we ’pick up on' any issue they wanted to discuss. For the first half 
an hour we considered the problem of ethical relativism, the sources of moral 
corruption, the problem of the police culture and then one officer remarked:
'Look - Rob, I  know you're a believer but I  think we can counter each o f  the eleven 
statements o f  ethical principle with a more realistic statement o f  unethical 
principles'.
'That's interesting - what might the top eleven statements o f  ethical principle be?' 
1 rep lied .
The fifteen officers in the g roup set about o rganising  them selves  to identify the list.
A fte r tea  they  presen ted  m e the fo llow ing  prin ted  notes, en titled : T h e  Po lice  
Serv ice  top  ten  - plus one  - uneth ical s ta tem e n ts ’:
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- We are an equal opportunity employer (Some are more equal than others)
- Tenure policy will be implemented fairly (When it suits us)
- Performance indicators are not league tables (But come bottom at your peril)
- You can trust me (When it's in my interests)
- I'll make sure your input is acknowledged (Thanks fo r  the idea)
- 1 don't agree with your move, but they wouldn't listen (By the way, I've shafted 
you)
- You have got a bright future (That'll make the bugger graft)
- This move will enhance your career (We can't get anyone to fil l  the post)
- I've got an open door policy (When I'm not too busy)
- We take an account o f  community views (But we do as we please anyway)
- Let me give you some helpful feedback (Here comes a bollocking)
I enjoyed the laughter that accompanied their work. They seemed to have had fun. 
Here, again, though, was drawn the contrast between organisations 'fit to house the 
human spirit' and the experienced realities. As the workshop ended, one officer 
quietly mentioned to me:
'You're ahead o f  your time. Keep it going. Take the flak. Keep at it. It's important' 
A simple evaluation:
However, were we as a team of tutors and presenters 'successful'? At the end of the 
module each member of each syndicate completed an evaluation of the 'ethics 
module'. Despite a number of reservations concerning this method of judging the 
work of the tutorial staff atBramshill it constituted the major basis for decision­
making concerning any substantive course content.
Overall, we had managed to survive. We were trying to obtain a rating that was 
below 3 (the 'mid-point) - on each of the criteria, where a rating of 1 was positive 
and a rating of 5 was negative. On six of the nine criteria the ratings leaned slightly 
towards the positive pole. On three of the nine criteria the ratings were leaning 
slightly towards the negative pole. The most positive rating was given to criterion 
three - 'I found that the module was sufficiently intellectually demanding' versus 
'I did not find the course sufficiently intellectually demanding' whilst the most 
negative rating was given to criterion five - The module struck the right balance 
between practical and theoretical work' versus 'I thought the course was too 
academic and theoretical/practical'.
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Table 1: Means and Standard deviations of ratings on nine evaluation criteria: 
(N = 74 students)
Criterion Mean
score
Standard
deviation
1. The module contained a great deal of new 
information versus 'the module included little 
that was new to me'
2.813 1.048
2. 'The module fully met its stated objectives' 
versus 'The module did not fully meet its stated 
objectives'
2.932 0.881
3 .1 found the module was sufficiently 
intellectually demanding' versus ' I did not find 
the course sufficiently intellectually demanding'
2.419 0.811
4. 'The module had the right focus for me' versus 
'The module did not have the right focus for me'
3.067 1.011
5. 'The module struck the right balance between 
practical and theoretical work' versus 'I thought 
the module was too academic and theoretical (or 
too practical)’
3.365 1.015
6 'The course was highly relevant to the work I 
will have to do' versus 'The course had little 
relevance to the work I will have to do'
3.122 0.757
7: 'I thought the amount of work I had to do was 
about right' versus 'I found that there was too 
little/too much to do'
2.986 0.914
8: 'I liked the structure of the module' versus 'I 
did not like the structure of the module'
2.985 1.014
9: 'I thought that the tutor(s) was/were fully 
competent' versus 'I did not think the tutor(s) 
was/were fully competent'
2.905 0.796
W hilst I had hoped  for a m ore  positive  o u tco m e  I w as p leased  tha t  the  re-
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introduction of ethics to a major programme of study atBramshill had managed, 
at least, to avoid an outright rejection from the client group as a whole. I felt that 
a platform had been established and that the next stage would be to consolidate and 
to try and incorporate some of the findings emerging from the responses to the 
questionnaire(s). I also wanted to feel a greater sense of mastery over the actual 
material I was presenting and developing, and, I wanted to find ways of working 
with the issues and concerns of the client group itself. In this way, after determining 
the content for an ethics education and organising for its re-introduction I had 
completed the preliminary process of beginning an action research inquiry.
Reflection and stock taking
The preparatory process and subsequent re-introduction of ethics to the middle- 
management programme, in the latter part of 1993, corresponded toLewin's (1946) 
ideas o f ’planning’, ’executing the plan' and ’reconnaissance'. I had wanted to create 
an ethics education that was marked by a variety of learning methods and structures 
- as well as a range of topic areas - in the hope that it might interest and engage a 
majority of the client group. In the preliminary stage of the inquiry process, I - with 
a small number of interested colleagues - wanted, initially, to develop a picture of 
how our clients would react to the essential contours of the subject, 'ethics', as well 
as our attempts to examine issues of contemporary relevance to police managers.
The re-introduction enabled me to learn how to use the language of ethics (in the 
sense that I could, fluently, describe different theoretical perspectives without 
recourse to notes) and to develop the specific content of a number of different 
learning structures. The lectures I developed were based on a number of 
introductions to the subject ’ethics'. These included Frankena's (1973) clarification 
o f the nature of ethics - including a discussion of the dilemma facing Socrates 
described by Plato in theCrito - and his outline of the major theories of normative 
ethics, Mackie's (1977) sketch of a practical morality, Warnock's (1967) 
examination of the purpose of morality, Williams (1993) delineation of the major 
concepts deployed in ethical discourse, and, Singer's (1993b) extensive collection 
of papers outlining the major theories of ethics and the major issues which attract 
ethical debate.
I a lso  m ad e  re ference  to the  facts o f  the holocaust, and the w ays  in w h ich  e th ic ists  
have  d iscu ssed  th is  te rr ib le  and  dreadfu l tragedy . I inc luded , fo r exam ple , the  
re m a rk  m ad e  by  B au m an  (1993)  w hich  invites us to be end less ly  a lert to ou r  
po ten tia l  for co m p lic i ty  in the  perpe tua tion  o f  evil. He w rites:
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"One needs to be defeated first to be accused o f  immorality, and fo r  the charge to 
stick. Leaders o f  Nazi Germany who ordered extermination have been judged, 
sentenced, and hanged - and their deeds, which would have gone down in history 
textbooks as the story o f  human ascent had Germany been victorious, have been 
classified as crimes against humanity. The verdict is safe ...I t will stand until cards 
are reshuffled and so historical memory is reshuffled to suit new hands. '(Bauman 
1993:226,227)
Whenever I referred to this observation during the course of my lectures, I would 
recommend that if anything were to be taken from the study of 'ethics’ this, of all 
things, might be the most important.
I tried, through the presentation of this latter material, to convey a sense of the 
perils liable to emerge if persons (or groups of persons) were denied a fully human 
status. However, to avoid conveying any sense that ethics was only concerned with 
extremes I also emphasised the 'everydayness' of ethics. Following Wittgenstein 
(1953), I noted that our particular actions are embedded in larger projects which, 
typically, are concerned with achieving a worthwhile state of affairs - and if  we 
examine the nature of that state of affairs we would find that it had a moral 
character.
The first informal version of the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire' had begun to 
reveal some data patterns that I was able to include in my presentations to course 
members. The purpose of this was to help stimulate and sustain processes of'self­
exploration' and to stimulate reflection on the ethics of the police organisation. 
Amongst the first set of findings were the following:
- one in five of the client group felt that they had been corrupted by the police 
experience. A similar proportion indicated that they had been 'tested' by the 
policing experience and after an initial decline in their ethical standards had re­
established a strong moral foundation to their professional lives
- of the ethical dilemmas they chose to identify, the largest proportion (more than 
half) concerned the conduct and/or actions of their fellow officers
- in the  m ain , the  officers a ttending  the  m idd le -m anagem en t p ro g ram m e expressed  
a pos itive  re sp o n se  to the  d raft s ta tem en t o f  ethical p rinc ip les
- a m ajo rity  o f  off icers  poin ted  to the police  culture  as a barrie r  to ethical c o n d u c t
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- almost all officers indicated that they were 'very highly' or 'very' ethical
- a majority of officers inclined towards a 'tragic' perspective on humankind 
compared with those who held a 'cynic' perspective (Ker Muir, 1977)
These (and other) data suggested that although some overall trends were present the 
moral landscape of police was marked as much by heterogeneity as homogeneity.
New developments
Whilst these developments were occurring, the design of the Leadership 
Development Programme (LDP) as a whole allowed the staff atBramshill to 
continue examining how to present and integrate both a 'student-centred' phase and 
a subsequent non-negotiable core subject/topic curriculum.
However, in the summer of 1994 we were to learn that the Leadership 
Development Programme was to be the last of its type in the history of the Police 
Staff College. According to the rhetoric of the most senior police and civilian staff 
at Bramshill, pressures towards the 'professionalisation' of policing had led the 
police service to wish for (and call for) programmes of study leading to nationally 
recognised qualifications. The syndicate-based seven-week long course structure 
of the Leadership Development Programme was to give way to a new modular 
design, the 'Police Management Programme'. I shall outline the nature of this latter 
programme and the nature and evaluation of'ethics education' on that programme 
in a later section of this chapter. Before I do so, I shall provide a summary of the 
final delivery of 'ethics' on the Leadership Development Programme. This latter 
design, in comparison with that presented fourteen months earlier, illustrates our 
attempt to make changes in order to 'reach' as many of the client group as possible.
In February 1995 - four programme deliveries after the initial re-introduction of 
'ethics' in November 1993 - the programme was entitled: 'Leadership, values and 
cultural change'. It was accompanied with short biographical details of the various 
contributors as well as selected readings on leadership. It also included an outline 
of Beabout and Wannemann's hierarchy of ethical principles - which, following the 
teaching methods used by Childress (1991) including his design for helping to 
resolve ethical dilemmas - constituted my attempt to provide course participants 
with a framework to consider employing when dealing with moral dilemmas.Here,
I should add that, whilst I agreed with the scepticism expressed byDonahue and 
Felts (1993) concerning the use of any technical formulae for the development of 
ethics, the intention behind such an inclusion was to demonstrate that some
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'practical guidelines' for making 'progress' in ethics did exist (Moreover, I had, I 
think, a duty to make them available.)
With the assistance of my colleague, Peter Villiers we designed a programme, the 
outline details of which are described below.
The programme itself ran from 7 - 1 0  February 1995. Course participants were 
given the following information:
1Introduction:
Over the next ten years the police service needs to:
- raise the quality o f  leadership
- demonstrate ethically acceptable professional standards; and
- make (selective) changes to police culture
You are the key ingredient fo r  putting ideals into practice.
This programme gives you the opportunity to investigate and debate what is wrong 
and what is right, and to decide what to do about it.
At 1400 hrs in the afternoon of Tuesday 7 February, the programme was launched 
by Assistant Chief Constable Ian Blair (then of the Thames Valley Police and 
subsequently to become the Chief Constable of Surrey Police) who examined the 
following three areas:
- Applied police ethics
- Police work and corruption
- The needfor an ethical code
T his  w as fo llow ed  by  a p rocess  o f 'e th ica l  s tock-tak ing ' in the  s ix  sy n d ica te s  (each  
co m p o se d  o f  tw e lv e  o ff icers)  us ing  w h a t  w as  n o w  pu b lic ly  d e sc r ib ed  as the  
'Bram shill Ethics Q uestionnaire ' - and som e preparation  for syndica te  p resen ta tions  
to the  w ho le  course. T he  purpose  o f  the 'e th ica l-s tock  tak ing ' sess ion  w as  to a l lo w  
course  pa rtic ipan ts  to no te  dow n the ir  re sp o n ses  to a range  o f  q u es t io n s  on  the  
q u es t io n n a ire  and  to co n tin u e  to use the da ta  patterns  em erg in g  to s tren g th en  the 
con ten t o f  su b seq u en t  'ethics ' deliveries.
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T h e  p ro g ra m m e  d es ig n  fo r  W e d n e sd a y  8 F eb ru a ry  w a s  as fo llow s:
0900 - 1040
'Ethics, values and morality: a general introduction to ethics as a practical basis 
fo r  decision making'. Robert Adlam
- The subject o f  ethics introduced and defined
- The nature o f  obligation. How ought we to act?
- The nature o f  moral value. What is an exemplary person ?
- Barriers to ethical behaviour
- Research on police ethics
1100-1245
Robert Adlam and Peter Villiers
- The reinvention o f  police
- The ethical profile o f  the police middle-manager revisited
- Law, morality and liberal democracy
- The fundamental role o f  the police
1400-1700
'Thepolice culture' - Paul Dennison (Co-director, the Strategic Command Course) 
1900 - 2000
'On Leadership' - Geoffrey Dear, Her Majesty's Inspector o f  Constabulary (HMI)
O n  T h u r sd a y  9 F eb ru a ry  th e  focus  m o v ed  in itia lly  to w ard s  a s tudy  o f  leadersh ip  
b e fo re  re tu rn in g  in th e  a f te rn o o n  to  a series o f  sem in ars  w ith in  w h ich  prac tica l  
e th ica l d i lem m as  w ere  exp lo red . T h is  cu lm ina ted  in a debate  on  eth ics conducted  
by  course  participants. T he  m o tion  for debate was: 'This house believes that police 
culture is a force fo r  good'.
F ina lly  each  o f  the six synd ica te  g roups  reco n v en ed  for a d iscuss ion , rev iew  and 
c r i t iq u e  o f  the  p rog ram m e.
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This design expressed a particular rationale and a distinct way of working that we 
had come to develop whilst we had the responsibility for managing the programme 
delivery to large groups of middle managers. First, in order to give the programme 
'gravitas' we included two very senior police officers. One took an uncompromising 
view about the need to take seriously the subject 'ethics' and to confront directly, 
corruption or moral sloth in the workplace. The other stressed the need for police 
leaders to demonstrate 'morally-principled' leadership and advocated taking the 
'moral highground' in the 'fight' against the criminal. Second, the central 
presentations given by Peter Villiers and myself were quasi-dramatic performances. 
We both used evocative storytelling and some theatricality to animate those aspects 
of the subject we were dealing with. We knew that if, for example, we referred too 
closely to notes we ran the risk of being perceived as 'not knowing' our subject. 
Third, a majority of the learning structures within the design involved the active 
participation of the client group. They were assigned a number of tasks - including 
the managing of the final 'whole-course' debate. In this way we attempted to 
provide moments of action and reflection, encounter and silence, intellectual 
stimulation and the sharing of experiences.
How was this design received?
The syndicate directors issued the course evaluation forms from which it was 
possible to gauge, crudely, how the experience had been valued. They also 
provided me with their observations concerning patterns of response amongst the 
syndicate groups.
On the rating scales we achieved the following results: (I have included, in 
brackets, the means and standard deviations of the first delivery in 1993)
The seventy one course participants rated our works as follows:
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Table 2: Mean and Standard Deviations of ratings on nine evaluation criteria (Data 
from initial re-introduction of ‘ethics’ included in brackets)
N = 71
Criterion Mean
score
Standard
deviation
1. The module contained a great deal of new 
information versus 'the module included little 
that was new to me'
2.014
(2.813)
0.786
(1.048)
2. 'The module fully met its stated objectives' 
versus 'The module did not fully meet its stated 
objectives'
2.137
(2.932)
0.781
(0.881)
3 .1 found the module was sufficiently 
intellectually demanding' versus ' I did not find 
the course sufficiently intellectually demanding'
1.875
(2.419)
0.675
(0.811)
4. 'The module had the right focus for me' versus 
'The module did not have the right focus for me'
2.357
(3.067)
1.386
(1.011)
5. 'The module struck the right balance between 
practical and theoretical work' versus 'I thought 
the module was too academic and theoretical (or 
too practical)'
2.538
(3.365)
1.102
(1.015)
6 'The course was highly relevant to the work I 
will have to do' versus 'The course had little 
relevance to the work I will have to do'
2.654
(3.122)
0.867
(0.757)
7: 'I thought the amount of work I had to do was 
about right' versus 'I found that there was too 
little/too much to do'
2.004
(2.986)
0.896
(0.914)
8: 'I liked the structure of the module' versus 'I 
did not like the structure of the module'
2.315
(2.985)
0.942
(1.014)
9: 'I thought that the tutor(s) was/were fully 
competent' versus 'I did not think the tutor(s) 
was/were fully competent'
1.874
(2.905)
0.863
(0.796)
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Compared with the re-introduction of'ethics' in November 1993 the ratings on each 
of the nine criteria had improved and were sufficiently positive for the staff of the 
Leadership Development Programme to conclude that the experience had been, in 
the main, a success. Nonetheless it is noticeable how the two lowest ratings were 
in relation to criterion 5 and criterion 6. These criteria refer to the extent to which 
participants perceived that we had struck the right balance between the practical 
and theoretical, and, to the perception of the relevance of the module to 
participants' future work projects.
The staff also made reference to the following:
- Some o f  the content was perceived as too academic and theoretical
- The police leaders were viewed, sceptically, 'as poachers turned gamekeepers'
- The student group as a whole would have preferred to spend more time 
addressing practical issues
- The data patterns on police themselves (i.e. the material emerging from  the 
Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire) interested most o f  the students
- The quality o f  the presentations was good
- Sometimes the sta ff seemed to be moralising
- A great deal o f  scepticism is attributed to the motives o f  those connected with the 
police service statement o f  ethical principles and the new emphases on ethics
The completion o f  the preliminary stage o f  the inquiry: a summary
T he  re - in troduction  o f  e th ics to the  police  leadersh ip  dev e lo p m en t cu rr icu lu m  and  
the  first series  o f  de liveries  had  enab led  m e  to  co m p le te  the  p re l im in a ry  cy c le  o f  
an  ac tion  resea rch  process . T he  co m p le t io n  o f  th is  s tage  led m e  to  d ra f t  the  
fo l lo w in g  re flec tions  co n ce rn in g  w h y  it w as  tha t  m y  design  fo r the  'e th ics  
educa tion ' ex p er ien ce  w as  not som eth in g  th a t  w as, u n ifo rm ly , v a lued  p o s it ive ly :
1. E th ics  - as a sub jec t  - w as not a topic  w ith  w h ich  a m ajo rity  o f  the  c lien t g roup  
w as fam iliar - in the  sense o f  having  received instruction and /or tra in ing  du rin g  the 
course  o f  the ir  professional developm ent.  In co n seq u en ce  its very  new n ess  m ean t
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that it was liable to attract the following types of observation from course 
participants:
It could be seen as the 'latest piece o f  Bramshill gimmickry', as the 'flavour o f  the 
month' or as 'something new with which to heat the police'.
2. Ethics - as a subject - is intrinsically difficult. Concepts such as 'justice' or 
'integrity' are relatively abstract and much less straightforward to grasp than 
empirical description or practitioner anecdote. Ethics as a subject is demanding 
intellectually. Thus, it can be dismissed by varying proportions of the client group 
as 'academic', 'removedfrom reality', 'theoretical gobbledygook etc.
3. Teaching ethics is difficult because it cannot offer clear-cut, straightforward and 
unproblematic solutions to problem situations.(This was to be expressed elegantly 
and succinctly by a senior police officer at the very end of the inquiry reported in 
this dissertation when, in the context of discussing the policing of situations of 
environmental protest, she said: 'You are never going to please everybody when you 
deal with a ‘real life ’ ethical dilemma. *)
4. Teaching ethics is difficult - in the sense that it may not lead to a positive 
evaluation from the client group - because of the level of moral development of 
some persons in the group. After Kohlberg (1969), the group itself might be 
characterised by a 'conventional' rather than post-conventional level of moral 
development - and find itself disturbed by an educational encounter seeking to 
examine the nature of an individual's 'moral world'.
5. The teaching of ethics is difficult because it can elicit within the client group 
feelings of shame and guilt. Perhaps moral exemplariness is beyond the reach of 
all but the tiniest fraction of mortals and so, as soon as the 'good' life is made salient 
through the presentation of'ethics', an inevitable response is to feel 'imperfect'. At 
the end of the film, 'Schindler's List', Oscar Schindler, in a moment of temporary 
emotional collapse whispers: 7 could have done more' and, in so doing, illustrates 
the psychological demands of'ethics'.
6. R e la ted  to the  above, it seem s  tha t the  s im ple  fact o f  m ak in g  the  sub jec t  'ethics ' 
salient necessarily  im plies the  need for change.The very  surfacing o f  concepts  such 
as 'justice ' and  'in tegrity ',  the  in troduction  o f  a s ta tem en t o f  e thical p rinc ip les  for 
po lice , and  the  ex am in a tio n  o f  a range o f  du ties  tha t have  com e to be a ttached  to 
the  ro le  o f  police  o ff ice r  in the  U nited  K ingdom , all serve  as tests  ag a in s t  w h ich  
cu rren t  p rac tices  and  hu m an  d isposit ions  can be ju d g e d  and found  w an ting . In
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consequence, the study of ethics, implicitly or explicitly introduces a critique of 
conventional practice and advocates a better state of affairs. To stay asone is - in 
an unjust world - is hard to defend. Thus, 'ethics’ calls for change.
7. Ethics teaching is difficult because the teachers/tutors can be perceived in 
negative terms - e.g. they may be seen to b e moralising' 'lacking experience o f  the 
police world', 'hypocritical' or 'unattractive'. This latter view may stem from the 
police antipathy towards civilians as a whole, or civilians with certain 
characteristics, or to 'trainers', or to senior officers - who, by definition, must be 
'unethical'. This latter point was later to be expressed byVilliers (1998) as follows:
"A police audience may be .. doubtful about the credibility o f  an experienced 
practitioner, because they doubt his (sic) personal integrity. Why has he come to 
lecture on ethics at a Police College? What is gnawing at his conscience? And i f  
he is so keen on morality now, why didn't he pu t his morals into practice when he 
was a working detective? "
He continues by outlining the argument underlying this scepticism:
"In effect, the senior officer faces the subtle, possibly part-conscious and probably 
unfalsifiable train o f  thought which runs something as follows:
a) The lecturer is a police officer who was once a working detective or uniformed 
officer.
b) As such, he must have faced many moral dilemmas, including such issues as 
bending the rules to achieve a result.
c) He was promoted. Therefore, he must have been successful in his work. 
Therefore he must have acquired convictions in court. Therefore, he must have bent 
the rules on occasion, or ignored others doing so, and taken credit fo r  their work. 
(The implication is that police work requires one to bend the rules. The questions 
are when and how, not why.)
d) Now, as a successful police officer, he is telling us not to bend the rules, and to 
stop others doing so. There is a contradiction here. " (V ill iers , 1998: 2)
I f  I w ere  to secure  the sub jec t 'ethics ' on the police  leadersh ip  and m a n a g e m e n t  
d e v e lo p m en t  cu rr icu lum  then  I w as  g o ing  to have  to c rea te  a design  th a t  w o u ld  
su rm o u n t these  difficulties. The Leadership  D evelopm ent P rogram m e had enab led
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me to trial a first design for an ethics education - and had been able to benefit from 
a relatively extensive set of resources. Moreover, the 'Bramshill Ethics 
Questionnaire’ had begun to provide a data-base in relation to the professional 
ethics of police managers.
The emerging data patterns meant that I was able to present concrete information 
about police themselves. This could be used as another tactic for achieving my 
goal.
In addition, subsequent versions of the questionnaire had enabled me to collect data 
concerning how my client groups identified the fundamental purposes of police, the 
appropriate values emphases in the developing police organisation and the proper 
moral foundations of police leadership. In this latter respect, the virtues of 
1honesty' and 'integrity' had been chosen as the most important personal qualities 
for a police leader. Finally, I had developed a picture, through the use of the 
questionnaire, of the perspectives on human nature held by police middle 
managers. (The general pattern of responses to the different versions o f the 
Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire will be reported in chapter fourteen of this 
dissertation.)
I was ready to begin the next stage of the inquiry. In the preliminary stage I had 
concentrated on the content and style of an ethics education for police leaders and 
managers. In needed to strengthen the rigour of the action research process. 
However, the circumstances for the delivery of ’ethics education’ would be 
significantly different: a fundamentally new type of programme design had been 
created for the middle-managers of the police service. I shall begin the next chapter 
by outlining the nature of this change
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Chapter seven
Action research and a developing ethics education fo r  police leaders and 
managers', the first action research cycle
"And he [Cezanne] repeated again and again: "All things, particularly in art, are 
theory developed and applied in contact with nature." " (Rewald, 1973: 578)
This chapter will chart the development of an 'ethics education' on the middle- 
management programme at Bramshill. I shall begin by describing the transition 
from the Leadership Development Programme to the new 'Police Management 
Programme', and illustrate how I attempted to create and deliver an 'ethics unit' in 
the 'Managing People' module of the new programme. I shall then indicate the 
features of the 'audit trail' I followed as part of a 'quality assurance' process 
designed to confer rigour and discipline on my inquiry. The chapter will include 
a synopsis o f my design, delivery and subsequent reflections on the emerging 
‘ethics educational experience’ that, together, constituted mini-cycles of action 
research within a more extended phase. I will conclude by acknowledging the fact 
that I was, unwittingly, conducting a form of practice underpinned by positivist 
assumptions. The 'shock' of this discovery was the major catalyst for a subsequent 
change in the tenor of my work.
1In search o f  the perfect design’ - individual educational action research and 
’ethics education ’ on the Police Management Programme
As part of a wider strategy for police training concerned with the 
professionalisation of policing and police management, the perception of 
stakeholder expectations and demands, and the need for 'quality-assured' education, 
training and development, the most senior decision-making educational group at 
the Police Staff College, Bramshill, the 'Programme Board' asked me, in August 
1994 to lead a project (which would include and involve certain of the tutorial staff) 
that would come to offer a management programme to the inspecting ranks of the 
police service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Our brief was 'to teach the 
knowledge and understanding component of the Management Charter Initiative's 
Middle Management (M2) standards. Our partner, in this venture, was the Institute 
of Management. However, in that partnership, it was not the role of the Institute to 
provide the curriculum or syllabus for the programme. So, our task was not only 
to develop an appropriate curriculum but to satisfy the Institute of Management that 
we would be offering a 'quality-assured' programme within an institutional setting 
that was itself structured to support the programme.
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The qualification, to which successful completion of the programme would lead, 
was the 'Diploma in Police Management'. Attainment of the diploma would be 
contingent upon candidates completing work-place based assignments within which 
they would demonstrate the 'practice' (or practical) equivalent of a 'first degree' 
standard. In other words, certain 'higher order skills, abilities and capacities’ would 
be manifested by candidates - and these would find expression in the way they 
described and analysed their actual management practice.
This brief and requirement constituted a radical departure in the nature o f police 
management education, training and development offered by the Police Staff 
College. To be successful, it required a culture change of the deepest order. It 
presaged something of a revolution in the college's organisational order and it 
meant that some very new sorts of questions and problems would be faced by all 
those connected with the new programme. In Schwab's (1969) analysis of the 
components of any educational setting, i.e. staff, students/learners, content and 
milieu, the staff were to experience significant change, students attending the 
programme would uncover a new 'psychological contract' with the programme 
deliverers, the content would be concerned with charting a new terrain in 
management education and the milieu - i.e. the College environment - would reflect 
uncertainties, contradictions and ambiguities, in the sense that the institutional 
setting itself embraced a range of competing values frameworks and educational 
paradigms.
The development of the proposal document was affected by a wider societal 
climate of 'self-help', (Fukuyama 1992) career uncertainties, (Schein 1994), 
postmodernist ethos and ethics, (Connor 1989), (Harvey 1990), (Best and Kellner 
1991), (Bauman 1993), and increasing competitiveness (Peters 1992) as well as the 
emergence of the knowledge economy (Toffler 1990), and, (Drucker 1992); these 
all created dynamics which made the construction of the curriculum a particularly 
demanding and tense experience for those concerned with its creation.
The Management Charter Initiative's model of managerial competence is an 
'outcome' model. The competent manager - at the M2 middle management 
standards - is that person who is able to effect certain specific outcomes in an 
extensive range of managerial situations. To achieve these outcomes, according to 
the model, the competent manager will fill, separately or simultaneously, four roles. 
These are: 'Managing Operations' (Activities), 'Managing Finance', 'Managing 
People' and, 'Managing Information'. The hierarchical structure of the standards 
specifies those outcomes in terms of performance indicators and the contexts in
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which such achievements need to occur. Our programme was to teach (or provide) 
the knowledge and understanding underpinning the achievement of a very wide 
range of types of managerial outcome. Among the questions that we had to 
confront were:
'What is the nature of that knowledge and understanding?' and, 'How does that 
knowledge and understanding relate to the achievement of those outcomes?'
In addition to these fundamental questions, we also had to examine what sort of 
educational experience needed to be offered to a particular client group that would 
actually catalyse effective management practice, which would be demonstrated and 
enacted in the workplace. Moreover, we understood the need to conceive o f the 
programme in developmental terms both in order to serve the practical needs of the 
client within a particular occupational and organisational culture, as well as to 
reflect current managerial orthodoxies concerning changing skill sets (Handy 1989) 
and the genesis of'reflective practitioners' (Schon 1983).
How did we resolve these issues? I have reported (Adlam, 1997) that the staff 
constituted themselves, temporarily, as a group of action researchers who met 
regularly both before the delivery of the new programme and during its first 
months, in order to try and resolve these (and other) questions. In that paper - 
which is included in Appendix P - 1 note that we were unable to find any clear-cut 
resolutions to our problems. We acknowledged, amongst ourselves, the tensions 
between 'education' and training', between 'meeting the wants and needs o f our 
customers' and 'providing expert and authoritative knowledges' etc.
We did, however, succeed in convincing the Institute of Management that we had 
sufficient professional capability to be in a position to launch the programme. Thus, 
in the late spring of 1995, the Police Staff College,Bramshill was accredited by 
a panel of assessors from the Institute of Management to offer a management 
development programme leading to a Diploma in Police Management at the M2 
level of the Management Charter Initiative's standards. The panel of assessors 
agreed that the 'Managing People' module should include a specific unit devoted 
to teaching an 'ethics' for police management practice.
The discipline o f the inquiry process: the audit trail and ‘quality assurance’
I c am e  to unders tand  this first full stage (i.e. the phase  after the  p re lim inary  phase  
o f  re - in tro d u c in g  ethics  to the  m iddle  m an ag em en t p ro g ram m es)  o f  the  resea rch  
process  in 'p rob lem -so lv ing ' term s. I th ough t tha t I w ou ld  be ab le  to  learn  a
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sufficient array of knowledges that would enable me, in practice, to secure the 
positive valuation that I was seeking. In my own mind, I was working towards the 
'perfect design1.
At the beginning of this phase of the inquiry I wanted to ensure that the process 
itself would meet - where possible - the 'quality assurance' criteria that had been 
suggested in the academic literature on action research. Throughout my action 
research enquiry I tried to ensure the validity of my claims to knowledge. I 
established an 'audit trail' for the design which was similar to that subsequently 
reported by Hughes, Denley and Whitehead (1999) in that section of their paper 
devoted to Hughes' reflections upon the process of legitimising her action research 
and reported in her doctoral thesis.
Hughes notes that she subjected the research process, her findings and her personal 
accounts to critical reflection and review through a number of methods. They 
included:
- Requesting colleagues to evaluate her effectiveness as a practitioner and 
researcher
- Requesting her colleagues to comment on the veracity of her accounts
- Ensuring rigour in her use of interviews and questionnaires
- Utilising a personal journal to assist the process of systematic ongoing reflection, 
planning and action
- Working with her tutor as a 'critical friend'
- Presenting her research for public debate and criticism
Hughes summarises the discipline she brought to bear upon her research process 
by asserting that it was these measures and procedures that would authenticate her 
accounts and would support the accuracy of her claims to knowledge.
I p reced ed  in an  a lm o s t identical w ay. In the  first s tage  o f  the  ac tion  re sea rch  
p rocess  I so u g h t to inc lude  the  tutorial s ta f f  as 'observers ' w ith in  the  de live ries  o f  
the 'e th ics unit'. I began  to keep  a personal jo u rn a l  in June  1985 - in w hich  I noted 
the em erg in g  designs  for the ethics unit as well as a range o f  personal observations  
and  re f lec tions  upon  th o se  designs  and the ir  'deliveries '. I a lso  invo lved  s ix  o f  m y
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colleagues directly in the role of interviewers. Their task was to uncover the nature 
of the participants' experience of ethics education. This was subsequently 
supplemented by 'experiential records' that course participants were asked to keep 
as the ethics unit was being delivered. Finally, I began to present accounts of the 
project to the wider educational action research community and to submit papers 
for publication. In this latter respect I wanted the process of criticism to help me 
become more aware of the limitations of my understanding and the deficiencies in 
my practice.
The conduct of my inquiry process was given added rigour as a result of 
contemplating the proposals and arguments advanced by Clarke, Dudley, Edwards, 
Rowland, Ryan and Winter (1993), Lomax (1994) and Tickle (1995) who were all 
concerned with critiquing the quality of action research reports. Clarke et al. refer 
to a distinct feature of action research:
"Action Research is distinctive in that it produces 'personal' (rather than objective) 
knowledge" (Clarke et al. 1993: 491)
In order to avoid the trap of an extreme epistemological subjectivism, action 
researchers, standardly, employ a range of methods to secure the authenticity and 
credibility of their accounts and explanations - such as those employed by Hughes 
and noted in Hughes, Denley and Whitehead (1999). However, it is probably true 
to say that personal experiential knowledge enjoys pre-eminence within the 
genesis, progress and presentation of action research projects.
The project undertaken here was permanently informed by Popper's (1972) 
cautionary warning concerning the inherent limitations o f our 'sources of 
knowledge' and his observation that 'the best we can hope for' is to arrive at a more 
mature appreciation of our problems.
L o m a x  (1994) , at the  ou tse t  o f  he r  a cco u n t m ak es  c lea r  h e r  b e l ie f  th a t  the  
ev a lu a tiv e  c rite ria  and  a ssessm en t p ro ced u res  o f  'academ ia ' sh o u ld  n o t  tak e  
p reced en ce  o v e r  the  ins igh ts  o f  teachers  th em se lv e s  p ro v id e d  th a t  th o se  in s igh ts  
w ere  'g ro u n d e d  in a r igo rous  ex am in a tio n  o f  th e ir  o w n  p rac tice '.  She  de f in e s  the  
m ost im p o r tan t  feature  o f  teach e r  action  resea rch  as 'p ro fess iona l '  i.e. c o n ce rn e d  
w ith  m ak in g  change  for the  better in concrete  s ituations o f  prac tice  ra ther th an  the  
'educa tiona l '  i.e. the  genes is  o f  m ore  k n o w led g e  - e spec ia lly  on the  pa rt  o f  the  
researcher. L om ax believes that teacher action research should  be seen as a p rocess  
o f  d isc ip l in ed  in terven tion . She su m m arises  the  nature  o f  te ach e r  action  research  
as fo llow s:
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"Teacher action research is a systematic and intentional inquiry by teachers in 
order to make sense o f  their practices and improve them." (Lomax 1994: 115)
In highlighting the practical focus of striving to effect a change for the better’ 
Lomax differentiates her main unit of appraisal from that proposed in Whitehead 
and Foster's (1984) earlier discussion. They focus upon the individual's claim to 
know his or her own educational development. For Lomax it is the emphasis on the 
'practical' as opposed to the more circumscribed 'educational' aim of teacher action 
research. Moreover, she argues that 'a focus upon the 'professional' rather than the 
educational is essential' if practitioner rather than academic criteria are to be 
identified forjudging an action research dissertation.
The remainder of her paper can be read as a sequential set of tests or requirements 
for disciplined action research conducted by practitioners in the situations of their 
own professional practice. I shall begin to discuss the extent to which my work met 
these criteria when I come to present a review of my action research inquiry in the 
next chapter.
The criteriological frameworks articulated by Clarke, Dudley, Edwards, Rowland, 
Ryan and Winter, and by Lomax were complemented by Tickle's listing of criteria 
constituting a test for 'quality' in educational action research. Tickle asked his 
audience at the second international conference on teacher research (at the 
University of Georgia, Athens, USA in April 1993) to define the criteria against 
which they would seek to have their own research judged. The conferencees 
adopted fifteen criteria which, according to Tickle, they 'appropriated' as an 
'approved list'. Tickle's list includes criteria that can be aggregated together 
because, like those of Lomax (1994) they point to the unfolding sequence of the 
research. Tickle's criteria are also concerned with the quality or validity of the 
knowledge generated by the research. He argues that meeting the full range of 
criteria would constitute as 'tough a task as any practitioner could wish for.' He then 
suggests that, for him, the standards set by the teacher-researchers amounted to 
'complete assurance', 'total quality', were 'fully inclusive' and would constitute a 
'masterly demonstration'.
I w an ted  to design  a form  o f  ethics education tha t m igh t m eet Tickle 's 'total quality' 
c riteria . It w as  b ecau se  o f  th is  am bition  tha t I chose  to subtitle  th is  p h ase  o f  the  
pro jec t:  'In search o f  the perfect design'.
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The emerging fethics education' unit fo r  the Police Management Programme 
The Design
The 'ethics unit' was positioned within a three-week long 'Managing People' 
module - which was itself designed to provide coverage of the knowledge and 
understanding underpinning the four units of competence comprising the module. 
Although ‘ethics' as a topic was not mentioned within the competence framework 
I indicated to the Institute of Management's panel of assessors that the practices of 
‘managing people’ needed a moral foundation - and that the content of the Police 
Management Programme would not only provide specific learning structures 
concerned with ethics but that a theme of'principled policing' would run throughout 
the programme material.
The design of the initial one-day module offered on the 'Managing People' module 
in June 1995 was organised in a tutor manual (which still exists) and included the 
following aims and objectives:
The aims of the unit were:
- To achieve a positive valuing o f  ethics and the study ofpolice ethics
- To enable the practice o f  ethical management and leadership through the use o f  
ethical perspectives and ethically based interventions
The objectives of the unit:
- To introduce the subject 'ethics' - including a definition o f  ethics, the history o f  the 
subject and an outline o f  its current territory
- To describe 'normative ethics'
- To present the 'ethicalprofile' o f  police leaders and managers
- To describe the nature o f  applied ethics
- To locate ethics in the institution and function ofpolice
- To profile the moral ethos o f  the police organisation
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- To examine the practice o f  ethical leadership
- To provide frameworks fo r  ethical decision-making
- To test knowledge and understanding through an 'open-book’ assignment at the 
end o f  the teaching day
The Delivery
On 8 June 1995,1 recorded in my 'action research' diary the 'actual content' o f the 
learning structures delivered on this, the first occasion that an 'ethics education' was 
presented on the Police Management Programme.
‘After an initial warm-up activity - when students were asked to convene in small 
groups and consider their 'first thoughts' about the nature o f  ethics - and a 
subsequent brief look at the 'ethical profile' emerging from the successive versions 
o f  the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire - 1 gave the first presentation. The aims o f  
this presentation were stated on the relevant computer slide as follows:
- To introduce the subject ethics and to underline its contemporary significance
- To describe the nature o f  obligation and value
- To comment upon police ethics
This presentation was followed by 'questions and answers' where some o f  the 
enduring concerns o f  some o f  those in the client group were mentioned. These 
included the following:
'Why do we have to study ethics - when the ethics o f  others in the criminal justice 
system are questionable?'
'This is all very well but how is it going to help policing Coventry on a Saturday 
night?'
'Isn't ethics ju st the latest flavour o f  the month?'
'Areyou saying that we aren't ethical?'
M assey  (1993), has ind icated  that in the course  o f  p resen ting  the  sub jec t 'ethics ' to
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police officers (undergoing their foundation training) these kinds of question are 
typically raised by his students. In the course of trying to respond to questions such 
as these I sensed that a substantial proportion of the client group were reflecting 
what Scheingold (1984) claimed was a characteristic of police cultures: the view 
that police are victims of public misunderstandings and varying levels of scorn. The 
literature of transactional analysis demonstrates how ’victims’ become ’persecutors’ 
as they try to 'hit back' against the real or perceived injustices visited against upon 
and against them. I had, therefore, in the course of my presentations and in my 
responses to these questions to avoid communicating from a perceived 'critical 
parent' position. In relation to this latter point, I wrote, in my research diary, a note 
to myself:
'Remember - i f  they begin to get hostile with you because they think you are 
reproaching them or being sanctimonious - remind yourself o f  the time you had 
'Equal Opportunities' training - and how resentful you fe lt at the lack o f  recognition 
concerning the attempt you had made to combat racism and sexism. That’s how 
many o f  them might be feeling.'
The presentation was followed by small group discussions using the 'Bramshill 
Ethics Questionnaire' as a basis for personal reflection before the second 
presentation. I had expected to give a lecture examining 'applied ethics' where I 
would surface some key moral dilemmas and challenges in policing - such as the 
problem of loyalty and conflicting claims to rights. However, because o f timing 
difficulties, I selected a presentation concerned with the 'reinvention of police'. This 
enabled me to introduce the police strategic emphases of the early 1990s beginning 
with a precis of Woodcock's (1992) paper 'Trust in the police: the search for truth’ 
and culminating in an overview of the ’Quality of Service' philosophy launched at 
the end of 1992.
Again, although a small number of the client group showed what appeared to be 
genuine interest, as the group left for lunch, one officer remarked:
'Poachers turned gatekeepers - I'd like to know how many people they have trodden 
on or destroyed getting to where they are.'
T h e  a f te rn o o n  sess ion  beg an  w ith  A ss is tan t C h ie f  C o n stab le ,  Ian  M c D o n a ld  
ru n n in g  an ana lys is  o f  the  ethical p rincip les  w h ich  m igh t un d e rp in  the  p rac tice  o f  
leadersh ip  - in w h ich  he described  the  pattern  o f  re sp o n ses  em erg in g  from  
w o rk sh o p s  he had conducted  in o ther countries . He no ted  tha t the re  w as 
cons ide rab le  cross-cultural consis tency  in the  specifica tion  fo r 'm o ra l ly  p rinc ip led
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police leadership1 and referred to the importance of 'honesty', 'justice', 'integrity', 
and, 'courage'.
This led into my final presentation to the module participants entitled: 'Frameworks 
for ethical decision-making' - where I discussed the police service draft statement 
o f ethical principles and the decision hierarchy suggested by Beabout and 
Wannemann (1994). This was followed by a half-hour test o f knowledge and 
understanding - which included three basic questions: participants were asked to 
define 'ethics', to identify at least one normative ethical theory and to discuss how 
ethics might assist in police professional practice.
Finally, I asked each person in the client group to complete, anonymously, a 'unit 
evaluation'.
The Evaluation
The unit evaluation asked for participants to respond to the following five 
questions:
1. What were the high points of the unit?
2. What were the low points of the unit?
3. How (if at all) would you improve the unit?
4. What (if any) learning 'happened' for you as a result of your experience with the 
unit?
5. What value (if any) do you assign to your experience with the ethics unit (Please 
tick the appropriate box) The categories were:
- A very high level
- A high level
- A moderate level
- Little
- V e ry  little
T h e  w rit ten  re sp o n ses  to these  questions  revealed  the  fo llow ing  patterns:
T h e  h igh  po in ts  o f  the  un it included:
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'The rigour', 'The commitment o f  the tutor’, ’The professionalism o f  the 
presentations', 'The refreshing look at something new', 'The opportunity to have a 
brain stretch ’
The low points of the unit were dominated by the response to the test of knowledge 
and understanding. This was cited by a large majority of the participants who made 
statements such as:
'The day was spoiled by the test’, 'The test/exam totally spoiled the day', 'What was 
the point o f  the exam? It detracted from the value o f  the day', 'It was like going 
back to school again, taking the test, it was a bit o f  an insult'
Additionally small numbers of participants mentioned that there was:
'Too much history', 'Too much theory', 'Not enough time fo r  addressing personal 
issues'.
In answer to the question, 'How (if at all) would you improve the unit? The 
majority of participants focused mainly on the need to abolish (or re-schedule) the 
exam.
In addition, a third of the participants thought that the content of the module would 
be improved if  it were to be less 'academic' and/or 'less theoretical'. More time 
should be given over to 'practical' or 'real-world/real life' concerns.
A quarter of the participants saw no value added by the contribution of the senior 
police officer and suggested that it should be 'dropped'.
A third of the participants suggested that 'more time'be allocated to 'ethics'.
The responses to the fourth question, 'What (if any) learning 'happened' for you as 
a result of your experience on the unit?’ revealed the following pattern:
10 out of 25 mentioned that they now had a 'clearer idea', a 'better grasp' or a 
'better understanding' of ethics
14 ou t o f  25 stated  tha t they  w ere  surprised  at the pattern  o f  resp o n ses  e m erg in g  
from  the B ram shill  E th ics  Q uestionna ire  and tha t they  w ere  as a resu lt  m ore  
'optimistic' or 'cheered' by the s tandards  o f  the ir  co lleagues.
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6 out of 25 noted that 'no' learning o r 'nothingparticular'had resulted from the day.
Finally, the responses to the fifth question, ’What value (if any) do you assign to 
your experience with the ’ethics’ unit were distributed as follows:
- A very high level: N = 1
- A high level: N = 7
- A moderate level: N = 10
- Little: N = 6
- Very little: N = 0
In addition to this simple and basic form of evaluation, the lead tutor of the module 
invited me to attend a ’stock-taking’ session at the beginning of the next week 
(when the module entered its second week). Although the bulk of the ’stock-taking’ 
was concerned with the nature of the Police Management Programme it became 
clear that the ’ethics’ unit had resulted in a high degree of reflection on the part of 
many of the participants.
Different individuals made remarks such as:
7 found m yself thinking a great deal about my own ethics and the ethics in the 
organisation - 1 needed more time'
'Ethics is a profound subject - we need to spend more time looking at the issues' 
'It caused me to re-think many things - about myself and my work'
'Ethics is so important that you need to give it more time'
I also discovered the fact that my own personality and character was the subject of 
a particular focus:
7 spent most o f  the time wondering i f  you were a poofta'
'You seem like a nice guy - but you come across as effeminate - this is a problem 
fo r  you'
'You're a believer - have you ever been out on the ground with police officers?’
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'You'd be more successful i f  we knew more about you'
'You come across as committed but you are living on a different plane'
The module leader emphatically believed that more time should be given over to 
the focus on ethics within the 'Managing People' module. I was invited to 'take' two 
days of the programme. In consequence, and in the light of the pattern of responses 
to the first unit delivery on the module, I set about creating a more extensive 
design.
The Design
My reflections prior to the unit delivery in July 1995 were documented in my diary 
notes. Immediately prior to the next 'design' of the ethics unit they included (1 July 
1995) the following:
'After initial presentations plus the 'Moral Ethos' questionnaire, the programme 
should be more 'student-centred' - there should be a 'co-operative inquiry' design.'
Ideally, I wanted course participants to have the 'space' and freedom to surface 
there own concerns and issues - and, with the help of their colleagues and the 
resources that might be assembled 'on site' (at the college) - find ways of addressing 
them. In this respect I was not seeking the design elegance suggested by Heron in 
his discussion of co-operative inquiry; here the intention was to provide something 
resembling a 'do-it-yourself type of inquiry, or a 'do-it-yourself approach to 
discovery and learning. In design terms, I thought it appropriate to lead and 
structure the first day - and then to grant the client group far more autonomy in the 
second day. This, I thought, would meet the needs for structure and for safety - and 
would then respect the participants needs for autonomy and self-definition.
I also realised that it was overly ambitious to create a design that might reflect 
Snell's 'critical pragmatism' and/or 'social transformation' curriculum model. So, 
my (clumsily worded) diary entry (1 July 1995) reads:
'My purposes fo r  an ethics education fo r  police, tested against Snell's (1993) 
outline are primarily to do with critical pragmatism and/or social transformation. 
But, having said this, I would be very cautious about the realities o f  achieving this. 
In fact, my actual practice may be more accurately mapped on to Maclagan's 
(1993) five purposes o f  an ethics education:
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- Raising awareness and stimulating the moral imagination
- Helping managers create organisations which support ethical conduct
- Enhancing personal and interpersonal skills o f  a non-cognitive nature
- Providing concepts, theories and analytical skills fo r  ethical reasoning and 
ethical decision-making
- The development o f  a 'capacity fo r  judgem ent''
The Delivery
On 12 July 1995 I began at 1100 hrs. with a reference to the previous module 
content and I highlighted the moral character of'the duty of care' as well as Egan's 
model of the 'skilled helper'. I outlined the overall structure of the next two days 
noting that I would 'lead' the majority of the first day and then we would move over 
to a 'form of co-operative inquiry' where the course members would aggregate into 
'interest' groups and focus upon a topic for which, hopefully, they would have some 
energy to explore. I asked participants to complete the 'starting point' sheet - 
concerned with communicating the aims and objectives of the unit and identifying 
their previous experience with 'ethics'.
By way of introduction I uncovered a poster sized photograph of my Grandmother 
(a person I had never met) and mentioned that she had been unable to return to her 
home in the Czech Republic because of the Nazi invasion of the Sudetenland in 
1939. She never did return to her home and died, in England, before I was born. I 
added that at least a part of the role of 'ethics' is to try to minimise the likelihood 
of these sorts of tragedy. I wanted my client group to know that for me 'ethics' was 
not merely an academic subject separated from the 'real world'. The 'moral point' 
of view was something very central in my life and work.
The first presentation dealt with the 'history' of ethical ideas and moved on to 
provide an outline of'normative ethics'.
T h e  seco n d  p re sen ta t io n  (after lunch) w as  en titled  'a first lo o k  at po lice  ethics'. 
H ere  I m e n tio n ed  so m e  o f  the  m a jo r  m oral d ilem m as  in p o lic in g  - bas in g  m y 
a cco u n t upon  R ichards  (1985) sum m ary . I also  reported  som e o f  the  data  pa tterns 
e m e rg in g  from  the  B ram shill  E thics Q uestionnaire .  T hese  inc luded , for exam ple , 
the  fact tha t m o s t  po lice  m idd le  m anagers  saw  th em se lv es  as 'h igh ly  eth ical ' and
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that a slight majority o f the respondents had a positive reaction to the draft 
statement of ethical principles.
This was followed by discussions in small groups where I invited participants to 
'explore any aspects' o f the material that I had covered or issues that had been 
surfaced for individuals. I also stated that because these issues could be sensitive 
and personal I would not expect any 'sharing' in the larger group.
The final session of the day was 'fronted' by a trained counsellor who had designed 
a session to examine the moral basis of management - through emphasising the 
outcomes to which counselling and 'helping' might aim. This (in my judgement) 
was a considered and reflective session and it culminated in the practice of a 
'helping skills' model.
On 13 July 1995 I began with a reflection on the previous day - which included a 
clarification of certain points - before suggesting the areas that separate student 
groups might wish to explore. I had selected three formats for examining ethical 
issues and concerns: an 'argument', a 'creative' piece and a 'personal development' 
exercise. I suggested that the group form itself into three subgroups each of which 
would produce a 'powerful, riveting and relevant' learning structure on 'ethics' that 
would 'move us all on'.
Three groups rapidly formed and worked on their area for the next two hours.
At midday the groups were ready to 'deliver' their designs.
The first group (the 'argument') produced a highly structured debate on the need for 
the police service to adopt a formal code of ethics. (The motion was defeated with 
8 votes for and 16 against)
The second group (the creative piece) produced (after lunch) a complex play 
exploring the fabrication of evidence and the pressures to subvert the due process 
of law. This was followed by a lengthy discussion and analysis.
T he  th ird  g ro u p  o ffered  the ir  s truc ture  a fte r  tea. It to o k  the  fo rm  o f  a g u id e d  
p h an tasy  cu lm in a tin g  in a se lf-confron ta tion  exercise . T h is  exerc ise  ra ised  issues  
such  as 'g iv in g  up p o w er  and control' and  'trust'.
A part o f  m y d iary  en try  for that day I co m m en ted :
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7 would say that this was a highly effective day. It was an excellent example o f  a 
focused group o f  learners - however, in the sense o f  a) a learning community and
b) a co-operative inquiry, neither forms were fu lly realised. It may be more 
accurate to say that I  am structuring relatively open-ended learning opportunities 
fo r  individuals within boundaries '
The Evaluation
Again, I used the same simple structure that had been constructed for the evaluation 
of the previous unit. Thus, the unit evaluation asked for participants to respond to 
the five questions noted in an earlier part of this chapter.
The high points of the unit were similar to those of the previous unit. They 
included: 'The high level o f  intellectual content', 'The inclusion o f  new research on 
police', 'The sincerity o f  the tu to f 'The opportunity to get stuck in to a meaty task’
'The chance to discuss deep things with colleagues'
The low points of the unit included: 'Wasting too much time on academic aspects.’ 
'Not enough time to deal with our issues''Counselling session didn't add anything,' 
'Inadequate preparation fo r  the topic', 'Not enough practical analysis’, ’Rob 
Adlam’s ideas too difficult to understand’.
The unit could be improved by addressing all those topics mentioned above. In 
addition, some respondents suggested that I ’include the study o f  police ethical 
dilemmas examined by senior and/or experienced police officers’ - as well as 
’guidelines fo r  resolving ethical dilemmas'.
The response to the fourth question, ’What (if any) learning ’happened1 for you as 
a result of your experience with the unit?’ was similar to the previous group:
11 out of 24 mentioned that they now had a ’more understanding’, 'clearer idea',
1an insight into', a 'grasp o f  or a 'better understanding' of ethics
10 out of 24 stated that they were surprised at the pattern of responses emerging 
from the Bramshill ethics questionnaire and that they were 'encouraged' or 
'reassured' or fe lt positive about' the data
5 out of 24 noted that 'not much' learning or 'nothing really' or 'zero' had resulted 
from the day.
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Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, 'What value (if any) do you assign to 
your experience with the 'ethics' unit were distributed as follows:
- A very high level: N = 3
- A high level: N = 4
- A moderate level: N = 11
- Little: N = 5
- Very little: N = 1
Whilst the data, overall, were satisfactory, I wondered why it was that I could not 
manage to create a design that would achieve, for the majority of the participants, 
a 'high level' of learning. Moreover, a quarter of the participants were not - in terms 
of their own judgements - achieving much learning from the ethics unit. This left 
me determined to create a design that might 'win over' the large majority o f the 
participants. I decided, for the next unit delivery, to increase the amount o f time 
spent on 'practical activities' and to curtail the amount of time I spent giving 
presentations.
The Design
The new design attempted to provide the client group with as much freedom as 
possible - within the constraints of a structure I would provide - to develop, for 
themselves and their colleagues, learning structures that would 'engage' everyone. 
I resolved to 'earn my com' by providing 'committed' introductory overviews to 
'ethics' and then 'applied ethics' at the beginning of each day. I would then continue, 
on the first day with the 'co-operative inquiry' model I had introduced on the 
previous unit delivery and develop a new activity that I would come to call, 'The 
play's the thing’. This design attempted to incorporate the subtleties of'drama' and 
the theatre in order to reveal and deal with 'truths' that are difficult to address in 
'real' life.
The Delivery
O n 6 S e p te m b e r  1995 at 1100 hrs. I beg an  an  in troduction  to  the  e th ics  u n i t  - and  
d iscu ssed , b rie fly  an a ss ig n m en t I had  c rea ted  en titled  'E th ica l leadersh ip '.  I th en  
m oved  on to give an overv iew  o f  the  subject 'ethics' (based upon  F rankena 's  (1973) 
in tro d u c tio n  to the  subject). I ex am in ed  the orig inal 'Socra tic  d ilem m a ' d iscu ssed  
in the  C rito  - w h ich  consti tu tes  a rem arkab le  ex am p le  o f  the  im p lica tio n s  o f  
ab id ing , u n sw erv in g ly  to ethical principles. D uring  th is  I w as asked  by one  
partic ipan t:
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Was Socrates mad? - he sounds a right prat to me'
This was immediately followed by a loud burst of laughter from the group before 
someone else quipped:
'He should stick to football’ (a reference to the Brazilian footballer, named 
Socrates)
I then introduced the client group to 'normative ethics'. As a result of the questions 
that began to issue from the group, this activity lasted for two hours.
After the lunch break, I announced that, 'following the positive response from a 
previous group', the members of the group could choose to create 'learning designs' 
for their colleagues. Again, the three structures for exploring ethical issues were: 
a 'creative piece', an 'argument' and a 'personal development' exercise.
Following the tea break each group presented their pieces. In turn they were 
concerned to examine the 'ethics police', the notion that the statement of ethical 
principles was an effort to manipulate public opinion and, an examination of the 
role of moral values in professional life.
On the second day, 7 September 1999,1 delivered a presentation entitled 'Applied 
ethics' and quickly moved on to present the new exercise I had written for the unit, 
entitled: 'The play's the thing". Each participant was given a single sheet of A4 
paper upon which was written:
'Ethics, leadership and professionalism - An exercise: 'Dealing with moral 
dilemmas in policing'
Introduction:
It is something o f  a truism to remark that policing is a morally demanding and 
morally vulnerable activity. Policing, as William Ker Muir wrote, deals with the 
'big questions' such as how to use coercive power without becoming corrupted, how 
to prevent loyalty from  becoming misplaced, and, how to present one's best se lf in 
the face o f  threat and abuse. The context ofpolicing provides the stage upon which 
some o f  the most testing moral dramas are enacted.
The purpose o f  this exercise is to examine areas in which moral dilemmas,
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difficulties or conflicts are likely to be experienced by police officers - and to 
explore ways in which the application o f  ethical principles might enhance the 
practice o f  police leadership and management. The areas have been chosen 
because they reflect those commonly noted in the research literature on 'police 
ethics'.
Then, under the heading, 'Theplay's the thing ' the participants on the module were 
asked to choose from one of four topic areas, concerning, 'loyalty1, 'discretion', 
'deception' and 'the use or power and authority', and then to produce a short play or 
playlet (lasting no more than twenty minutes) in which a moral dilemma connected 
with the subject area was to be presented.
In addition, the group was asked either to present an analysis as to how to resolve 
the dilemma by making reference to the application of moral principles or to invite 
the audience of fellow students to resolve the dilemma(s) by 'finishing the script'.
Each group was also asked to invite 'discussion' and a 'critical appreciation' from 
the audience. Finally, in order to finish the activity, each group was requested to 
make a summary of the process 'by providing a short record of the most significant 
learning points to the 'learning community''
This, I felt was a considerable risk on my part. I had no idea how the group would 
come to respond to this structure. However, after a moment's pause, individuals 
organised themselves into the four separate groups and spent, independently of me, 
the next two hours working on their designs.
Immediately after lunch, Assistant Chief Constable, Ian McDonald ran a session 
examining the practice of'ethical leadership' after which the student group began 
their 'plays'.
The first group, taking the subject, 'loyalty', examined the devastating difficulties 
surrounding the problem of encountering a drunk police officer - who happened to 
be a personal friend - involved (and at fault) in a car accident.
The second play explored the moral aspects of power - taking as its focus three 
forms of power; the power of patronage, sexual power, and, the power of 
knowledge.
The remaining plays were presented and discussed on the morning of the third day.
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The play on 'discretion' showed how social class factors influence police decision­
making including arrest and detention. It featured the discovery of homosexual 
encounters involving inter alia the director of a social services department (who 
was vividly caricatured) and a local magistrate (who was also vividly caricatured). 
The final play attempted to capture the prevalence of deception within the police 
organisation by focusing on the way performance figures are 'massaged' - and 
published in order to give the impression that police are 'effective'.
In my diary I noted:
'The plays seem to 'work'. They like to he set a task which they have to master. 
There was plenty o f  creative work - and I  think Donahue and Felts (1993) are 
correct to contrast the 'code ethics' approach with the attempt to create 
communicative conditions where discussions on ethics can place. Is this structure 
getting towards Habermas' ideal communication conditions?'
The Evaluation
In addition to the basic and simple framework I had introduced for the first two 
deliveries of the 'ethics unit' on the module, I wanted to examine the pattern of data 
emerging from one other source. A 'Quality of Service' form had been re-instituted 
at the College - the second part of which allowed course participants to reflect on 
each week as a whole.
The high points of the unit, because of the inclusion of the 'play's' showed some 
differences in comparison with the previous unit(s). They included: 'The chance 
to work with other police officers studying ethical dilemmas'Addressing practical 
concerns', 'The practical exercise f  'Doing something profound , and 'Coming to 
terms with the dark side o f  policing'
The low points of the unit included: 'Too much time on the theory', 'Theory - 
difficult to understand', 'We don't need Greek history', 'The tutor was not easy to 
understand - make it more simple ', and, 'The tutor needs to come down a level to 
be understood’.
As with the previous unit deliveries, the suggested improvements were related to 
the 'low' points mentioned above and again recommended reducing the amount of 
time spent on the academic aspects of'ethics'.
The response to the fourth question, 'What (if any) learning 'happened' for you as
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a result o f your experience with the unit?' was similar to the previous group:
14 out of 28 mentioned that they now had an 'insight', ' a knowledge o f  ethics', 
'clarification about ethics' 'a clearer idea', a 'good grasp', or a 'better 
understanding’ o f ethics
12 out o f 28 stated that they were 'interested in' or 'surprised by' the pattern of 
responses emerging from the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire and that they were 
"pleased with' or 4enthusiastic about' or 'reassured by ' or fe lt positive about’ the 
data.
9 out of 28 noted that 'very little', 'not much'learning or 'nothing really'or 'naff all' 
had resulted from the day. This was disappointing for me. I had imagined that the 
ethics plays might, in themselves, have produced some valuable learning. They 
had, for example, demonstrated how ethical problems become amplified after an 
initial carelessness or ethically unskilled judgment. The vividness of this simple 
fact - through the medium of the plays - appeared to me to hold important lessons. 
This did not, however, impress itself on almost one third of the participants.
Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, 'What value (if any) do you assign to 
your experience with the 'ethics' unit were distributed as follows:
- A very high level: N = 1
- A high level: N = 5
- A moderate level: N = 13
- Little: N = 7
- Very little: N = 2
The new 'Quality of Service' evaluation which focused upon the week as a whole 
produced the following information:
The first question asked: 'What were the high points of the course?'
On the positive side, of the eighteen respondents, nine wrote the following:
'The presentations by Rob Adi am were technically amazing’, 'Entirely due to the 
laughter generated - the plays on moral dilemmas - They provided, however, a 
good vehicle fo r  discussions', 'Practical exercises - the plays - which allowed 
theoretical knowledge to be applied','The plays ', 'The rigour', 'Presentation on 
ethics was catalytic fo r  further know ledge'The playlets on the subjects o f
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discretion, deception, loyalty and power. All very informative and enjoyable.',
1Playlets ', 'The four plays produced by the syndicates fo r  Rob Adlam's input on 
Thursday’
Conversely, in response to the question, 'What were the low points of the course' 
it was clear that almost one third of the participants identified aspects of or all of 
the 'ethics unit'. Thus, they wrote the following:
1Ethics ', 'First morning on ethics - taught session Plato, Aristotle et al. Probably 
necessary but not the stuff to seize the imagination'The first session by Mr. Adlam 
went right over my head ' 'Difficulty in understanding theory o f  ethics,' 'Difficulty 
in understanding Rob Adlam's ideas','Two hours on the esoteric theory o f  ethics
- practical applications dealt with in fifteen minutes'
Reflection
After the first three designs I recorded the following observation in my diary - 
which was to lead, a few months later, to a re-appraisal of my practice:
'Inadvertently, I  realise that I  have adopted something o f  a positivist perspective
- i.e. i f  I  could come up with enough tricks and distractions then 'ethics’ education 
would receive a positive evaluation’
I was beginning to realise that I was attempting to get a grip upon as many 
variables affecting the evaluation of the ethics unit as was possible and then, by so 
manipulating those variables, I was hoping to succeed in obtaining the level of 
positive response to my work that would secure ethics on the curriculum. However, 
although I recorded this reflection I continued to try to make improvements to the 
design. The plays had proved to be a ’success' in the sense of securing a positive 
response from a slight majority of the group (although the amount and level of 
analysis following the presentations was minimal and any analysis that did take 
place was relatively superficial).
I resolved to spend less time presenting an introduction to the subject of ethics to 
the group - and to use extracts from video-tape material in order to stimulate 
discussion and enquiry into police related issues. Over the next two deliveries my 
diary entries record my continuing attempts to find ways of presenting valued 
learning structures and opportunities to the client group. The pattern of feedback 
remained similar. I noted in my diary on 31 October 1995:
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"Activity' - any activity - such as the ’plays' is preferred to 'analysis'. ’
By the end of the fifth unit delivery my diary note on 23 November 1995 was 
headed: 'Action research as techno-fixx. I went on to write:
'One conclusion I  have gradually come to settle upon is that the 'action research' 
which I  have been conducting is, to a large degree built upon a 'techno-fix' 
assumption - o f  which I  was, initially, largely unaware. In this sense, I  suspect that 
I  have embodied the world-view that Bauman (1993) describes in his 'postmodern 
ethics' - especially chapter five. This techno-fix assumption suggests that i f  the 
practitioner can identify all the key variables which then might be manipulated or 
controlled in a certain way e.g. in my case through the initial 'cognitive structuring' 
o f  the situation, the 'performance art' I  achieve, etc. then a positive valuation (in 
this case of'ethics') will occur. This casts the action researcher into something o f  
a techno-magician role'
Beginning the transition to a new phase: 'Pragmatics and experimentation'.
I realised that my final design for 1995 would constitute the beginning of a 
transition to a new phase of action research. In this next phase I wanted to build 
upon the learnings from the earlier preliminary stage and from the first major phase 
of the inquiry 'in search for the perfect design' - and find ways to stimulate 
appropriate learning amongst the client group as well as a deeper understanding of 
the experience of the client group. My diary note of 29 November 1995 reads:
'In order fo r  me to change I  will have to give something up. This is the last time I  
shall be using the 'techno-fix' style - infotainment as a means o f  conducting ethics 
education'.
I continued:
'Today the 'ethics' unit began. I fe lt in a strange mood. Right up to the last minute 
I  was working on the purposes and justification fo r  an ethics education. But, my 
mood was strange. The action research experiences had probably taken their toll. 
I  was fed-up' with feeling under pressure from the 'audience' and constantly being 
placed under a kind o f  relentless scrutiny. That's why it will be 'easier' to move 
away from  this way o f  working. It requires too much discipline, too much self- 
monitoring. '
In addition, a new exercise I had piloted with a group, of overseas police officers,
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entitled, 'Ultima Ethica'served as an illustration of a response tendency within the 
client group. This exercise was designed to raise questions about the way any 
complex society might best be organised and policed.' However, although the 
exercise was constructed to identify the moral foundations of policing it was not 
possible for me to elicit from a majority of the group a sustained and serious level 
of analysis. By way of example, a part of the exercise asked for responses to the 
question: What principles should be at the foundation of an ideal society? The 
responses included:
Everyone to stand on their own two fee t (all o f  them)
S elf reliance
No such thing as a free lunch, dinner or tea 
No god higher than man 
The end always justifies the means 
Strength is power
All men are equal - some more equal than others 
The power team - big swinging 'dicks'
The pond life - frogs and tadpoles
The ’response tendency', I have referred to above, consisted of a predilection, by 
more than a minority of the client group to sabotage any sustained rational and 
thoughtful inquiry into the fundamentals of policing. It was, therefore, time to 
rethink my designs for an ethics unit on the Police Management Programme.
Preparing fo r  a transition
To help with the transition I had decided to enlist the help of colleagues on the staff 
at Bramshill to conduct interviews with randomly selected course participants. I 
wanted the interviews to help me get a clearer idea as to what impact the ethics 
education design was having upon them. I was determined to take account of the 
information that would be surfaced in these interviews in my search for the 
construction of an ethics education that would be positively valued by the client 
group.
The first six interviews took place in December 1995, a few days after the ethics 
unit on the Police Management Programme. Each of the three interviewers used the 
same interview schedule and, at the end of the interview, provided the interviewee 
with a brief summary of the content of the interview to check that the summary 
was, itself, ’accurate’.
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The first interview schedule consisted of the following six questions.
1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit 
of the Managing People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the 
highs and lows? etc.
2. On reflection, what if anything, did you learn from the unit?
3. What value do you assign to this part of the module?
4. How might your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit influence your practice as a 
manager?
5. How, if  at all, would you improve the ethics unit?
6. Anything else?
I classified the responses to each interview into one of three categories:
A) A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the 
first aim (goal) of the action research process
B) A ’mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at 
achieving the first action research aim
C) A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the action research 
process has been achieved
I have reproduced the details of the first six interviews at Appendix G.
Summary o f  the first interviews:
1. Overall the interviews left me with some grounds for optimism concerning the 
first goal of the action research process - i.e. to achieve, from a majority of the 
client group, a positive valuation of their experience with 'ethics education'.
2. The initial presentation(s) on 'ethics' were perceived as intellectual - and 
although it was possible to value the overall process there appears to be the risk of 
a negative valuation of the experience if it is perceived as too or overly theoretical.
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3. There are suggestions of a reluctance or resistance by members of the client 
group to participate (exercises are resisted or people ’do not put their toe in’)
4. There is evidence of some 'significant learning’ e.g. one participant came to 
'understand myself' - and there was evidence of increased awareness as well as an 
enhanced ethical; sensitivity/perception
Summary and Review:
At the conclusion of the first action research cycle I made the following note in my 
diary dated 28 December 1995:
There is evidence from the project that ethics education can be developedfor police 
middle-managers and leaders so that it is fun', enjoyable, personally significant, 
valued and experienced as worthwhile, illuminating and rewarding. Some o f  the 
comments that course participants made over the three weeks o f  the last module 
delivery in 1995 were:
- "I was, fo r  want o f  a better word, enlightened."
- "I was a cynic but I'm not now."
- "This has been the best three weeks on a police course I  have ever spent - 1 have 
been 'touched', and I  didn't think I  would."
The new design will try to build upon those methods which seemed to work most fo r  
the group as a whole - i.e. vivid video, plays, activities in small groups - but I  shall 
try to worry less about the relentless attempt to identify and stay in control o f  all 
the variables that might conceivably have a bearing on the final evaluation. I  shall 
develop an approach which is more eclectic and pragmatic.
I looked forward optimistically to a shift of emphasis in the new design.
199
Chapter eight
Action research and a developing ethics education fo r  police leaders and 
managers: the second cycle
" "Frankly, this is my position, "Signac had written to Monet. "I have been painting 
fo r  two years and my only models have been your own works; I  have been 
following the wonderful path that you broke fo r  us ... I  beg you to let me see you, 
i f  only fo r  a short visit. I  should be happy to show you five or six studies; perhaps 
you would tell me what you think o f  them and give me the counsel I  need so badly, 
fo r  the fact is that I  have the most horrible doubts, having always worked by myself, 
without teacher, encouragement, or criticism."
It is not known whether Monet received Signac, fo r  he was little prone to giving 
advice and usually told those who came to consult him: "I advise you to paint the 
best way you can, as much as you can, without being afraid to paint bad pictures 
... I f  your painting does not improve o f  itself... then there is nothing to be done ... 
I  can't do anything about it." " (Rewald 1973: 503)
In this chapter I shall describe how I attempted to improve the design and delivery 
of the ethics unit on the Police Management Programme. The second cycle of 
action research was initially concerned to build upon the positively valued learning 
structures developed in the first full cycle. Simultaneously, I wanted to break free 
from a positivist (or neo-positivist) approach. However, this cycle culminated in the 
failure to introduce a genuinely collaborative or participatory action research 
approach to conducting 'ethics education'. It was this failure that led me to 
introduce a third cycle at the beginning of 1997.
At the outset of the second cycle I had come to conceptualise the particular 
approach I was taking as 'eclecticism and pragmatics'. Thus as I began this cycle, 
I was less concerned with having to meet essentially academic criteria - such as 
ensuring that my client group had insights into some of the major ideas and 
theoretical frameworks standardly encountered in introductions to ethics (e.g. 
Frankena, 1973, Foot, 1979, and Singer, 1993b) - but more keen to provide a set 
of'triggers' - or catalytic learning structures - that might 'connect' with the interests 
of police middle-managers. However, this did not mean that I would entirely 
eschew a discussion of the basic concepts which have emerged as answers to the 
question, 'How should one live?'
I wanted to enhance the rigour of the design by ensuring that 'learning log' activities
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would offer the possibility for my clients to ground the learning in their own 
reflections on their practice. These learning log activities were based upon the 
material that would be presented during the teaching day.
I had come to realise that primarily the course participants welcomed the 
opportunity to converse with each other about their policing practices and 
experiences. In consequence, I began to develop learning structures to help them 
'share the stories' of their own personal and professional development. These 
structures included the examination of their personal and professional values 
frameworks.
In addition, throughout this research cycle, I continued to gather data from the 
module participants using a modification of the interview schedule that had been 
used in December 1995. By the end of this cycle a total offifty four interviews had 
been conducted. The interview data revealed a slightly more positive response to 
'ethics' than the data emerging from the simple evaluation form. A careful study of 
the interview data powerfully illustrates the variety of 'voices' at play in police 
middle management. A record exists of all those interviews. However, in this 
chapter I have picked out those few respondents who typify categories of reaction 
to the ethics education.
I shall begin, however, with a return to the question of'quality assurance' in order 
to show how the frameworks articulated by Clarke et al (1993),Lomax (1994) and 
Tickle (1995) helped me to monitor and 'take stock' of the progress of my inquiry.
A return to the question o f fquality assurancer
In the last chapter, I introduced brief details concerning contemporary discussions 
investigating the criteria that have been thought to be appropriate for governing the 
quality standards of action research inquiries. Lomax (1994) takes an explicitly 
radical stance and argues that the 'academy' should recognise the competence of an 
'insider' to make the appropriate 'judgement' about the development of their 
professional practice. She is reluctant to accord primacy of judgement to external 
authorities and/or experts, noting also that standardisation (in the form of fixed 
criteria) is 'at odds' with many of the basic premises of action research.Lomax, 
instead, stresses theparamountcy of the researcher - him or herself - in relation to 
the process of authenticating knowledges emerging from his or her (or the shared) 
action research inquiry. She writes:
"Action research celebrates difference between researchers and allows fo r  unique
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solutions to unique problems. It is adaptable and does not prescribe a common 
course o f  action. It is sensitive to context and supports the exploration ofpreviously 
implicit understandings. These features o f  action research certainly do not sit easily 
with form al assessment arrangements." (Lomax 1994: 124)
Whilst this statement is consistent with the values of autonomy, respect for 
individual differences, empowerment and emancipation, Lomax, nonetheless, 
presents a comprehensive set of guidelines which help the action researcher to test 
the quality of their research activities. I should note thatLomax discusses how she 
has attempted to support the process of making appropriate judgements about 
action research projects by pointing out that 'the research has to be validated within 
the practitioner context before it can be submitted for assessment in report form'.
I chose to provide my tutorial colleagues with descriptions of my practice and I 
asked them to judge whether the content of those descriptions was 'accurate, fair 
and authentic'.
Here, using the criteria developed by Clark et al. (1993),Lomax (1994) and Tickle 
(1995) I shall present a brief interim analysis of my inquiry in order to demonstrate 
how I was monitoring the unfolding processes. The reflection on my work helped 
stimulate my later attempt to conduct a form of collaborative inquiry.
Reflection and stock-taking
Lomax presents a relatively straightforward sequential identification of successive 
moments in the action research inquiry process. (Appendix H summarises the 
criteria she describes for each of a five stage action research process) For this 
reason, I asked myself questions connected with this sequence of activities. Where 
Clarke et al. and Tickle refine or extend the issues addressed byLomax I included 
these additional points in the critical appraisal of my project.
In stage one, Lomax asks the researcher to explain the research context, make 
explicit the educational intention and provide a rationale for the inquiry. This I had 
done - although I had not made public the nature of my educational values or my 
educational intentions. This latter task needed to be completed.
In stage two, Lomax focuses on the role of the researcher and writes:
"You should start with a clear plan o f action which includes imagined solutions but 
you should be ready to modify this as the research proceeds. This process should 
he recorded and made explicit. You will need to be ready to take 'risks' and 
possibly expose others to risk. You will need to consider the part others play and
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be clear about the ethical principles that will govern your research." (Lomax 
1994:120)
This aspect of my project was problematic. Whilst my plan of action was to create 
and present an 'ethics education' - and I had developed learning structures designed 
to be appropriate for and relevant to the distinctive client group I had acted 
unilaterally in determining the form and content of the educational experience. This 
was because o f my reluctance to risk facilitating a genuinely learner-centred 
approach to the educational design. This, I thought, was a particular weakness of 
the inquiry. I resolved to change a part of the character of the inquiry - when I had 
sufficient confidence to risk doing so. I was also concerned that, ironically, my 
development of an 'ethics education' - which was also the subject of an action 
research inquiry was, itself, unethical. Was I 'exploiting' the client group in the 
pursuit of my own interests and agenda? I tried to make clear to the successive 
groups of police middle managers that my project had been stimulated by the 
publicly stated need to develop educational materials in the field of police ethics 
- to help implement the strategy set by the Quality of Service committee - but I was 
aware of the disjunction between the values of my clients (on courses of study at 
Bramshill) and research values. I have already mentioned how a proportion of 
police middle-managers resent or devalue research endeavours. This remained an 
uncomfortable tension for me throughout the whole of the inquiry process.
Stage three, for Lomax, concerns monitoring the nature of the action taken and the 
reconnaissance phase of the research cycle(s). She advises the inquirer to collect 
comprehensive data and then to subject that data to thorough critical scrutiny. She 
adds:
"In order to 'appreciate' the action, you (sic) will need to interrogate the data and 
identify patterns and themes. These patterns and themes are the 'green shoots' o f  
theory that is grounded in the events that you describe." (Lomax 1994: 121)
Whilst I had tried to provide a detailed description of the way I had progressed the 
basic action research cycle into and within my situation of practice I had not 
exposed any of my analyses to critique by others. Here, too, was another weakness 
in my approach. (I was, much later in my research, to convene meetings with the 
staff and with officers returning to Bramshill for various programmes of study in 
which I, after first describing the nature of the data that I had gathered, asked for 
their help in making sense of that data. This constituted an attempt to improve the 
situation.)
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I had spent many hours intensely contemplating the emerging data and I had begun 
to create theory grounded in the phenomena emerging in the situation of practice. 
A very real puzzle for me concerned the fact that it remained difficult to find 
obviously uniform responses to the ethics education experience. This seemed to be 
corroborated by the variability within the responses to the different questionnaires.
Stage four asks for an evaluation of the project. This stage explores whether or not 
the outcomes are significant, whether there has been any practical change and 
whether the research(s) has (have) developed professionally. At the very least I was 
confident that I had begun to present a worthwhile area of study to police leaders 
and managers. Beyond this, I was beginning to build a useful data profile 
concerning the patterning of responses to the questionnaires. I was, however, much 
less certain that I had 'exposed the assumptions and contradictions' in my 'claims 
to know'. At this stage of the research inquiry I hoped that I might I achieve this.
Stage five addresses the actual nature of the research report. Clarke et al. and 
Tickle emphasise the importance of providing almost palpable descriptions of the 
research situation and of communicating with a credible and authentic voice. I 
wanted my research to portray the story of my inquiry and the writings on case 
study research suggested ways in which to achieve this. So, for example, Stake 
(1995) describes what readers of a case study should expect. He emphasises both 
the uniqueness of the single case, its inherent complexity, and, its relationship to 
wider circumstances.
The second major phase of my inquiry was marked, initially, by insouciance and 
sanguininity. I worried less about the critical gaze of moral philosophers as I moved 
into the new phase.
Action research and a developing ethics education fo r  police leaders and 
managers', the second cycle - fEclecticism and pragmatics'
The Design
My design was scheduled to be presented to the course on 11 January 1996. In 
order to communicate an outline of the nature of the subject 'ethics' and to provide 
initial 'structure' I resolved to give an opening and relatively informal presentation 
on 'ethics' which included a 'first look at police ethics'. This opening presentation 
was positioned in the afternoon of the third day of the module. I began the next day 
with a brief comment on the nature of human nature - where I made reference to 
the idea of human limitation, before outlining the major police ethical dilemmas.
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These included: ’The problem of loyalty', ’Impartiality’, 'The proper use of force', 
'The use of discretion', 'The problem of deception', 'Conflicts of rights', and 'The 
conflict between due process and crime control'. I then outlined a 'programme for 
managing ethically' which drew from Heron's (1989a) six category intervention 
analysis, Snell's (1993) analysis of skills for ethical management and ideas from the 
'quality' movement.
The remainder of the day was devoted to the exercise, 'The play's the thing'. I 
encouraged the client group to form itself into four sub-groups each of which 
would select one of the four topics and present both an unfolding drama prior to 
their facilitating a detailed analysis of the ethical issues that were involved. Those 
topics were:
- The practice of discretion
- The problem of loyalty
- The problem of deception
- The use and abuse of power
The final part of the unit, scheduled for the beginning of the next day attempted to 
use video material to explore the problem of ethical relativism. I wished to include 
exercise 'Ultima Ethica 'because I thought it provided the opportunity to appreciate 
the role of police in any complex human society. Lastly, I included a 'personal 
journey' design based upon Assagioli's psychosynthesis in order to emphasise the 
centrality of the human agent and their choices in the expression of ethical conduct.
The Delivery
I had a sense that the delivery of the unit was carefully 'stage-managed'. I was 
feeling considerable pressure to achieve positive results but, simultaneously, 
liberation from trying to uncover and control every variable that might impact on 
the value that might be assigned to the way I had presented the educational 
structure.
I introduced the unit by recognising that 'it would be quite wrong' to imply that, in 
virtue of the fact that we were examining 'ethics', any one person in the client group 
was unethical. I also indicated that there were support readings to supplement any 
topic areas that would be raised during the unit.
In addition, I realised that my delivery was beginning to reflect my own educational 
development. I had begun to consider that the study of ethics could lead to a form
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of personal liberation because it not only gave permissions to lead and live a 
'mixed' life but it also served to avoid the alienating effects of a technological 
and/or materialist consciousness.
My diary entry on 10 January 1996 includes the following:
7 began with a lecture, 'Foundations fo r  ethics'. This went smoothly enough. Two 
officers came up to me at the end and said: 'That was excellent.' '
At the end of the first full day, my diary entry on 11 January 1996 states:
7 mapped three issues - the nature o f  human nature, police ethical dilemmas and 
ways o f  'managing' ethically. And then it was: 'The p lay’s the thing’. Four plays 
were produced - they were lengthy and intricate - a commendable set o f  
productions - and a good level o f  analysis. For example, it became clear that there 
is a police norm (which can collude with the commission o f  unethical conduct) that 
features a readiness not to 'look' too closely at what fellow officers are doing. It 
also became clear that ethical discourse is not especially prevalent in police 
problem solving or decision making. Police officers are not particularly used to 
employing the language o f  moral principles. They are quick to judge and use 
expressions like, 'That's way out o f  order’ - but they infrequently stress moral 
positives like benevolence or integrity.'
I had chosen to illustrate the problem associated with the widespread assumption 
(amongst police and non-police) that ethics was/were 'merely relative to a particular 
culture at a particular time' with a video contrasting the treatment afforded to cats 
in Manhattan with that meted out to different sorts of animal in a province in 
southern China. Some Manhattan dwellers lavish more care on their pets than they 
do on fellow humans whilst cats, dogs etc. can be subjected to unsympathetic 
treatments in some parts of China. Following Singer (1993a), the ethical relativist 
would not be able to 'take against' these local Chinese customs and practices or the 
choices made by a community of rich Americans.
Exercise 'Ultima Ethica’ again proved to be, at best, partially successful. Only two 
of the three groups took the exercise seriously. However, a video segment from the 
film 'Schindler's list' - which I had chosen to prompt reflection on the 'moral 
distance' a person can 'traverse' - impacted powerfully upon the client group. The 
final activity, 'a personal journey', elicited from the vast majority, considerable 
energy - and the value of this exercise was mentioned in the subsequent interviews.
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The Evaluation
I used the simple structure used in the unit deliveries of the previous cycle.
As before, every one of the twenty eight module participants was asked to give 
their responses to the five questions on the evaluation form.
The high points of the unit included: 'The play's - a refreshing way to learn', 'The 
study o f  police ethical dilemmas via the plays', 'The deep nature o f  the subject 
matter', 'The thoroughness and high level o f  the inputs', 'The professionalism o f the 
tutor', 'The experience o f  enlightenment', 'Seeing hard bitten cynical coppers 
getting 'stuck in' - and taking things seriously', 'Schindler'slist clip - I  shall go and 
see the whole film'.
The low points of the unit included: 'Too heavy in parts','Rob's too much o f  an 
academic', ’Theory boring, 'Theory over my head, 'More input needed from police',
'Too much time on academic aspects', Not enough practical analysis’ 'Rob Adlam 
should spent more time out on the ground - then he'd understand us better’.
It seemed that the unit could be 'improved' by reducing even further the academic 
or 'theory' content and increasing the practical discussions. In addition, some 
respondents suggested that I 'include the study o f  police ethical dilemmas 
examined by senior and/or experienced police officers'- as well as 'clear guidelines 
fo r  resolving ethical dilemmas'.
The response to the fourth question, 'What (if any) learning 'happened' for you as 
a result of your experience with the unit ?' was similar to the previous group:
16 out of 28 mentioned that they now had a 'better awareness', 'better idea', 
'clearer idea', a 'grasp' a 'better understanding'of ethics. In addition, 14 out of the 
28 participants added that they now 'understood the importance o f  ethics in 
policing ', or 'saw the relevance o f  ethics to police work', or 'realised that we are 
involved on a daily basis with ethics'.
12 ou t  o f  28 indica ted  that  they  had learned m ore  abou t  the  'ethics'  o f  the i r  
co l le ag u es  as a result  o f  ex am in in g  the patterns  o f  da ta  em erg in g  from the  
Bram shi l l  E th ics  Quest ionna ire .
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6 out o f 28 noted th a t 'Very little', 'not a lot', or 'not much' learning had resulted 
from the two days
Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, ’What value (if any) do you assign to 
your experience with the ’ethics’ unit were distributed as follows:
- A very high level: N = 2
- A high level: N = 10
- A moderate level: N = 10
- Little: N = 5
- Very little: N = 1
Comment
This data suggested that the new approach - which was as much a reflection of my 
own feeling of ’liberation’ from the relentless search for the ’perfect design’ - was 
edging towards the uniformly positive evaluation I was seeking.
The interview data
The interview data provided me with grounds for optimism. Four of the six 
interviewees were unequivocally positive in their valuation of the experience. The 
other two revealed a mixture of positive and negative reactions to the ’ethics 
education’ experience.
The set of interviews (P7 - P I2) were conducted on 16 January 1996.
In response to suggestions by the interviewers the interview schedule had been 
altered. It now consisted of four questions:
1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit 
of the Managing People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the 
highs and lows? etc.
2. The second area concerns your own ethical development: How do you picture 
yourself in terms of your ethical development?
3. The third area concerns your views of what ethics education might achieve. 
What do you think ethics education might achieve and in what way would you like 
to see ethics education conducted?
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4. Lastly, how if at all would you improve the ethics education offered on the 
module?
I have chosen to reproduce two interviews in their entirety; the content remains 
faithful to the notes of the interviews given to me by the interviewers.
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Interview schedule (P7)
1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit 
of the Managing People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the 
highs and lows? etc.
A very positive experience. Torn with note taking rather than sitting back 
absorbing. Felt that the presentation was very well structured - flow ed from  the 
almost abstract to the practical concrete issues within the police service.
Felt concerned about colleagues - almost antipathy [o f his colleagues] to the 
abstract philosophies presented and they were unable to see the relevance o f  these 
in current present day activities
2. The second area concerns your own ethical development: How do you picture 
yourself in terms of your ethical development?
Input seemed to crystallise many thoughts and ideas that he had before, however, 
there is now an increased level o f  awareness about these issues with which he is 
able to make the appropriate links and interpret more clearly in the workplace
3. The third area concerns your views of what ethics education might achieve. 
What do you think ethics education might achieve and in what way would you like 
to see ethics education conducted?
It brought home to him as a serving officer o f  19 years and it is the first time that 
any such structured input has been available. Believes it should be offered to new 
recruits which will be o f  great benefit to them and enable them to understand better 
the practical issues o f  policing and more amenable to change
4. Lastly, how if at all would you improve the ethics education offered on the 
module?
Information should be given at the start o f  the presentation i.e. in handouts and 
their contents in order to enable the participants to gauge how muchnote-taking
is required. This would create more time fo r  S _______and others to relax and
enjoy the presentation much better.
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Classification: A - A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident 
at achieving the first aim (goal) of the action research process
Comment
1. This individual had a Very positive experience' with the 'ethics education' 
event(s). This simple statement represents the achievement of the first goal set for 
the action research process in the design and delivery of ethics education to police 
leaders and managers.
2. Evidence is (again) presented concerning the negative response ('Felt concerned 
about the almost antipathy to the abstract philosophiespresented..') that colleagues 
exhibited (even if that response was masked in the more public educational 
settings).
3. In response to Question 2 some data concerning the impact of the ethics 
education is volunteered: there is both an 'increased level of awareness' and a 
consolidation of'm any thoughts and ideas' (the term he uses is ‘crystallise’). In 
addition ‘greater clarity of perception’ can be brought to the workplace.
4. Question 3 reveals the fact that this was 'the first time that any such structured 
input (on ethics) has been available during 19 years as a serving police officer’
Interview schedule (P9)
1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit 
of the Managing People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the 
highs and lows? etc.
Personally speaking I  had to listen intently - 1 knew nothing o f  the background (to 
ethics) - 1 was racing on ahead - thinking 'where is this taking me professionally?' 
I'll listen to anything and I  wasn 't clear where it was taking me. I  wanted, at the end 
o f the session, to see where I  was going to get the benefit. I  would have liked more 
'organisational ethics' e.g. 'What gives the right o f someone who is younger etc. to 
say 'you're corrupt'? I  think the exercises that were teed up were very good; then 
I was hoping that we'd see more practical application. I f  you were able to draw in 
other aspects I would like a comparison - e.g. business ethics, medical ethics - this 
would give another angle to it. Overall I had a positive feel about it - a positive 
value
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2. The second area concerns your own ethical development: How do you picture 
yourself in terms of your ethical development?
I'm 'there' frankly. Ethically the only problem is how much subterfuge I  will have 
to use. Ethically, I  have to decide. Individually my ethical stance won't change - it'll 
alter a bit - but its built on some sociological things - I  won’t change. I  thinlpolice 
ethics have been driven by the need to deal with dishonesty (and with 'Jack-the- 
Lad' who wants a conviction at all costs) - and I  now see a different ethical 
standard. I  am 'set'. The only bit I  have to think about is minding my Ps and Q's - 
a little bit o f  sensitivity.
3. The third area concerns your views of what ethics education might achieve. 
What do you think ethics education might achieve and in what way would you like 
to see ethics education conducted?
What I  would like to see achieved is ethics put into the practical arena - I'd  like to 
see how an ethical stance changed an organisation or what ethical practice is in 
organisations - both police and non-police. To round it off, it may be beneficial fo r  
people to have an examination o f  their own personal ethics - i f  there were a way 
o f  doing it.
4. Lastly, how if at all would you improve the ethics education offered on the 
module?
I  enjoyed 'where it came from ' - 1 enjoyed the build up - 1 got a positive lift from  it 
- it was the one subject on the programme I  was frightened of....
Classification: B - A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be 
confident at achieving the first action research aim
Comment
1. Again, there is a reference to knowing 'nothing' of the background to ethics
2. This  part ic ipant  w an ted  to 'know where  it was  tak ing  m e professional ly '  and  this 
w as  l inked wi th  a desire  to 'see more  practical  applicat ion '
3. T h e  issue o f 'o rg a n i s a t io n a l  ethics'  is raised - again  in the con tex t  o f  w a n t in g  
more  o f  a focus on this topic - and, again,  this is linked to comparat ive  e thics  - e.g.
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business and medicine
4. There is a suggestion about some of the distinct developmentsvis a vis 'police 
ethics' which may constitute part of the 'role morality' - i.e. the standards acceptable 
within police practice - including 'subterfuge' and its limits which are not thought 
to be acceptable to a more common and general morality
5. This participant also wanted to see 'ethics put into the practical arena ... how an 
ethical stance changed an organisation'
6. An additional suggestion for improving the unit was the fact that 'it may be 
beneficial for people to have an examination of their personal ethics'
Reflection
Although the interview data suggested that the design of the ethics unit was 
beginning to achieve the reaction that might lead to achieving the goals of the 
action research project there was, in the overall unit evaluation, a more tepid 
response. To some extent this was not surprising. The interview context affords to 
the interviewee a relatively intense level of attention that is normally denied in the 
usual process of police education and development. Moreover, the interviewee is 
actively asked to explore their learning and valuing of the project in a social 
situation which tends to call for a considered reaction.
I should note, too, that one of my police colleagues mentioned the fact that police 
learn to respond to interviews and surveys by 'giving them what they want to hearI 
In other words, the interview data may have drawn a response from the participants 
that was skewed in a positive direction because they knew I was concerned to 
design a 'successful' form of ethics education.
As I prepared for the next delivery in this research cycle I resolved to introduce the 
Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire not as a specific means to help collect data from the 
group but expressly to stimulate small group discussions concerning how the 
individuals in that group responded to the various questions. I was to discover that 
technological developments at Bramshill were to cause me to create more of a 
redesign than 1 had originally planned.
The Design
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The usual room in which I was able to show my computer screen presentations was 
not available so the module leader decided that the ethics unit should begin the 
second week of the course. This was significant because the design that emerged 
gradually became consolidated and moreroutinised - especially in the third long 
action research cycle. I wanted to provide certain foundations in 'ethics' but, from 
the outset, I was determined to locate the subject in the practice of policing. To that 
end, I had decided to use a video clip featuring an undercover operation that placed 
male and female police officers at risk of physical harm. The video also included 
references to the 'morally difficult' nature of police undercover work made by a 
very senior police officer. In order to support this emphasis of grounding ethics in 
the practice of policing I had also elaborated and finalised the design o f the 
Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire. This consisted of sixteen questions that could be 
used to prompt individual reflection on such issues as the nature of their own moral 
system and subsequent 'sharing' in small group discussions. I had also assembled 
video material designed to illustrate wider concerns about the probity of public 
officials. In addition, I wanted to draw from the powerful images and vignettes in 
the film, 'Schindler's list' as well as the demanding material concerning the 
treatment of animals in the film examining our (often) contradictory attitudes 
towards animals.
In design terms, I was still attempting to provide containment through structure 
within which there was considerable 'space' for individual enquiry processes. I was 
also trying to do justice both to the subject 'ethics' and the 'real-world' experiences 
of police officers. My choice of video material was influenced by the need both to 
'legitimate' the subject through evoking very obvious police dilemmas which were, 
themselves, acknowledged as such, by senior police officers. I also wanted to 
continue with a conceptual analysis of police concerning their proper function and 
appropriate conduct in a democratic society. However, I also wanted to include in 
the design a set of very personal questions using the metaphor of life as a personal 
journey towards fulfilment and self-actualisation. The design, through the medium 
of the 'plays' attempted to empower the client group to take responsibility for its 
own identification and analysis of major ethical dilemmas in policing.
The Delivery
M y  diary  en try  on 19 Februa ry  1996 records  the fo llowing:
7 kept the pace on the first day moving along briskly. After the introductory 
presentation - which lasted an hour - 1 showed the video clip featuring undercover 
operations. The Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire was used fo r  small group
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discussions - and, although I  did not 'poke my nose in' those discussions seemed to 
be earnest, focused and productive. Quite a lot o f  thoughtful self-disclosure seemed 
to be taking place. After lunch I  used video clips (Schindler's list, andthen an 
interview with the Commissioner o f  the Police o f  the Metropolis) to catalyse small 
group discussions. These preceded exercise Ultima Ethica'. I  finished the day with 
the 'personal journey exercise.'
I then added:
' Ifee l that I  am nearly at a position where I  am 'there'. Most officers take the work 
seriously and seem to spend quite a lot o f  effort thinking about the 'issues' and 
reflecting upon their own moral systems and their moral development.'
Although I was beginning to feel that my action research project was on the 
threshold of achieving its goal I was also continuing to experience considerable 
psychological pressure. Part of this pressure was connected with the sheer demand 
of preparation for the unit. In addition, the actual delivery of the material itself was, 
for me, tense and anxiety-ridden. The presentations I gave required lucidity and 
energy. The experience was similar to that of being a solo actor in a very lengthy 
one-act play. The video material was impactive - but it was also profound and 
distressing. The psychosynthesis exercise concerned with the ’personal journey’ was 
always risky and required very real discipline on my part. Moreover, it was always 
possible that, despite the rationale or ’cognitive structuring’ I provided before any 
learning structure of stimulus, I could always ’lose’ a person.
My diary entry on 20 February 1996 following the second day of the unit reads:
'After an opening lecture on 'Appliedethics' which was followed by some questions 
it was time fo r  the plays. Four veiy good plays were produced and performed. Two 
o f the plays made references to various writers on police ethics - includingfCleinig, 
Klockars andDelattre'.
My diary notes also adumbrated the content of the four plays and concluded with 
the observation:
'Good news. I was told that the group was going to meet in the Mansion Bar and 
afterwards in the Great Drawing Room to discuss the issues raised over the two 
days. This is a real step forward.'
Evaluation
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I continued to use the simple structure used in the previous unit deliveries.
Every one of the thirty module participants was asked to respond to the usual five 
questions:
The high points of the unit included: 'Rob's commitment and professionalism was 
excellent', The research that has gone into the course', 'Theplays on the second 
day', 'The 'journey exercise’ - it has changed my life', 'The study o f  something 
'deep', 'The chance to think out o f  the box' 'Schindler's list video clip - made me 
want to see the film'.
The low points of the unit included: 'The first day was over my head in places', 
'Ethics is ju st a flavour o f  the month thing', 'The tutor was living in a dream world', 
'Overly academic ' 'Somepeople shouldn't be on the course'
As before a small number of participants noted that the unit could be 'improved' 
by reducing even further the academic or 'theory' content and increasing the 
practical discussions. And, again, as before, some respondents suggested that I 
'include the study o f  police ethical dilemmas examined by senior and/or 
experienced police officers'- as well as 'guidelines fo r resolving ethical dilemmas'.
The response to the fourth question, 'What (if any) learning 'happened' for you as 
a result of your experience with the unit?' was similar to the previous group:
21 out of 30 mentioned that they now had a 'Clarification o f  what ethics is', a 
'clearer idea', or a 'better understanding'of ethics. As with the previous group, 16 
out of the 30 participants added that they now 'understood the importance o f  ethics 
in policing, or 'saw the relevance o f  ethics to police work', or 'realised that we are 
involved on a daily basis with ethics'.
12 out of 28 indicated that they had learned more about the 'ethics' o f their 
colleagues as a result of examining the patterns of data emerging from the 
Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire.
4 out o f  30 noted  that  N aff all', 'Zilch', 'Very little', or 'Not a lot' o f  learn ing  had 
resulted  from the  tw o  days.
Lastly,  the  responses  to the  fifth quest ion,  'W hat  va lue  ( i f  any)  do you  ass ign  to 
y o u r  exper ience  with  the 'ethics '  unit  were  dist ributed as fo llows:
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- A very high level: N = 2
- A high level: N = 10
- A moderate level: N = 10
- Little: N = 4
- Very little: N = 4
As with the previous module six officers were asked to take part in interviews in 
the week following their experience with an 'ethics education1. The reaction of two 
interviewees was positive, two reported a mix of positives and negatives whilst two 
had negative reactions.
Here, I have reproduced an example of each category of respondent. The responses 
to each question were written by each of the interviewers; the accuracy was 
checked and agreed by each of the interviewees.
Interview schedule (P I5)
1. Before we look at your recent experience with 'ethics education' have you had 
any previous training or development experience where you have examined 'ethics' 
as a subject area? If you had, what did it consist of and what did you 'make' of it?
Ethics did get a mention on an EO course - but it was like an exhortation. There 
wasn't any analysis.
2. We would like to explore, in detail, the nature of your recent experience with 
'ethics' on the 'Managing People' module. Please could you describe that 
experience. What was it like? Were there any 'highs' or 'lows' for example? Did it 
prompt reflection on your part? What (if anything) has it achieved for you? And so 
on ...
It was a real high fo r  me. I  feel 'enlightened'. I  had never had the chance to 
examine and think about these kinds o f issues - and it has helped me to understand 
why I am policing and how I should police. We've got all sorts o f  dilemmas and
problems with the N ________ demonstrations and protests and now I'm clearer
about the important principles at stake
3. The  third area concerns  your  view on w ha t  ethics education might  achieve ,  and, 
h o w  it m igh t  be conducted .  Specifical ly,  a) w h a t  do  you  th ink  ethics  educa t ion  
m igh t  ach ieve ,  and, b) in w ha t  w ay  w ou ld  you  like to see ethics educa t ion
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conducted?
Well - as it is, it worked fo r  me. So it can achieve enlightenment - and confidence 
in the way we police. I  wouldn't change any o f  it.
4. Lastly, how, if at all, would you improve the ethics education that was offered 
on the module?
The trouble is - i f  you alter it much -you might not achieve what you could achieve. 
A bit more practical in emphasis I  suppose.
Classification: A - A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident 
at achieving the first aim (goal) of the action research process
Comment
1. This is a positive evaluation of the experience and reflects, therefore, the first 
aim of the action research process
2. Again, there is evidence of the ’underplayed' and underdeveloped nature of 
'ethics' in police 'professional' development
3. The educational experience had led to ‘enlightenment’
4. He was not keen to see many changes - except perhaps a reduction in the level 
of'theory'
Interview schedule (P I6)
1. Before we look at your recent experience with 'ethics education' have you had 
any previous training or development experience where you have examined 'ethics' 
as a subject area? If you had, what did it consist of and what did you 'make' of it?
In my regional Inspectors' course reference was made to 'ethics'from time to time 
but there was no detailed focus
2. W e  w o u ld  like to explore ,  in detail ,  the  na ture  o f  yo u r  recent exper ience  with  
'ethics '  on the 'M an ag in g  People '  module .  Please  cou ld  you  desc r ibe  tha t  
exper ience .  W hat  was  it like? W ere  there  any  'highs ' or ' lows'  for e x am p le?  Did  it 
p rom pt  reflection on your  part? W ha t  ( i f  anything) has  it achieved  for you?  A n d  so
\
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o n ...
Initially I  fe lt a bit negative because I  wondered why we needed to do ethics and 
then I  began to see how it would help me in Complaints and discipline where I  shall 
be working. A t the end o f  the first morning I  was lost - there wasn't anything 
concrete to grab hold o f  - but when we did the plays and started analysing them I  
could see ethics more clearly - It achieved a lot o f  reflection
3. The third area concerns your view on what ethics education might achieve, and, 
how it might be conducted. Specifically, a) what do you think ethics education 
might achieve, and, b) in what way would you like to see ethics education 
conducted?
Well, I  would have preferred it i f  it were simpler. But maybe it isn't a simple 
subject. There is a real value in ju st knowing what ethics is - and that’s the first 
thing to achieve. I'd  like to see ethics presented by a mixture o f  police and non­
police.
4. Lastly, how, if at all, would you improve the ethics education that was offered 
on the module?
I  would try to fin d  a way so that everyone on the course was forced to participate. 
Some people ju s t pay lip-service to what is going on - and then mumble in the bar 
that its f***ing crap
Classification: B - A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be 
confident at achieving the first action research aim
Comment
1. There was only partial achievement of the primary aim of my action research
2. Again, the content of ethics was perceived to be ‘too difficult’
3. Reference was made to the hypocrisy (and therefore dysfunctionality) of some 
(an unspecified number) of course participants
Interview schedule (PI9)
1. Before  w e  look at yo u r  recent exper ience  with  'ethics educa t ion '  have  you had
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any previous training or development experience where you have examined 'ethics' 
as a subject area? If you had, what did it consist of and what did you 'make' of it?
Nothing comes to mind
2. We would like to explore, in detail, the nature of your recent experience with 
'ethics' on the 'Managing People' module. Please could you describe that 
experience. What was it like? Were there any 'highs' or 'lows' for example? Did it 
prompt reflection on your part? What (if anything) has it achieved for you? And so 
o n ...
It was all more-or-less negative fo r me, I'm afraid. The presenter [RohAdlam] used 
quite unnecessary words like 'a map o f  the terrain' and his definition o f  ethics left 
us all worse o ff  As fa r  as I  could tell we didn’t get anything o f  benefit. The plays 
were ju s t ways o ffi lin g  the day - a 'waste o f  space'
3. The third area concerns your view on what ethics education might achieve, and, 
how it might be conducted. Specifically, a) what do you think ethics education 
might achieve, and, b) in what way would you like to see ethics education 
conducted?
Ethics is a waste o f  time. It won't achieve anything because either you're naturally 
a good character or you aren't. Some police are, perhaps, able to get a bit o f  
benefit but I  think its unlikely. I f  we have to have ethics then do it twenty years 
earlier
4. Lastly, how, if at all, would you improve the ethics education that was offered 
on the module?
I  don't think I t ’s worth having on the module
Classification: C - A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the action 
research process has been achieved
Comment
1. The  first a im o f  the action research process  is not achieved. This  part ic ipant does  
not give a posit ive  valuat ion to the exper ience  - in fact, the exper ience  w i th  e thics  
educa t ion  is va lued  negat ively
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2. Apparently related to the negative evaluation is his theory ofcharacter which is 
divided into those who are ’naturally’ good and those who are not
3. Another reference is made to the perceived inappropriateness of the way I was 
using language (as a presenter) - 'the presenter used quite unnecessary words'
Review
Although I was feeling relatively buoyant concerning the achievements of the 
project I was still unable to 'succeed' with all the participants. The overall pattern 
of data showed that a majority of the client group was valuing its experience with 
my educational design. Despite the discipline that I was trying to exert I was still 
unable to 'connect' with everyone in a way that was, for each, positively valued. I 
decided, therefore, further to reduce the 'academic' content and to develop a new 
structure which would help explore 'organisational ethics'. However, I reproduced, 
in broad terms, the two day design in the March and April deliveries. The pattern 
of feedback in the 'evaluation' remained remarkably constant. In the April delivery 
I noted in my diary :
'The results have been, in some ways, encouraging.
The positives are as follows:
- A small number o f  officers reported - in an unsolicited way - that my ethics 
education has 'changed their lives’.
-The majority o f  those interviews have valued, enjoyed, liked etc. the ethics 
education.
However the disappointments have been:
- Rarely a sustained analysis o f  the 'plays'
- Not much apparent valuing o f  exercise 'Ultima Ethica'
- My own discomfort with my role - more a tutor or 'teller', less a facilitator
- A general failure on my part to provoke self-managed or 'mature' learning. We 
all seem, as a sta ff to have to 'mother' them.'
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I had also established a relatively stable design. The design was reproduced over 
the next three module deliveries in the months of June, July and August.
In my diary entry of 15 June 1996 I summarised the developments concerning the 
ethics unit and the nature of its design as follows:
'As the incoming 'Managing People’ module approaches, I  shall note the principle 
developments that have taken place and the new 'ingredients' that have been 
'designed' into the unit:
- my values statement in relation to action research 'on' ethics education
- the learning log and its relationship to the unit
- the content fo r  an ethics education: this consists o f  a very broad introductory 
lecture and videos, the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire, a brief review o f  the main 
ethical issues discussed in the 'ethics o f  policing', the Moral Ethos Questionnaire' 
and the exercise, 'Theplay's the thing'.
I  also include a choice o f  activities fo r students to examine in small groups - ethical 
leadership, the practice o f  ethical management and the development o f  a 
'managerial manifesto'
On 17 June 1996,1 welcomed thirty officers who were attending the ’Managing 
people' module of the Police Management Programme. I had taken on the role of 
module leader - and this enabled me to outline how the different components of the 
module would 'hang together'. It also gave me a chance to distribute my 
'educational values' statement to help participants recognise the nature of the 
emphases I would be taking. A part of my diary entry, written on the evening of 
that day, recounts the reaction to my 'values statement'.
'We assembled at 0900 hrs fo r  the 'Managing People' module. For the firs t time, 
I  distributed - early on in the programme - a copy o f  my 'Values statement'J asked 
each o f the thirty participants to read it - and to do two things; first, to let me know 
what they thought - and how they had responded to it; and, second, to 'confront' 
'challenge' or 'indicate' to me when they saw a departure on my part form  these 
espoused values.
As a matter o f  fact, everyone appeared to read the statement but no one said
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anything about it when I  asked fo r  feedback.
This doesn't surprise me fo r  three reasons. First, my own anxieties about doing 
such a culturally abnormal thing probably led me to do it all (i.e. the distribution 
o f  the statement) in rather too cursory manner. So, it probably seemed that I  wasn't 
really encouraging a response. Second, my action took place at a very early stage 
ofgroup formation. Participants would not be unfrozen - and therefore disinclined 
to respond. Third, the powerful character o f  police culture has developed ways o f  
dealing with 'things sensitive' and/or 'things different'. They read it but probably 
dealt with it as follows: O.K., latest thing, let's move on - this isn't immediately, in 
any way, connected with policing'. I  had probably tapped into a culturally 
patterned response.'
The evaluation data provided by the client group replicated that of the preceding 
unit deliveries.
The interview data complemented this pattern. To illustrate this pattern, I have 
included the responses of the interviewees to the question:'We would like to 
explore, in detail, the nature of your recent experience with 'ethics' on the 
'Managing People' module. Please could you describe that experience. What was 
it like? Were there any 'highs' or 'lows' for example? Did it prompt reflection on 
your part? What (if anything) has it achieved for you? And so on ...'
P32
It's good to know where you stand with your personal ethics. It gives you a god  
focus from  here [this point in my career] onwards. I  didn't like the Plato and Pluto 
bit and it went on too long. It was in too much detail. Rob speaks at a level way 
above my head - but I've only got 'O' levels. It's useful fo r  policy making I  think. I  
needed the work to be more related to my work environment. The 'Hard Cases'[ 
a sample o f  ethical dilemmas experienced by police officers in the UK that were 
provided by Kleinig] were good, and so were theplaylets because they provoked 
discussion.
P33
My view is tainted because the ACPO Quality o f  service launch on ethics fe ll so 
flat. It's a waste o f  time teaching it. The lectures are too long. We've all got 
discretion and we can exercise it i f  we wish - it's as simple as that.
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P34
Ifound  the periodical extract interesting [Pollock-Byrne's chapter on ethics and 
criminal justice] and the 'Hard Cases' too. The plays were informative. Apart from  
that I  found  Socrates and Plato irrelevant because it wasn't linked to my current 
environment. It would be better to get straight to the issues that matter
P35
The subject is right, although I  fe lt not enough time was spent on it so it seemed a 
bit rushed. There is value in putting our work into an ethical framework - it was a 
refreshing experience
P36
I  ended up in a group o f  quite negative people who didn't think it was worth doing 
the exercise(s) - so it was a bit o f  a low really. The videos were interesting except 
we've learned to 'keep the lid on' our feelings. I  thought it was all rather gloomy - 
but I've reflected on the experience - we all have - and we know it is important. A 
mixture o f  negative and positive fo r  me
P37
Its hard to describe because I'm still thinking about it. When I  drove home on 
Friday I  didn't listen to the stereo because I  was going over it all in my mind. I  was 
asking questions like: 'Is our society ju st? ' 'Am I  ethical?' So although it was [ the 
two days focus] complicated - especially the history o f  ethics - and the comments 
during and about the plays - I've got interested in the subject. Do we need a code 
o f  ethics? Is utilitarianism the best fo r police? It was successful because it made me 
think about these things fo r the first time in a focused way.
Whilst I had continued in July and August with broadly similar designs to those of 
the preceding month a question had taken shape in my mind. In part,this was 
prompted by a University lecturer who had come to take an interest in my work. 
She had remarked:
'Why don't you try some proper (sic) action research? Even i f  it fails that will be 
a worthwhile finding.'
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Would it be possible to develop a design that would approximate theorthodoxies 
of a more 'adult* approach to learning and the more genuinely collaborative and co­
operative models of action research? At the very outset of my project I had wanted 
to create an emancipatory form of action research. Could I demonstrate the courage 
of my convictions?
Preparing fo r  a collaborative action research approach to an fethics education 
experiencef
Throughout August and September I prepared to launch a more genuinely 
collaborative approach to conducting ethics education. I made a particularly 
detailed study of two recently published resources. The first was Kleinig's (1996),
'The ethics o f  policing'. The second was Stringer's (1995), 'Action research'. 
Kleinig's work represented the most comprehensive scholarly examination of the 
subject 'police ethics' now available. Stringer presented a relatively straightforward 
framework for conducting collaborative action research.I thought that it would be 
possible to follow Stringer's design and, to support the variety of concerns that 
might emerge from a more 'invitational' approach to 'ethics', I set out to compile a 
wealth of resource materials in order to support the inquiry process that I was 
hoping to stimulate as a result of the new design. Here though, I found myself 
experiencing a frustrating contradiction. From a purely rational standpoint it 
seemed perfectly possible to collaborate with the client group in setting an inquiry 
agenda. On the other hand, my experience told me that such an approach would be 
counter the 'rule bound' nature of the culture. Nonetheless, I hoped that, with proper 
skill and sufficient resources, it might be possible to conduct and facilitate the 
educational process in a reasoned and collaborative way.
Stringer had described a 'basic action research routine' consisting of three steps, 
'look', 'think' and, 'act'. The basic routine was preceded by a preliminary stage 
described as 'establishing the climate'. He had noted that prior to the actual 'look', 
'think' and 'act' process of collaborative action research it was necessary to 'set the 
scene' by basing the actual process upon four 'working principles of community 
based action research'. These are:
- Establish 'quality' relationships
- M an ife s t  e ffec t ive  co m m u n ica tio n
- D ev e lo p  au th en t ic  partic ipa tion
- Inc lude  all re levan t parties  (s takeho lders)
In m y m o d if ica t io n  o f  S tr inger 's  p rocedure  I w an ted  to en co u rag e  partic ipan ts  to
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'look' and 'think' about their situation of practice in relation to 'ethics'. To help them 
do this I would ask them to consider the draft statement of ethical principles and to 
use Kleinig's comprehensive cataloguing of 'police ethics' in order to help in the 
process of identifying the issues they would wish to 'work on'. Prior to the 'act' 
stage I wanted individuals in the group to consider the methods they might adopt 
to make progress towards their own learning goals. I would facilitate the process 
and provide as many appropriate resources as I could.
Initially I tried, in the September delivery of the ethics unit, to work in a more 
interactive way with the client group, as a prelude to the stronger form of action 
research that I had planned for October. My diary notes made on 4 September 1996 
illustrate some of the difficulties I anticipated if I were to adopt the action 
researcher role as defined by Stringer (1996). He had suggested that 'titles such as 
facilitator, associate and consultant are appropriate' and had emphasised that, in 
collaborative action research, the researcher (or co-researcher) was 'there as a 
catalyst'. Stringer elaborated the research role by making four other points:
- The role was not to impose but to stimulate people to change. This was to be done 
by addressing issues that 'concern them now'
- The essence of the work is process - the way things are done - rather than the 
result achieved
- The key is to enable people to develop their own analysis of the issues
- The researcher starts 'where people are', and not where someone else thinks they 
are or ought to be
However, even though, in the September delivery I tried to handle the material in 
as interactive a way as possible I noted:
'The participants prefer the tutor to lead, structure, inform and to take the major 
educational decisions'.
Attempting a collaborative action research approach to conducting an ‘ethics 
A education’ experience y 7 ^
M y diary  note  (dated  23 O c to b er  1996) im m ed ia te ly  fo llo w in g  m y a t tem p t to 
c o n d u c t  a m ore  co llabo ra t ive  approach  to eth ics  ed u ca tio n  reads:
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At around 0900 hrs. I  launched the first explicit attempt to conduct a collaborative 
action research approach to ethics education. I  looked down at my notes and 
smiled to m yself as I  read the instruction (or exhortation) that I  had written to 
myself: 'Don't panic'. I  did not feel particularly panicky - but I  immediately realised 
that so much o f  my preparation was irrelevant. No one was or would be 
particularly interested in the finer points o f  action research nor in the fine details 
o f  my intellectual approach. Suddenly it all seemed a bit ridiculous. My task was 
to find, i f  I  could, a way o f  involving them in 'setting the agenda'. So, rather than 
'inform' them of'action research' I  simply asked them to 'glance at' my statement 
o f intent. I  then outlined the basic idea o f  action research - and emphasised the fact 
that I  thought they would prefer to ’have a say’ in what we looked at and how we 
looked at ’ethics’. I  then adhered to my original scene setting design in the 
following way: I  described, briefly, my own relationship with ’ethics’ and then I  
showed an extract from the film  ’Schindler’s list' as a prelude to asking the 
question, ’What is ethics 7  ‘I f  it ’leapt up and hit us in the fa c e ’, would we ’know’ 
it was ’ethics’?’ I  organised the twenty eight participants into small groups to 
discuss their definition o f  ethics and followed this with Kleinig's (1996) 
characterisation o f  'ethics'. I  provided a short introduction to ethics making 
reference to ’how it all began' with Socrates’ question, 'How should one live?'. I  
then distributed some cards and asked everyone i f  they might write down the topics 
in which they were interested and how they imagined they might 'address’ the 
issues. The atmosphere suddenly became very strained. Some participants were 
frustrated and some became hostile'.
What then happened?
My subsequent diary note records the outcome:
'The 'warm-up' doesn't seem necessaiy. The instructions - i f  they are to work at all 
- need to be articulated very carefully. Otherwise participants ju st do not seem to 
understand what is required o f  them'.In fact, most o f the group seemed bewildered.
Some remarked: 'What are we supposed to do?'
One commented'. 'But you're the expert - we don't know what we have to write 
down'
Another declaimed: 'Oh just get on with it, Rob - let's not waste any time'
A cro ss  the  g roup  a m o o d  o f  frustration  and irrita tion w as  beg in n in g  to m an ifes t
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itself. These feelings were clearly reflected in the subsequent interviews.
In the presenting circumstances - a group waiting expectantly for me to lead an 
examination of ethics - I judged that it was educationally absurd to insist on 
conforming with a collaborative mode of inquiry. I recalled the comments of one 
of my colleagues:
'Thesepeople are, by and large, not mature learners'.
I should also add that prior to and during the process I experienced very 
considerable anxiety. I noted in my dairy:
'My level o f  anxiety is raised by risking a genuinely collaborative approach. I  have 
to guard against this i f  it is not to lead to some panic-driven decisions’
After the hesitation and the discomfort I decided, after all, to structure the 
remaining two days beginning with the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire and 
finishing with a personal exploration into values and leadership. I included the 
newly developed 'Moral Ethos' (of organisations) questionnaire as well as small 
group discussions examining a series of police moral dilemmas supplied by 
Kleinig.
Evaluation
Every one of the twenty eight module participants was asked to respond to the 
usual five questions:
The high points of the unit included: 'One o f  the 'deepest and most worthwhile 
experiences I  have had at the college' 'Schindler's list - very moving' 'The 
thoroughness o f  the material', 'At last something 'different' and profound'
The low points of the unit included: 'Unnecessary beginning', 'Too much removed 
from  reality', 'The tutor didn't seem to know where he was going' 'Too abstract', 
'You've either got ethics or you haven't so its a waste o f  time studying it', 'No police 
speakers'
Y et again  a small num ber o f  participants suggested that the unit could  be 'im proved ' 
by red u c in g  still fu rther the  academ ic  or 'theory ' co n ten t  and  in c reas in g  the  
practica l d iscuss ions . As before, som e re sp o n d en ts  sugges ted  thzt'There should 
be included the study o f  police ethical dilemmas examined by senior and/or
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experienced police officers'. Again, more specific help in dealing with practical 
problems was mentioned: 'Give us practical guidelines fo r  resolving ethical 
dilemmas'.
The response to the fourth question, ’What (if any) learning 'happened' for you as 
a result of your experience with the unit?' was similar to the previous group:
17 out of 28 mentioned that they now had a 'better ideal 'clearer idea', a 'grasp' a 
'better understanding' of ethics.
Again, as with the previous group, 10 out of the 28 participants added that they now 
'understood the importance o f  ethics in policing, or 'saw the relevance o f  ethics to 
police work', or 'recognised that 'principles' are our businesh, 'realised that we are 
involved on a daily basis with ethics'.
3 out of 28 noted that ’Very little', or 'Not a lot' of learning had resulted from the 
two days.
Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, 'What value (if any) do you assign to 
your experience with the 'ethics' unit were distributed as follows:
- A very high level: N = 1
- A high level: N = 7
- A moderate level: N = 12
- Little: N = 5
- Very little: N = 3
The interview data revealed that four interviewees had a positive reaction to the 
unit whilst two reported a mixture of positive and negatives responses. All 
participants commented on the difficulties caused by my attempt to involve them 
actively in creating a collaborative form of inquiry.
To complete the detail of this cycle of action research I have selected one of each 
of the two categories of interview in order to exemplify the type of responses to my 
educational design:
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Interview schedule (P50)
1. Before we look at your recent experience with 'ethics education' have you had 
any previous training or development experience where you have examined 'ethics' 
as a subject area? If you had, what did it consist of and what did you 'make' of it?
None - apart from  commenting on ACPO draft ACPO paper
2. We would like to explore, in detail, the nature of your recent experience with 
'ethics' on the 'Managing People' module. Please could you describe that 
experience. What was it like? Were there any 'highs' or 'lows' for example? Did it 
prompt reflection on your part? What (if anything) has it achieved for you? And so 
o n ...
A strange beginning - a slow start - and then having been away from  ’academic’ 
arena I  had some difficulty in absorbing [the material] - but, on reflection, it was 
a very effective activity. The learning logs help - the handouts - a bit sterile - but 
a useful reminder. It could be easy to 'switch-off i f  you are not prepared to learn. 
For me it was very effective. I  have looked 'inside m yself at the way I  conduct 
myself.
3. The third area concerns your view on what ethics education might achieve, and, 
how it might be conducted. Specifically, a) what do you think ethics education 
might achieve, and, b) in what way would you like to see ethics education 
conducted?
From the manager's point o f  view it does nothing but good. It gives the individual 
responsibility rather than acting as the organisation is perceived as wanting. It 
should be given at all levels - probationers because it is more difficult to 'correct' 
people later - but it is also important fo r middle and senior managers.
There should be a place fo r  ethics and values on all courses - at an appropriate 
level and quantity - get the 'thinking process' going and let people take it forward  
fo r  themselves
4. L as tly , how , i f  a t all, w o u ld  you im prove  the  e th ics  ed uca tion  th a t  w as  o ffe red  
on the  m o d u le?
On Wednesday and Thursday [o f the previous week] I would have said, 'pitch it at 
a lower level' but, on refection, it has achieved the effect
230
Classification: A - A ’mix' o f positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be 
confident at achieving the first action research aim
Comment
There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the first aim of the action research 
process - to create an ethics education positively valued by police leaders and 
managers has been achieved -'on reflection, it was a very effective activity'
Interview schedule (P54)
1. Before we look at your recent experience with 'ethics education' have you had 
any previous training or development experience where you have examined 'ethics' 
as a subject area? If you had, what did it consist of and what did you 'make' of it?
No previous experience
2. We would like to explore, in detail, the nature of your recent experience with 
'ethics' on the 'Managing People' module. Please could you describe that 
experience. What was it like? Were there any 'highs' or 'lows' for example? Did it 
prompt reflection on your part? What (if anything) has it achieved for you? And so 
o n ...
The experience? Interesting in parts - the plays were fun  to do - but watching the 
others [theirplays] wasn't very valuable although quite enjoyable. The two days 
were rather separated from one another in content and emphasis. Sometimes I  got 
'lost' - although it is a difficult subject. Overall a 'fifty/fifty' - half-and-half'highs' 
and 'lows'
3. The third area concerns your view on what ethics education might achieve, and, 
how it might be conducted. Specifically, a) what do you think ethics education 
might achieve, and, b) in what way would you like to see ethics education 
conducted?
Ethics should help to make us or keep us ethical. I  would like to have had a 
preliminary briefing - so that I didn't just 'walk into it' - and a chance to listen to 
some police speakers - fo r  'balance' - as well as an examination o f  how and why 
things go wrong (E.g. the Guildford Four)
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4. Lastly, how, if at all, would you improve the ethics education that was offered 
on the module?
Less theory - more practical - more analysis o f  police work and difficulties. As it 
was there were plusses - it got most people thinking and talking
Classification: B - A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be 
confident at achieving the first action research aim
Comment
1. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that the first aim of the action research 
process - to create an ethics education positively valued by police leaders and 
managers has been achieved - 'Overall a 'fifty/fifty' - half-and-half 'highs' and 
'lows"
Review
Although I had prepared extensively and carefully for an approximation of a 
collaborative action research process I had been unable to initiate an educational 
process where, together, the participants and myself shared in setting the 
'educational agenda'. My fellow tutors on the Police Management Programme had 
all encountered difficulties with the client group and recognised that, in very broad 
terms, police middle managers are not used to exercising autonomy either in the 
work place or in the context of training. Moreover, the module - within which the 
ethics unit was placed - did not provide any induction into a learning process 
marked by the 'mood' of a co-operative inquiry'. Although the University tutor had 
stressed that I should, in the design of an ethics education, resist the 'socio-political 
pressures' of my situation, I found that my attempt to resist them jeopardised the 
positive responses to my educational designs.
My disappointment, frustration, anxiety and fear were the mainsprings for me, in 
December 1996 to enter a new cycle of action research. My diary note of 4 
December 1996 reads:
7 am beginning the process o f  preparing to look at the next ethics education as a 
case study'
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By this I meant that I would abandon the struggle to refine and re-develop the 
educational design. I would simply lead and structure the first day of the unit and 
provide plenty of space throughout the second day for individuals to pursue their 
practical concerns. I would also hold to a fixed pattern of delivery and be especially 
receptive to the client experience in order that I might better come to understand 
the nature of the client group. Extraordinary as it may seem, I realised that I had 
never sought to collect some basic information about the client group (such as their 
age, length of service, and level of educational attainment). I had recognised that 
they were ’experienced1 but if I were to be asked to provide any more specific 
details I would not be able to do so. Moreover, this information was not available 
within the administrative systems of the college. I thought that I needed to be better 
placed to answer the question, 'Who are these people?’ So, a new cycle was about 
to begin.
Chapter nine
233
Action research and a developing ethics education fo r  police leaders and 
managers: the third cycle - the fcase study' emphasis
"The assistant looked at me with an amused, vaguely ironic expression: better not 
to do than to do, better to meditate than to act, better his astrophysics, the threshold 
o f  the Unknowable, than my chemistry, a mess compounded ofstenches, explosions, 
and small futile mysteries. I  thought o f  another moral, more down to earth and 
concrete, and I  believe that every militant chemist can confirm it: that one must 
distrust the almost-the-same (sodium is almost the same as potassium, but with 
sodium nothing [no explosion] would have happened), the practically identical, the 
approximate, the or-even, all surrogates, and all patchwork. The differences can 
be small, but they can lead to radically different consequences, like a railroad's 
switch points; the chemist's trade consists in good part in being aware o f  these 
differences, knowing them close up, andforeseeing their effects. And not only the 
chemist’s trade." (Levi 1986: 60)
In this chapter I shall describe the characteristics of the third major action research 
cycle. I shall include a small number of illustrative vignettes designed to 
communicate fragments of the social reality obtaining in the ’educational situation'. 
A part of my intention in this chapter is to represent my situation of ’classroom’ 
practice through the provision of a relatively rich description of that same situation. 
I shall also make reference to the data emerging from the 'experiential records' that 
were kept by randomly selected course participants during this phase of the inquiry. 
In this way, I shall continue to ’bring the voices’ of the police students into the 
narrative. Whilst the design elicited, in the first half of the cycle, a generally 
favourable response, I encountered hostile and negative reactions in the autumn of 
1997. This prompted me to attempt one last design strategy. I shall discuss the 
nature of this strategy in the next chapter.
Im m ed ia te ly  p r io r  to  th is  p h ase  I had  b eco m e  co n v in ced  tha t  I w as  n o t  capab le , 
th ro u g h  the  p ro v is io n  o f  n ew  learn ing  struc tures, o r  m ore  rad ica lly , th ro u g h  
c rea tin g  a rev ised  learn ing  parad igm , o f  m ak in g  any  substan tia l im p ro v em en ts  to 
the  co n ten t  and  m e th o d s  o f  the  'ethics unit'. A p ar t  from  in c lud ing  so m e  'persona l 
aw areness ' exercises  I though t that I had reached a 'plateau' in the  creative  process. 
It seem ed  that, desp ite  m y attem pts to involve, actively , the  client group, in setting  
the  educa tiona l agenda , the  idea o f  'tak ing  responsib il ity ' for m a n ag in g  at least 
certain aspects  o f  the learning event was too alien for a m ajority  in the group. I f  the
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group preferred to be 'led' then, for me to be effective, I would have to provide a 
design that, simultaneously, would provide direction and containment as well as a 
freedom for participants to focus upon issues that interested and animated them.
As I prepared for the 'Case study' emphasis I wanted to adopt as 'receptive' a way 
of working with the groups as I could. I wanted to be 'open' to the presenting 
characteristics of the groups themselves. If my work was to be disqualified from 
achieving a full 'action research' status (following the disappointments I have 
described in the previous chapter) then I might still attain my objective by 
providing a rich and varied learning opportunity whilst carefully attending to the 
variety of persons within the client group. I wanted to 'take' the group in such a way 
that reflected the style of group leadership advocated by Heider (1986). Heider 
provides a deceptively simple set of recommendations - in part derived from the 
ancient Taoist philosophy of Lao Tzu - for group leaders; he is keen to emphasise 
the importance of both the masculine and feminine aspects of group leadership as 
well as the importance of stillness or, as he puts it, 'a return to silence'. Similarly, 
Gibran's (1980) observations on teaching suggest that it is better not to try and 
convince others of one's doctrines but allow them to find their own 'way'. It was 
because I was no longer concerned to 'force the pace' that I thought it appropriate 
to conceptualise this phase of the action research project as the 'case study' 
emphasis.
The Preparation
Kleinig (1996) had examined the moral foundations of policing and had argued 
that, in liberal democracies it is most appropriate for police to act as 'social 
peacekeepers' rather than as 'crime fighters' or 'law enforcers'. Prior to his analysis 
he had explored the nature of ethics and, within this exploration, had included a 
discussion on the conditions that enable humans to become as they are. He points 
out that we do not attain our humanity as the result of a 'simple process of 
maturation' but as a result of our 'communal engagement with others through a 
process of interaction and learning'. However, he also turns to identify the 
conditions that allow us to achieve these secure foundations for a subsequent 
socially flourishing and creative way of life. He leads his readership forward in the 
following way:
" ...for hitmans to aspire to be and to be what they aspire to be, they must interact 
and be disposed to interact in certain kinds o f  ways. Their experience o f the world 
must be o f  a relatively firmly established kind. Not every form o f interaction is 
conducive to human flourishing: that we know from child and social psychology>,
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from oppressive and destructive legal and political regimes, and so on. A t least in 
the early stages o f  their development, humans need social stability, predictability, 
and affection, i f  they are to flourish. I f  the bonds are too tight or too loose, some 
form o f  crippling breakdown or anomie is very likely to result. "(Kleinig, 1996: 6)
This observation enabled me to develop a way of thinking about the proper purpose 
of police that I articulated, publicly, for the first time at a senior officers seminar 
convened at Bramshill in November 1996. There, I argued that if, as a species, we 
need certain conditions to prevail in order for us to move beyond deranged, 
compulsive or narrowly conventional modes of existence, then we need police (or 
the policing function) to help secure those conditions. In addition, if we are not so 
much creatures of instinct and maturation, but rather creatures with learning 
capacities, then, police are agents in the service of securing those conditions in 
which we may enjoy learning and ’good' learning. In this latter respect I had in 
mind an idea of the good life which was, following Plato, a ’mixed' life where the 
moral and non-moral good were pursued (both in ample measure). In short, I came 
to think of the police as a public agency charged with 'helping to secure those 
conditions within which humans learn and learn well'.
I was pleased to discover that none of the seminar participants quarrelled with this 
way of thinking about the essential function of police and I thought it sensible to 
include this conception of the police role within the next 'ethics unit' delivery. So 
strengthened, I began to finalise the new design. I had developed new exercises 
concerned with the social construction of persons and with the values o f the 
leader/manager. The purpose of these latter activities was to provide an opportunity 
to focus upon the 'self and to ground the exploration of ethics in the nature o f an 
individual's personhood.
I chose to consider the final delivery of the 'ethics unit' in December 1996 as a 
transitional experience. My diary notes of 4 December 1996 include the following 
observation which begins to illustrate more of the detail of my situation of practice. 
I include that description here in order to signal the beginnings of the new 
approach:
'It was a freezing morning. It took me about thirty minutes to 'set up' the Assembly 
Hall and get it ready to receive the twenty seven students. Four gas fires had been 
supplied by the engineering department. They were glowing - a reddish soft-famed  
incandescence. They seemed to help create a slightly utilitarian yet romantic 
atmosphere. I decided to play Beethoven's violin concerto. I placed my own seat 
facing a wide horseshoe o f  chairs. I had no desk, no papers and no protection.
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Gradually individuals started to come into the hall. No one said anything to me. I  
went to get a cup o f  coffee. By the time I  returned it was almost 9 a.m. I  was feeling 
extremely nervous - but I  noticed that the Hall itself resembled a chapel. The 
lighting arrangements created many localised pools o f  light and the back- 
projection screen, filled  with bluish-purple light, at one end o f  the hall, seemed to 
take the place o f  an altar. '
The note continues:
7 had been very conscious o f  the need to consider carefully the structuring o f  the 
total environment over which I  had some control. I  could not ignore the relatively 
recent advances in media and communications studies and their understandings o f  
semiology and iconography. I  was attempting to manage the context in order to 
effect a shift from  the everyday world into a realm o f  thoughtful and considered 
reflection, even, o f  reverence.'
On this occasion I was not able, however, to conduct an evaluation of the delivery. 
The Christmas preparations and a sudden change in my college role called me away 
from the Police Management Programme. I was, unexpectedly, appointed Director 
of the Accelerated Promotion Course, on 10 December 1996. My immediate duties 
made it impossible to collect information concerning the experience of the client 
group with the new emphasis. Over the Christmas recess I organised the design of 
the first 'case study' delivery which was subsequently offered to the participants on 
the first 'Managing People' module of 1997.
Prior to the actual delivery of the unit I wanted to collect more information on the 
client group itself. As I noted in the previous chapter I had come to realise that, in 
fact, I was not as informed about some of the basic characteristics of the client 
group (such as their ages, their length of service, the level of their educational 
attainment etc.) as I might be. In consequence, to collect such information, I 
developed a simple questionnaire, entitled, 'Preparation for ethics education' (see 
Appendix I).
The Design
A part  o f  the  o b jec t ive  o f  u s in g  a 'p repara tory ' ques t io n n a ire  w as  to ind ica te  to 
course  partic ipants  that I w as keen to provide educational m aterial in order to  m eet 
the  top ic  a reas  they  w an ted  to explore . In the  event, I w as ab le  to p h o to c o p y  
se lec t io n s  from  the  litera ture  to m eet, w here  possib le , special in terests  tha t w ere  
iden tif ied  (e.g. 'po lic ing  the internet', 'the e th ics o f  c rim e investigation ')  but w h ich
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I could not cover in the unit itself. I also hoped to 'signal' the fact that I was 
approaching the unit with a high level of commitment and a real thoroughness of 
preparation.
The design I had created followed a basic pattern throughout the first day. It used 
a mixture of video material either to trigger discussion or for illustrative purposes, 
questionnaires, small group activities and computer screen presentations. I wanted 
to ensure that course participants had a great deal of material both to serve as a 
foundation for their reflections on ethics as well as a stimulus for the more practical 
inquiry scheduled for the second day. On that second day, I would form 
participants into small 'inquiry' groups based upon 'learning style' preferences and, 
later in the course of the cycle I included analyses of ethical issues in policing led 
by police officers who had volunteered to help with 'police-specific' issues (such 
as the 'Carl Bridgewater' case and cases concerned with racial attacks).
The Delivery
In Appendix J, I provide an outline chronology of the activities and structures I 
included in the first ‘case study’ delivery. My extended diary note of 5 and 6 
February 1997 concerning the delivery of the module, under the heading: 'a case 
study', reads as follows:
'Immediately prior to this two-day case study I  had re-focused upon Stake's (1995) 
recommendations fo r  case study research. In consequence, I  had spent the evening 
prior to the 'delivery' o f  the unit organising the room [the Assembly Hall] and 
establishing an atmosphere that might be 'conducive' to learning. I  had also asked 
the course administrator to distribute a questionnaire on the first day o f  the module 
requesting information that would help in the subsequent design o f  the 'ethics' 
focus.
As I  arrived at the college - it was 0820 in the morning - to begin my work with the 
course, I  was, as usual, feeling very anxious. Why do I  always fee l so nervous 
before I  'take' the group fo r  the two days? Is it because the subject ju st is 'difficult' 
and I  can offer no guarantee that life will be made any easier as a result o f  
engaging with 'ethics'? Is it because I  know that I  will be judged in terms o f  the 
degree to which I manifest conduct in accordance with ethical principles? Is it 
because most people in our society have only known the oppressive nature of'duty' 
ethics and therefore have, from the outset, an antipathy to the subject?
I noticed, as I walked from my parked car to the Assembly Hall - the place where
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the ethics unit was to be delivered - a faint rustling sound. The now-dry fallen  
leaves were swirling in the winter wind across the courtyard. Undaunted by their 
subtle melancholy, I  had decided to begin my ethics teaching by playing the quietly 
moving and sometimes inspiring music from the ’Concierto de Aranjuez' by Joaquin 
Rodrigo.
I  arranged my papers - including a page o f  notes concerned with introducing the 
ethics unit. I  turned on (powered up) the various equipment and ran through my 
firs t computer screen presentation. It looked beautiful in the dim light. I  checked 
the 'change over'from computer screen to the video channel and tested the sound 
levels on 'Schindler's list'. Whilst I  was doing all this a few  members o f  the group 
came into the Assembly Hall and placed coats and briefcases adjacent to or under 
their seats. Some said 'morning' or 'alright' - before returning to the Dining Hall 
fo r  their brealtfast or else to linger at the entrance to the Assembly Hall. Everything 
was neat and tidy. I  had laid out the photocopies o f  the support material on a small 
stage behind my seat. There were more than dozen such documents.
Once all my preparations were complete, I  left the hall fo r a quick cup o f  coffee and 
reminded myself o f  the sequence o f  activities and the rationale fo r those activities. 
I  then observed a few  'stilling' activities - to calm my nerves and to establish a 
proper mental discipline before returning to the hall a few  moments before 9 a.m. 
The hall itself contained almost its fu ll complement o f  course participants. Who, 
though, were these people?
The data collected on the 'preparation for ethics education' questionnaire revealed 
the following set of characteristics concerning the client group:
Apart from presenting robust, bluff and sizeable physiques, some of the details of 
this group (numbering 31 persons) emerging from the responses were as follows:
- The group was in the first stage of'middle age' with an average age of 42.25 years
- The average length of service was 19 years 7 months
- T h e  g roup  estim ated  tha t approxim ate ly  one-tw entieth  o f  its police experience had 
been  sp en t  on  tra in ing  a n d /o r  dev e lo p m en t courses  w ith  an average  e s tim ated  
leng th  o f  t im e  spen t on po lice  cou rses  at ju s t  ov e r  12 m on ths
- T h e  'q u a lif ica tion  profile ' o f  the  g roup  show ed  tha t one  th ird  had a first an d /o r  
m aste rs  d eg ree  w h ils t  the  re m a in d e r  had a varie ty  o f  qua lif ica tions  inc lud ing
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NVQs, ’A1 levels, ’O’ levels and 'City and Guilds'. One person had no educational 
qualifications.
- More than one half of the course had never encountered something named or 
referred to as 'ethics' on any training and/or development course within or outside 
police training. 17 of the group mentioned 'No experience', 11 indicated that the 
topic had been mentioned on a course, 2 had experienced a one-day focus in the 
context of a course such as 'equal opportunities, whilst 1 participant had examined 
ethics on a four-day course.
- In response to the question, 'What topic areas would you like to study during the 
two days on ethics, the client group showed considerable variation. The responses 
ranged from the very specific to the rather general. 10 respondents either'didn't 
know' or were 'happy to be guided'or simply left the question blank. Amongst the 
remainder, two small clusters were apparent. One cluster grouping was interested 
in 'barriers to ethical behaviour or the problems of trying to be ethical in a non- 
ethical environment. Another cluster wanted to examine broad ethical principles 
such as 'integrity', 'impartiality', 'equality', and 'equal opportunities'. 3 wanted to 
focus upon 'change management'.
- Overall there was a fairly even spread of ‘learning style’ preferences. 7 were 
activists, 7 reflectors, 3 were theorists, 2 were pragmatists whilst the remaining 10 
had strengths in more than one style. 2 persons left this question unanswered.
(I should note that this profile was repeated with remarkable regularity in 
successive groups apart from the July course - which had a far higher proportion 
of women)
My diary entry continues:
7 began with a statement o f  the aims fo r  the two days. Beneath the injunction, 
'Don't panic' (a message to myself reminding me not to allow my emotion to lead 
me into making rash decisions) I  had written down, in my notes, the following text 
which I  reproduced verbatim:
"The purpose o f  the following two days is to visit some o f  the areas with which 
ethics is concerned and to provide you with a language or set o f concepts, in order 
to make the subject and its concerns more manageable. But really, the design is fo r  
you. It provides you with materials, space fo r  refection and the opportunity to 
explore, on your own terms, issues which are relevant to you and to the situations
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in which you manage”.
I  sat in a lone chair facing the group and, after announcing these aims, I  
emphasised that, whilst I  would be featuring prominently in the first day, the second 
day would be given over to their 'agenda' and their 'designs'for learning.
The first day was largely orchestrated and structured by me. We watched a range 
o f  video clips (such as excerpts taken from  'Schindler’s list') each o f  which 
catalysed discussion (in small groups) on subjects such as the nature o f  ethics itself, 
ethical dilemmas, and, frameworks fo r  their resolution. We paid  attention to three 
computer screen-based presentations that I  had made, completed two 
questionnaires, one concerned to uncover - from the point o f  view o f  descriptive 
ethics - the character o f  the individual’s moral system, whilst the other focused  
upon the 'moral ethos' o f  the police organisation. The day was then focused upon 
completing two 'learning log' activities concerned with values clarification and the 
nature o f  principled leadership.
The responses they gave to the questionnaire exploring their perception o f  the 
moral ethos o f  the organisation were particularly interesting. This instrument, 
made up o f  sixteen dimensions, including, fo r  example, 'Moral tone’, 'Respect fo r  
dignity' and, 'Positional abuse' provides an indication o f  the nature o f  the moral 
force fields' prevailing within the organisation. This group, in comparison with the 
aggregate profile ofprevious groups, had a noticeably more negative view o f  their 
organisation. So, fo r  example, the modal tendency was to characterise the 
workplace as follows:
- 'Get the job  done at all costs'
- 'Oppression and coercion'
- 'Secretive scheming'
- 'Strictly rule-bound'
- 'Combat arena'
- 'Rigid Command'
- 'Dialogue seeking' - and
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- 'Symbiotic relationship'.
I  pointed out, that, compared with their predecessors they painted a rather 
disturbing - almost negative - picture o f  the organisation.
Most o f  the group were clearly interested by this finding - and, seemingly, rather 
pleased with themselves fo r  achieving what many saw as a certain notoriety.
'But wouldn't you have predicted that?', conjectured one o f  them. 'That's what 
happens when you're only evaluated on performance indicators and results'.
I  responded by saying that, in the light o f  strategic emphases in policing, such as 
'Performance with integrity' and the 'Duty o f  care', one might have predicted that 
there would be a perceived improvement in the moral ethos o f  the organisation. 
This was met by wry smiles and shakes o f  the head. Tacitly, I  was being told that 
I  was not 'in touch with reality'. Silently, I  said to myself:
"There really is a deep distrust o f  the motives o f  senior management - these people, 
here, in this room, seem to have virtually no faith in the integrity o f  command 
personnel”.
Throughout the day, somewhere around ha lf o f  the group were 'bright-eyed' and 
engaged. As many, i f  not more, were taciturn, laying back in their seats, winking 
at each other, immobile. My efforts were certainly not engaging everyone.
My diary record continues:
On the second day, the onus was on them. After a 'warm up' activity featuring  
'biography work' (during which I  was informed by another college tutor, who had 
encountered some o f  the group during a coffee break, that 'some o f  them were not 
taking the exercise seriously'), I  formed the group into 'Reflectors', 'Theorists', 
'Pragmatists' and 'Activists', depending upon their learning style preferences. I  
gave them a list o f  topic areas from which they might wish to draw as well as 
various appropriate support materials. It was up to them to set their learning 
goals, to discover content and methods suitable to the achievement o f  their goals 
and to concern themselves with how they might evaluate their processes and 
products.
Compared with the partial success (in terms o f  energy> and amount o f  shared and 
relevant discourse) this was the most successful learning design. For the remainder
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o f the day the pragmatists worked towards producing a learning pack fo r  ethical 
policing, the theorists took a particularly problematic policing moral dilemma 
involving decisions to use 'agents provocateurs' and subjected the problem to levels 
o f analysis involving a hierarchy o f  moral principles, whilst the reflectors produced 
a play examining the dilemmas involved with adhering to principled practice, in the 
knowledge that the actual result would be less effective than one emerging from  
adopting less principled methods and procedures. The activists, who chose to 
present their work at the culmination o f  the day, produced four beautifully 
conceived playlets each involving decision dilemmas. The audience was asked to 
predict subsequent behaviours on the part o f  the characters portrayed in the 
playlets. The design was engaging, elegant and revealing. So, always, the audience 
was split in its predictions - and stimulated to explore the assumptions upon which 
their decisions and predictions had been based.
Powerfully, by way o f  conclusion, one o f  the activists said:
'We have heard over the last two days, o f  Socrates, o f  Sophocles and even 
Aristophanes. But I  want to ask you a question, taken not from the Greeks but the 
Romans. It is this: 'Quis custodiet ipsos custodes ?' It means: 'Who guards the 
guardians?' Well, we are the guardians - so, who guards us? He paused: 'The 
answer is, 'nobody'. We have to do it ourselves. And that is the challenge. We have 
to look to ourselves fo r  setting and maintaining the highest standards '
Quickly, I  drew the day to a conclusion:
'I hope you have enjoyed a good quality o f  conversation', Was my final remark.
A closing vignette: 'At the end o f  the day'
I sp en t  a  few  m inu tes  ex p lo r in g  w ith  a co lleague , w h o  h a d  ac ted  as a  h e lp e r  an d  
o b serv er  du ring  the  process, his reflections upon  the  events  he had  experienced  and  
w itn e ssed , d u r in g  w h ic h  h e  said:
'You must keep the first day theory input as it is. I f  they don’t get it then, they will 
never get it' - and then he moved on to examine ways o f  improving the design o f  the 
second day. He said that he would pencil down some suggestions and send them to 
me. Then I spent some time with another member o f staff who had come in to watch 
the student 'products'.
7 liked the pragmatists piece', she said. 'Obviously they put a lot o f work into it. The
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theorists bit was strange. I  didn't like the way they slightly mocked you - but the 
thing as a whole was good.'
We shared our impressions of the quality of learning opportunity that was on offer. 
Genuinely we thought that we were edging towards Stenhouse’s (1975) 
establishment of learning groups within which concepts could be developed to 
work through into the formal cultures of the wider social structure. We asked the 
question:
'What more can we expect - from  them andfrom us?'
I returned to my study and worked through the E mail and voice mail messages that 
had accumulated throughout the day. This took me until after six in the evening. 
Finally, I was free to return to the teaching arena, collect my papers, videos 
computer disks and CDs and make for home. I walked across the courtyard, 
through the now still long-ago fallen leaves of autumn, touched by the evening chill 
with rimy frost, into the Assembly Hall. I paused, at its entrance, surprised. The 
lights were on, and, from the interior I heard voices - animated voices - happy 
voices. Three officers were sitting near to my lectern. They were concentrating 
upon their learning log activities. Next to them the fires still glowed.
One looked up. He said:
'We tried to make the Dire Straights' video work (I had showed an excerpt earlier 
in the day) but we couldn't. We wanted to see it and listen to, it again. It was so 
good'. -
'Yes', I replied. 'It is marvellous'.
They continued with their work. I tidied up. Then, unsolicited, the same man said:
7 want to tell you, that I  really enjoyed the days. I  didn't always understand it - but 
it was really worthwhile'.
'Thankyou,' I replied.
A woman inspector, sitting next to him said:
7 was not sure, at the beginning. But it was really great as it developed'.
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The third among them added.
'We're going shortly. We've nearly finished. I  have to say that it has been good to 
do it. Thanks'.
I felt a great sense of relief. I looked up at the clock hanging high at the end of the 
hall. It was six thirty in the evening. I thought:
' We started at nine this morning and these three people have worked through, with 
ju st short breaks fo r  coffee, lunch and tea, until after six during which time they 
have listened to a lecture, written their biography, created and presented a theatre 
piece, participated in other people's work efforts and completed two learning log 
activities'.
As they left, I thanked them for their efforts and said that I particularly liked the 
pieces of work that the groups had produced. I had. I added that I wanted to work 
in a way that freed people from their subjugation to the voice of the 'expert' so that 
individuals might create their own language, meanings and concepts, with which 
to surface and address their issues and problems. They had done this.
I played the tape of Dire Straights in concert and wondered at the good 
comradeship of the musicians. The fires burned red-orange.
Something worthwhile, both in process terms and in terms of working towards 
Habermas' (1974) ideal communication conditions had come into being.
I was very tired as I arranged the seats, picked up the remainder of my papers 
strewn hither and thither, switched off both the projector and the astonishingly 
complex music system and walked towards the door. As I left, no one was around. 
There was a stillness everywhere. In the flowerbeds, I noticed that the first leaves 
of the daffodils and tulips were making their appearance.
Evaluation
T h e  p a tte rn  o f  re sp o n ses  on  the  s im ple  'e th ics  ed u ca tio n  evalua tion ' fo rm  w as  as 
fo llow s:
In te rm s o f  the  'h igh points ' o f  the unit, a m ajority  o f  the participants m entioned  the 
p lays  in c lu d in g  the fo l lo w in g  rem arks:
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'Theplaylets', 'Theplay's’, 'Getting into the activist group and the dramas', 'The 
role plays', 'The study o f  ethics in the plays'. 'The deep nature o f  the subject matter’
In addition, slightly over one-half mentioned the video clips including the 
following:
'The videos were very impactive', 'The videos', ’The thought-provoking videos', 
'Schindler's list'
Other observations included:
'The efforts o f  the tutor', 'The professionalism', 'The presentations were excellent'
Almost half the participants continued to find the material too academic, too 
difficult, or too demanding:
Thus, the low points of the unit included:
'Rob pitched it - on the first day at too high a level’, 'Too much theory', 'Some o f  it 
went over my head and a tutor shouldn't lose people', 'I had to try to get my head 
round some o f  it - it was too difficult'.
As with the previous unit deliveries, those who suggested improvements wanted 
a toning down of the academic and/or conceptual aspects and the inclusion of more 
'real world scenarios'. In addition, some respondents wanted me to try and include, 
'real world' practitioners (fellow police officers) who had been engaged with 
solving or addressing ethical dilemmas.
The respondents indicated a generally positive response to the fourth question 
concerning the learning that had occurred during the module.
22 out of the 31 participants reported that they had learned more about ethics and 
police ethics. They included remarks such as:
7 learned about a new subject 'ethics' and how it relates to policing','I have a 
better idea what ethics is', 7 understood the relevance o f  ethics in policing','I 
learned something about ethics'.
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10 out o f 31 learned more about themselves:
7 had a lot o f  insights into myself, 7 clarified my morals', 7 learned more about 
m yself, 7 realised the sort o f  person I  was better than I  had before'
9 out o f 31 mentioned learning something as a result of the questionnaires.
5 out of 31 remained impervious to learning. As with previous groups they were 
terse in their remarks. For them, 'Null point', 'Zero', 'Not a lot' or 'Very little’ 
learning had resulted from the two days.
Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, ’What value (if any) do you assign to 
your experience with the 'ethics’ unit were distributed as follows:
- A very high level: N = 4
- A high level: N = 10
- A moderate level: N = 13
- Little: N = 2
- Very little: N = 4
Throughout the project I had been hoping to discover a design that would result in 
no one falling into the categories 'Little' or 'Very little' and, ideally I wanted all 
participants to achieve a 'High' or 'Very high' level' of learning. However, the 
previous three years had taught me that this was still an elusive dream. 
Nonetheless, the pattern of data appeared sufficiently positive for me to feel a sense 
of 'success'. This sense of 'success' was confirmed by the interview data; in a 
similar way to previous groups this data revealed that four interviewees were 
unreservedly positive in their responses whilst two were ambivalent in their 
reactions to my learning design.
By way of example one interviewer recorded the following remarks made by two 
respondents in the 'positive' category:
- 'Two days o f  stimulation. M  is a reflector and so he was stimulated. The playlets 
were a 'high' M  especially liked the way the groups were formed (i.e. reflectors, 
activists etc.) Video clips were good. There were no 'lows'. It stimulated 
conversation at the weekend.'
- 'Overall positive. Made him reflect on some issues in force and also acted as a 
catalyst fo r  that. ’Low' was format o f the room (too big) and too many people to
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allow fo r  proper discussion. But it made him stop and think about what he stood 
ford
In contrast, the following remarks were made by a respondent in the 'mix of 
positives and negatives' category:
- 'In general has prompted a lot o f  thought especially as he is a detective. I f  there 
had been no ethics input he would still think about ethics (it is genuinely discussed 
at work). It is couched in intellectual terms by Rob. E. feels a 'warming up'period  
is needed before we get into the intellectual aspects. At present Rob loses some in 
group. What was the relevance o f  ancient philosophers ? Very difficult fo r  some 
students. Playlets were very good - and directly relevant. It made him think about 
it. 90% found  it too difficult.'
Reflection
Overall, I felt pleased with this achievement and, despite, my observations on the 
first day of the unit i.e. that as many as one half of the group were at best ready to 
dismiss my efforts, it seemed that the overall design, the content and the methods 
were achieving a genuinely positive valuation from a majority in the group. I 
remained, however, aware of the slight difference reflected in the interview data 
compared with the anonymous 'evaluation' form. I reminded myself o f the broad 
and informal procedural rule existed within the occupational culture that advised 
its membership to 'tell them what they want to hear'. It seemed to me that at least 
one of the interviewees was an individual who entertained negative feelings 
towards the experience but who responded in a more detached and analytic way in 
the context of the interview.
I was also acutely aware of the sheer demand of'taking' a relatively large group of 
'mixed ability' police managers over a two-day period. I still thought that, in my 
role as a tutor at the College, the role itself require that I continue to provide some 
content concerned with the nature of the subject 'ethics' - even if this was 
considered to be 'academic' by substantial numbers in the group. This was an issue 
of role-integrity for me. Clearly it remained a challenge to my competence and 
ability as to how I would find a way to do this without it being overly abstruse and 
inaccessible.
In add ition , I rem inded  m y se l f  tha t the  design  w as w ro u g h t in te rm s  o f  a 'w ho le '.  
T h e  first day  explic itly  sought to establish  foundations  for a subsequen t though tfu l 
and  s ign if ican t inquiry  by the  c lien t group. I f  I w ere  to a lte r  th e  c o n ten t  an d /o r
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methods then I might destroy the balance between the two educational moments.
In consequence, I decided to hold the design constant and simply include inputs 
from police officers who wanted to help me in the last phase of the second day. 
However, in place of the evaluation interviews I decided to invite participants to 
keep 'experiential records' during the actual delivery of the ethics unit. I was no 
longer able to call upon staff to act as interviewers. One was about to retire and the 
secondments of the others to the college had come to an end.
The design o f  the 1Experiential Records'
Randomly selected participants were invited to complete an 'experiential record' 
every two hours. They were asked to make eight entries over the two days (four 
each day) against the following headings:
1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?
2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, 
reflecting, not understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.
3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what 
happened?, how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to 
whom? etc.
4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?
5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever 
etc.
6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself 
making?)
7. H o w  did  I p e rce iv e  m y  c lassm ates?  H o w  w o u ld  I sum  th e m  up?
8. I f  I w ere  to  d esc rib e  the  p reced in g  session(s) to so m eb o d y  co m p le te ly  ex ternal 
to the  w ho le  p ro g ram m e  - e.g. m y partner - w ha t w ou ld  be the  th ings  I w ou ld  say?
I a lso  d rafted  a s ta tem en t o f  m y educa tiona l ob jec t ives  (see  A p p e n d ix  K) - w h ich  
I d is tr ib u ted  to each  o f  the m o d u le  partic ipants. P artic ipan ts  c o m p le t in g  the  
exper ien tia l  reco rds  w ere  asked  to indica te  w h e th e r  the  d esign  for an 'e th ics
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education1 was achieving these objectives.
A brief note on the design and delivery o f  the unity March 1997
In the light of the preceding reflection, I adhered to a very similar pattern both in 
terms of the content and methods of the delivery. However, a police officer 
colleague had volunteered to 'ground' the subject in 'real' policing issues. So, once 
the 'plays' had been completed by the four groups I constituted on the second day 
(reflectors, activists, pragmatists and theorists) the group turned to examine the 
ethical issues involved in the tragic murders of Carl Bridgewater and Stephen 
Hughes. However, the group turned against the presenter and devalued the 
exercises. Such was the fragility of my achievement that I was especially concerned 
about the effect one negative experience could have on the overall value attached 
to the unit.
The Evaluation
The pattern of responses on the simple 'ethics education evaluation' form very 
closely approximated those of the previous unit delivery. However, the visiting 
tutor was the subject of a number of critical remarks by a majority of the students 
including:
'Who was that prat?''Get rid o f  that police officer', 'If we were armed we'd have 
shot him' and, 'The visiting speaker was supercilious and ineffective'
Nonetheless, the data emerging from the experiential records kept by four o f five 
randomly selected course participants) sustained my strengthening belief that the 
design was a ’success’ and that I would achieve the goals of the research project. 
(Appendix L reproduces one record in its complete form.) In the next section, I 
shall provide a synopsis of the data emerging from the experiential records.
The Experiential Records: emerging themes
The following themes were apparent in the detail of the experiential records:
- T h e  e th ics  un it  had  su cceed ed  in s tim u la ting  a ’q u es t io n in g ’ p ro cess
E.g. 'Do organisations pay due regard to ethics? 'Didthose involved in the 
Bridgewater case believe they were acting 'ethically' in 1970's, given the Policing 
attitudes at that time? ’
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- The educational value of the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire'
E.g. Fascinating. Not enough time to explore everyone's views relating to ethics 
questionnaire. Our group o f  four were very candid.
- The design and content of the ethics unit had succeeded in evoking processes of 
reflection
E.g. 'Reflecting on where ethics fits  into policing. *Thinking, reflecting. Observing 
interest o f  other students. ’ 'A variety o f  different thought processes and emotions 
were triggered during the session, stimulated by the video clips.
- Resistances to learning were noted by some participants in relation to their 
colleagues
E.g. 'One o f  my group didn't really want to get in touch with the issues. The 
remaining 2 members were trying to reflect and explore the issues raised. ’ 'People 
were listening. In the group discussion a couple ofpeople did not participate - one 
had the shutters up - the other seemed to reject the ideas and the input.
- The data from the experiential records show that some positively valued learning 
was occurring
E.g. 'Whenever I  come to the college I  may not always agree with what In hear but 
I  do walk away feeling I  have been given new dimensions to reflect on. So fa r  after 
three days o f  Managing People, today has provided the most stimulation. But to get 
the best from  stimulation I  need more time to think'.
E.g. 'Overall, I  return to my comments after Day One. Bramshill always presents 
a challenge to my thinking, it stimulates concepts. Conversely, the 
Bridgewater/Lawrence sessions were not that fruitful, I  kept asking m yself the 
direction and stimulation o f  this session on ethics, there was ample discussion on 
legal process but not on ethics'. 'Enjoyable. Enlightening. Revealing'
E.g. 'Thoughtprovoking. Lively and appealing to me'
E.g. 'We, the police service, are not up to the standard we want to be. The group 
was benefiting from the experience'
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Reflection
The experiential records had yielded valuable information confirming my belief 
that it was possible to create a design that could succeed in securing a positive 
response form most of the client group. The data also revealed that course 
participants themselves were aware that a number of their fellows were not 
receptive to me, the unit, the module or the institution. I remained disappointed 
that, despite a lengthy process of trying to create a design that would both do justice 
to the subject and 'please' the client group I had not been successful. However, 
because the data was sufficiently positive I kept faith with my design although I 
replaced my police colleagues with others from a large Metropolitan force who had 
created an 'anti-corruption' unit.
A brief note on the ’ethics unitr delivered in April 1997
I held the design constant (apart) from introducing a new session at the end of the 
second day which was led by police officers from an anti-corruption unit. Again, 
the responses to the simple evaluation form reproduced the pattern of the preceding 
two deliveries. The experiential records continued to provide evidence for a certain 
degree of success with the 'case study' design emphasis and approach. This data 
also revealed the important differences in terms of the way individual participants 
chose to record their experiences. So, for example, despite his response at question 
8 (see below) one participant mentioned to me, in a conversation following the unit 
delivery:
7 spent - like I  don't know how many o f  us did as well - trying to work you out - 
whether or not you were a queer'
whilst another described the unit as:
'A 'tour de force' with a mixed ability group'
At the end of the first session the first respondent (above) described his experience 
in response to question 8 in the following terms: (I.e. If I were to describe the 
preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole programme - 
e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?)
I would say that I had never considered ethics to this degree before. By this stage 
I had begun to realise the importance o f  the issue. On my questionnaire the
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previous day I  had asked the question ’do we have a code o f  ethics?' I  was 
surprised that we do and we managed to explore the various viewpoints which 
illustrated to me that my basic moral code was similar to others
whilst the other articulated his experience as follows:
Ethics is worth studying and deals with the most important issues facing humans 
generally and police specifically.
From Success to Failure
The next three deliveries of the ethics unit, which took place in May, June and July 
1997 were, again, in general terms, favourably received. In fact, at the end of the 
two days and for the first time, the 'July' group spontaneously applauded my work. 
This was a moment of very real pleasure for me. I imagined that I had, at last, a 
sufficient warrant to claim that I had been 'successful'. Moreover, I decided, 
therefore, not to require any more participants to complete experiential records. 
However, In September 1997 I was disabused of the idea that I had achieved my 
goal.
My detailed diary note of the September delivery made on 16 September 1997 
indicates how easy it is, in the course of sustaining a factual and/or rational 
analysis, to be 'mis-taken'. The Royal Ulster Constabulary occupy a special status 
in the minds of the police of the United Kingdom (as Villiers (1998) has 
documented) and I made the mistake of mentioning them in the context of 
discussing the use of torture. Despite the fact that I had covered the same material 
in the July delivery I was not able to elicit the same response from the client group 
- as the diary record illustrates:
'Towards the very end o f  the first day I  started to conclude in my usual manner.
Firstly, I raised the question o f  'ethical progress' by stating that it is perfectly 
possible to defend and justify the claim that very real moral advances have been 
made over the course o f  human history - and that even in relatively recent times 
such an idea of'ethical progress' could be applied to the nature and quality o f  
police probationer training. For vivid effect I  illustrated this with the opening 
scenes from  Kubrick's film, 'Full Metal Jacket' - in large part because several 
experienced police officers had told me that those opening scenes were 'not too far  
removed' from  their very first experiences (some twenty years ago) in the police 
organisation.
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Then, I  moved on to remind the group that ethics deals not only with the most 
profound questions we face such as : 'How should one live?' but also the most 
intractable and difficult o f  questions, (following Kleinig 1996) such as: 'Are there 
circumstances or conditions when it is right, or at least, not evil, to use torture?' 
Again, to make the question 'come alive' I  had selected a particularly harrowing 
section from  Pontecorvo's film, 'The battle o f  Algiers' - which featured the 
responses o f  a French paratroop commander to journalists who were demanding 
a more detailed account o f  the French army's treatment o f  Algerians suspected o f  
or connected with terrorism. As the film  sequence unfolds the viewer looks at 
disturbing (even horrifying) scenes o f  torture. I  simply prefaced the screening by 
noting that this question probably confronts any state authority faced with violent 
insurrection and will not have been 'a million miles away from the relatively recent 
situation facing the police and army in Northern Ireland'.
On the second day o f  the course at the beginning o f  the day (and following the 
usual pattern o f  activities) I  briefed the group to form into three evenly-sized sub­
groups, to identify ethical or moral dilemmas with which they have had to grapple 
or which they were currently facing, and, by way ofplay, playlet or extended role 
play, to stage a thirty minute event fo r their colleagues on the course that would be 
'riveting', and 'would enhance our grasp and appreciation o f  practical ethics in 
such a way that the presentation would move the whole group forward'. Each 
group had two hours to work at this task.
The first group presented a particularly dramatic exploration o f  the sexual assault 
o f  a young woman probationer by a very 'successful' crime-fighting team ofpolice 
officers (o f which she was a member) - under the title (and justification) that it was 
'only a joke'. This piece was hugely impactive and its denouement took the form  o f  
an investigation o f  each person involved in the assault - an investigation which 
explored their justifications or explanations fo r  and o f  the event.
Then the second group followed. This group had decided to explore the attitudes 
o f police managers to police professional development opportunities. They 
contended that it was possible to identify three roughly equal groupings; 
individuals who welcomed any opportunities fo r  professional development; 
individuals who presented a public face that professional development was 'rubbish 
and a waste o f  time' but who did so because this conformed with a wider 
occupational culture taking as one o f  its norms the derogation o f  anything dome 
by way of'training'. In fact, though, this group was able to accord some value to 
training and development but would never voice this publicly; finally, the third
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group consisted o f  people who cynically made public statements advocating the 
benefits and value o f  training and development but who were savagely 
condemnatory o f  those experiences among their close associates.
Following this identification o f  these three types o f  responses to training and 
development, the group then chose to capture each type by taking my first day o f  
'ethics teaching' as an example. Vividly they portrayed the three sorts o f  character 
- and then invited the watching audience to examine their response to the first day 
o f  teaching. Specifically, they asked the audience to arrange itself in a group 
sculpture along a continuum o f  response to my work from  the positive to the 
negative.
A slight majority indicted that they had responded moderately or very negatively. 
In addition, some o f  those in the 'negative' category spoke:
One said: 'It was dismal'
Another said: 7 thought it was disgraceful to link the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
with genocide. It made me very angry'
A third remarked: 'It didn't have anything to do with reality'
As I  listened to these responses I  was - once again - tempted to abandon the venture 
o f  trying to provide a valued ethics education fo r  police managers.
It seems that the client group has a tremendous readiness to smuggle into the 
educational structures intentions on my part which I  simply do not have. I  was not 
linking the Royal Ulster Constabulary with genocide. I  was simply raising a 
question (concerning the hardest o f  choices persons in authority may have to face) 
and inviting, by way offilmic example, an extended consideration o f  the question, 
'Are their conditions or circumstances when torture may be the right (or least 
harmful) course o f  action?' Sometimes, even the majority o f  my client group is 
unwilling or unable to take a disinterested point o f  view and shows a propensity, 
instead, to 'read' into the presentation o f the material a slight upon themselves or 
it displays a heightened readiness to condemn the presenter as 'unethical'.
Often, it seems the attribution 'unethical' is earned simply because the material is 
disturbing or invites some self-evaluation on the part o f  the individual police 
officer. It is this 'assault' on my character which is particularly hard to bear.
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This unit delivery was then followed (in October) by another delivery that attracted 
a hostile or negative response from a majority in the group. I shall describe that 
response at the beginning of the next chapter. This, together with the response to 
my work in September 1997 was sufficient for me to search for a final design.
Summary
The action research inquiry reported here demonstrated that I could not achieve a 
consistent positive response to the learning structures I had developed over a period 
of five years.
I had, after the preliminary stage of the research process, adopted three design 
emphases. The more recent stage, reported in this chapter, had sought to hold the 
design constant and document the emerging phenomena. Those phenomena pointed 
to the basic unpredictability inhering in the educational encounter.
It seemed that as I delivered the unit I trod a hazardous path. Thus, whilst I could 
draw energy from my anxieties - and use this to fuel my passion and commitment 
for the subject 'ethics’ - the energy had to be very carefully controlled. So, an aside 
here, the development of a train of thought there, or even just a moment o f levity, 
could jeopardise the entire design. Sometimes I felt as if I were 'superglued' into 
position.
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Chapter ten
Action research and a developing ethics education fo r  police leaders and 
managers: the fourth cycle
"A sad fact, o f  course, about adult life is that you see the very things you'll never 
adapt to coming toward you on the horizon. You see them as the problems they are, 
you worry like hell about them, you make provisions, take precautions, fashion 
adjustments; you tell yourself you ’ll have to change your way o f  doing things." 
(Ford, 1996: 5)
In this chapter I will begin with a prolix description of the specific and critical 
episode which led me to initiate a fourth cycle in the action research process. I shall 
also include a short reflection upon that episode in which I make a number of 
observations concerning some characteristics of the client groups which the tutorial 
staff have to take into account as they practice their educational endeavours at 
Bramshill. I entitled the final design, 'Values and ethics! This design endeavoured 
to emphasise the 'personal experiences', 'practical concerns' and 'individual wishes' 
o f the client group.
I shall then outline the nature and fate of this 'final' design - which was presented 
as the 'ethics unit' on the 'Managing People' module. Lest the experiences I have 
described over the course of this narrative emerge as especially idiosyncratic I shall 
include, at the end of this chapter, a short note written by a fellow tutor concerning 
his experience of teaching short courses on ethics at Bramshill. This note is 
significant because it suggests that I was not alone in encountering difficulties with 
the presentation of the subject 'ethics' to police leaders and managers. I shall end 
with a brief summary noting some of the achievements that have taken place as a 
result of my inquiry.
The struggle continues
At the end of the last chapter I concluded with a brief note contrasting the delight 
I experienced in July 1997 with the subsequent disappointment I felt in September 
1997 following the vituperative criticism to which I was subjected. Originally, I 
had intended to continue my 'case study' emphasis until the beginning of August 
1997. From then on I imagined that I would allow myself to rely upon what I 
thought constituted a manageable and 'effective' design for ethics education - which 
I would continue to deliver to my client group for as long as I was able to do so. I 
had already learned and relearned that an enormous amount of discipline, rigour
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and preparation needed to be devoted to each 'delivery' of my work if  I was to be 
ready to 'model' and express a set of moral values commensurate with my subject 
matter. I had even become optimistic that I might even be able to relax and enjoy 
the experience of delivering the material. Indeed, as I have already mentioned, in 
July 1997, to my surprise and delight, the group had broken out into applause at 
the culmination of my work. Moreover, some persons in this particular group had 
asked for me to make a more extended contribution to future deliveries of the 
'Managing People' module. I was confident that, at last, I had, achieved a way of 
working with the client group that would secure, in the main, a positive response 
to and valuation of'ethics'.
I also discovered that the general strategy I was adopting co-incided with designs 
thought to be effective by other criminal justice ethics educators. Kleinig and 
Leland Smith (1997) had published a collection of papers (following a specially 
convened workshop in the City University, New York) which took as its theme 
'strategic issues' in teaching criminal justice ethics. They point out that the various 
contributors to their volume share the view that the use of some kind of case study 
material was likely to be the most effective way of helping achieve the various 
aims of ethics education. My inclusion of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire and 
the subsequent opportunity to identify and then present - through the medium o f 
theatre - an ethical dilemma - represented a specific variation of the 'case study' 
method. In fact, this approach corresponds to a particular description presented by 
Caroline Whitbeck in Kleinig and Leland Smith's (1997) publication.
Throughout August I focused my own thoughts on the notion of'ethical progress'. 
I wanted to develop a response to the argument raised by many in my client group 
that 'ethics' was always relative to a particular culture. Basing my ideas upon 
MacIntyre's (1982) contention that 'moral concepts change as social life changes',
I wanted to argue that - as a result of learning (by which I mean the knowledge we 
have come to have about ourselves e.g. those conditions which need to be met if 
we are to enjoy positive psychological functioning free from crippling distresses) 
- it becomes possible to adopt a certain distance from any particular culture. This 
distance enables us to view the varieties of cultural practice in relation to the extent 
to which any practice provides those conditions within which individuals learn and 
flourish. From this stance it seems possible to transcend ethical relativism by 
subjecting particular social arrangements to something approximating a universal 
test. That test is constituted in terms of the extent to which the moral values 
underpinning and guaranteeing those conditions within which people may learn 
(and learn well) - i.e. tolerance, benevolence, appreciation of difference - are 
manifested - and that the forms of human life expressed and permitted in the
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culture can be ’read' as derivatives of those values.
So, apparently strengthened, I presented the 'ethics unit' in September. As I 
reported in the last chapter a majority in the client group made a public statement 
that was critical o f my work. That unit delivery illustrated how my situation of 
practice was intrinsically unpredictable.
In the light of this experience, I decided to return to an earlier formulation for the 
unit where - with the use of three central 'presentations', three exercises and some 
evocative videos - 1 would base my work upon the general themes which interested 
managers in the police organisation. I would lead and structure the first day. In 
addition, I had asked a co-tutor on the 'Managing People' module if she would 'sit 
in' and provide me with feedback concerning her evaluation of my work.
A Stimulus fo r  Change - the delivery in October 1997:
In the lengthy description which follows I have recorded the turn of events leading 
to a final revision of my learning design.
At the conclusion of the ‘ethics unit’ my diary note on 15 October 1997 records the 
following:
'From my point o f  view the day seemed to go rather successfully. I  covered a lot o f  
ground andfinished by showing the notorious clip from the beginnings o f  Kubrick's 
'Full Metal Jacket' - where I  emphasised the idea of'ethicalprogress' - and then 
concluded with my reminder o f  the fac t that ethics deals with the most difficult 
questions we have to face - including fo r  example: 'Are there certain conditions 
when the use o f  torture is justified in the sense that it is the least evil o f  options?'. 
Again, by way o f  example I  used an extract from Pontecorvo's 'The Battle o f  
Algiers' - which shows scenes and images o f  torture. I  used this film  clip to 
emphasise the 'hard questions' ethicists have to deal with'
However, my cautious optimism was short lived: my diary entry on 17 October 
1997 reads as follows:
'As I left the College and drove home on Tuesday 15 October I  was feeling pleased 
with the way I had performed. Forty eight hours later my feelings were sad, angry 
and bitter. This is what proceeded to happen:
I was sitting in my office preparing to brief two new 'consultant tutors' who had
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joined the sta ff at Bramshill in the earlier part o f  the week. They were to take on 
the role o f  co-facilitators on the Accelerated Promotion Course that was scheduled 
to begin in a few  days time. Both had relatively little experience with the kind o f  
facilitation that they were going to be called upon to practice so it was important 
fo r  me to give them as much help as possible. During a preliminary conversation 
with them, M. (the leader o f  the 'Managing People' module) suddenly appeared at 
the entrance to my office and asked me i f  I  would join him and the other tutor who 
were leading sessions on the module. 'Something interesting has come up', he 
added. 'Try to jo in  us fo r  lunch i f  you can'.
Somewhat against my better judgment I  agreed to jo in  them.
Over lunch, I  learned that the co-tutor who had been with me during my 'ethics 
unit' had run a morning event entitled 'Managing with Heart' and, in the course o f  
that event, had not only revealed to the group her own emotional state following  
my work (she had fe lt a bit depressed) but had then elicitedfrom some persons in 
the client group a range o f  negative or distressed emotions that had originated as 
a result o f  my work. It seemed that I  was to blame fo r  this improper state o f  affairs. 
I  was asked i f  I  would be prepared to come back into the group at the beginning o f  
the next day and 'work through' a number o f  problems that seemed to be 'at large' 
in that same group. It seemed to me that I  rather owed this to my colleagues and 
to the course - although I  desperately wanted to spend the day preparing fo r  a 
conference at which I  was scheduled to deliver a paper. The lead tutor o f  the 
'Managing People' module suggested that I  bring in some video triggers in 
anticipation o f  the fact that we would invite the client group to explore, through the 
medium o f  theatre, their practical problems in the areas o f  ethics and the 'duty o f  
care'.
Duly, in the evening I identified some video material that I thought might help 
extend and/or clarify the content of my earlier teaching. My diary entry recorded 
the following events:
I  arrived the next morning at 0830 hrs. and just after I  had set up the room - in case 
the video material would be needed - the other tutors arrived:
'How do you think we should play this?' asked M. the module leader.
7 don't really know', I replied. 7 wonder i f  we might get some feedback from  them 
concerning the problems they are experiencing'.
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'O.K. ' he replied. 'Look', he said’ 'The ha lf term reports are coming up at school. 
It's about ha lf way through the course so why don't we invite them to form  into 
three groups and give us a 'half term' report on how they think we are doing and 
we can give a 'half term' report on how we see things going?’
'That sounds interesting', I  said, even though the symbolism o f  the school room 
struck me as rather inflammatory. 'O.K.', I  said, 'Let's do it.'
M., the module leader, began the session with a long recitation on 'sarcasm', formed 
the large group into three sub-groups and gave each half an hour to list on one sheet 
of flipchart paper their response to the question: 'How do you see us doing?'
We convened to another room and debated our own response. My two co-tutors 
wanted to present, on A1 size flipchart paper, a drawing of two tombstones with the 
inscription on one: 'We wanted to change the world’ and on the other: 'We changed 
some things fo r  the better and some fo r  the worse’. I was a little surprised at this 
shared ambition of theirs and at the rather enigmatic symbol of tombstones. 
However, since time was pressing, I said, 'Well, I  don’t really want to change the 
world - only small bits o f  it'. After some discussion, the inscription on the 
tombstones became: 'We wanted to change bits o f  the world' and on the other the 
inscription was: 'We changed some bits fo r  the better and some bits we made 
worse'. To the bottom of the page, I added: 'Sun’s going down' - an oblique 
reference to a line from a dialogue in the film, 'Schindler's List'- and to the fact that 
we, as tutors, were now in the latter stages of our careers.
We re-entered the Assembly Hall. What followed became difficult for me to report 
because I began to experience very strong emotions that became so intense I could 
not, in the end, trust myself to speak. I was afraid that I would 'come out with 
something' for which I might later 'pay dearly'. I might 'pay dearly' for the 
following reason. It is not unknown for police officers to leave courses at 
Bramshill and then to write letters of complaint to the most senior personnel 
connected with police training. The senior personnel then contact the senior college 
staff and in the subsequent inquiries the tutorial staff are required to provide a 
written or verbal account giving their 'side of the story'. However, it is by no means 
clear that the tutorial staff are appropriately supported by senior management. One 
college tutor summarised his perception of the situation saying:
'There is a confusion in this place in relation to the understanding o f  impartiality. 
Impartiality and support are not, in fact, mutually exclusive - but in this place that 
point is missed.'
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The first group had not finished writing their conclusions on a flipchart so they 
decided to read them from the notes that a spokesman had in front of him. I began 
to write down the various points on a sheet of paper. Under the heading: 'Feedback 
from Group One', I wrote:
*For a course that is about managing people this is not a good way o f  managing 
people:
- we fee l that the group is much too big
- we did not have a proper introduction
- there is inflexibility in the programme
*M (the module leader) starts o ff today with an input on 'sarcasm' - some o f  us fe lt 
a bit patronised
*Rob - turning to you and ethics. You finished on a long day input with something 
on torture. We are all used to seeing awful things; what were we supposed to do 
with those images?
*You, Rob, said that something like a third are 'unreachable' - thirty three percent 
o f people who come on the courses at Bramshill - does that mean one third o f  us 
shouldn't be here?
*You (Rob) said, 'Ifyou want to fa ll asleep then you can.' That implies that what 
you're doing doesn’t matter
* Ethics - we didn't know much about the subject - and you went straight through 
on your set agenda
*We have a lot o f  sympathy fo r  you — it ’s a very large group 
*And we have learnedfrom one another
*One member is very disappointed. I t ’s not meeting their needs.
*One tutor, P. V. has credibility. He avoided jargon.
As I wrote down these points I began to feel both sad and angry and a sense of 
hopelessness. For example, I did not realise that it was 'up to me' to determine how 
individuals are to deal with images of torture. 'Surely', I thought, 'on a residential 
course, people have plenty of opportunity to discuss their responses and can 'think 
things through' for themselves.'
M ., the  m o d u le  leader decided  that he w anted  to respond  to  certain  o f  these  po in ts
- but before  he  did  one  o f  the  g roup  said:
'Before you go on, M, I just want to say that I'm not happy with what Rob is doing. 
He doesn't seem to be listening but is writing'.
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This was sufficient to trigger intensely strong feelings of anger in me. I felt as if my 
own normal professional discipline - i.e. trying to record accurately what was being 
said - and my character itself - were being attacked.
The other tutor, D. leant across to me and remarked quietly but crossly: 'There 
really is an extraordinary level o f  misreading going on here'.
With barely disguised anger in my voice I said: 'I'm writing down everything that 
is being said. I fin d  it very interesting'
'Well, it doesn't seem like it,' was the reply.
Immediately I shot back:
'Do you want to see what I've written? ’
'No'. He shook his head.
On this particular occasion I really did find it difficult to recover my composure. 
I listened as M. explained that he, too, thought the venue was 'awful', that there 
were not enough staff, that the group was too big and so on. Then some debate took 
place about the need for a training needs analysis and the poor reputation of the 
programme. I simply began to feel worse and worse. I had no idea as to how I was 
going to support M. and P. What is more I knew that if I failed to show, overtly and 
obviously, some support to M. and P. I would probably be seen by the group as 
disloyal, cowardly and, of course, unethical.
At last we were 'ready' to hear from the next group.
Although M. had pointedly opened the proceedings of the day with an analysis of 
the destructive power of sarcasm, the second group began with: 'Could do better'. 
I wrote down the following as I attempted to capture exactly what it was that their 
rapporteur was saying:
*Read what is going on (You should be able to read what is going on. You did not).
* Day 2: Ethics. Pitched at wrong level - Rob's lecture was on a plane - at a level 
- that most people didn't understand what was going on.
* I f  this course is a bus on a tour, the bus is in a lay-by and the wheel's come o ff  
We're trying to fix  it.
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* What's the purpose o f  this exercise? - who's benefiting - us or you (i.e. the staff)?
During the recounting of this M. (the module leader) was accused o f playing 
games. Shortly after the feedback, M. emphatically stated that he 'did not play 
games'.
Notwithstanding the pressures M. was under, I remained feeling pretty beleaguered. 
It seemed that my relatively simple description of the nature o f 'ethics' and the 
illustrations in the videos were, somehow, still too difficult and unhelpful for the 
group.
The third group responded as follows:
*The practical application is missing
*The input is not always set at an appropriate level
*A cross-flow o f  experience is required
*You should be aware o f  the content ana the audience
*There should be an opportunity to explore issues as they arise
*There is a lack o f  flexibility
*The content is interesting and thought provoking
*The theory on ethics was excellent - but we didn't have the opportunity to use the 
experiences that are current in the service. The theory must be pitched at a level 
which is acceptable to all people in the audience. It was quite apparent in our 
group that it was over the heads o f  some people in the group and you have a duty 
not to lose any one
*This opportunity fo r  feedback is appreciated 
Again, some discussion followed this but I noted down:
'My thoughts, once again, are to do with giving the subject i.e. offering 'ethics', a 
miss'.
I had reached the stage where I was no longer sure that it was worth the effort 
continuing with the teaching of'ethics'. I had had enough of the criticisms.
A fte r  th is  feed b ack  w as  com ple ted  M . then  sho w ed  o u r  tw o  to m b s to n e s  to  the  
group. A t a later po in t on the  m orn ing  one  o f  the  c lien t g roup  asked  both  for m ore  
specific  feed b ack  co n ce rn in g  the g roup  i tse lf  as well as an ex p lan a tio n  o f  the  
m ean in g  o f  the  design  - but because  o f  various  d y n am ics  p u sh in g  and  p u ll in g  at 
d ifferent people  this never actually took  place. The m orn ing  con tinued  m ain ly  w ith
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M. and P. responding and with me listening. My gloominess must have been 
palpable. I was not sure whether my anger was so obvious. I suspect that it was.
Curiously, one member of the group chose to address me at some length 
concerning his belief that I had the power to influence 'The whole o f  the police 
service'. The subtext of his intervention was that I really should be capable of 
doing more and responding more appropriately in my 'ethics' sessions. Another 
person queried whether or not I had read the 'pre-ethics' questionnaire that she had 
completed. Yet another wanted to address issues to do with the use of informants. 
I was also challenged for not showing support for the need to conduct a thorough 
'training needs analysis' before offering a 'Police Management Programme' but that 
same person announced some forty minutes later that he actually did not know 
what his needs were - although he did know what he wanted. However, he failed 
to acknowledge that I had raised doubts about the value of training needs analyses 
precisely 'because they reveal a great list of elements that do not necessarily 
correspond with people's needs - and the reason for that is that they are not aware 
of those needs'.
I spent the lunchbreak doing some vigorous aerobic exercises. This was my attempt 
to release my feelings of stress and frustration and prepare myself for whatever was 
in 'store'.
M. and D. led the afternoon session - a rather shapeless discussion concerning 
'levels of communication' - and, finally I was asked to provide a structure to help 
explore 'peak level' communications. Even this was problematic - and one person 
considered the exercise 'dangerous'.
Reflection
Within this 'feedback data' something is revealed which points to the complexity 
of providing 'management development' in general and ‘ethics education’ 
specifically for groups of police officers in the middle management ranks of the 
police service in the institutional context of Bramshill. Here, on the basis of factual 
evidence, I shall identify a number of those problems
- W ith in  the  c lien t g ro u p  as a w ho le  there  is a lack  o f  fam iliarity  w ith  tak in g  
responsib il i ty  for 'm ak in g  learn ing  happen '. T he  group  rem ains  re la tively  passive. 
T he  tu tors  are the providers. A dditionally , the tutors are supposed  to do m ost or all 
o f  the  in terpreting and sense-m aking. T he  idea o f  au tonom y and 'inner dependence ' 
seem s ra ther a lien  to the  m ajo rity  in the  group.
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- Broad conceptual ideas, theory and principles have to be 'worked through' by the 
tutors 'into' the workplace. However, this exposes the tutors to a constant dilemma 
because too much 'obviousness' means that the tutor can be regarded as patronising 
whilst too much 'stretching' of the learner means that the tutor is 'on another plane' 
or 'out of touch' - and therefore insensitive or overly (and pretentiously) intellectual.
-F o r some in the client group, the criteria forjudging tutors are unforgiving and 
extreme. If a person 'gets lost' it is the tutor's fault and a reflection upon that tutor's 
competence. This though is unreasonable. If  tutors work at the pace of the least 
sophisticated they come to frustrate the more sophisticated.
- Exercises that are 'normal' - or productive - on other management development 
programmes (such as 'biography work') - are taken to be 'dangerous' by a 
proportion of police officers/managers. This is so because it is imagined that they 
might elicit distressing memories or even some form of'catharsis'. The catharsis 
may be expressed in tears or bitter anger. There is, in consequence, a fear, that 
these expressions might lead to some form of personality destruction.
- The prevalence of attributing negative intentions, motives or dispositions to tutors 
is especially marked. (In fact, tutors are simply and innocently 'doing their 'best' but 
are rarely credited with this).
- The rapidity with which persons in the client group take offence (or take offence 
on behalf of another member of the client group who may or may not have taken 
offence) leads the staff to feel that they are constantly 'walking on eggshells' - it is 
as if some police develop quite extraordinary sensibilities and become remarkably 
'precious'.
To exemplify this last point, I was asked by one person in the client group (as the 
group was dispersing) if I would spend some time discussing the day's events. 
During that discussion I was told that my use of the expression 'Jesus Christ' 
(which, apparently, I had uttered earlier in the day during the feedback session) was 
'offensive'. As I listened to this I thought, again, how incredibly difficult it is to 
navigate through the sensibilities of the membership of the group(s). I 'came out' 
with this expression because of my frustration and irritation. Nonetheless, and 
quite plainly, it was considered a serious breach of probity.
- T h e  c lien t g roup  rem ains  suscep tib le  to in fluences  o v e r  w h ich  the  tu to rs  at 
B ram sh ill  have  little contro l. T he  re lative lack o f  fam iliarity  w ith  m a n a g e m e n t
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theory and concepts means that persons within the group - who claim to have that 
understanding and familiarity - can come to exert an unusual level of power (within 
the group). This was starkly revealed in the October delivery o f the 'Managing 
People' module when one participant claimed a knowledge of Heron's (1989) 
model of interpersonal intervention and then went on to give a straightforwardly 
inaccurate characterisation of that model. However, the group appeared to 'side' 
with his obtuse rendition rather than that of the better informed tutor.
Despite my temporary loss of heart I enjoined myself not to 'give in'. I concluded 
that, notwithstanding all the strategic developments I had undertaken over the years 
of the inquiry, a new design was necessary.
Moving On - A New Design:
As I came to terms with the features of the October delivery I revisited my strategy 
for the delivery of the 'ethics education'. Another cycle of'individual educational 
action research' was about to commence.
I decided to re-title the unit, 'Values and ethics' in an attempt to remove some of the 
anxieties which seem to be elicited at the prospect of having to explore something 
called 'ethics'. I also decided that, after establishing 'safety' - (by outlining my aims 
and intentions for the unit - in which I would include a very clear statement that the 
programme would allow one complete day for participants to explore their own 
issues, interests and problems) - I would begin by examining the moral 
development of one chief police officer. I would use an autobiographical account 
that included descriptions of particular life experiences which had deeply 
influenced the person in question. I wanted to make sure that the 'ethics unit' did 
not depart from 'reality'.
I wanted to 'tell the story' of that leader in a way which illustrated those few 
moments in his life which had shaped his practice of 'principled leadership'. I 
thought that this short presentation would be sufficiently interesting for participants 
to be stimulated to explore the development of their own personal and professional 
values.
O n ce  these  p e rso n -fo cu sed  activ ities  had been  co m p le ted  I w o u ld  m o v e  on  to 
ou tline  - in the  b riefes t o f  te rm s  - the  na ture  o f  e th ics, and  then , im m edia te ly , I 
w ou ld  in troduce  those  areas tha t present particu lar d iff icu lties  for police  - such  as 
'loyalty ' and 'impartiality '. Participants w ould  then have the opportunity  to consider 
these  a reas  in sm all d iscuss ion  g roups  before  tu rn ing  to ex am in e  both  the  idea o f
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an 'ethical reading' (through the analysis of Frank Holl's (1874) painting, 
'Deserted') and the subsequent 'ethical audit' or 'ethical stocktaking' - through the 
medium of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire.
I would finish by asking the question: 'Just how can we create an ethical working 
environment? ’ - for which I had designed a practical set of guidelines made up of 
eight different steps.
The new design was scheduled to be delivered in November 1997. This would be 
the last delivery of the 'Managing People' module in that year.
Action research: The fina l phase: fGrounding the study o f  'ethics' in persons, 
their personal experience, practical concerns and individual interests'
Between the end of October 1997 and mid-November 19971 developed the 'final' 
design for an ethics education for police leaders and managers in the police 
organisation. During that relatively short period, I created three new exercises and 
two new 'lecture-presentations'. The new design set out to 'ground' the educational 
experience in the personal experiences of police officers and, additionally, sought 
to provide participants with a framework for ethical practice in the workplace. The 
first new exercise provided descriptions of the characteristics of superior managers 
and leaders - (after, Bennis and Nanus, 1985, Kouzes and Posner, 1987, Kinlaw, 
1989 and Egan, 1994) and was designed to help participants identify concrete 
evidence for any claims that they might make concerning their own management 
and leadership practice. The second exercise focused upon values and leadership. 
The third exercise contained guidelines for creating an ethical working 
environment. These developments were in direct response to the frustrations and 
difficulties that the most recent client groups appeared to have been experiencing. 
Throughout my previous work I had been (more or less heavily) criticised for being 
overly 'intellectual' and although I tried to respond to these charges with a gradual 
attenuation of academic references and language, I had still not succeeded, in 
avoiding the pejorative label of being 'academic'. In consequence, the emphasis 
throughout the final design was to make the subject as accessible, practical and 
uncomplicated as possible.
Whilst my aim was still to attain a positive valuation for the 'ethics education' 
experience I was no longer setting out to 'make the subject come alive' in the same 
way as I had originally intended. How was I revising the aims?
As I looked again at the original 'action research values statement' I produced (for
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the classes taking place throughout 1995 and 1996) I was struck by the fact that, 
whilst such a statement might be interesting to full time educationalists, it would 
be relatively irrelevant to the 'practical man' (or practical woman). My statement 
of intent for 'ethics education' no longer reflected the emphases in the new design.
My aims were now simpler. I was hoping to achieve the following goals:
-T o  describe some significant moments in the development of a police leader and 
to illustrate the relationship between those key moments and subsequent police 
management practice
-To help participants examine their own value system and consider the relationship 
between their values and their actual practice
- To provide participants with concrete guidelines for developing 'ethical 
organisations'
-T o  give participants the opportunity to analyse personal and organisational ethics 
with a view to strengthening their desire to attain consistently high ethical 
standards
In addition I was aiming to identify - for participants - the moral demands and 
difficulties in policing and by so doing, to encourage an appreciation of the moral 
complexities of policing.
The more specifically educational objectives - such as 'stretching persons powers 
and capacities' now lay at an implicit level embedded in the processes and 
experiences of the different specific learning structures.
This new emphasis reflected three significant learnings from the action research 
process:
First, I was responding to a dominant occupational cultural preference - in part 
reflecting a personality type i.e. the predominance of a 'sensing judging' type (after 
Jung 1926) - for focusing upon tangible police experiences rather than more 
general conceptual ideas or principles.
Second, I was designing an educational experience that consciously recognised the 
fact that police managers and leaders focus considerable energy upon 'personality'
- the motives and dispositions of their fellow interactors. In broad terms, the police
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officers with whom I was working were curious about the psychological contours 
of others. In consequence I was setting out to provide opportunities - through small 
group discussions etc. - for participants to 'ground' the content of'ethics' in their 
personal experiences and viewpoints.
Third, I was coming to terms with my own limitations. Although I had tried to 
introduce a relatively thorough examination of ethics - through, for example, 
outlining normative ethical theories, the history of moral philosophy, a note on 
'postmodern ethics' and some philosophical analysis of concepts such as justice or 
loyalty, this had not been valued by a majority in the client groups. Moreover, I was 
no longer prepared to be thought of as 'unethical' as a result of using certain 
materials - even if those materials were commensurate with an evocative and 
focused exploration of ethics and the questions with which ethics deals. To an 
extent, I had admitted defeat - both at the level of practice and at a more emotional 
level.
A Prelude to the New Design
The 'Managing Operations' module of the Police Management Programme - a two 
week residential module with the same client group as the 'Managing People' 
module had taken as its themes, 'Customer service', 'Community partnerships and 
consultation' ' Guidelines for managing police operations', 'The management of 
change' and 'Quality management'. I had been asked by the module leaders to 
evolve my work on 'Quality management' into' Principled leadership'. In November 
1997 the session I was asked to run was entitled: 'Managing Operations and Ethical 
leadership'. This allowed me to begin to explore a way of working with the client 
group consisting of a higher proportion of small group exercises focusing 
simultaneously upon the individual participant and the situations of their practice.
On that module, I provided one presentation interspersed with four activities. The 
activities were structures focusing upon 'empowerment', the development of a 
personal vision (for the part of the organisation over which the individual had 
some control), a 'values clarification' activity and an analysis of personality 
preference and subsequent implications for managing operations.
In fact the outcome was highly successful in terms of client response. One officer 
- who had known me from a programme I had run eleven years previously - sought 
me out to say:
"It worked fo r  them you know. It really worked. They liked it. They were positive
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about it"
The ratings on the course feedback sheet confirmed this. My work received a very 
positive evaluation.
As the first occasion for my launching the new emphasis approached I found 
myself grappling with the fact that the 'trick' in providing a valued educational 
experience for my client group lay in managing a set of polarities and tensions. 
Among these was the need to introduce 'something new' but to limit the degree of 
strangeness. Another was the need to provide a sufficient stimulus for small group 
personal discussions but to 'keep the action moving along'.
In the new design I was also returning to some of the principles for helping adults 
to learn. I was particularly concerned to try and create an atmosphere in which 
participants would draw from their own experiences. I would be concerned to 
provide a set of short (but coherent) 'inputs' as a prelude to personal/experience- 
based small group activities.
As I prepared the 'inputs' I found myself facing, once again, the enormous 
disjunction between the informed and scholarly literature on ethics - instanced, for 
example in Kleinig's (1996) 'The ethics o f  policing' - and the more practical 
discourse of my client group. I realised that - especially in the light of my teaching 
experiences - 1 would not be able to address any issue in the illuminating depth that 
a university course of study might realistically achieve. However, I continued to 
remain anxious about how I would avoid the banality of the commonplace in my 
'inputs' as well as the obscurity and esotericism of significant philosophical 
analysis. Moreover, I had to remain constantly vigilant for the readiness with which 
individuals within the client group might 'take against' myself, the course, or the 
college. A former Accelerated Promotion Course student, attending part of the 
Police Management Programme, who had known me for a number of years, 
murmured to me on 7 November 1997:
"It really is extraordinary how negative some o f the participants can be"
As I began to make my final preparations over the weekend before 11 November 
1997 the design I had shaped under the title: 'Values and ethics' was as follows:
- A n  in form al in troduction  to 'va lues  and ethics'
- T h e  va lues  d ev e lo p m en t o f  a police leader and an outline  o f  the characteris tics  o f
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superior leaders and managers - a presentation
- Exercise 1: Profiling the individual participant against the characteristics of 
superior leaders and managers
- Exercise 2: Leadership and values
Illustrative videos: Scotland Yard: The Commissioner,; Schindler’s List
- Ethics and police - a presentation
- Exercise 3: The Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire
- Illustrative video: Mutiny on the Bounty
- Managerial ethics - a short informal introduction
- Illustrative video: The Suffolk video factory
- Exercise 4: Profiling the moral ethos of the Police organisation
- Exercise 5: Creating and developing ethical organisations
As I prepared the Assembly Hall - in a conventional design - three rows o f chairs 
with nine in each row - 1 felt very real disappointment at its symbolism. My attempt 
to bring something new, fresh and 'contemporary' was being abandoned. I reminded 
myself that it would be quite wrong to let my disappointment diminish the 
experience for the participants in the client group that I would meet the next 
morning. For them, none of my disappointment would be known. They were 
coming to the day - 1 had to assume - in good faith.
The struggle to achieve an effective ethics education experience had impacted 
upon others of the staff at Bramshill. Two of the tutorial staff and my 
administrative assistant (who was playing a significant role helping with data 
collection) were now deeply interested in the outcome. They were also worried. 
How would the new focus be received? They anticipated that a focus upon the 
police experience itself would produce a different kind of reaction, namely, 
'defensiveness'. This was the risk 1 was taking.
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Introducing the new design
My diary note on 11 November 1998 included the following observation:
'Today was 'Remembrance day' - The eleventh day o f  the eleventh month o f 1997. 
As I  drove to work through country lanes washed with the colours o f  a damp 
autumn I  thought o f  St. Exupery's observation: 'In this war men fa ll like autumn 
leaves'. I  was keen that the participants in my client group would have something 
worthwhile to remember as a result o f  the day's learning structures.'
I subsequently developed the following description of the launch of the new design 
for the fourth cycle in the action research process:
7 began by introducing myself - distributed the two sets o f  aims fo r  'ethics 
education', underlined the fac t that by addressing the subject I  was not implying 
that any participants in the group were unethical and then outlined the basic 
structure o f  the day. I  then noted some o f  the points emerging from  the 
questionnaire that they had all completed the day before - fo r example, the fac t that 
in this particular group some two-thirds had not previously examined the subject 
'ethics'- before making a short reference to the origins o f  the study o f  ethics. I  then 
gave the first lecture/presentation which I  duly illustrated with a video featuring the 
actions and considered reflections o f  the Commissioner o f  the Metropolitan Police. 
The firs t activity looked at the characteristics of'superior managers and leaders' 
- within which I  had highlighted the moral dimension. I  formed the participants into 
six groups o f  four persons. A relatively animated buzz o f  conversation was 
generated in those groups.
After coffee I  turned to focus the subject more in the actual practice o f  policing. By 
way o f  entree I  made reference to the purpose o f  ethics - 'to promote human 
flourishing and combat human limitations' and then, to emphasise the 'positive and 
negative' possibilities in human conduct I  showed a fifteen minute clip from the end 
o f  the film, 'Schindler's List' - which, in addition, surfaces several o f  the hardest 
questions with which ethics must grapple. I  knew that the next presentation would 
be the most difficult to deliver because I  was going to identify those areas which 
caused ethical problems in policing. The first part - on the moral history ofpolice 
went well until I began to suggest the reasons behind Newman's (1985) 
development o f  the principles o f  policing: I included a reference to Amnesty 
International's criticism o f the Royal Ulster Constabulary which, I commented was 
'probably justified'. Almost certainly this was a mistake simply because it was too 
risky a thing to say at this point in my relationship with the group.
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Nonetheless, something o f  the earlier buzz o f  animated conversation was recovered 
as pairs o f  individuals attempted a 'moral reading' o f  the painting, 'Deserted'. 
However, a very distinct 'stiffening' o f  mood overtook the group when I  began to 
comment on the seven areas Kleinig (1996) describes as 'personal ethics'. Here, 
then, I  probably made three more mistakes. First, I  imagine that I  overemphasised 
the negative aspects o f  policing - e.g. by describing 'cynicism', the 'inevitable 
practice o f  lying', the 'power o f  informants to corrupt police officers' etc. Second, 
I  was not rehearsed or tight enough in my descriptions; I  should have been able to 
clarify the major points better. Third, I  added - again rather gratuitously - that I  
did not mind what police officers did in their private lives - and then foolishly  
mentioned that it was up to the individual concerned what sorts of'perversions' he 
or she got up to in the confines o f  their own home. This was meant to be humorous. 
It was probably misplaced.
Here, I  think I  lost some o f  the necessary discipline that I  have learned is essential 
in the course ofproviding ethics education i f  the tutor is not to excite some hostility 
and/or defensiveness.'
I reformed the small groups of four and distributed the Bramshill Ethics 
Questionnaire. After a slightly muted start the groups continued to discuss their 
responses until sometime after their allotted time for lunchbreak.
I began the afternoon session by acknowledging the fact that I might have caused 
offence through some of my remarks in the morning and then introduced the 
concept of a moral ethos. I did this by asking what ’atmosphere' characterised 
'Bramshill'. The initial answers to my question were significant.
'It's a fantasy world\ was the first comment. 'Its insular' was the second. 'It’s like 
a boarding school' was the third.
I showed my concern to these responses by saying:
'Oh, dear. I  suppose I'm one o f  the people to blame fo r  this since I'm one o f  the 
culture setters and carriers'.
Then, however, a fourth individual commented: 'All those things that have been 
said are good. Bramshill shows consistency and continuity. The one thing we can 
all do here is have time to think precisely because o f  those conditions o f  insularity 
and containment. We can't do any o f these things 'out there.' '
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At this I moved on. The group studied the organisational ethos of the Victoria and 
Albert museum (through the use of a video clip) before focusing on their perception 
of the moral ethos of the police organisation. Two members of the total group 
refused to complete the questionnaire. I let it pass because the other members of 
their groups were responding to the refusals. Finally we concluded with the 
analysis o f the 'Suffolk video factory'.
I ended the day with a question that I addressed to the whole group\’How sure can 
you be that you do not display some o f  the same characteristics o f  the managers we 
have ju s t observed?’
As the group left my sense was that, for the majority, the day had been received 
positively. Moreover, my sense was that the same majority would have been 
content to continue for another two hours. Certainly I had plenty more material to 
use. I was disappointed that I had not been able to include two of the exercises I 
had designed especially because they would have reinforced the design emphasis 
concerned with giving individuals structures within which to examine their own 
'values' and with some practical guidelines to 'create ethical working environments'.
I discussed my perception of the day with one of the course tutors and with the 
course administrator. They both expressed very real concern at the way the 'ethos' 
at Bramshill had been described and agreed that it was very likely that I had elicited 
a level o f defensiveness that was scarcely likely to be conducive to learning.
'You are walking on eggshells all the time[ observed the course administrator: 'You 
have to try to anticipate every possible response to whatever you say or do. You 
have to possess an extraordinary degree o f  self-control where almost everything 
you do has to be pre-planned. It seems well-nigh impossible.'
How would the group evaluate their experience?
D. and M. (the module leaders) had set aside the following lunchtime to share any 
information they had been able to glean from the group concerning my work. D had 
included a specific focus on the morning of Wednesday 12 November to examine 
- as part of her inquiry into the nature of emotions - the affective responses to the 
day on 'ethics'. M. had canvassed views (informally) over breakfast and coffee. 
They reported a positive response. D. noted that the group had been particularly 
influenced by the film of the Suffolk video factory -'You must, keep it in’, she said, 
and that individuals in the group had been able to make links not only between the 
sessions e.g. the 'duty of care' and 'ethics' but also with police work. M. identified
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one individual from a northern force who had especially sought him out to say how 
powerful and impressive the examination of ’ethics' had been. Nonetheless, P. 
identified support for the view that the work was 'intellectual demanding'. At this 
I expressed surprise, even, incredulity - but overall I felt very considerable relief.
Significantly, when the written course evaluations were received at the end of the 
module, my work on ethics was not identified by any participant as warranting 
either negative or positive comment. To the extent that I had managed (almost for 
the first time) not to have some relatively explicit critical response I was pleased. 
However, the price for my less ’demanding’ and more conservative approach was 
that I had not managed to 'excite' any explicit recognition of a more powerful and 
'significant learning' episode.
Moving on - Sustaining the design
I resolved both to continue with the emphasis I had first 'piloted' in November 1997 
and to sustain the discipline of avoiding the provocation of defensiveness or 
hostility on the part of my clients by maintaining a rigorous control over myself and 
my 'teaching' content. I also decided to simplify the instrument examining the 
'moral ethos of organisations' through constructing a simpler questionnaire, 'The 
organisational ethics questionnaire'. I was excited about the prospect of collecting 
more data concerning the moral ethos of the police organisation - and, from 
experience I knew that my teaching performances tended to be invigorated by the 
frisson  o f the 'new' and my wonderment at the outcomes. In addition, I had 
developed a set of support materials based upon Kleinig (1996), Laughame and 
Newman (1985) and Villiers (1997) in order to 'reassure' those officers who felt 
that they needed a more extensive examination of ethical issues involved in areas 
such as the use of force and discretion as well as the ethics of crime investigation. 
However, one particular element that I realised I should include in the learning 
materials was a method, design or 'recipe' for ethical decision-making (despite my 
reservations that practitioners in situ scarcely, if ever, seek out and follow any 
actual piece of paper upon which guidelines and procedures are stated). I saw this 
as one of the development tasks I should undertake for a ’strengthening’ of the 
ethics education unit.
The delivery o f the 'ethics unit' February 1998:
The module leaders had tried to secure some basic conditions where all of the 
eighteen student participants were given plenty of opportunity to settle into the 
'classroom environment' and to form preliminary relationships with one another
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before any 'learning structures' were provided. Prior to my work, I had arranged 
the chairs in three rows - in order to provide 'safety.'
I introduced myself - and gave some simple information concerning who I was and 
my role in the College. I said that the fact we were examining the subject 'ethics' 
did not, in any way, imply that persons in the room were unethical. The subject 
itself was worth examining 'especially in the light of recent strategic emphases 
from within policing itself - such as the 'statement of common purpose and values'. 
I then began with a simple clarification as to the nature of'ethics' before embarking 
upon the first presentation - which I duly illustrated with some video material 
featuring a police leader.
I then proceeded to offer the group a choice from two activities. Would they prefer 
to examine a case study featuring the 'moral development' of a police leader or 
would they prefer to compare themselves to 'superior' managers and leaders? After 
a few moments of hesitation the group opted for the second activity. Once this had 
been completed I simply provided a brief synopsis of the 'case study'.
I began the next session similarly by offering a choice between two activities: 
either we could review the major ethical dilemmas in policing or the group could 
use the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire as a form of'ethical stocktaking'.
The group opted for the 'stock-taking' activity - and, once the subsequent lengthy 
discussions had been completed, I concluded the session with a summary of the 
data patterns emerging from the instrument.
I continued throughout the day by offering choices to the group and remaining as 
informal and uncontroversial as possible. I also began to collect data from the 
'Organisational Ethics questionnaire'. The findings indicated that most participants 
worked in organisations that fell short of the type of moral ethos advocated by 
police strategists.
The Evaluation
I had re-installed the simple evaluation questionnaire that I had used throughout the 
majority of the action research process. The data emerging replicated the pattern 
of the previous unit delivery in the new cycle of the research.
In terms of the 'high points' of the unit, a majority of the participants mentioned the 
following:
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'The opportunity fo r  self-reflection' ’Thinking about personal ethics' 'The chance 
to examine something deep', The intellectual stimulation', 'The videos - very 
interesting’, 'The videos were excellent’, 'The thought-provoking videos', 
’Schindler’s List - 1 will go and see the whole film ’, ’The small group discussions'
More than ha lf the participants either left the space blank in which to identify low 
points or said that there were no low points
Of the remainder only one commented on the fact that it was:
'Over my head - not enough practical application'
Whilst the others mentioned:
'The lack o f  time to address the issues'
'The venue', 'The acoustics'
Those who suggested improvements wanted the inclusion of more ’real world 
scenarios'. Two participants wanted more clarification of'ethics'. Three wanted to 
spend more time examining how to make the organisation more ethical.
In relation to the fourth question concerning the learning that had occurred during 
the module the results were positive.
14 out o f the 18 participants reported that they had learned more about the subject 
'ethics' and/or 'police ethics' or 'professional' ethics. They included remarks such 
as:
7  learned about a new subject area I  had never studied before 'ethics' and how it 
relates to policing', 7 now hw w  what ethics is', ' The ethics in policing', 'Ethics and 
professions'
12 out of 18 stated that they had learned more about themselves:
7found out things about my own values and ethics','I realised that I  had lost my 
ethics', 'I sorted out my values'
9 o u t o f  18 stated  that they  had learned so m eth in g  from the d iffe ren t so rts  o f  
activ ities .
278
Only two persons out of 18 reported a low level of learning:
One wrote: 7 merely reinforced what I  know already'.
The other commented: 'Some interesting discussions but what did I  learn? Nothing 
earth shattering'
Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, 'What value (if any) do you assign to 
your experience with the 'ethics' unit?' were distributed as follows:
- A very high level: N = 0
- A high level: N = 2
- A moderate level: N = 14
- Little: N = 2
- Very little: N = 0
Reflection
Although the new design was a distant relative of that which I had created in the 
first cycle of the action research process it appeared not to elicit the polarity of 
response and, with careful replication, I felt optimistic that I might gradually 
improve the level of positive valuation. I would sustain the style, method and 
content o f the unit in the next delivery.
The Delivery - March 1998:
Just prior to what was to be the final delivery of the ethics unit on the 'Managing 
People' module I had written in my diary:
'There seems to be a way to do it.. There needs to be some choice, lots o f  structure 
and rhythms o f  concept development and emotional evocation’
On this occasion I was looking forward to engaging, in a relaxed way, with the 
group. I had decided begin with an informal introduction to 'ethics' and examine, 
by way of 'warm -up' activity, Frank Holl's painting, 'Deserted'. I would then 
reproduce the design of the previous unit delivery. This I did. There were twenty 
one participants.
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The Evaluation
The results of the evaluation questionnaire were as follows:
In terms of the 'high points' of the unit, the participants mentioned the following:
'It was interesting to see the influences on a senior police leader', 'The chance to 
reflect on my values', 'Not having the usual police training type course'Chatting 
about profound things with colleagues','Thinking fo r  a change', 'The videos on 
organisations', 'Thinking about my ethics', 'The mental stimulation', 'The bit from  
'Four weddings and a funeral - very moving', 'Schindler’s List', 'The discussions 
with other police officers'
The low points were:
'Too idealistic - not in touch with reality', 'The prejudices o f  the police', 'Not 
enough time spent helping on the realities', 'The size o f  the group', 'No police 
speakers'
A majority said that the unit did not need to be improved.
Those who suggested improvements wanted the inclusion of'practical guidelines' 
and "how to combat the performance target mentality’ or 'more information on 
ethics'
In relation to the fourth question concerning the learning that had occurred during 
the module the results were positive.
17 out of the 21 participants reported that they had learned more about the subject 
'ethics' and/or 'police ethics' or 'professional' ethics or 'organisational' ethics 
including the following remarks:
7found  out things about my own values and ethics','I realised that I  had lost my 
ethics', 'I sorted out my values'
14 o u t o f  21 s tated  tha t they  had  learned  so m eth in g  from  the  fo l lo w in g  d if fe ren t  
sorts  o f  activ ities:
The 'ethical reading'
The Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire
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Discussions with colleagues on 'ethical dilemmas in policing'
The tutor input
The study o f  organisations and ethics 
The chance to reflect
3 persons out of 21 reported that little if any learning had resulted from the unit.
Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, 'What value (if any) do you assign to 
your experience with the 'ethics' unit?' were distributed as follows:
- A very high level: N = 0
- A high level: N = 4
- A moderate level: N = 13
- Little: N = 3
- Very little: N = 0
An Ending
A former tutor at the college, who had been a participant on the module, 
generously, sought me out at the end of the module delivery and said:
'You ought to collect the data on the 'Organisational Ethics' and publish it - its 
important stu ff you know.'
I had begun to 'write up' the earlier findings on the ‘Moral Ethos’ Questionnaire and 
I said; 'Yes - 1 wish I  had the time.'
The Police Management Programme, which had begun in the Spring of 1995 was 
undergoing a review. When the new design was decided upon in May of 19991 was 
not asked to offer any form of 'ethics education' to the course by the new 
Programme managers. No one told me why this was so.
I was to learn, in 1999, from the course administrator, that my work was perceived 
as 'risky' because it could lead to strong positive or negative feelings - and if strong 
negative feelings were aroused this would make it difficult for the subsequent 
'inputs' by other tutors to be appreciated. It was better, therefore, to 'drop' ethics 
from the module.
In the Spring of 1998 I had to come to terms with the fact that my attempt to 
'secure' ethics education on the police leadership and management curriculum had,
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apparently, failed.
A concluding note
Towards the latter end of 1998, after I had begun to assemble all the facts emerging 
from the inquiry, I had begun to develop following the publication of the draft 
statement of ethical principles in December 1992, I asked my colleagues in the 
Police Leadership faculty if they might help me in the process of developing theory 
from the data. Informally, I mentioned to one of my colleagues - who had helped 
me in the earliest days of the project - that I had, after so much effort 'failed' to 
secure the subject 'ethics' on the curriculum - through achieving sufficiently 
positive feedback from the participants in the client groups. A few days later, and, 
unsolicited, I received a note from that tutor.
I have chosen to include this note here because I think it helps to corroborate my 
account and I think it also lends authenticity to that same account.
It read as follows:
'My experience in running short courses on ethics at Bramshill has been, more 
often than not, they end in the crushing disappointment o f  negative, destructive and 
even vindictive feedback from a vocal minority, whilst the majority remains silent, 
their real thoughts undeclared. Clearly a committed and thoughtful minority wishes 
to make something o f  the subject, recognises that the tutor is not there to pander 
to and flatter their prejudices but, in some sense, to help their education, and 
accepts that there is no easy path to ethical understanding and awareness. 
However, this group has always proved a minority, and I  am left with a deep sense 
o f mystery as to why their colleagues come, or having come, why they remain.'
The note continued:
'Their unwillingness to apply themselves to the task in hand, actively and whole- 
heartedly, saddens me. What they ask fo r  is glib and simplistic formulae; and the 
tutor whom they really approve is the showman who flatters them, and who writes 
integrity on the board, but ignores its absence in the room.'
The note then succinctly and incisively captures the difficulties of keeping faith 
with the courage of one's convictions. It observes:
7 challenge them in some way; their behaviour, their compromises, their
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inauthenticity; and they react by being abrasive, cynical, flippant, dismissive and 
crass. (As opposed to the minority, who remain interested, thoughtful, sincere and 
committed. But, as always, an empty vessel makes the most noise.)'
My colleague finished his note by observing that he did not wish to signal ’a 
resignation' but 'a reflection' on a recurring state of affairs and ended by saying:
'Please read it in that light.'
Although the programme managers and relevant module leaders of the Police 
Management Programme could no longer support the inclusion within their 
programme content of something called 'ethics' a great deal of learning and 
discovery had taken place throughout the inquiry. Data patterns had emerged from 
the questionnaires which illustrated some features of the moral world of police 
officers - and which constituted valuable material for helping stimulate thinking 
about how to develop the police organisation. For example, the organisation was 
perceived by the majority of middle-managers to be marked by 'secret scheming' 
and characterised as a 'rules and procedures' rather than a 'quality' organisation.
Slightly more than one-half of all the police officers who attended the 'Managing 
People' module had never, throughout their entire police career experienced a 
training or development event which included some study of ethics. My inquiry had 
demonstrated that the ethics unit had been impactive for at least a small number of 
offi cers. Some of these effects were unpredictable. Thus, one officer decided, as 
a result o f my work, to make a formal complaint against his organisation on the 
grounds of racial discrimination. Another decided to choose to focus upon the 
subject 'police ethics’ in his dissertation for a Master's degree. One officer who had 
been appointed training manager within his force decided to incorporate some 
study of 'ethics' on all the training designs offered within that force. Yet again, 
another officer developed a 'leadership manifesto’ as a result of the stimulation 
provided by the ethics unit. He told me that his manifesto was prominently 
displayed in his office so that those around him knew the nature of his value 
commitments. Two officers volunteered to return to Bramshill to help act as 
additional resources during the delivery of the ethics unit. They assisted me in the 
first months of the 'case study' emphasis - and would have continued to do so but 
for the fact that one was promoted and the other was selected to take on a new role 
within his force. Finally, many of the learning structures I had developed were 
borrowed and adapted by officers who had some form of training function.
My work was also responded to positively by a wider audience. Two researchers
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in the United Kingdom cited my work in their papers and presentations whilst 
visitors to Bramshill, from overseas, showed a particular interest in the work. Most 
of these visitors wanted to include some of my materials in their police 
development programmes.
After so much effort to make the exploration of the subject ’ethics’ (and ’police 
ethics') a positively valued experience - and to see it secured on the middle- 
management programme - 1 had to face up to the sad fact that I had failed. I turned, 
therefore, to find a way of making sense of the experience and its attendant 
phenomena.
But this individual educational action research process was to culminate in a happy 
ending; in the course of that sense-making process I asked my colleagues to me 
help develop explanations and theories. As a result of this - and almost eighteen 
months later - 1 was asked to make contributions to the new ’Advanced People 
Skills' module of the middle-manager programme. I shall return to remark upon 
this outcome in the concluding chapter of this narrative.
Part Three
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Making sense o f  the inquiry
Chapter Eleven begins with a question, 'What sense can I make of the inquiry?' and 
starts the process of constructing a 'personal and local educational theory' - at the 
core of which lies a framework of values.
Chapter Twelve considers 'ethics education' at Bramshill from a dramaturgical 
perspective and shows how the experience can be 'read' as an example of 
ethnopsychology in action.
Chapter Thirteen - using some of Foucault's ideas concerning the science of 
discipline - speculates upon the 'governmental rationalities’ at work in police 
leadership and management generally as well as police leadership and management 
training specifically - and recognises that the 'ethics education' design is contexted 
within a 'site of contestation' reflecting competing ‘governmental rationalities’.
Chapter Fourteen describes the findings emerging from the successive versions of 
the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire as the study unfolded. This data helps to make 
sense of some of the enduring response patterns noted in the inquiry reported here.
The dissertation is completed by a ‘concluding chapter’ which underlines the fact 
that ‘ethics’ continues to be a police strategic emphasis, comments on the work of 
two ethicists working at Bramshill, summarises the achievements of the inquiry and 
ends with a closing vignette.
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Chapter eleven
Theory building: What sense can I  make o f  the inquiry?
"The.. illusion is that changes in the climate o f  opinion are so large and slow that 
we what we do as individuals makes no difference to them. This is to confuse 
making an imperceptible contribution with making no contribution. There is a great 
difference between many people making an imperceptible contribution and the 
same people each making no contribution. There is a difference between a town 
where everyone puts their ice cream wrapper in the bin and one where each person 
drops in it the street, saying, 'Mine won't make any difference. ’ " (Glover, 1989: 
204)
Introduction
The study reported here has shown how a form o f ’ethics education’ was explicitly 
re-introduced to the curriculum of the Leadership Development Programme (and 
subsequent Police Management Programme) at the Police Staff College, Bramshill. 
My account describes how, over a period of more than five years, I strove to find 
a way of presenting ’ethics' so that it might be positively valued by the programme 
participants. I wanted the subject to become a stable feature on the middle- 
management development programme. However, in 1998, following a revision of 
the programme, 'ethics' (as a subject for a particular focus) was not selected - by the 
decision-makers responsible for the programme content - to be included on the 
curriculum. Subsequently, though, two new members of the teaching staff at 
Bramshill became familiar with my work and included 'ethics and leadership' on 
the 'Advanced People Skills' module of the Police Management Programme in the 
autumn of 1999.
The research question I had asked was: 'Could I create an 'ethics education' for 
police leaders and managers that would be positively valued by sufficient o f the 
client group such that the subject 'ethics' would be secured on the curriculum?'
Notwithstanding the various strategies and tactics I deployed over the course of the 
inquiry I did not, in fact, succeed, consistently, in achieving my aim. Moreover, I 
had aspired to establish a form of emancipatory action research as the expression 
of a critical educational science. The account of the different phases or cycles in my 
action research process shows that I failed to establish those conditions where 
participatory, collaborative or emancipatory action research could even begin to 
take place. It follows that a number of my values - both educational and moral -
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were not realised in my practice.
How can I make sense of the process? What sort of theoretical interpretation can 
I create from the facts of the inquiry? In principle I could draw from the full range 
o f theories that have been advanced and developed as explanations for human 
conduct. Clearly, for example, it would be possible to ‘read5 the details of this study 
form the perspective of chaos theory of to understand the more specific successive 
educational designs as representations of post-modernist educational practices. 
However, whilst my interpretations have been influenced by several such sources 
I have organised my theory-building into three related but separate areas. Thus, in 
this chapter I shall highlight the role my own values and role-conceptions played 
in initiating, sustaining and shaping the inquiry itself. In so doing, I shall link my 
theoretical formulation to Whitehead’s (1989) framework concerned with creating 
a ‘living educational theory’. In the following chapter I shall discuss the inquiry 
from a dramaturgical perspective. Then, in chapter thirteen, I shall adopt a 
Foucauldian approach as I move on to consider the ‘make-up’ of police and the 
complexities of their governance.
First, though, I shall make reference to Winter’s (1998) discussion concerning 
theory in action research. He shows how theory is rich, pervasive and multi-faceted 
in the conduct of action research. In the course of his text, Winter observes that 
action researchers, at some level, always encounter specific and particular 
situations which provoke commensurately local theoretical interpretations. This 
‘local’ mode of fashioning theory has been well-illustrated by Elliott (1992). I shall 
cite Elliott’s example and take this as my cue for personalising the sense-making 
process and ground my theorising in patterned aspects of my own person.
Theory in action research
Winter (1998) probes, specifically into the nature of theory and the conduct of 
action research; he describes 'theory' as 'speculative play with possible general 
explanations of what we experience and observe'. He rejects the notion that theory 
is something residing in books stored in the 'warehouse' of the university. For him, 
theories can be used to control or, conversely, can be personally (and collectively) 
empowering. Plainly, if a theory is generated by a practitioner/inquirer then it is, 
in a sense, 'owned' by that same inquirer and linked to their identity.
He likens the theoretical dimension to a 'voyage of self-discovery'. My experience, 
in part, coincides with this characterisation. As my inquiry developed I realised that 
it was my own personhood - the way I interpreted my role, my modes of reaction,
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the nature and pattern of my experience which prompted those modes of reaction, 
and, the extent of my creative competence - that lay at the heart o f the research.
Winter moves on to make four points about both the origins of, and the nature of, 
theory in action research. I shall summarise those points and indicate how my own 
theory-building reflected the processes to which he refers.
He asks; 'Where does 'theory' come from in action research?' and answers this by 
saying that it does not come from a computer search of the literature. Theoretical 
resources are not predefined in advance but are drawn in by the 'process o f the 
inquiry'. So, for Winter, theory emerges:
" ...from  a process o f  improvisation as we draw on different aspects o f  our prior 
professional and general knowledge in the course o f  the inquiry. This theoretical 
dimension o f  action research inquiry may be thought o f  as a journey o f  self- 
discovery. Every time a colleague or a student or a client presents us with 
something and surprising (in the data) or a new possible interpretation pops into 
our head concerning some event or part o f  the data, we fin d  new relevance in 
theories which we were 'aware o f  beforehand, but which until this moment had not 
seemed significant." (Winter 1998: 250)
A clear example of this process in my inquiry concerned the reflections of a police 
officer who wanted me to 'succeed'. He reported that he was 'surprised' at how 'anti' 
so many police were towards civilians. I was reminded that I was a 'mere civvy'. 
This particular experience helped to make salient those social psychological 
theories reported in Brown (1986) - and especially Tajfel's (1978) studies in the 
social psychology of intergroup relations - which point towards a generic norm 
featuring the tendency to discriminate in favour of one's own group identification. 
This led me to ask the question: 'If, because I am an outsider, I am likely to be 
discounted in some fashion, how might this be overcome?' At least a part o f my 
answer to this problem was to acknowledge, in the early phase of my 'ethics 
teaching' how difficult it is for any outsider to 'get on the inside of another form 
of social practice'. I also chose, in my introductions to the ‘ethics unit’, to 
accentuate the fact that I was not a police officer and that I hoped that I would not 
be perceived as presumptuous or patronising by persons in the client group.
His second point concerns the fact that theory in action research is inherently both 
reflexive and multi-disciplinary because action research is necessarily concerned 
as much with the process of the inquiry as with the 'problem' issue(s). He notes that
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throughout action research the inquirer (the researcher) involves participants in 
negotiations, resolves ethical dilemmas, establishes and develops the focus of the 
work and constructs strategies for agreeing interpretations of events. Therefore and 
inevitably, the action researcher draws on a whole variety of different types of 
theory including those concerned with social interaction to wider macro 
political/economic theories helping to understand the contextual influences 
impacting upon the actors and their situations of practice. (I should note that, whilst 
I had hoped to be able to involve participants in negotiations (concerning how, 
collaboratively, we might address 'ethics') I only risked this approach on two 
occasions - both of which I had to abandon rapidly. In the final stage of the project 
I was able to offer choices to the participants - but this fell short of more 
conventional action research practice.)
Winter, I think, is entirely correct in his description of this aspect of 'theory in 
action research'. Thus, as I developed the inquiry I had to take account of theories 
concerned with individual personality and identity (including the fact that police 
are more interested in the person than in a rational critique o f their arguments and 
opinions) as well as those concerned with understanding the nature of Bramshill as 
an institution. In this latter respect, I had to accept that, although my workplace was 
described as a 'college' it did not practice 'education' but something curious and 
distinct representing a complex and often tacit negotiation between tutor and client 
group. I characterised (see Adlam, 1999) the nature of the encounter as a form of 
'infotainment' or 'edutainment'.
Third, action research requires theory in the sense of speculation on the 
hypothetical meanings of the immediately observable. Winter points out that 
theory, in this sense, is absolutely central to action research because it involves 
questioning the meaning of the data so that participants can go beyond the already 
'expert' understandings which 'defined' their starting points. Throughout the course 
of the study I met, intermittently, with my staff colleagues in order to try and 
develop understandings of our practice. In the last two years of the study I was able 
to begin the process of presenting my findings to my colleagues and to invite them 
to 'speculate' upon the 'data'. These meetings led me towards an analysis of the 
'make up' of police leaders and managers that I shall explore, in detail, in a later 
chapter. Here, though, I want to emphasise three insights that emerged for me in 
the course of the study.
First, I learned that despite my apparent commitment to emancipatory action 
research, 1 was, in fact, unwittingly pursuing a positivist form of practice as I 
searched to identify, manipulate and control as many relevant 'variables' as I could
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discover which might have had some bearing on the 'evaluation of my teaching 
designs. Unbeknown (to myself), I had succumbed to the power of the positivist 
impulse and the desire to 'be in control'.
Second, my inquiry suggests the need for a 'conversational community' to form - 
in order to help practitioner/inquirers explore and analyse their practice. Because 
of the fragility of the educational ethos in my situation of practice I made some 
educational decisions that were bom out of distress - and this led me to adopt some 
highly questionable tactics. So, for example, on occasion I used overly emotional 
and disturbing video content in an extreme effort to counter the view that 'ethics 
is/are only relative'. If  I had been able to discuss my work and my inquiry within 
such a conversational community then I would (I think) have dealt more effectively 
with my emotional reactions.
Third, the data emerging from my inquiry enjoined me to face up to a difficult 
realisation concerning the dominance of the arational over the rational in relation 
to educational decision-making at Bramshill. Prior to my study I had not realised 
the extent of the limits to the rational enterprise. At the very beginning of the action 
research inquiry I developed - for police leaders and managers attending courses 
of study at Bramshill - a thorough rationale (a defense) for the study o f ethics. In 
a world where rationality dominated, the arguments in this rationale would, 
themselves, contain sufficient reason to continue with the study of ethics on all 
police leadership and management development courses. However, as my study has 
shown, this did not, in fact, happen. Consequently, a major finding of this study 
concerns a reminder about the existence o f limitations to rationality and rational 
decision-making -  identified, for example, by Simon (1962).
Winter's fourth point about theory in action research starts from recognising the 
fact that engaging in action research inevitably brings the inquirer(s) 'up against' a 
varied set of theoretical perspectives. He emphasises, however, that action research 
is 'above all about determining courses of action'. The researcher, in the light of 
their understandings and their values, is always trying to approximate to a 'better',
i.e. a more valued, state of affairs. Yet, in order to act we need to make choices. 
Consequently:
".. this means that we have to establish an effective relationship between these 
different theoretical perspectives. So action research involves the integration o f  
theory - in and fo r  action. The action research process itself involves deciding how 
best to intervene here and now, in this situation, with these individuals, in the light 
o f these social and professional values, amidst the complex pressure o f  this
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organisational and political context. " (Winter 1998: 251)
It could be argued, therefore, that theory in action research is subordinate to the 
technical, ethical, social and political aspects of a practice. This, I think, is mistaken 
because any practice is theory-impregnated. However, it remains the case that the 
action researcher confronts (and works with) the massivity of goal-oriented social 
projects and that direct experiential knowledge assumes a certain precedence over 
other forms of knowledge. To be effective the action researcher does need to 
deploy an extensive and integrated range of theoretical knowledges. The most 
recent stage of my project provides a good example this; here, I have developed a 
form of practice which makes use of the support from my fellow tutors and which 
reflects a better appreciation of the existential circumstances of my clients whilst 
they are at Bramshill.
I hope, that in the course of describing the different stages of the action research 
process I have begun to indicate the variety of theoretical understandings which 
helped me to decide how best to intervene 'here and now, in this situation'. Winter's 
last point highlights the central role that the decision-making processes of the 
practitioner play in the course and progress of an action research inquiry. I shall 
take this as an appropriate moment for identifying the way the inquirer builds 
theory from practice and then integrates that theory into subsequent practice.
An example o f  practitioner-generated theory
Elliott (1992) provides a straightforward example of theory grounded in practice 
which demystifies the business of 'theory construction'. I shall refer to his example 
because it also illustrates, clearly, the most general sequence of individual action 
research activity that I followed throughout the inquiry.His example of theory- 
building grounded in practical experience (rather than imported from the 'outside' 
in the form of academic conceptualisations) is taken from his own work as a 
teacher in a secondary modem school in the early 1960s. He reports that the deputy 
head at the school had organised for the fourth year girls to see a film depicting, in 
great detail, the birth of a baby. News reached the staff room that, during the 
screening of the film, four girls had, simultaneously, fainted. He, Elliott, argued 
that if boys had been present they would have provided an 'emotional check' on this 
reaction. During the afternoon the boys complained that they had not been able to 
see the film and that the girls were using the occasion to impute 'emotional 
immaturity' to them. Elliott decided to test this theory of emotional 
maturity/immaturity and invited fourth year boys (and any girls who wanted to see 
the film again) to view it after school. He summarises what happened as follows:
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"No immature behaviour was evidenced from the boys, no girls fainted, and the 
showing was followed by a thoughtful, lively, and sensitive discussion. '(Elliott, 
1992:8)
He goes on to say that the data gathered during these events, from observation of 
practice and student feedback provided the basis for changes in the programme of 
sex education within the school. He outlines the theory/practice process as follows:
"Information about the fainting episode led me to hypothesise that it wouldn't have 
happened in the presence o f  boys. The feed-backfrom the boys about their feelings 
on being excluded prompted me to organise the second showing in order to test the 
hypotheses that girls wouldn't fa in t in the presence o f  boys, and that the boys 
wouldn't display immature behaviour in the presence o f  girls. The success o f  the 
second showing then stimulated the gathering offurther data from  students about 
their needs in the area o f  sex education." (Elliott, 1992: 9)
Elliott’s example demonstrates well the reflective-interpretive processes o f the 
practitioner/researcher. These processes were highlighted by Orona (1997) in her 
grounded theory study of persons who were carers of Alzheimer's disease sufferers. 
Orona found that much of the time during her study she simply ’walked', or 'sat' or, 
most importantly, 'daydreamed' - all of which were integral and productive 
processes in her inquiry.
It may well be the case that any researcher’s quest for understanding will include 
phases of intense internal dialogue and then a vaguer kind of dreaminess - a 
dreaminess where lines of thought are (somehow) surfaced and pursued, 
conclusions are rehearsed, new possibilities are conjectured and insights achieved.
Certainly, I can say that the dominant activity of the study reported here has been 
a deep and sustained inner mentation - occasionally sharp in focus because of the 
clarity of a question - but more generally marked by a sense of wondering - 
wondering why something had happened, wondering if 'such and such' were the 
case - or just revisiting past noticings. In the light of this preliminary discussion 
concerning theory and the centrality of the person in (individual) educational action 
research I can now begin to elaborate a more specific interpretation of the inquiry.
Personalising the inquiry
I want, at the outset, to emphasise that I have come to understand the inquiry as
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analogous to a type of creative project. I mean by this that, when I view a painting, 
theatre piece, garden design or architectural construction, it seems to me that I am 
presented with the outcome of a search to express something valued by the designer 
- and yet something constrained by and embedded within a wider historical and 
socio-cultural context. If  I am to make sense of the 'finished' piece that, for 
example, the painter presents, I can only do so by trying to grasp the values 
informing and guiding the painter's practice and the wider historico-socio-cultural 
context. Therefore, if I am, similarly, trying to make sense of the form and content 
of the project I have described here, then I can only do so by trying to grasp the 
values informing and guiding my practice and the context in which that practice 
took place. So, the concept of'value' constitutes a major explanatory unit in my 
sense-making process. In consequence, I shall need to provide an account that 
illustrates how the educational events and encounters I have described were 
fashioned from some of my (socially-constructed) values.
However, the account of the inquiry process also shows that I f  ailed to express 
certain values in my practice. Thus, an equally important part of my discussion is 
devoted to making sense of why this was the case. To help me provide such an 
account I shall draw from Weber's (1948) 'professional political' model.
I shall make the assumption that I acted as a 'practitioner-inquirer' or 'teacher- 
researcher' - and, my practice was intended to be 'educational' - throughout the 
duration of the research process. It follows some of my sense-making might 
sensibly draw from my understanding of the nature of an educational practice. This 
I attend to in the following section. The discussion will allow me to move on to 
explore the creation of a 'personal and local' educational theory using Whitehead's 
(1989) model as a generative framework. I shall take Whitehead's concept of a 
'living educational theory' as a catalyst for developing theory. I shall emphasise the 
fact that it was the denial or suppression of certain of my values - especially as 
they were related to my role obligations, my personal development and my 
professional development - that were responsible for launching and shaping the 
project. They constitute a central element in the 'living educational theory' or 
'personal and local educational theory' I begin to articulate here.
The nature o f  education and educational inquiry
Peters (1968) in his analysis of the concept of education points out that, for 
something to count as 'education', it must embody or be connected to something 
judged to be worthwhile. He identifies the intrinsically ethical character of 
education in the following way:
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" 'Education' has notions such as 'improvement', 'betterment' and 'thepassing on 
o f  something worthwhile’ built into it. That education must involve something o f  
ethical value is, therefore, a matter o f  logical necessity." (Peters 1968: 91)
Following Peters, a fundamental presupposition underpinning my inquiry was that 
if I took it to be educational (rather than something else - such as 'propaganda', 
'manipulative persuasion' or 'indoctrination') then it must conform to certain criteria 
amongst which must be included the direct or indirect expression of moral values. 
It follows that an inquiry into something purportedly 'educational' will need to 
examine, at least in part, the moral ends sought and the moral qualities embodied 
in the practice; it will also examine whether or not the practice aims to sustain and 
enhance the expression of moral values in future social actions. Thus, an 
educational inquiry will be concerned to discover which moral values are expressed 
in the practice and will explore how they are expressed in the practice. It will also 
explore which moral values are denied in practice and will attempt, in the first 
instance, to give an account explaining why they are not expressed in the practice.
I want to add that whilst it is possible for almost any human experience to be 
'educational' (in the sense that some form of learning can, in principle, take place), 
institutions specifically established for educational purposes - such as the Police 
Staff College, Bramshill, enjoy choice, some control and some degree of power 
over the nature of the curriculum experience they provide. In virtue of that choice, 
control and power, the curriculum so constructed has, always, the potential to 
embody, express and commend a range of both moral and non-moral values. Not 
only was I acting within an institutional context as a practitioner-inquirer but I was 
also fully aware of the powers and privileges conferred upon persons, such as 
myself, within that institutional context. The role I filled - and my interpretation of 
my role requirements - need, therefore, to be included within my theorising of the 
inquiry process and its outcomes.
These preliminary observations provide me with grounds for locating my inquiry 
within the framework that Maxwell (1985) refers to as a 'philosophy of wisdom' 
rather than a 'philosophy of knowledge' perspective and approach. A 'philosophy 
of wisdom' (in contrast to a 'philosophy of knowledge') takes the view that the aim 
of practical inquiry is to realise what is of value in life (and values are both moral 
e. g. justice and non-moral e. g. efficiency). The aims of practical educational 
inquiry are to realise certain moral and non-moral values in the social practice of 
education. (It may be added that the aim of practical educational inquiry is also to 
be concerned to realise values and educational values in social practices after the
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educational event itself.) Practical educational inquiry - given prior commitments 
to a philosophy of wisdom - begins with questions of the form, 'How can I realise 
certain of my values in practice? I shall develop an answer to this question shortly.
As I began to try and make sense of my project - its unfolding and its termination 
and its ultimate revival (on the Police Management Programme) - 1 recognised that 
I had begun the inquiry with a form of the question, 'How do I improve my 
practice?', and I had then endeavoured, throughout the course of the project to 
improve aspects of my practice. This type of question and form of conduct appears 
to be isomorphic with the 'theory-generating' model Whitehead (1989) presents in 
his paper concerning the creation of a 'living educational theory'.
Whitehead's approach to creating a 'living educational theory'
Whitehead (1989) introduces his readership to the idea of a living educational 
theory by stating an assumption he has concerning something common to the 
conduct o f educational practitioners. From this he moves on to propose a basic 
approach to generating educational theory. He writes:
"I'm assuming that all readers o f  this journal will at some time have asked 
themselves questions o f  the kind, 1How do I  improve my practice? ' and will have 
endeavoured to improve some aspect o f  their practice. I  believe that a systematic 
reflection on such a process provides insights into the nature o f  the descriptions 
and explanations which we would accept as valid accounts o f  our educational 
development. I  claim that a living educational theory will be produced from  such 
accounts." (Whitehead 1989: 41)
The first part of his contention - which includes his reference to a concern by the 
practitioner to improve their practice - would certainly appear to be accurate. 
Moreover, it directly applies to my situation. Thus, when I reviewed the content of 
the middle-management programme at Bramshill I found that 'ethics' as a subject 
occupied, at best, a peripheral feature of the curriculum. I endeavoured to improve 
the practice of education at the Police Staff College, by re-introducing ethics to the 
main curriculum and by trying to present a valued educational experience for the 
participants on the programme.
In the second part of Whitehead's contention he goes on to make his central point 
concerning the genesis of a certain type of theory. Thus, he believes that a 
'systematic reflection on the process of endeavouring to improve aspects of practice 
will provide 'insights' into the 'nature of descriptions and explanations' - which we
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- the writers and readers - would accept as valid accounts o f our educational 
development. These ‘valid accounts’ would themselves produce or stand as a 'living 
educational theory'.
Here, then, I shall attempt to provide a systematic reflection on the process of 
endeavouring to improve aspects of my practice. If  I am successful in this, then, 
according to Whitehead, I should go some way towards creating a 'living 
educational theory'.
Whitehead is also concerned to embrace an epistemology reflecting Collingwood's 
(1982) emphasis on the importance of the 'questioning activity'. Collingwood 
introduces his readership to the 'question and answer' nature of knowledge by 
observing that the work of Bacon and Descartes represented a classical expression 
of a fundamental principle in logic which he, Collingwood, expresses as follows:
" .. the principle, that a body o f  knowledge consists not o f  ’propositions', 
'statements', 'judgments' or whatever name logicians use in order to designate 
assertive acts o f  thought.... but o f  these together with the questions they are meant 
to answer, and that a logic in which the answers are attended to and the question 
neglected is a false logic." (Collingwood, 1982: 30,31)
Collingwood contends that in order to understand anything anybody advances by 
way of explanation we must know the exact nature of the question that the 
explanation is trying to answer. Moreover, the truth of any assertion also lay in 
such a 'question and answer complex':
"It seemed to me that truth, i f  that meant the kind o f  thing which I  was accustomed 
to pursue in my ordinaiy work as a philosopher or historian - truth in the sense in 
which a philosophical theory or historical narrative is called true, which seemed 
to me the proper sense o f  the word - was something that belonged not to any single 
proposition, nor even, as the coherence-theorists maintained, to a complex o f  
propositions taken together; but to a complex consisting o f  questions and answers." 
(Collingwood, 198: 37)
Whitehead advocates that theory building by educational practitioners should 
reflect the 'complex' consisting of questions and answers rather than the 
'propositional' form that is typical of the 'disciplines' approach to educational 
theory. I shall follow his suggestion when I turn, shortly, to explicate the details of 
Whitehead's discussion concerning a living educational theory.
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Following his discussion of the contrast between ’propositional* forms of theory and 
'question and answer' forms, he is able to move on to define the purpose of his 
influential paper as follows:
"... the purpose o f  my own text is to direct your attention to the living individuals 
and the contexts within which a living theory is being produced (Lomax, 1986). 
Again, I  wish to stress that this is not to deny the importance ofpropositional forms 
o f  understanding. In a living educational theory the logic o f  the propositional 
forms, whilst existing within the explanations given by practitioners in making 
sense o f  their practice, does not characterise the explanation. Rather the 
explanation is characterised by the logic o f  question and answer used in the 
exploration o f  questions o f  the form, 1How do I  improve my practice? "(Whitehead, 
1989:43)
As I develop this account I hope to illustrate how the explanations I offer reflect my 
attempts to answer different sorts of question, all connected with the specific 
educational project I undertook. The project itself was located within a particular 
institutional context and I shall need to reflect the impact of the institutional context 
in my sense-making process.
The genesis o f  a personal educational theory: a general model
Whitehead presents an outline of his idea concerning the creation of a 'living 
educational theory' by describing the 'state of his thinking' in relation to the genesis 
of such a theory - which itself reflects the logic of question and answer. He focuses 
upon six areas. They are:
1. How do I improve my practice? - a question of methodology
2. A question of acknowledging one's existence as a living contradiction
3. How do we show our values in action?
4. How do we know that what the researcher says is true? - a question of validity
5. How can we move from the individual to the universal - a question of 
generalisability.
6. Which power relations influence the academic legitimacy of a living educational 
theory? - a question of the politics of truth.
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The value priorities and the value concerns of the inquirer are central to the first 
three areas. I shall provide a brief outline of the way Whitehead discusses these 
three areas before I turn to apply his thinking to my own inquiry.
He thinks that the question which initiates an educational inquiry, i.e. 'How do I 
improve my practice?' is a question of methodology. However, the question itself 
presupposes a denial or suppression (or negation) of the values of the practitioner
- or some problem the practitioner experiences in relation to the enactment o f his 
or her values. Whitehead finds that this question initiates a form of action research. 
He writes:
"If we look at the locations where a living form  o f  educational theory is being 
produced (Lomax 1986; M cNiff 1988) we can trace the development o f  a number 
o f  teacher-researchers who have used the following form o f  action/reflection cycle 
fo r  presenting their claims to know their own educational development as they 
investigate questions o f  the form , "How do I  improve this process o f  education 
here? " ' (Whitehead 1989: 43)
According to Whitehead, the 'action reflection cycle' takes the form:
- 1 experience problems when my educational values are negated in practice 
- 1 imagine ways of overcoming my problems 
- 1 act on a chosen solution 
- 1 evaluate the outcomes of my actions
- I modify my problems, ideas and actions in the light of my evaluations .... (and 
the cycle continues)
So, for Whitehead the 'action/reflection' cycle is energised by the negation of the 
practitioner's values. He points out that this form of inquiry falls within the tradition 
of action research - but it is distinguished from other approaches 'through its 
inclusion of 'I' as a living contradiction within the presentation of a claim to 
educational knowledge'.
The idea of action research as taking the form of cycle or spiral of steps has a long 
and well-known history but Whitehead's emphasis on 'contradiction' is more
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unusual and idiosyncratic. He elaborates upon this when he turns to address the 
second area, 'A question of acknowledging one's existence as a living 
contradiction'.
What does this mean? Here, it seems that Whitehead draws, in part, from the 
theoretical tradition established by Hegel and Marx - a tradition which holds that 
all phenomena incorporate latent tendencies and contradictions that generate 
change. Lyons (1988), informs her readership that one of the basic principles of 
materialist dialectics is that change comes primarily from the development of 
contradictions inside a person. She argues that 'everything is full of contradictions' 
and, by way of example, notes:
" .. For instance, there is a part o f  me that is courageous in bringing out 
differences, and a part o f  me that wants to preserve the peace at any price. There 
are parts o f  my understanding that are firmly grounded and will remain consistent, 
but I  also know that some things I  think and write today may embarrass me three 
months from  now." (Lyons 1988: 14)
She continues, saying:
"Because dialectics sees that change arises primarily from contradictions inside 
a person, it opposes the world view that people are like billiard balls, incapable o f  
changing until hit by an outside force. In a dialectical view, changes can and 
should arise from an internal commitment on the part o f  the one who is changing. " 
(Lyons, 1988: 15)
This argument seems valid. If persons are characterised by contradiction then an 
awareness of those contradictions might be sufficient to provoke change. 
Whitehead recognises that his own 'insights about the nature of educational theory' 
have been influenced by video-tape evidence which led him to see himself as a 
living contradiction. He writes:
"I could see that the T  in the question, 'How do I  improve this process o f  education 
here?', existed as a living contradiction. By this I mean that 'I' contained two 
mutually exclusive opposites, the experience o f holding educational values and the 
experience o f  their negation." (Whitehead, 1989: 44)
In a subsequent text (Whitehead, 1993) he provides a striking example of the 
contradictions between his educational values and their negation when he describes 
how his identity as a 'creative academic' was negated by the conventions of higher
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education. Lyons' observation makes it possible to identify how educators might, 
in practice, negate their educational values. For example, there might be 
contradictions between the educational value of'self-directed learning' and the level 
of directing, structuring and controlling exhibited by the teacher. Or, their might be 
a contradiction between valuing diversity and the finding of a 'personal voice' with 
the judgement of students' work if  it is measured against conventional assessment 
criteria. We could easily imagine contradictions between moral values such as 
'impartiality' with according preferential treatment to the more tractable or docile 
students, or, 'justice' with the differential allocation of time and resources to the 
student body. Whilst Whitehead emphasises the significance for him of the 
'contradiction' experience in catalysing his educational development, Lomax, in an 
earlier published dialogue with Whitehead (Whitehead and Lomax 1987), has 
allowed for the possibility that there may be other motives which come to stimulate 
the search for solutions and/or the betterment of practice. It may be the case that 
inquiry can either start from the position where a practitioner experiences a gap 
between the real (actual) and the ideal or even from a more disinterested curiosity.
Thus, in my own situation, it was th^absence of something I thought had value (i.e. 
'ethics') from the police leadership and management development curriculum that 
provoked me into beginning the inquiry. It was not until the inquiry process had 
reached some maturity that I was able to focus my attention upon myself as a 
'living contradiction'. In consequence, and in some contradistinction to Whitehead, 
I want to start detailing the process of creating a living educational theory by 
focusing upon Whitehead's third question. That third question is: 'How do we show 
our values in action?'
Most obviously, a person's actions, in circumstances of choice, indicate the projects 
they have energy for (i.e. they choose this rather than that) - and, within the 
parameters of the project itself, their conduct reveals a particular values set. Findlay 
(1970) for example, reminds us that we do, in fact, cherish, esteem and prize states 
o f affair, objects and situations. In the practice of education, for example, one 
teacher may especially value 'precision' in measurement whilst another may, in 
comparison, place more value on inculcating a 'spirit of inquiry'. Whitehead, 
though, develops his question in a particular way. He writes:
"The reason that values are fundamental to educational theoiy is that education is 
a value-laden practical activity. We cannot distinguish a process as education 
without making a value-judgement. 1 am taking such values to be the human goals 
which we use to give our lives their particular form. These values, which are 
embodied in our practice, are often referred to in terms such as freedom, justice,
300
democracy (Peters, 1966) and love and productive work (Fromm, 1960). When 
offering an explanation fo r  an individual's educational development these values 
can be used as reasons fo r  action " (Whitehead 1989: 45)
Whitehead's discussion demonstrates how questions of value lie at the heart of 
those educational practices concerned with attempting to bring about improvements 
in a situation of practice.
Values and action: identifying the clusters o f  values determining the inquity(or, 
an outline o f  the values I  sought to realise in my practice)
Which values served as the catalyst for the whole of the inquiry reported here?
When I asked the question, 'How can I realise my values in my practice?' I drew 
a distinction between my role obligations in relation to participating in institutional 
processes concerned with police leadership practices within the United Kingdom, 
my more general moral values, certain, more specific educational values, and, 
person-centred framework of values developed by Heron (1990).
First, I understood my role as a 'civilian tutor' - employed by the Home Civil 
Service - to be constructed and legitimated in terms of some form of alignment 
with the ideals of civil and public service in a liberal democracy. If  I were to enjoy 
the powers and privileges conferred upon me in such a role I could only do so if I 
were to meet the obligations - contingent upon my situation of practice - and 
provide police leadership and management development opportunities which 
included a serious and systematic focus on helping police to discharge their 
legitimate function in a liberal democracy. The professional ethic of the 'Home 
Civil Service' has been discussed by Hennessy (1989) and Phillips (1991) and this, 
too, constituted a basic scaffolding of values for the guidance of civil and public 
servants. I shall refer to their formulations of civil service ethics when I turn to 
examine how my work reflected these and other moral values commitments.
Second, at a more general level, however, I was also the beneficiary and inheritor 
o f an ethical tradition stretching back in time to the earliest recorded ethical 
writings - and continuing through the more systematic formulations of the Greeks
- then on, over the last two thousand years, to modern and postmodern moral 
philosophy. In consequence, I was alerted to the richness of ethical schema - 
including duty-based, rights-based, virtue-based, goal-based and discourse ethics
- and the possibility of bringing ethical considerations to the foreground of 
individual lives, social practices and organisational forms.
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Third, I understood education, ultimately, to be concerned with the promotion of 
human flourishing through the provision of those conditions which facilitated the 
realisation of that which persons - in manifold ways - might be. To that extent, I 
valued the inclusion of all those knowledges which appear to have some bearing 
upon that realisation. In consequence, my educational designs attempted to 
incorporate 'whole person' learning structures (such as 'biography work') as well as 
the provision of learning structures designed to help examine ethical dilemmas. I 
had learned a great deal from Heron's (1977) theories concerning the disabling 
effects o f human distresses and of the impact of psychodynamic processes on 
communication and social encounters.
Fourth, Heron's (1974) concept of the 'educated person' i.e. someone who is self­
directing, self-monitoring, and, self-correcting - within a social milieu - provided 
my practice with a fundamental source of inspiration. This inspiration was given 
a more political focus through the writings of Freire (1996), Carr and Kemmis 
(1986) and Kemmis and Wilkinson (1998).
After the 'preliminary' phase of my enquiry, I was able to provide brief summaries 
o f these values emphases for those police leaders and managers who attended the 
'ethics unit'. (This statement is included at Appendix L to this dissertation.)
In relation to my role obligations, I shall first consider the ethic of the 'Home Civil 
Service'. Second, I shall address the values at the heart of liberal democracy and 
those appropriate for police in a liberal democracy.
Hennessy (1989) in his exposition of Civil Service ethics describes a 'genetic code' 
of constituent parts which, together, generates a greater ethical whole. The 
constituent parts of the 'code' are:
- 'Probity'
- 'Care for evidence'
- 'A  re sp ec t  fo r  reason '
- 'A  w il l in g n ess  to  speak  truth unto  pow er'
- 'A capacity not just to live with the consequences of what you believe to be a 
mistaken course, but to pursue it energetically'
302
- ’An appreciation of the public interest'
- 'An awareness, necessary at all times, of other people's life chances', and
- 'Equity and fairness'.
Hennessy also makes reference to the important requirement for civil servants 
always to be 'constitutional'. By this he means that the Civil Service itself be under 
the control of a higher authority of elected ministers accountable to Parliament. A 
'constitutional' Civil Service is made possible because of'three flying buttresses, 
essential to the stability of the system': They are:
" A constant and careful concern fo r  the law. A constant and careful concern fo r  
Parliament - its needs and procedures. No lying and misleading. A concern fo r  
democracy. You may not like the kind o f  people it places above you but coups or 
any kind o f  destabilisation are out (sic)." (Hennessy, 1993: 413)
If I were to fill, adequately, the role of tutor at the Police Staff College, then my 
practice either would need to be able to meet Hennessy's criteria or, if they departed 
from them I would have to provide a proper justification. In fact one of Hennessy's 
criteria or 'constituent parts could encourage a form of obedience to bureaucracy 
i.e. his observation that a civil servant should pursue, energetically, a perceived 
mistaken course of action. When I turn to discuss Weber's model of the 'mature 
man' (sic) I shall describe a conceptual framework that suggests a corrective to this.
To the extent that I enjoyed considerable freedom in the construction o f course 
curricula and specific learning structures I had certain responsibilities to ensure that 
the 'public interest was served'. I imagined that the project concerned with 
developing a positively valued ethics education experience would be one way of 
working towards serving the public interest.
Phillips (1993) offers a more general approach towards identifying the professional 
ethic of the Home Civil Service but concludes with the following remarks both 
applauding the recent commitments to efficiency whilst endorsing a tradition of 
'service':
"The modern trend towards setting out much more clearly and publicly the targets 
to be achieved by each management unit is an indispensable part o f  improving the 
efficiency o f  the service; but it cannot be substituted fo r  the corporate ethos o f
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integrity and public service which has developed over the last one hundred andfifty 
years." (Phillips, 1993:57)
From Phillips I drew further support for the idea of serving the public interest and 
finding a moral basis for my own and police accountability.
At the beginning of 1990 I began to ask the question: ’What, for me, are the 
important emphases and issues that should be included in the formal processes of 
police leadership and management development? (Later I was to refine this 
question by asking: 'What should we expect from police leaders?11 answered this 
question (see Adlam 1998c) by suggesting the nature of a range of knowledges that 
a person claiming the status of police leader might reasonably be expected to 
express.)
My answer to the first question began with an observation about policing itself. As 
Kleinig (1996) suggests, human societies have always needed a policing function; 
social co-ordination and harmony have never flourished without some form of 
executive authority. However, the fundamental relation of the citizen to the police 
in a liberal democracy is one of consent. Police are carefully constituted in order 
to take account of this fundamental relation. Police activity is designed as a process 
o f facilitating the acheiovement of worthwhile ends through the adoption of 
socially and morally acceptable means. The original instructions created for the 
metropolitan Police in 1829 and the successive statements from ACPO and the 
Home Office concerning the purpose of police illustrate well the moral ends to 
which policing aims. In addition, some additional remarks in the original 1829 
instructions also specify the dispositions of character that should be expressed by 
the individual police officer:
"He will be civil and attentive to all persons, o f  every rank and class; insolence or 
incivility will not be passed over. While on Duty, he must not enter into 
conversation with any one, except on matters relating to his Duty. He must be 
particularly cautious, not to interfere idly or unnecessarily; when required to act, 
he will do so with decision and boldness; on all occasions he may expect to receive 
the fullest support in the proper exercise o f  his authority. He must remember, that 
there is no qualification more indispensable to a Police officer, than a perfect 
command o f temper, never suffering himself to be moved in the slightest degree, by 
any language or threats that may be used; i f  he do his duty in a quiet and 
determined manner, such conduct will probably induce well-disposed bystanders 
to assist him, should he require it. " (Metropolitan Police, 1829)
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These remarks are important precisely because they refer, in large part, to moral 
qualities such as impartiality and the proper use of power. The ACPO statement of 
Common Purpose and Values commends a similar set of virtues.
Williams (1993) takes a virtue to be a 'disposition of character to choose or reject 
actions because they are of a certain ethically relevant kind'. In short, a virtue is an 
ethically admirable disposition of character. The actions of police officers - in the 
pursuit of their ends - are expected to reflect certain of these admirable dispositions 
of character - such as 'compassion', 'courtesy' and self-control.
Thus, a first answer to the question, 'What, for me, are the important emphases and 
issues which should be included in the formal processes of police leadership and 
management development? is simply that something is wrong if police leaders and 
managers do not appreciate the moral foundations of policing and the function of 
the police institution in liberal democracies. I understand the police function, 
ultimately, to be connected with helping to secure those social and psychological 
conditions which people need if they are to learn and 'learn well'. These conditions 
have been extensively documented by Heron (1977) and Kleinig (1996). They 
include affection and love, choice and control, stability and predictability, and, the 
possibility of making sense of the complex phenomena o f the world. A major part 
o f the police function is to help create stability and predictability - which 
themselves facilitate the expression of affection.
If  I return to Whitehead's question, 'How do we show our values in action?' then 
I think it is legitimate for me to claim that my decision to reintroduce the subject 
'ethics' onto the police leadership development programme is indicative of some (or 
all) o f the values I have noted above.
In addition, I think it is important for me to highlight the fact that I wanted the 
police leadership development curriculum to make salient ideas and ideals central 
to liberal democracy. These have been recently analysed in a subtle way by Jones, 
Newburn and Smith (1994), in the context of their examination of the 'democratic 
nature' o f policing. The overall aim of their research was to describe and analyse 
how the various actors involved in the policy-making process interact to produce 
changes in the style, organisation and operation of policing on the ground. A major 
part of their study involved detailed case studies of four provincial police forces 
and relevant organisations such as police authorities in the four force areas. 
However, their work is more fundamentally an exploration of democracy. They 
point out that most research and writing on democracy focuses on 'political' 
institutions such as parliaments, political parties, cabinets, electoral systems and so
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on. They argue that in the ’modem service delivery state' the way public services 
impinge on the lives of citizens may be more important as the 'embodiment or 
negation' of the democratic ideal than parliament or central government. For them:
"The protection o f  liberty, social and economic opportunities, and the ability o f  
individuals to shape and develop their lives are crucially affected by a range o f  
public services." (Jones, Newburn and Smith, 1994: 1)
They suggest that, arguably, the police are the central public service in the modem 
state because the police are constituted to protect the essential freedoms of the 
citizenry whilst simultaneously enjoying a monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force. If  the police are such a central element in the modem state then it follows 
that policing policy and its formulation can be taken as an indication of the extent 
to which the democratic ideal is achieved. In this way, Jones, Newbum and Smith 
are led to tease out the main ideas and ideals of democracy. Their review of the 
concept of'democracy' in political thought - from the critique by Plato through the 
classical theorists such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill and the 
'empirical' theorists such as Joseph Schumpeter - enables them to propose seven 
criteria of democracy that can be used as a framework of analysis to test how far 
a state (or any of its public services) is, in fact, democratic. Moreover, they arrange 
these criteria in an order of priority as follows:
- Equity
- Delivery of service
- Responsiveness
- Distribution of power
- Information
- Redress
- Participation
They provide definitions of each of the seven 'criteria' - as they might be applied 
to policing - in the following way:
Equity: In so far as the police are delivering services, these should be distributed
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fairly between groups and individuals. In so far as the police are enforcing the law 
in their adversarial role, the pattern of enforcement should be fair.
Delivery of service: The police should deliver the appropriate services (as 
determined on other criteria) effectively and efficiently.
Responsiveness: In determining the order of priorities, the allocation of resources 
between different activities and objectives, and the choice of policing methods, the 
police should be responsive to the views of a representative body.
Distribution of power: Power to determine policing policy should not be 
concentrated but distributed between a number of different bodies.
Information: Information should be regularly published on funding, expenditure, 
activity and outputs. A representative body should be able to engage in a continuing 
dialogue with the professional managers of the police force so as to become better 
informed and to elicit relevant information through a sequence of interactions.
Redress: It should be possible for a representative body to dismiss an incompetent 
or corrupt chief officer, or one who exceeds his or her powers. There should be 
means o f redress for unlawful or unreasonable treatment by individual officers.
Participation: As far as possible, citizens should participate in discussion of 
policing policy with police managers
Whilst Jones, Newburn and Smith's analysis provides relatively specific criteria 
which can test the extent to which the police service is itself'democratic' it is also 
possible to locate the police within the more abstract values of liberal democracy. 
The liberal democratic state seeks to create and preserve certain social and cultural 
conditions especially those concerned with civil liberties and human rights. The 
public political culture of liberal democracies is marked by a possible freedom of 
expression, the search for justice and equity, 'voice', 'protest' and 'dissent'. It is also 
marked by the Rule of Law - which is brought into existence through a 
democratically elected Government. Police help to secure those social and cultural 
conditions through upholding the Rule of Law and maintaining the Queen's Peace. 
These are worthwhile ends and can be achieved through morally acceptable means. 
It is here that 'ethics' - as a subject of study - can facilitate the quality of the 
policing function in liberal democracies.
To the extent that ethics occupied (at best) a fringe position on the police leadership
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and management development curriculum I think it is valid for me to claim that 
certain of my values were denied in my practice. However, I think that this 
interpretation reflects a certain development of Whitehead's original meaning; he 
seems to emphasise the development of an ongoing practice rather than the 
different question of redesigning or reconsidering the actual curriculum subject 
matter.
Whitehead thinks that in order to understand the values that move our development 
forward we should start with 'records of our experience of their negation'. He 
advocates using video-tape recordings of practice so that teachers can engage in 
dialogues with colleagues about their practice. (I used colleagues as direct 
observers o f my work and the data emerging from interviews with the students as 
well as the data emerging from the experiential records.) He moves on to say that 
'a clear understanding of these values can be shown to emerge in practice through 
time and struggle' and adds:
"The kind o f  theory I  have in mind forms part o f  the educational practices o f  the 
individuals concerned. It is not a theory which can be constituted into a 
propositional form. It is a description and explanation o f  practice which is part o f  
the living form  o f  practice itself." (Whitehead 1989: 45,46)
In short, Whitehead is arguing that values - the things an educator thinks are 
important - form an irreducible part of their educational practice. I think that my 
own study clearly endorses this. I also think that Whitehead's view coincides with 
Heron's (1989) observation that a 'person is a signature in action'. In other words, 
each and every practitioner brings a unique style and energy to their practice, a part 
o f which expresses their non-moral and moral values.
I shall now attempt to indicate, specifically, how the ethics education experience 
I constructed was animated by the value possibilities connected to my institutional 
role and my educational values - and which, also, contained evidence o f their 
contradiction. I should also add that, in addition to my relatively abstract value 
commitments concerning civil liberties and human rights, as well as valuing 
'education' (rather than training') I also valued my own psychological well-being 
in the face of group responses that were always initially sceptical and could become 
marked by hostility, overt criticism, negativity and personal insult.
First, 1 have indicated some of the basic values of a public servant, especially as 
they are focused by the role of'tutor' at the Police Staff College, Bramshill. Equity 
and justice have been identified as core values along with 'probity', 'integrity', and,
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’public service'. Thus, from the outset, in the face of discretionary choice - where 
I could have chosen to emphasise the purely 'managerial' aspects of police 
leadership - 1 chose, instead, to construct an ethics education experience which 
attempted to provide my clients with an appreciation of the moral foundations and 
ideals of their profession (or vocation). The design of that educational experience 
was accompanied by an explicit statement of my values and my clients were asked 
to reflect back to me the extent to which my practice met those values. This values 
framework was presented to each of my classes once the earliest stages of the 
action research process had been completed. It made reference (see Appendix M) 
to my hope that the progress of the ethics unit would allow us to enjoy:
- Freedom - including the freedom to dissent
- Democracy
- Fairness:
- Self-determination
I asked participants to 'tell me i f  I  deviatedfrom these value commitments'.
The statement continued with a reference to my educational values, my personal 
values and my professional values. Finally I included the following comments 
about the character of the ethics education unit I was hoping to deliver as follows:
'This is what I  aspire to achieve in experiential terms fo r participants on the 'ethics' 
part o f  the syllabus.
- Understanding and valuing the history o f  ideas in relation to ethics
- Recognising the everyday and commonplace nature o f  ethical reasoning and 
ethical action
- Focusing ethical principles and theories on the analysis o f  policing and police 
leadership issues and practices
- Promoting and realising an active learning process on the part o f  participants 
where, ultimately\ agendas are co-operatively negotiated and learning structures 
are developed to meet participants wants, needs and interests
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- Providing a learning climate within which participants have freedoms to learn 
and enjoy exploring ethics as a domain o f  enquiry
I also made explicit the particular educational aims I had for an ’ethics education’ 
and those clients who were chosen to keep experiential records of the 'ethics unit' 
were asked to judge the extent to which I had achieved those ends.
I think that these statements provide sufficient evidence for my claim that it was a 
set of values developed over time that both energised the project and gave it much 
of its specific form.
In order to defend my claim, however, I shall provide some more specific evidence 
illustrating congruity between the values and the design:
- Freedom-in-action
My introduction to the unit included references to 'a way we might all think about 
how to construe the next two days devoted to 'ethics’ '. I suggested that we could 
'enjoy' a 'space' in which to explore ideas and reflect upon our practices - a space 
where I would 'try to respond to the energies and interests of the group'. I would do 
this by being flexible over the timings of the activities and by attempting to elicit 
from the group their preferences for alternative learning structures. For example, 
I would ask the group - after an initial 'warm-up' activity if they would prefer to 
compare their own professional development with a case study of the professional 
and ethical development of a police leader or whether they would prefer to begin 
by examining video material that could help them to clarify the nature of'ethics'.
- Democracy-in-action
I sought, most obviously, to enact the democratic ideal in the two attempts to create 
a genuinely 'collaborative' approach to the design of the ethics education 
experience. I knew that this was a high risk strategy but, in October 1996,1 began 
the unit by contrasting a 'traditional' with a more 'client centred' approach to 
education and then I invited participants to note down their objectives, preferences 
and suggestions for the subsequent learning design. However, on both occasions, 
despite the fact that I had distributed cards upon which individuals could write 
down their interests and I had divided the class into smaller groups comprising four 
(or five) members - each of which had a flip chart (to collect the individual 
responses) - there was very little energy for the process.
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However, despite my failure, in subsequent learning designs I tried to encourage* 
individuals to make it clear to me what activities they had 'energy for' and, 
similarly, to make it clear to me how I might proceed in ways that were meeting 
their needs. I would also 'stop' whatever it was I was doing if it seemed that certain 
problems were becoming manifest in the group. For example, one officer, 
described Heron's 'ideal client outcomes' as:
'a load o f  bollocks - nothing more than a load o f  bollocks',
I responded by saying how intrigued I was by his response and that I always found 
it easier to make progress if people would express 'how they saw things'. The 
officer in question was then able to enjoy a share in the governance of subsequent 
discourse.
- Fairness-in-action
I tried to ensure fairness at the group level by providing a wide range of learning 
structures and by attending to the detail of discussion and/or problem solving in the 
different sub-groups. I also made it clear that I was available to help when groups 
began working in different locations on their own designs and projects.
Most importantly, however, I tried to make sure that everyone felt that they could 
'enjoy an equal voice' by using non-verbal behaviours to 'bring in' contributions 
from everyone. I would also ask, once certain of the group had spoken or had 
provided analyses whether there were other views - or whether the issues could be 
developed in any ways.
- Self-determination-in-action:
Concretely, my valuing of'self-determination' was expressed in structures such as 
the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire. I would suggest ways in which, within the 
context of small groups, participants might like to proceed. However, I always 
emphasised (gently) that different groups and different preferences for ways of 
working and that they were free to determine the pace and emphasis of their work. 
I would also provide a range of options concerning which aspects of 'ethics' 
different individuals might wish to explore and discuss - and these options were 
supplemented by a range of different 'support' materials.
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Values underprivileged or suppressed in my educational practice
In the planning and preliminary stage of the project, I clarified the values I wanted 
to express in my practice and recognised how they approximated to the outline of 
a critical educational science that had been described by Carr and Kemmis (1986). 
Yet, my actual practice - in the face-to-face educational encounter - failed to give 
full expression to many of my educational values. The values underprivileged or 
suppressed in my practice included; choice; autonomy; collaboration; participation; 
authenticity; courage; integrity; and, mutuality. Such was the extent of my failure 
that it remains a moot point whether the project I have described can be accepted 
as ’action research'. Moreover, tested against the models of educational decision­
making discussed by Heron (1977), (1989) I would probably be adjudged to have, 
unilaterally, made all the major educational decisions. Thus, I operated in the 
‘hierarchical’ and ‘authoritarian’ mode.
How can I explain this? When I recount the story of my research to any listener 
who might have an interest in the work I acknowledge that nothing would seem 
more reasonable, attainable and appropriate (for an educational project) than the 
practising of a form of collaborative action research. Surely, the participants would 
have wanted to co-operate in the setting of learning goals, in identifying the content 
they wished to explore, and, the methods they deemed attractive for investigating 
that content? Instead, when I tried to initiate this mode of working I simply 
succeeded in exciting a response marked by confusion, irritation, anger and 
bewilderment.
To explain this turn of events I have had to come to terms with the fact that I 
compromised (or 'gave up on') some of my educational values. As I turned to 
analyse this phenomenon I began by recreating a basic design dilemma in my 
practice. Thus, I had set out to achieve a worthwhile end (i.e. a positively valued 
ethics education) but I had to decide, from a number of possible approaches, which 
means to employ. So conceptualised I was able to recast my inquiry in terms of 
Weber's 'professional political' model and to explore my conduct in relation to his 
analytic schema.
Weber's 'professionalpolitical' model
The professional political model was first enunciated by Weber in a lecture at the 
University of Munich in 1918. Weber warned his audience - advanced students of 
law and politics - that very grave moral dangers would inevitably face those
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amongst them who pursued a career in politics. This was because, as Weber saw 
it, a profound moral dilemma lay at the core of every politician's professional life. 
The dilemma lay in the fact that every politician must, on some occasion, use 
morally reprehensible means in order to achieve morally good ends. The politician 
is caught in a genuine moral dilemma from which it is impossible to escape without 
committing a moral wrong: if politicians employ reprehensible means to achieve 
worthwhile ends they become morally tarnished for having done so; if, on the other 
hand, they fail to employ morally 'dirty' means they become guilty of failing to 
achieve good and worthwhile ends.
How does Weber characterise the morally reprehensible means? He included: lies 
and threats, actually hurting or threatening to hurt people, committing or causing 
to be committed acts of violence and brutality. All of these acts would sometimes 
be required of politicians. Plainly, politicians do decide that, in order to achieve 
their ends, co-ercive power may be visited upon the person of the citizen. Ker Muir 
(1974) reminds us of the sheer extent of personal possessions which render us 
(more or less) vulnerable to (and victims of) co-ercive power. He writes:
"... we can itemise a vast stock o f  possessions a potential victim has: his (sic) life 
or his physical and emotional integrity, to start with; his reputation; his good  
conscience; his attractiveness; his influence; his job; the tools o f  his trade; his 
store o f  wisdom; his self-confidence; his freedom; his initiatives; his access to 
positions ofpower; and all the valuable possessions o f  the persons and institutions 
with which he identifies - those o f  his family, his friends, his firm, and his country. 
In any such inventory o f  possessions, there is invariably a considerable number o f  
quite fragile items which can be destroyed easily in the first strike." (Ker Muir 
1974:199)
Weber's original audience included students who were committed to ideals such as 
promoting justice, preserving freedom and achieving social peace. Those same 
students were, presumably, looking forward to doing these things in honest and 
decent ways and in finding pride in what they had done. Weber made it clear that 
it was not possible to have it both ways. Worthwhile means could only be achieved 
through the use of co-ercive (hurt-making) means or decent means could be 
sustained at the expense of realising worthwhile ends. Politicians, and as Ker Muir 
(1977) demonstrated, police, could not avoid becoming ‘corrupted5. Weber, though, 
offered four alternatives to those who would let themselves in for 'politics'. First, 
people could give up a political career. Second, they could give up their passionate 
hopes for using their power to achieve their ideals and become obedient 
bureaucrats. Third, they could hold on to their ideals but abandon their respect for
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sensitive and civilised mean for achieving them. They could lie or hurt without 
suffering guilt or sustained doubt. The fourth alternative was to become, as Weber 
put it, a ’mature man' (sic). Ker Muir (1977) refers to this as the 'professional 
political' alternative.
Weber developed an appreciation of this last alternative in the following way: the 
problem of the professional politician was to suffer the morally devastating 
pressures o f exercising co-ercive power without crumbling, without abandoning 
ideals, and without becoming bitter and cynical. Weber thought that this would be 
possible if  two virtues were cultivated.
The first was moral; it lies in the strong conviction that the achievement of certain 
morally worthwhile ends are so important that it allows the professional politician 
to accept having to use morally dangerous, co-ercive or violent means.
The second virtue was intellectual. Weber called it 'perspective'. It meant that 
politicians would see the 'big picture'. Perspective helped the professional politician 
see that their passions were part of a complex world - a world of chance, 
'thrownness', accident, fate and choice - and this caused them to respect the 
'lifeworlds', sensitivities and sufferings of others. Perspective reminded the 
politician that humans are ‘one of a piece’. Rogers (1961) suggests this when he 
remarks that what is most personal is also most general. In other words, personal 
suffering - the sadness of loss, the fear of abandonment, the anger provoked by 
injustice - is the shared experience of everyone. So, perspective served to teach the 
professional politician tragedy and tragedy acted as a restraint upon the tendency 
or impulse to use morally reprehensible means too quickly. Whilst perspective 
would not prevent the politician from using 'dirty' means it prevented them from 
becoming insensitive to the pain and suffering that they would inflict on others.
What has this got to do with the practice of education and with the choices I made 
in my situation of practice? If Ker Muir was able to extend Weber's analysis to the 
practice of policing, then, in principle, it is possible to apply the analysis to the 
practice of educating. Educators, in fact, can employ the power to hurt. They can 
harm a learner's possessions - such as his or her sense of competence, or esteem. 
They too, on this analysis, are liable to becoming corrupted. What though, was my 
situation within the Police Management Programme context at Bramshill?
At the outset of my project, to use Weber's terms, I wanted to present an ethics 
education in 'honest and decent ways'. For me this meant practising a form of 
emancipatory and critical education. To do this I ought to have worked according
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to a collaborative action research model. However, I wanted to achieve the 
worthwhile ends of a positively valued ethics education - as part o f a longer term 
ambition to help enhance the quality of police leadership and management. A first 
glance, according to Weber’s analysis, indicates that in my practice I chose his third 
option. I abandoned worthwhile means in order to secure worthwhile ends. Whilst 
I did not lie or use threat I failed to sustain the courage of my convictions. It is for 
this reason that I include amongst the values suppressed in my project those of 
courage and integrity. Moreover, because I kept silence about my preferred ways 
o f working I did not share an authentic communication with programme 
participants.
Whilst this constitutes a logical analysis of my practice it is based on a particular 
conception of the nature of 'honest and decent' means. It might be possible for me 
to escape this damning judgement if I were to find some evidence that I used 
'honest and decent' means. At best I can find partial exoneration. Thus, amongst the 
duties of an educator I might be able to surface concepts such as 'readiness', 
'familiarity', 'expectations', or even, 'level of development' in relation to the 
characteristics of participants and recognise that it is neither honest nor decent to 
proceed without taking these factors into account. There appear to be some 
empirical grounds for believing that a majority of my client group had not 
experienced, in the course of their police training, an approach which allowed them 
the freedom to find their own understandings and/or the methods for applying 
'official' knowledge. The procedures of and for applying the law, the technical 
methods for achieving specific police purposes and the technical developments in 
the practice of police management dominated the content of their training 
experience.
My analysis is also based on the idea that I was working in an educational context. 
This, though, is rendered problematic because competing definitions can be 
constructed which might better reflect the actual institutional ethos. A first 
alternative definition might consider Bramshill as a place where clients avail 
themselves of a professional service. A second can consider Bramshill as a training 
institution providing ‘training solutions’ to policing problems. In fact, the latter 
term is actually used in the formal and public statement concerning the aims of 
National Police Training within which Bramshill functions as a 'solution provider'. 
(An alternative way of conceptualising Bramshill as an institution responding to 
'moral-panic' rationality will be noted in another chapter.)
Against the first alternative conception - i.e. Bramshill as a place where clients 
avail themselves of a professional service - there is little (if any) debate across the
315
institution as a whole exploring alternative ways of conceptualising the nature of 
the client-professional relationship. Schein (1988), in his revision of an earlier 
discussion of consultation models, discusses the radically different ways of'being' 
a client. In the 'purchase of information or expertise' model he characterises the 
'essence of the message' from the client to the consultant as follows:
"Here is my problem, bring me back an answer and tell me how much it will cost" 
(Schein 1988:23)
However, Schein pushes his analysis further and suggests that:
"Psychologically the message is, "please take the problem o ff my shoulders and 
bring me back a solution" which permits the client to relax and concentrate on 
other matters, secure in the knowledge that an expert is now handling the situation 
- "owning the problem,". I f  the solution turns out to be useless, the consultant can 
easily be blamed." (Schein, 1988: 23)
The client at Bramshill appears to be marked by this type of assumption. Put in 
Schein's terms:
"You, the tutor are expert and it is up to you to dispense your expertise and 
information such that it sorts out my problems."
In Schein's second model, the 'doctor-patient' model the consultant is called in to 
find out what is wrong with the client and then recommends how to make the client 
better. Schein writes:
"The essence o f  this model is that the client delegates to the consultant not only 
locating a remedy, but first, diagnosing the disease. The client becomes very 
dependent on the consultant until the consultant is ready to offer a prescription. As 
in the expert model, the consultant takes the problem onto his (sic) own shoulders 
and permits the client to relax, secure in the knowledge that someone else is 
looking into it. " (Schein 1988: 27)
In both these models the client is ‘looked after’ by the consultant and the 
responsibility for 'owning' the problem and finding solutions to the problem is taken 
away from the client.
In contrast to these two models, Schein describes the characteristics of the process 
consultation model. He writes:
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"The major distinction o f  the process consultation model [with the expert and 
doctor-patient models] lies in how the consultant structures the relationship, not 
in what the client does ... Clients may be asked fo r  information, invite the 
consultant to do a diagnosis, or askfor help in some other way, but the consultant 
is not obligated to respond literally to the client's overt request" (Schein 1988: 
volume I I 29)
My practice did not operate within this mature form of the client-professional 
relationship. My situation of practice, was marked by either (or both) of the first 
two models described by Schein. I note this in defence of my actual practice. It is, 
at best, an imperfect defence.
A return to Whitehead's model
In the final section of this chapter I shall complete my discussion of Whitehead's 
'model' for creating a living educational theory.
The claims made and advanced by the researcher need to be validated. It is this to 
which Whitehead turns when he addresses the fourth area. He asks: 'How do we 
know that what the researcher says is true?'
Whitehead's fourth question is concerned with validity. He notes:
"Researchers need to know what to use as the unit o f  appraisal and the standards 
o f  judgement in order to test a claim to educational knowledge. I  suggest that the 
unit o f  appraisal is the individual's claim to know his or her own educational 
development. Within this unit o f  appraisal I  use methodological, logical, ethical 
and aesthetic standards to judge the claim to knowledge." (Whitehead, 1989: 46)
Whitehead grounds his epistemology within the framework of 'Personal 
Knowledge' established by Polanyi (1958) and he continues with an indication of 
the questions he includes in making judgements about the validity of an individual's 
claim to educational knowledge. Those questions are:
- Was the inquiry carried out in a systematic way? (He adds: 'One methodological 
criterion I have used is the action reflection cycle....)
- Are the values used to distinguish the claim to knowledge as educational 
knowledge clearly shown and justified?
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- Does the claim contain evidence of a critical accommodation of propositional 
contributions from the traditional disciplines of education?
- Are the assertions made in the claim clearly justified?
- Is there evidence of an enquiring and critical approach to an educational problem?
I shall, in my final chapter, provide an outline of the main facts emerging from this 
inquiry. Here, though I simply want to make a series of claims about my 
educational development which, in turn, stemmed from a question about improving 
the practice of education in this situation - here - at the Police Staff College - 
concerning the content of the police leadership development curriculum. 
Specifically, the subject 'ethics' consisted of an optional two-hour 'elective' session 
on the Junior Command Course attracting a relatively small proportion of the 
students on that course. Most simply, this constituted a failure to meet one o f the 
basic purposes for which the institution was established; for me, it constituted a 
fundamental dereliction of duty. As I have noted above, I have chosen to construe 
this as a situation in which my values were negated in my situation of practice. This 
negation catalysed the inquiry process that, as a result, enables me to make the 
following claims about my educational development:
At a personal level:
- I have clarified and developed my moral and non-moral values 
- 1 have clarified and developed my educational values
At an intellectual level 
- 1 have extended my knowledge of ethics 
- 1 have extended my knowledge of police ethics 
As an 'educationalist' (or 'educational practitioner')
- 1 have learned more about the nature of education
As a practitioner in a particular educational context
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- 1 have learned more about teaching ethics
- 1 have learned about teaching ethics to police
- 1 have learned about the ethical dilemmas in policing
- 1 have learned about police themselves
My educational development also includes five other learnings:
First, I have learned about myself in relation to my own psychological security and 
well-being: I have learned about how I ’survive' in a particular institutional setting. 
This learning has also revealed what could be described as my ’dark’ or shadow 
side.
Second, I have learned about the nature of a ’practice’
Third, I have learned about some aspects of educational research
Fourth, I learned about the nature of an institution’s culture and the impact of that 
culture on educational processes.
Fifth, I should add that the action reflection cycle and the enactment of action 
research leads, continually, to realisations about my own ignorance - and this 
perhaps constitutes my final claim to educational knowledge i.e. how tentative, 
necessarily, my claims to knowledge really are.
Whitehead's fifth area of focus is concerned with 'generalisability'. His question 
takes the form, 'How can we move from the individual to the universal? - a 
question of generalisability.'
He proposes that educational theory be viewed as a dynamic and living form 
'whose content changes with the developing public conversations of those involved 
in its creation'. A living educational theory 'is constituted by the practitioners' 
public descriptions and explanations of their practice'. However, the theory is not 
confined to these accounts but in the relationship between the accounts and the 
practice.' Moreover, it is the relationship which constitutes the descriptions and 
explanations as a living form of theory.
The actual practice of making public one's descriptions and explanations together
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with the analysis of the relationship between the account(s) and practice can 
illuminate and illustrate this process:
I made public (initially in conversations and discussion and then in more formally 
convened meetings) my descriptions and explanations of the 'fate' o f different 
learning structures I provided within the 'ethics unit'. Amongst these was my 
experience with exercise ’Ultima ethica’ - an exercise which attempted to help 
participants examine and clarify the moral foundations of policing. This exercise 
was 'unsuccessful' in the sense that it never attracted significant positive comment 
and, on occasions, led to patterns of response that appalled certain of the same 
client group. In consequence I stopped using the exercise. This is a brief description 
of the facts. How am I to explain this? I stopped using the exercise because of the 
tendency for negativity (once it was elicited) to generalise across the whole range 
o f learning events. In other words, a 'failure' in one area of the ethics unit could 
'provoke' a rejection of the whole unit. What was the reason for the negative 
response in the first place? I explained it in terms of the perceived 'irrelevance' of 
such an activity to the 'real world' of everyday policing.
The relationship between the account and my practice is complex and significant. 
My experience with exercise 'Ultima ethica’ was salutary cautioning me to avoid 
or minimise including references to the historical development of ethics and the 
inclusion of material which would be perceived as too far removed from the 
immediate world of policing. It also left me feeling disappointed and slightly 
resentful. However, in making explicit these feelings I am immediately conscious 
that it seems somewhat unusual to do so. And this suggests to me that a whole 
aspect of practice is suppressed and 'left out' o f the descriptions and explanations 
of the practice.
My description and explanation served to confirm a view held by my colleagues 
in the faculty - i.e. that our educational ambitions and methods would remain 
particularly modest. In this way, an individual account extends into a wider 
community where it confirms, disconfirms or stimulates other practitioners to 
embark upon their own conjecture-refutation process.
Finally, Whitehead turns to the 'politics of truth'. He asks: 'Which power relations 
influence the academic legitimacy of a living educational theory? - a question of 
the politics of truth.
Here, Whitehead confronts the nature of those power relations which 'legitimate' 
claims to knowledge and truth within the academy. He is concerned to discover
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how ’to support those power relations which support the autonomy of practical 
rationality within education’ - or, put differently, with the search for the expression 
by practitioners of moral and non-moral values in their educational practice. He 
finds that the 'academy' can include practices - such as the appointment of 
examiners, the formal requirements concerning the style (and content) of research 
publications and, the fact that the power relations in the academic community 
support the power of truth against the truth of power. Implicitly Whitehead calls for 
a reform - and a significant part of the reform process would be concerned with re- 
conceptualising the nature of educational theory. He writes:
"What I  am advocating is that the propositional form o f  discourse in the disciplines 
o f  education should he incorporated within a living form o f  theory. This theory 
should not be seen in purely propositional terms. It should be seen to exist in the 
lives o f  practitioners as they reflect on the implications o f  asking themselves 
questions o f  the kind, 'How do I  improve my practice?" (Whitehead, 1989: 50)
Significantly, he concludes by emphasising the ’voice’ of the practitioner - and 
thereby underlines his commitment to the value of the sharing of personal 
knowledge -  by quoting Gilles Deleuze in conversation with Michel Foucault:
"You were the first to teach us something absolutely fundamental; the indignity o f  
speaking fo r  others. We ridiculed representation and said it was finished, but we 
fa iled  to draw the consequences o f  this theoretical conversion - to appreciate the 
theoretical fac t that only those directly concerned can speak in a practical way on 
their own behalf. "(Foucault, 1980: 114))
This last point - especially the last sentence quoted above - is fundamental to the 
study reported here precisely because I have been directly concerned with a 
particular educational enterprise about which I am attempting to speak in a 
practical way. At this stage I should simply emphasise that as I came to develop a 
’personal and local’ educational theory I realised how difficult it is to make contact 
with and speak one’s own voice. The study reported here has been strongly 
influenced by emotion, by a recognition of its uniqueness and by a sense of 
’difference’. However, it does appear that none of these are unequivocally valued 
in the traditions of the academy - and that has led me to consider suppressing some 
of the actual realities of the study. This, I think, adequately underlines Whitehead's 
concern about the truth of power and its relation to admissions of truth.
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Concluding remarks:
Throughout Whitehead's approach to theory building is his emphasis on the 
knowledge emerging from the process of 'question and answer', the centrality of 
experiencing oneself as a living contradiction and the significance of dialogue in 
the genesis of educational knowledge. The process of question and answer is 
illustrated below and this will form a conclusion to this chapter.
His fundamental question is: 'How do I improve my practice?' or its more specific 
variants. How, then, do I improve my practice as a practitioner in the field o f ethics 
education for police leaders and managers? Here are my answers:
I improve my practice by examining the quality of my practice in relation to the 
constituent elements of the educational situation. Thus:
I improve my practice by developing the content of ethics education; I improve my 
practice by developing the methods of ethics education; I improve my practice by 
understanding (learning more and more about) the characteristics (including the 
wants, needs and interests) of my 'clients'.
I improve my practice by 'working' on myself - both as a 'performer' and through 
a process of self- study (designed to help me reflect on my practice). I improve my 
practice as a performer by remaining open to learning about how to offer ethics 
education. So, for example, it was not until the Spring of 1999 that I first witnessed 
a senior police officer offering an account of ethical policing grounded in her own 
practice which perfectly illustrated how to enhance moral sensitisation, the 
increasing o f moral resolve and the enhancing of ethical skills - thus coinciding 
with Kleinig's (1990) suggestions as to what ethics education might achieve.
I improve my practice by 'conducting the political struggle' in the institutional 
context; and; I improve my practice by examining the nature of'education' itself.
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the role my values played in the 
constructing and pursuing the inquiry. These values form a basic element in the 
‘living educational theory’ - here conceived as a ‘personal and local educational 
theory’ - that has begun to be constructed in this chapter. The next chapter will 
explore the details and drama of the actual 'educational' encounter.
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Chapter twelve
Ethics education as a complex cultural drama
"Titus, the seventy seventh. Heir to a crumbling summit: to a sea o f  nettles: to an 
empire o f  red rust: to rituals' footprints ankle deep in stone. Gormenghast. 
Withdrawn and ruinous it broods an umbra: the immemorial masonry: the towers, 
the tracts. Is it all corroding? No. Through an avenue o f  spires a zephyr floats; a 
bird whistles: a freshet bears away from  a choked river. Deep in a fis t o f  stone a 
doll's hand wriggles, warm rebellious on the frozen palm. A shadow shifts its 
length. A spider stirs.... And darkness winds between the characters.” (Peake, 
1970: 7)
In this chapter I shall draw from the recent developments in discourse psychology 
and provide an interpretation of my situation of practice (and the specific 'ethics 
education' encounter) in relation to a complex and dynamic process involving 
powerful cultural meanings. I shall suggest that Bramshill creates problems of 
identity for both course participants and tutorial staff alike and that ethics education 
can be 'read' as the staging of a complex cultural drama. The nature of that drama 
is made unusual because of its theme 'ethics'. To help with exploring ethics 
education as a complex cultural drama I shall pay close attention to the detailed 
description and analysis of a 'possession oracle' - which, despite the apparent 
cultural distance with my work as an ethics educator in the Police Staff College, 
Bramshill - provides illuminating points of comparison and contrast with the 
inquiry reported here. This analysis throws the dramatic setting of Bramshill into 
relief. In consequence, it becomes possible to understand better the responses of 
police managers to the 'Bramshill experience'.
Introduction:
The account which I shall present here was initially provoked through reading 
Benjamin's (1999) discussion of the 'storyteller'. Benjamin thinks that the first 
storyteller of the Greeks was Herodotus. Benjamin goes on to give an example of 
Herodotus' writing taken from the fourteenth chapter of the third book of the 
‘Histories’ which deals with the story of the Persian king Psammenitus. It is this:
"When the Persian king Psammenitus had been beaten and captured by the Persian 
king Cambyses, Cambyses was bent on humbling his prisoner. He gave orders to 
place Psammenitus on the road along which the Persian triumphal procession was
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to pass. And he further arranged that the prisoner should see his daughter pass by 
as a maid going to the well with her pitcher. While all the Egyptians were 
lamenting and bewailing this spectacle, Psammenitus stood alone, mute and 
motionless, his eyes fixed  on the ground; and when presently he saw his son, who 
was being taken along in the procession to be executed, he likewise remained 
unmoved. But when, afterwards he recognised one o f  his servants, an old, 
impoverished man, in the ranks o f  the prisoners, he beat his fists against his head 
and gave all the signs o f  deepest mourning. " (Benjamin 1999: 89)
Benjamin takes this as an example of the nature of'true' storytelling. He suggests 
that a story 'does not expend itself. Instead, 'it preserves and concentrates its 
strength' and is capable of releasing it even after a long time. This, he thinks is true 
o f Psammenitus' story. He exemplifies this as follows:
"Thus Montaigne referred to this Egyptian king and asked himself why he mourned 
only when he caught sight o f  his servant. Montaigne answers: 1Since he was 
already overfull o f  grief, it took only the smallest increase fo r  it to burst through 
its dams'. Thus Montaigne. But one could also say: 'The king is not moved by the 
fa te o f  those o f  royal bloodfor it is his own fate. Or: We are moved by much on the 
stage that does not move us in real life; to the king, this servant is only an actor. 
Or: Great grief is pent up and breaks forth only with relaxation. Seeing this servant 
was the relaxation. Herodotus offers us no explanations. His report is the driest. 
That is why this story from  ancient Egypt is still capable after thousands o f  years 
o f  arousing astonishment and thoughtfulness. It resembles the seeds o f  grain which 
have lain fo r  centuries in the chambers o f  the pyramids shut up air-tight and have 
retained their germinativepower to this day." (Benjamin 1999: 90)
In this discussion of'true storytelling', Benjamin posts a reminder concerning the 
way an account may arouse 'thoughtfulness' and a number of subsequent 
explanatory stories. Whilst the account I have provided in the preceding pages does 
not aspire to the quality of storytelling Benjamin identifies, it has aroused the 
'thoughtfulness' (on my part) to which Benjamin refers. It would be possible to 
generate a host of explanatory readings. Yet, out of a range of 'explanatory 
readings' which one(s) might I select?
This question resolved itself for me in the course of examining the rethinking of 
psychology that has been suggested by Harre and Gillett (1995), Harre and Stearns 
(1995), Smith, Harre and Van Langenhove (1995) and Harre (1998). Harre and 
Gillett (1995) outline the basis of this new psychology through their discussion of
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the recent 'second cognitive' revolution that has happened within the subject. The 
principle of the new movement is that the main characteristics of human life - from 
emotion to will - are best understood as products of discourse. The specific 
approach to discourse analysis I shall present here lies itself within the earlier 
tradition of the dramaturgical perspective given renewed analytical rigour in the 
works of Goffman (1959) and in Harre and Secord's (1972) approach to explaining 
social behaviour.
This form of analysis has been lucidly presented in Harre and Steams (1995) in 
their selection of cases that illustrate discursive psychology in practice. Amongst 
these cases Much and Mahapatra (1995) provide an analysis of a Kalasi or 
'possession oracle' entitled: 'Constructing divinity'.
Kalasis are possession oracles who take their name from the Goddess Kali. The 
goddess selects a few of her human devotees for possession - who thus become 
'possession oracles'. As I reflected upon the detail of Much and Mahapatra's 
descriptions and discussion of the 'possession oracle', I was stmck by the parallels 
and similarities with my own context of practice. I began to turn the eye of 
discourse analysis onto my practice of'ethics education'.
In the discussion that follows, I shall first provide a precis of Much and 
Mahapatra's account. I shall then take the form of their analysis and apply it the 
presentation of ethics education to police middle-managers in the institutional 
context o f Bramshill.
A study o f  transformation: Much and Mahapatrafs exploration o f a possession 
oracle
To establish their credentials as discourse analysts Much and Mahapatra, at the 
very outset of their discussion refer to the 'prospectus' for a trans-cultural 
psychology outlined by Much (1995) - which takes as its focus the investigations 
o f a) indigenous theories and b) the interconnectedness of three co-creative 
semiotic systems, namely : persons, social structures and cultural symbol systems. 
This framework for investigation is developed with and by the case study of the 
Kalasi.
Much and Mahapatra suggest that it is possible to consider the role of possession 
oracle from the point of view of personal meanings and values, social statuses or 
positions and of local cultural symbolic contexts. I shall illustrate how, similarly,
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I can consider the interaction between myself as a tutor and police officers as I 
presented an ethics education in terms of personal meanings and values, social 
statuses and positions, and, local cultural symbolic contexts.
Much and Mahapatra begin their study of the Kalasi with a contextual reference. 
They write:
"Orissa, a state on the eastern coast o f  India, just south o f  West Bengal and Bihar, 
remains in many ways an 'enchanted' world, where a remarkable feature o f  the 
ordinary life is the extent to which all aspects o f  the daily environment, domestic, 
occupational and commercial are saturated with the symbols o f  the sacred world, 
reminding participants, at every encounter, o f  the here-and-now presence o f  a 
sacred order permeating even as it transcends the objects and events o f  the 
material and social world. Here also various arts o f  ritual are outstanding in 
countless cultural performances designed to draw onlookers into the realm o f  
discourse with the gods." (Much and Mahapatra 1995 : 55)
Whilst the location of my practice was not directly constructed as a place of 
worship it is possible and plausible to apply a similar template of analysis and to 
ask what symbols 'saturated' all aspects of the 'daily environment' o f Bramshill. I 
shall return shortly to provide a detailed response to this question. (My response 
will, in addition to my own 'reading', reflect a recent 'culture audit' conducted by 
'high flier' students on the Accelerated Promotion Course.)
Much and Mahapatra note the popularity of one ritual art in Orissa - the darshan. 
They describe this as a vision or viewing of persons or objects who are in one way 
or another 'special conduits of divinity'. They describe how both animate and 
inanimate objects may be such conduits of divinity or 'containers' into which the 
God or goddess can be persuaded to dwell. However, they draw a distinction 
between performances involving ritual discourse with object conduits (such as a 
natural stone) and those involving discourse with personal conduits of divinity. 
Thus, they say that there is:
"... apparently intense satisfaction o f  not only viewing the divinity and having 
oneself heard by the divinity, but having the divinity respond immediately and 
directly to oneself in words and gestures that can be apprehended as human 
discourse. "(Much and Mahapatra 1995: 56)
They move on to examine one particular conduit of divinity who, they think, is an
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excellent example of the Kalasi tradition. They provide considerable background 
detail concerning the Kalasi - a married woman to whom they give the pseudonym, 
Basanti Devi - before moving on to describe the events involved in her 
transformation from a ’devout housewife and village woman' to the living Goddess. 
So, for example, they include the fact that Basanti Devi recalls that her earliest 
inclinations were consistent with the demands of divine possession and that a cobra, 
the mascot o f the God Siva, stayed near her in childhood.
Much and Mahapatra introduce their readers to the transformation process as 
follows:
"The public possession trance o f  a Kalasi occurs in the following way: At specific 
times and places, and after ritual preparations, the Goddess enters and merges with 
[lagaiba] the Kalasi. A t this time the ordinary person in the body disappears into 
the background and the Goddess acts and speaks through the Kalasi's body. " 
(Much and Mahapatra 1995: 57)
Kalasi possession oracles - like other possession oracles in Orissa - are held to have 
special powers when possessed by the Goddess:
"Their actions and speech are understood as the actions and speech o f  the Goddess 
and their special powers are understood as attributes o f  the Goddess and not the 
person in her ordinary state. During the time o f  possession devotees gather around 
the Mother hoping fo r  advice and cures fo r  their psychological and physical 
problems, court cases, school problems, family problems and illnesses. '(Much and 
Mahapatra 1995: 58)
These observations help to shape the points of comparison and contrast with the 
situation at Bramshill. To some extent, for example, people on courses at Bramshill 
hope for advice and even for 'cures' to their professional problems. Similarly, to 
some extent, tutors at Bramshill can be understood as experts with special powers 
and knowledge. However, I shall try to illustrate how the cultural background of 
police and the symbolism of Bramshill create conditions that lead to distinct ways 
of apprehending the tutorial staff. The responses of police to the staff create distinct 
patterns of adaptation as uncertain and insecure identities collide. The observations 
noted by Much and Mahapatra also helped to shape the following questions: In 
what ways did I prepare myself for the performance of'ethics education? What was 
I a conduit for? To what extent does a 'teaching' performance at Bramshill require 
a departure from the 'ordinary state' (or the ordinary state of consciousness) of the
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person? I shall return to discuss these at a later stage in this chapter.
Much and Mahapatra describe the series of ritual discursive actions through which 
Basanti Devi transformed herself from village woman to the living Goddess. 
During this account they include Basanti Devi's observation that three kinds of 
people visited the goddess - true devotees, people who were curious, and, some 
who were more interested in others amongst the audience. What purposes did my 
'audience' of police officers bring to the 'ethics education'? This reveals a part of the 
difference between the two situations. The staff folklore at Bramshill reports that 
a third of the audience 'want to learn something', a third 'will go one way or the 
other', and, a third 'should not be at the College' (either because they did not want 
to come or because they are not disposed to value anything 'on offer'.)
Much and Mahapatra include considerable details concerning the symbolic 
communication that takes place during the ritual transformation - water is sprinkled 
to purify the area around a fire pit, oblations are offered to satisfy the fire, 
pushpanjali (petals and leaves) are offered to the Goddess - and they describe the 
nature of the physical transformation that accompanies the manifestation of the 
Goddess:
"While the Mother is trembling her very long black hair falls out o f  its knot and  
hangs loose down her back. Her countenance has changed dramatically ... Her 
face, now, has taken on an angry appearance with the lower eyelids raised at the 
inner corner and darkened. The forehead is not creased but is sternly set and stony 
giving a different set to her eyes. The mouth is also sternly set, giving her a fierce  
look." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 60)
They continue:
"Her demeanour continues to change. She no longer has the held-in rounded 
posture with down-curving shoulders typical o f traditional village women. The 'veil' 
o f her sari is now o ff her head and her walk has become upright and strong- 
shouldered, a confident, arrogant, even swaggering posture. ” (Much and 
Mahapatra 1995: 60)
So transformed Basanti Devi/Goddess - the 'Mother' - prepares to address the 
worshippers, supplicants and inquirers who have gathered around the Thakara 
ghara - the shrine. A woman sings bhajans - songs of praise of the Goddess. A male 
devotee sings bhajan in her praise from the background. At this point the Mother
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begins her hukum or commands. Their text contains several examples of the 
features o f hukum discourse.
At the conclusion of their description Much and Mahapatra (1995) refer to Much's 
(1995) contention that discourse analysis should routinely include context analysis. 
By this Much means the 'idea that much important symbolic communication occurs 
in the environmental and action contexts surrounding speech.' Their description and 
observation, prompted me to ask: What important symbolic communication occurs 
in the environmental and action context surrounding the words and symbolic acts 
constituting programmes of study and the specific educational and training events 
at Bramshill?' I shall provide the answer to this question after I have noted how 
Much and Mahapatra make sense of the rituals of transformation.
They describe how they make sense of the ritual as follows:
"The purpose o f  ritual arts seems to be to produce in the practitioner, as well as 
those privileged to share the performance, an intense imaginative experience o f  
communicating with (e.g. speaking with, seeing, feeling, identifying with, merging 
with) divinity, and the presence here and now o f  a sacred world, awesome, 
fearsome and beautiful." (Much and Mahapatra 1995 : 63)
In the earliest stages of the project - as my colleagues and I sought to 'bring ethics 
to life' - my preparations were too, marked by rituals, by an intense focus of 
consciousness on the performances I would be giving, and, by inner dialogues 
which attempted to reproduce Socrates' conversations in the Crito, the Meno, the 
Phaedo and the Protagoras. I shall describe my own identity transformation process 
in the latter part of this chapter. Before that I shall address a basic question 
concerning the 'divine context' of my practice. In the wider institutional context, 
how was my social role constituted? What was its raison d'etre? What was I to be 
a conduit for?
A conduit fo r  what?
Richards (1999) understands the core institutional purpose of Bramshill to be 
concerned with realising Home Office policy. In his reflection upon the way of life 
Bramshill continues to reproduce he finds an institution consistently concerned 
with implementing the resolutions of government. Richards finds that the 
symbolism at Bramshill is best understood in terms of the maintenance of the 
'establishment'. He elaborates on this by drawing an analogy between the situation
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at Bramshill and the governmental problems obtaining in the Roman empire. Put 
most simply, he asks: ’How was Rome to make sure that its provinces were 
'Romanised'? For Richards, 'the centre has to find a way of fettling the unfettled'. 
Bramshill continues, primarily, to carry out a 'fettling' function. Richards also 
develops a class-based analysis in order to make sense of the sequences of 
adaptation at Bramshill. He puts his interpretation as follows:
"The Home and Colonials o f  the established middle-class had to fin d  a way o f  
establishing a major organ o f  social control (the police) - and therefore o f  subjects 
f i t  fo r  the localised rule o f  the outlying districts. It had to turn the working class 
NCOs o f  the police into officers. It relied on the sta ff o f  the college to do this. With 
the rise o f  the meritocratic society, the Home Office has had to manage the rise o f  
the working class - and therefore, o f  the police. So Bramshill makes a series o f  
adjustments as the Home Office develops its strategies o f  control. '(Richards 1999 
personal communication)
The topics for study on the curriculum at Bramshill illustrate how the institution 
responds to the concerns of central government, the emphases of individual Home 
Secretaries and the directives of senior and influential civil servants. For this 
reason, Home Office circulars are often referred to in the scholarly literature on 
police as the major catalysts determining the storylines and semantic content - the 
discourses - of police leaders. Home Office circular 114 of 1983 - with its 
emphases on 'efficiency and effectiveness' in the provision of police services is 
probably the paradigm case.
Thus, it becomes possible to provide a first answer to the question: 'What are the 
tutorial staff at Bramshill conduits for?' They are conduits for Home Office desires. 
How does the iconography - the symbols that saturate Bramshill - create a context 
for the pursuit of Home Office desire? The photographs I have included at the 
conclusion of this dissertation begin to speak to the reader and illustrate some of 
the inanimate objects that carry potent sacred and secular meanings. Villiers 
(1998), in his history of the Police Staff College, begins to elaborate a picture of 
the core meanings attaching to Bramshill. He notes how the opening of the Police 
College was featured on the radio newsreel of the Light programme on 15 October 
1948. The newsreel started by describing the current agenda of the U.N. Security 
Council but moved on to report on 'matters closer to home':
"On the domestic front, the main item was the official opening o f the Police College 
by the Home Secretary, the Rt. Hon. Chuter Ede, M.P., who referred to the event
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as a landmark in police history." (Villiers 1998: 21)
Villiers' history includes photographs of the official opening of the college where 
Sir Frank Newsam (the 'creator* of the college), the Rt. Hon. Chuter E de, M.P., and 
Brigadier Dunn (the first commandant) are pictured inspecting the uniformed 
police officers. He also includes a more recent colour photograph showing a view 
from the walled rose garden to the mansion entitled, 'Bramshill - through the 
gateway'. The institution is presented as aristocratic and noble. Villiers consolidates 
this picture by including, the following text under the heading, 'Distinguished 
visitors' to the college. With reference to the 'several royal visits' to Bramshill he 
writes:
"King George VI and Queen Elizabeth visited the college on 5 April 1951 .... They 
were so interested by a demonstration o f  police dogs at work that they were unable 
to spare the tim e .. to see the specially prepared museum display... '(Villiers 1998: 
22)
Villiers suggest that Bramshill exists as 'a symbol of the past within the present' and 
he suggests its other worldliness when he remarks that the visitor to Bramshill will, 
on arriving at the security controlled front gate:
"Look up the mile long oak-lined ... avenue to the massive house on the ridge in 
wonder and amazement" (Villiers 1998: 39)
In his description of the enormous number of gifts that have been donated to the 
college he intimates that Bramshill as an institution is suffused with meanings that 
transcend its college status - and he recognises that the donations themselves make 
it possible to consider Bramshill as an anthropological institute. The symbols at 
Bramshill that are most 'obvious' include those of royalty and patriotism, state 
officials, including police themselves and the police link with the military through 
uniform, badges of rank and weaponry. The mansion itself provides rooms for the 
'teaching' on some of the courses. Those rooms are called, 'The Great Drawing 
Room', 'The Chapel Drawing Room', 'The Morning Room', 'The Zouche Room' 
(after Lord Zouche - who bought Bramshill in 1604). Placed in various parts of the 
mansion itself are various items of literature presenting the work of National Police 
Training (NPT). This literature attempts to show how the relatively new training 
organisation is taking good care of police training. McDonald (1999) points to the 
extensive and complex iconography as well as the meaning(s) of the College in the 
following way:
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"The title 'Police Staff College' conjures up many images. For those living in North 
East Hampshire it may be a place o f  history and mystery - a large Jacobean 
mansion set on a hill and yet largely hidden from  view. For those who work there 
it may be a picture o f  contrasts - the still beauty o f  the grounds and the hi tech 
bustling activity needed to meet the needs o f  more than twelve thousand course 
participants every year." (McDonald, in Villiers 1998: 4)
Such 'hi tech' emblems include the publicity materials. In both 'form and content' 
the literature of the establishment attempts to sustain the image of the 'bustling 
activity needed to meet the needs' of those people who attend courses and 
programmes of study at Bramshill each year. The examples noted below illustrate 
how NPT and Bramshill have copied marketing techniques adopted by 
organisations across the private and public sectors. Thus NPT and Bramshill 
sloganises itself in the following ways:
'NPT is the leading provider o f  police training and development' (NPT annual 
report 1998/99
'NPT is setting the pace in police training worldwide'^NPT annual report 1998/99)
N PT invests in people - its a great place to work’ (NPT annual report 1998/99) 
The author(s) of these claims to actual states of affairs remain anonymous. They 
appear to approximate the types of communication used by any large contemporary 
corporation to market its goods and services.
The text of the NPT annual report provides an introduction to the nature of the 
organisation itself and then begins to speak of the work of the different 'business 
areas'. The vertical career path of courses (within which this study took place) has 
become organised within the 'professional development business area'.
Woodcock (1992) used the term, 'the reinvention of police' in his attempt to 
provoke change in police organisations related to the ACPO statement of Common 
Purpose and Values. An actual attempt at re-inventing the institution of Bramshill 
has steadily taken place as it has been placed within the wider NPT organisation.
Creating identities at Bramshill
As the visitor approaches the mansion something else occurs. In recent times the
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reception area has been moved out of the mansion house itself. The original 
entrance hall in the mansion is replete with symbols of the past, o f royalty, of an 
aristocratic heritage, and of an ecclesiastical patrimony. But visitors and course 
participants now travel past the mansion and are welcomed in a different area. The 
institution begins to develop its discourse and construct the identity of the police 
who attend programmes of study at Bramshill. In this next section, I shall develop 
a picture of this identity. I shall also include notes concerning identity problems 
experienced by both the civilian and police tutorial staff.
In the course of curriculum development meetings, the following observations were 
made to me, by the tutorial staff (allocated to the Police Management Programme), 
about the participants attending that programme during the last year of the study 
reported here:
"These people are really constables with two pips or three pips [badges o f  rankfor 
Inspectors and Chief Inspectors respectively] on their shoulders \  T. A. a civilian 
tutor - with extensive contacts amongst rank-and-file police officers - on the Police 
Management Programme)
"The way you have to manage the people who come on the programme is by going 
along with - becoming a part o f  the police culture" (D. R. A police tutor on the 
Police Management Programme)
"They are different from  Superintendents. They are more literal - what I  mean by 
that is that you cannot have an abstract discussion with them. You cannot work fo r  
any length o f  time with concepts. You cannot speculate." (H. J. a civilian tutor on 
the Police Management Programme)
"You have to fin d  a way to get through whatever you have to do as a tutor as 
quickly as possible and get them talking about police. They'll go on happily fo r  
hours. They love talking about themselves, telling stories, swapping anecdotes - 
most o f  it has little i f  anything to do with the content or purpose o f  the course. '(W. 
D. a civilian tutor on the Police Management Programme)
"It beats me what you have to do to drag these people out o f their narrow, bigoted, 
unsophisticated views. They resist everything - find  faults with everything. God 
knows how we are to achieve punter satisfaction\A. R. a police tutor on the Police 
Management Programme)
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"I've been damaged working on this programme - 1 don't quite know how - but I  
have to spend ages recovering from the experience. Its made me fa r  more 
aggressive and it means I'm not at all frightened when working with other 
occupational groups outside this place." (G. J. a civilian tutor on the Police 
Management Programme)
These remarks demonstrate that not only do the staff develop views about the 
nature o f programme participants as a whole but also that they meet a patterned 
response from those participants. How might I account for the patterning of 
response?
Holdaway (1983) based on covert participant observation study explores the folk 
narratives of police that function to keep the tradition of the culture alive. He 
remarks on a noticeable feature of police - and something both recognised and 
exploited by the tutorial staff at Bramshill. Stated most generally, police talk is 
replete with stories about police, policing and police work. However, Holdaway 
points out that those individuals who 'spin a good yam' are also 'popular policemen' 
(sic). He also alludes to the mild contempt in which a category of researchers are 
held in the following observation:
"... they [popularpolice officers] can hold their own in the canteen, billiard room 
or station office at three in the morning with a 'goodly one' about a chase and a 
fight, the finale is generally a description in fine detail, o f  the last sociologist who 
tried to research them." (Holdaway 1983: 138)
A corroboration of the latter point about the response of police to researchers 
working in a sociological tradition emerged in the course of my inquiry when a 
police member of staff described to me how, within his own force, participants 
taking part in a socio-anthropological study vied with each other in inventing the 
most far-fetched story involving police as they, systematically, set about sabotaging 
the integrity of the research. He added that, subsequently when the work was 
published an enormous amount of glee, mirth and pleasure was expressed by the 
participants as they indicated to each other which particular fiction they had 
created.
Holdaway moves on to analyse the jokes and stories told about policing in terms 
o f discourse that serves both to preserve the traditions of the occupational culture 
and to sustain its definitions of reality 'against the odds of experience'. 
Contemporary discourse psychologists would quarrel with Holdaway because he
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wants to pit the ’real' nature of police work against the constructed experience of 
police as if the latter were an inferior and inaccurate version. This would be similar 
to denying the reality of the possession oracle by asserting that Basanti Devi merely 
mistakenly believes that she is a conduit of divinity. However, this should not 
detract from the actual account Holdaway then provides concerning the way the 
discourse of police-on-the-ground functions to sustain a special 'in-the-know' status. 
He writes:
"Ifyou listen carefully to PC 123 (sic) holding forth during a game o f  cards you  
will hear how his (sic) values and strategies o f  policing are pitted against 
alternative and more authoritative definitions o f  policing which can constrain his 
and his colleagues. When policemen tell jokes and stories to each other they are 
sustaining their definition o f  policing as the practical, common sense way o f  
working. That definition is compared with and triumphs over the potentially cogent 
definitions fram ed by senior officers, the law, courts and the range o f  people with 
an interest in police work." (Holdaway 1983: 139)
The tutorial staff at Bramshill find themselves engaging with persons who have 
been immersed in the folk narratives of police discourse. To the extent that 
Bramshill reflects ’alternative1 or, even, 'authoritative' definitions of policing then 
the tutorial staff may be defined as 'impractical' and lacking 'common sense'.
However something else has occurred when police officers come to Bramshill. 
Whilst a remarkable feature of police discourse is the extent to which they 
confidently speak of'we' - as in "We'll find a way around this one' or 'We're a 'can- 
do' culture' - they also discourse at length in terms of the way they do things in their 
own forces. Police officers are creatures of locality. They police a territory and they 
speak of the things that happen on their 'patch'. When they come to Bramshill they 
are, quite literally, dislocated. The important sense of control that police have of 
their territory is subverted. Understanding Bramshill as a form of 'holiday' 
experience constitutes a successful device for coping with the temporary loss of 
control. It also subtly links to the idea of a 'holy day' - and thereby continues to 
support the sense that a sacred aura attaches itself to the institution - its buildings 
and its landscaping.
Individual police managers in the rank of Inspector or Chief Inspector enjoy a sense 
of status on their own 'patch'. However, now dislocated, they discover that they 
have to by-pass the mansion and are everywhere reminded of their lowly status in 
the discourses of Bramshill. Whilst the Home Secretary will address the Strategic
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Command Course, Commanders from the Metropolitan police will give 
presentations to the Operational Commanders Programme for Superintendents, and, 
the ’high fliers' of the Accelerated Promotion Course are treated to an assortment 
of Chief Constables, Senior Academics and ’significant' persons, the middle- 
managers do not enjoy this kind of treatment. Thus, within the confines of 
Bramshill, the Inspector or Chief Inspector is, according to one police member of 
staff, 'suddenly rendered a nobody'.
The difficulties of adjustment for police middle-managers are compounded when 
one compares 'police time' with 'Bramshill time'. Holdaway finds that the lower 
ranks, exploit the freedom they have within the formal organisation to 'mould the 
nature of policing so that it conforms with their image of it". He summarises that 
image as follows:
"Policing is defined as work which is fu ll o f  action andfun. '(Holdaway 1983: 62) 
He notes that:
"Story-telling, joking and banter are typical and important aspects o f  life at a 
police station. At H. it is noticeable that stories are told at quiet times and are often 
associated with car chases or other incidents involving an element o f  action and 
excitement. Drama, elaboration and embellishment are used to transform narrative 
description o f  mundane events into a series o f  vignettes o f  significant moments 
which might confront the police officer at any time. Quiet and boring aspects o f  
policing -non-work- are forgotten as a plethora o f  exciting tales are recounted to 
the relief." (Holdaway 1983: 55)
Holdaway notes that neophyte police officers soon learn that policing is based on 
a foundation that is firm and secure. He writes:
"The uncertainty o f  the neophyte has to be glossed over with certainty. Policing is 
straightforward and speedy work, the essence o f  which is prompt and resolute 
decision-making." (Holdaway 1983: 63)
The busy-ness and speediness of police work contrast with the slowing down of 
time at Bramshill. Tutors at Bramshill speak of the experiential learning cycle and 
the importance of 'time to reflect'. Thus, and again, a part of the culture of the 
institution is set against the phenomenal world of police middle-managers. Foster 
(1998) describes her experience of teaching applied criminology to the strategic
336
command course in the following way:
"We [the tutors] are frequently told that they do not like the change ofpace (too 
slow) and style we adopt. We want them to be independent learners and set this as 
an expectation and in the way we structure the timetable (we have a lot o f  study 
periods where they work independently) and we hold sessions in the evening (which 
disrupts their normal pattern o f  working and many o f  them don't like this). The 
macho culture o f  the organisation .. confuses being busy with being productiveI" 
(Foster 1998: written personal communication)
Foster's observations are echoed on the Police Management Programme. This is 
clearly demonstrated in the way participants on that programme dealt with certain 
learning structures: many of them were completed with enormous rapidity. So, for 
example, explorations of personal and professional values within groups of three 
could be finished within five minutes. Once 'finished' participants would look 
towards members of staff waiting for the next set of instructions. Inevitably this 
rapidity meant that there was a relative absence of significant analyses in relation 
to the tasks that were completed. Thus, for example, when 'culture audits' (Johnson 
and Scholes, 1993) were taken, plenty of material - reflecting various cultural 
phenomena - was surfaced but it was accompanied by a minimum level of 
interpretation concerning its meaning.
The folk narratives or semi-public discourses of police also provide definitions of 
the people who are encountered in the course of policing. Holdaway builds upon 
Manning's (1977) observation that there is a 'common sense' theory about human 
nature and characterises the typical police view as follows:
"The police view is that humanity has fallen. People do not really understand the 
nature o f  their fellows; their gullibility, their lack o f  stability and common sense... 
There are good grounds fo r  this view - at least i f  you are PC 49. I f  people are on 
the edge o f  chaos, they need to be restrained... Further given this view PC 49's is 
superior to that o f  members o f  the public. They may be naive; he (sic) is not." 
(Holdaway 1983: 65)
Holdaway continues by finding a way of characterising a core belief shared by 
members of the Police rank-and-file occupational culture:
"He (sic) subscribes to an attitude that brooks no appeal: We, the police have real 
knowledge; they the public, do not have access to it. Policing has a strangely
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gnostic aspect. " (Holdaway 1983: 65)
In the police world, people who are non-police - 'the public' - are arranged along 
a continuum from the domesticated but naive through the fickle, the incompetent 
and pathetic to the downright evil. All non-police - including those on the tutorial 
staff at Bramshill - are inherently suspect characters. If Holdaway's analysis might 
be criticised as outdated, more recently Brown (1992) considered the extent to 
which police culture - as a whole - was changing. In the course of her review of the 
occupational culture she described those characteristics which seemed to remain 
intact over time and which appeared no matter which force was studied. Those 
features are: a sense of mission; pessimism - that the morality police officers adhere 
to is being eroded on all sides; suspiciousness; conservatism; and, machismo.
Despite the fact that she identifies a number of factors that might facilitate culture 
change - such as the increasing number of graduates in policing, the impact of 
'equal opportunities' and an increased civilian presence within the organisation - she 
cites the 'power of the prevailing culture' in the 'socialisation of recruits'. Brown 
concludes by drawing attention to the fact that the 'grass roots cultural milieu of the 
Police' continues to 'subsume and subvert' change initiatives and policy emphases. 
Thus, Brown's comments suggest that the features Holdaway identified still remain 
socio-cultural characteristics of police.
The tutorial staff at Bramshill conceptualise the 'mass' of programme participants 
as persons who express the dominant features of the occupational culture. 
However, a complication is added because they (the course participants) are 
'supposed to be managers' - and therefore they are expected to have achieved some 
distance and/or differentiation from the attitudes and values of street level 
constables. The programme participants conceptualise the staff in ways consistent 
with the general assumptions held about people within the folk narratives of the 
occupational culture. That is to say, they are intrinsically suspect. Moreover, since 
Bramshill is not a University it means that they have somehow ‘failed’. They have 
not the intellectual capacity or the competence to have found employment in a top 
rank educational institution. They are, therefore, second rate. In addition, the 
tutorial staff are Bramshill tutors: their identity is constructed by the police as 
emblematic of the fanciful world of Bramshill.
As these identities become complexly constructed through the interplay of 
symbolic interaction, the educational or training encounter is fraught with a unique 
set of difficulties for both parties.
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The tutorial staff construct the identity of programme participants as ’resistant', 
tendentious and contrary. The dislocation of programme participants and their 
temporary loss of status takes place alongside the more chronic status problems 
suffered by the staff. They know that they are, at best, 'on trial'. Their status has to 
be earned each time a course is delivered and they know that they may do or say 
something in an unguarded moment that earns the opprobrium of the student group.
Ethnopsychology in action: exploring the cultural exchanges in the educational 
encounter
Schein (1987), in an extension of Goffman (1959), identifies a centrally held North 
American/European cultural assumption about the nature of relationships: 
relationships depend upon mutual co-operation giving all parties to the relationship 
as nearly as possible what they claim to need. He adds:
"Human dramas must come out equitably between actors and audiences ... " 
(Schein 1987: 84)
However, the tutor experience at Bramshill in general (and mine in particular) does 
not seem to result in feelings that the 'drama' has always come out equitably - and 
this is especially the case when the tutor delivers a central presentation or lecture. 
In those situations staff do not feel they have been given their due. The sense that 
'worth' has not been recognised and effort has not been rewarded indicates how 
breaches of the social rules that make life safe and predictable are regular 
occurrences at Bramshill. A 'fair exchange' has not taken place. Schein (1987) 
observes that if we pay close attention to the way we use language as we discuss 
social encounters that language tells us that a great deal of what goes on between 
people reflects both a form of social economics and a form of social drama.
As he turns to discuss social behaviour in terms of social economics he writes:
"We all learn early in life that human interaction is reciprocal. I f  someone is 
talking to you, you are paying attention; i f  someone gives you something, you say 
thank you; i f  someone insults you, you defend yourself in some manner or another. 
We also learn when the reciprocating action is inappropriate and when it is not, 
and we have a quantitative sense about this. I f  we are saying something important, 
we expect 'more' attention and get annoyed when the listener seems to pay too little 
attention." (Schein 1987:79)
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However on the Police Management Programme these reciprocations are not 
guaranteed. If the tutor tries to give something - there is no certainty that it will be 
well-received. If they 'front' a learning structure (into which they have put a great 
deal o f effort) its conclusion may be met with:
"Where do we get our sandwiches from? 'or "The game offootball begins at 6 this 
evening."
These remarks suggest that the lecture might never have really happened. It 
constituted a waste of time. In other words, the due 'owed' to the tutor is not 
forthcoming.
When Schein moves on to examine the idea of'sacredness of the person' another 
problem involving the interaction between tutor and police student is foregrounded. 
Thus, whenever a lecture or other related learning structure is offered by a tutor he 
or she is implicitly claiming that they are about to say something interesting in 
relation to (and relevant to) the practice of police management. The wider cultural 
rules dictate that the social self and the relationship(s) into which it has entered 
must somehow be sustained. If the lecture is, in fact, rather boring or seemingly 
irrelevant, the cultural rules dictate that the audience will try to disguise these 
feelings and help the lecturer 'save face'. If the audience manifestly 'switch off or 
respond at the close of the performance by immediately changing the subject then 
they have not sustained the claim and the lecturer has lost face. In effect the 
lecturer is told that their social value - at that moment in the relationship - is less 
than they had claimed it to be. However Schein underlines how unusual it is for 
persons in social interaction to abandon 'face work' and thereby allow a person to 
lose face:
"Cultural rules dictate that you will not [give me reason to lose face] except under 
extreme circumstances. " (Schein 1987: 85)
The tutorial staff at Bramshill are very aware of the judgements not only of 
lecture/learning structure content but also of the lecturer/presenters themselves 
which have been publicly voiced by programme participants and which have 
featured on written course evaluation forms. They learn that there is always some 
likelihood that any educational or training event and/or its author will attract a 
strongly negative response. In part this explains why they adopt an 'impresario' 
role.
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Since the tutorial staff run the risk of losing face they are careful not to claim too 
much in the first place. 'You are the experts on this one', they may say, or, 'I'm a bit 
of a novice in this area'. Thus, in the politics of the social exchanges, they adopt the 
obverse of the strategy 'the more you have, the more you have to lose'; it is 
psychologically safer to play out the encounter in terms of 'the less I have the less 
I have to lose'. The tutorial staff who work on the vertical career path management 
programmes rarely give 'central presentations' to these programmes. Instead they 
work as discussion leaders/facilitators with their own student groups, and when 
they 'lead' programmes they take on an impresario function. Programme managers 
arrange for a variety of 'outside experts' and 'specialists' to provide the specific 
content of the learning structures. (Thus, for example, in the three years that I 
directed the Accelerated Promotion Course on only three separate occasions did the 
police tutors who were assigned on a full time basis to the programme provide any 
form of central presentation to the complete student group.)
Why, though, do police fail to 'give tutors their due' or set aside the social practices 
of'face work'?
A part of the answer appears to lie in the conceptual frameworks that come to be 
established through the discourse of the folk narratives that Holdaway describes. 
Police are 'primed' to be sceptical of the citizenry or 'public' as a whole - and this 
attitude is generalised to include persons at Bramshill. Moreover, there are no 
penalties if they choose to commit acts of social murder. If anything, these acts 
confirm the definitions they project of themselves as 'hard-bitten, practical men 
(and women)'. Superimposed upon these are the symbolic communications taking 
place within the institutional context at Bramshill. I have already mentioned the 
problems of spatial and psychological dislocation. In addition, 'Bramshill' is 
constructed as one those sources of erosion of police morality to which Brown 
(1992) refers. It becomes a vesicle into which the frustration, ire and bile of police 
can be projected. It functions as the 'dumping ground' for their cultural 'baggage' 
and the tutorial staff find themselves most exposed to these processes.
T o  il lu s tra te  h o w  d an g ero u s  the  re sp o n se  pa tte rns  o f  the  partic ipan ts  w ith in  the  
P o lice  M an a g e m en t  P ro g ram m e can  seem  to  be, I recently  invited the  tu torial s ta f f  
f rom  the  L e ad e rsh ip  facu lty  to a ttend  a lecture  on  the  A cce le ra ted  P ro m o tio n  
C o u rse  tha t w as  to be g iven  by a p ro fesso r o f  h um an  rights law. A  n u m b er  o f  s ta f f  
a t ten d ed  the  lecture and expressed  a very positive  response  to the  event. H ow ever, 
w h e n  I m en tio n ed  to the  leader o f  the  M an a g in g  Peop le  m odu le  tha t I w as  lucky
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to be able to call upon such resources he replied that, despite the fact he thought the 
content was excellent and very relevant to the practice of policing, he would not be 
able to risk including such a speaker on the Police Management Programme.
"They would miss the subtleties, they wouldn't understand the humour and they'd 
end up giving the guy a hard time."
A further part of the answer lies in a more general pattern of engagement summed 
up by Bauman (1993) in his discussion of postmodern types. Thus, a major 
postmodern figure is the 'tourist'. But Bauman finds that 'tourism is no more 
something one practices when on holidays'. He writes:
"Normal life - i f  it is to be a good life - ought to be, had better be, a continuous 
holiday." (Bauman 1993: 243)
And he continues:
"Ideally, one should be a tourist everywhere and everyday. In, but not of. 
Physically close, spiritually remote. Aloof. Free - the exemption from  all non­
contractual duties having been paid for in advance. ” (Bauman 1993: 243)
Thus, just as police themselves began to practice their version of a 'quality of 
service' philosophy so they have begun to construe themselves as customers of 
National Police Training services. And this means that wider cultural developments 
find themselves imported into the educational contexts at Bramshill.
Bauman summarises the wider cultural pattern as follows:
"It is a 'your value fo r my money' situation: citizenship means getting better service
fo r  less expense, the right to pay less into the public kitty and get more from  i t ....
The ideal fo r  the citizen is a satisfied customer. Society is there fo r  individuals to 
seek and fin d  satisfaction fo r  their individual wants." (Bauman 1993: 244)
How then, did I prepare for the transformation from unknown member of college 
staff to 'ethics tutor' on the Managing People module of the Police Management 
Programme?
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Acts o f  enchantment: staging ethics education
Discourse psychology (after Harre, 1995) enjoins us to follow Wittgenstein's 
(1953) advice. Thus, where possible we should discard our theories of what might 
be going on and, in their stead, we should look at what people are actually doing, 
in context and in the full concreteness of their situation.
In the final section of this chapter I shall try to just that and take a look at what I 
ended up doing 'in context and in the full concreteness of my situation'. I shall try 
to show that whatever it was I did it had some similarities with - (it paralleled) - 
Basanti Devi's performances as a possession oracle. This will enable me to raise the 
possibility that I failed in my attempt to 'win over' the totality of my police groups 
because my 'personality' was unable to 'articulate' with the identities at large in my 
social environment of face-to-face education and training.
The transformation of Basanti Devi to the Mother reported by Much and Mahapatra 
through the ritual of the puja leads them to write:
".. she has communicated an extraordinary amount and has done the foundation  
work fo r  establishing her transformation to a Goddess moving in the world. People 
have seen an elegant ritual performed with concentration, and then, before their 
eyes, the transformation o f  her identity from that o f  a housewife to the wild 
unpredictable and dangerous, though compassionate, Mother. This drama is 
enacted in an environment saturated with sacred symbols, symbols o f  the divine 
realm and the person's relationship to it. It is constituted by a series o f  actions each 
o f  which represents a form  o f  communication with the divine realm..." (Much and 
Mahapatra 1995: 61)
This is an important summary because it invites comparisons with my own 
transformation from an 'ordinary husband and market-town dweller' to 'ethics 
educator'. My own preparations began, however, in relative privacy. First, I would 
be informed by the module leader of the Managing People module about the nature 
o f the group I would come to meet.
If he had managed to get through unscathed he would say '.'They are as good as 
gold'. If some of the group would signal resistances or dismissiveness I would be 
told: 'One or two need a finger -wagging job done on them' ox'Some o f them are 
a disgrace to the service' or 'You're going to have to watch some o f the bastards'.
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In the main, however, my family and my administrative assistant would act as 
supporters. They would help in the backstage activities that would be followed by 
my attempt to stage a performance representing a form of communication with the 
'ethics’ realm. How would an ethnopsychologist give an account of my 
'transformation and 'performance' as I sought to become a conduit through which 
ethics would 'come alive'? A shortened account (which could easily be written in 
the third person) could run as follows:
I - a white European male - would begin to prepare for the 'ethics unit' of the 
Managing People' module several days in advance of the event itself. I would 
locate several different documents for photocopying including one that I wanted 
reproduced in colour; it was a nineteenth century painting entitled 'Deserted. It 
featured a number of persons including two police officers, one of whom was 
holding a baby. I thought that it represented an archetypal image of the 'helping' 
image of police. My other material included miniaturisations of my computer 
screen presentations, three original questionnaires I had designed, several exercises 
and a range of texts including a complete introductory course to the subject 'ethics'.
On the evening prior to presenting each formal ethics unit my preparation would 
continue as I 'set up' the room. I would spend a great deal o f time attending to 
detail. So, I would arrange the seating for the class, try to adjust the heating and 
lighting - so that it might be most comfortable for the students - place the 
photocopied 'hand-outs' carefully and neatly in the order I intended to distribute 
them to the students, check that the projection system was working, and, then, 
vacuum-clean the entire surface area of the floor. I would remove old newspapers, 
empty (or half-full) beer cans, plastic cups, and all the debris left behind at the end 
of the preceding teaching sessions by the class of students. I wanted the 'ethics 
education' to be given in an environment that was as enjoyable and pleasant as I 
could make it for the course participants.
T hen , m y  rehearsa l w o u ld  beg in . I w o u ld  w a lk  b ack  an d  fo r th  a t the  f ro n t  o f  th e  
large ro o m  ta lk ing  to im aginary  students. A s I did  th is  I w ould  som etim es  s top  and  
u p b ra id  m y s e l f  as I s tum bled  ove r  m y  lines o r  fa iled  to  m a k e  easy  f lu en t  links  
be tw een  poin ts  o f  inform ation  or argum ent a long  the s tream s o f  d iscourse . I w o u ld  
then  note  dow n, on an unm arked  p iece o f  p la in  w hite  p ap er  the  m a in  p o in ts  o f  the  
in troduction . I w o u ld  say  to m yself: 'R em em b er  - th is  is the  first t im e  fo r  th e m  - 
and i t’s im portant to bring freshness to each new  occasion.' I w ould  m ake  sure tha t 
each  o f  the  h and -ou ts  had four holes 'punched ' in them  - so tha t they  w o u ld  fit
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easily into the student folders.
On returning home in the evening I would quietly talk with myself about the 
material - and make notes in my diary concerning any variations that I might be 
introducing to the performance. At some point - in mid evening - 1 would turn to 
consult my texts on ethics. Typically, these would include the Socratic dialogues, 
Mill’s 'On liberty' and MacIntyre's 'After Virtue’. I needed to feel alerted to the 
nature of the subject.
I would finish my preparations by selecting the music I would arrange to have 
playing as the students came into the room in the morning. I would choose from 
Allegri's 'Miserere', or Beethoven's violin concerto in D (opus 61) or Rodrigo's 
guitar concerto. At some point I would have to ask my family to stop watching the 
television whilst I checked that all the videos I might use were ready to be played 
at the correct starting point.
Before going to bed I would 'look out' my best suit, choose a white shirt and a 
soberly coloured silk tie, polish my shoes and make my sandwiches. The 
sandwiches were important. They meant that I could eat my lunch alone and 
prepare myself for the afternoon session without disturbance. Finally, to still my 
nerves and the excited voices of my inner dialogues, I would retire to bed and read 
Montaigne or La Rochefoucauld or Augustine. Montaigne would encourage me to 
be humane and tolerant. La Rochefoucauld was witty. Augustine was grave.
My alarm would sound at six thirty. I would run a bath, bathe, shave, dress, check 
that my 'lucky stone' was in the right hand jacket pocket of my suit, eat a light 
breakfast, say 'goodbye' to my family and drive through the country lanes to work.
I needed my lucky stone. I had received it from a class of co-learners at the end of 
a two-year programme designed to develop facilitators of adult learning. In the 
closing ceremony of that course I was told that it would be my 'power object'. 
Touch if, one of the group leaders said, 'and let it be the source of the power you 
need'. Over the years I had come to rely on the stone - especially when the going 
got tough.
I would park my car immediately outside the Assembly Hall and begin to unload 
the videos, a few books and an old leather bag in which I carried the computer 
disks on which had been saved the lecture presentations - along with my 
sandwiches.
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At this point, as the time moved on towards eight a.m., I would begin my final 
preparations.
I wanted the environment to work for me. I needed to use lighting, music and the 
symbols of study and scholarship to support a transition from the mundane world 
to the magic of'ethics'. I wanted the course participants to enter a fuliginous and 
partly supernal atmosphere - and I was conscious that such an atmosphere was 
likely to be conducive to reflection and contemplation.
When everything was completed I would remind myself that I was about to 
undergo, metaphorically, a 'long distance race' and that meant I would have to 'pace 
myself. I would remain separate from the programme participants as they gradually 
filed into the hall. I did not want to become distracted. Nor did I want to find 
myself responding to any sarcastic jibes.
Then, if it seemed that almost everybody was ready to begin, I would start, softly, 
with a ritual opening:
'Good morning ladies and gentlemen - I'd like to begin by giving you some idea o f  
what it is we will be covering in the next two days' and then, after giving a few 
background details about myself, I would begin by trying to convey a little o f the 
nature of ethics - using Frankena's introduction to morality and moral philosophy. 
His introduction explores Socrates' argument - presented in the Crito - that 
illustrates why he, Socrates, should^ctf take the opportunity to escape from prison 
and should abide by the sentence of the court of law - a sentence that has 
condemned Socrates to death.
As I would speak my eyes would scan the room and the form of my communication 
would gradually reveal its basic 'question and answer' pattern. Once I had felt that 
a sufficient grounding in the very basic aspects of 'ethics' had been established, I 
would use video featuring an undercover operation - which put the lives of police 
officers at risk - to help in the process of 'bringing ethics to life' and locating it 
within the operational and professional practices of the police.
T h e  co m p u te r  screen  p resen ta tions  inc luded  selec tions  des ig n ed  to  h ig h l ig h t  the  
fu n d am en ta l  h u m an  concerns  w ith w h ich  e th ics  deals. O ne  such  s lide  s im p ly  
consis ted  o f  a set o f  questions  taken from  the  cover  o f  B es t and  K ellner 's  (1 9 9 1 )  
'Postm odern  theory - critical interrogations': 'W ho is free to choose?  W ho is beyond
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the law? Who is healed? Who is housed? Who speaks? 'Who is silenced? Who 
salutes longest? Who prays loudest? Who dies first? Who laughs last?
They also included the remark made to me by a Detective Inspector who had been 
among a team of officers investigating cases of paedophilia and child murder. A 
television programme had been broadcast featuring the inquiry'. Its content 
included the identification of the leader of the paedophile ring - who had been 
committed for trial, found guilty and sentenced to prison. As the programme was 
broadcast the ringleader was serving his sentence. The Detective Inspector had then 
reported to me:
'One good thing did come out o f  the programme. As a result, A. [the ringleader] 
had his throat cut in prison'.
'How', I asked the group, 'should one respond to such an observation?’
In the whole of this process I had become transformed from an ordinary to an 
extraordinary person. During her possession, the Kalasi is in the rare position of 
absolute social ascendancy over the audience of devotees, supplicants and 
followers. She gives hukum (directives) which mainly consists of advice on how 
to cope with personal problems and illnesses. Occasionally, Basanti Devi - the 
Mother - would give 'unsolicited predictions' about local events. Much and 
Mahapatra interpret the process of hukum as follows:
"During the hukum, a socially shared illusion is created wherein participants have 
the experience o f  darshan and receive personal attention and advice directly from  
the Goddess." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 76)
In contrast I was disinclined to dispense hukum. Instead I invoked the Goddess of 
conjecture and refutation. I imagine that an ethnopsychologist might find that I 
worshipped at the shrine of uncertainty.
M u c h  and  M ah a p a tra  e x am in e  the  consti tu tive  fea tu res  o f  h u k u m  and  f ind  th a t  is 
it has  a  h igh  p ro p o r t io n  o f  im pera tives. T h is  m arks  the  speech  as tha t  o f  so m eo n e  
in a  'very  specia l ' p o s i t io n  o f  socia l and  m oral a scendancy . T h e  M o th e r  speaks  to 
m en  and w o m e n  alike as 'boy' and  'girl' respectively. B y  referring  to the  persons  in 
the  a u d ien ce  as 'boy' and  girl' the  M o th er  takes  on a p o s it ion  o f  unila teral pow er. 
T h is ,  a lo n g  w ith  m y absence  o f  supernatural pow ers  p rov ides , at first g lance , a 
m a jo r  co n tra s t  b e tw e e n  m y situa tion  o f  p ractice  and tha t o f  a possess ion  oracle.
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However, a part of my performance was built upon the assumption that the 
audience was composed of 'hard-pressed' professionals - who, by implication, 
would not want to have the additional chore of coping with 'difficult' learning 
foisted upon them. So, if I were to redescribe my teaching in the terms of 
transactional analysis I could find evidence for a continual movement between 
'nurturing parent' and 'adult' modes of address. Moreover, my performance 
intimated the existence of a divine and heavenly reality. So, whilst I had no 
pretensions to bearing supernatural powers I did manifest a 'contact' with the 
possibility of paradise on earth. My references to Plato's 'Republic' hinted at the 
fact that the earliest recorded writings on 'ethics' contained esoteric designs 
concerning the model for an ideal society. My references to Rawl's 'Political 
Liberalism' sustained the idea that ethicists were engaged with constructing forms 
of heaven on earth. Just as the Kalasi's speech included features functioning to 
index the divinity of the speaker so my discourse would include markers of 
'scholarship' and an apparent appreciation of the police situation. These 
manoeuvres, in strategic terms, were risky undertakings. Scholarship could betoken 
the presence of 'the academic' - and thereby attract a palpable or concealed scorn. 
A claim to know about the police situation might have been 'read' as a contemptible 
act of ingratiation or dismissed as something both presumptuous and arrogant.
Reflecting on the transformation
Much and Mahapatra discuss Basanti Devi's transformation (and the manifestation 
of alternative states of consciousness and significantly different types of conduct) 
in relation to the wider cultural symbol system. They note that all o f puja (the 
ritual) that they observed in Orissa is notable for its aesthetic qualities. The effect 
is to help move outsider and onlookers to feelings of communication with a sacred 
order. This is paralleled by my arrangement of the seats, the position, slightly off- 
centre, of the lectern - made of solid oak and donated to the college by a 
distinguished public servant - the flip chart stands - and the use of a form of 
'question-answer' style of public discourse. All the 'props' were designs helping 
both to sustain my own transformation and suggesting to programme participants 
access to a realm of special knowledge.
M u ch  and  M ah ap a tra  no te  th a t  the  clients  o f  K alasis , and  K alas is  and  o th e r  fo lk  
healers them selves , often state that i f  the c lient does no t have the  faith, the  cure  will 
no t be effective. A t its very  s im plest, this app lies  s tra igh tfo rw ard ly  and  d irec tly  to 
a p ro p o r t io n  o f  m y 'clients '. F requen tly , I w ou ld  be to ld  by  'devo tees ' th a t  so m e  
officers  w ou ld  not 'play the gam e', w ould  not 'give it a go', w ou ld  not 'd ip  th e ir  toe
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in the water1 or would not want to 'get involved'. They had 'the shutters up'.
As my inquiry has shown, a small but significant proportion of my 'clients' 
remained aloof and rejected the invitation to discourse with the ethical realm.
Much and Mahapatra conclude their analysis of the cultural symbol system of 
traditional Hindu culture with an observation that might overemphasise the 
distinctiveness of that culture. They write:
"To us the most outstanding feature o f  the entire 'magical' universe o f  traditional 
Hindu culture is its skilled use o f  ritual with imagination, drama, humour and 
beauty, to evoke or bring to the forefront a 'magical' (that is a meaning-saturated, 
value laden, surprising and sometimes awesome) world o f  order, from ju st behind 
the mundane, chaotic, sometimes harsh, images presented by the material 'reality' 
o f  the ordinary social world. This 'magical' world is understood as an order o f  
reality in its own right, correlated with, though not identical to, the 'ordinary' 
world." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 66)
It seems perfectly possible to say that in the Western world generally and in 
specifically structured educational events (such as 'ethics education') in particular, 
a pristine world of order, rationality, logic and conceptual analysis is brought to the 
'forefront' and mundane ordinary reality is relegated to the shadow of 
consciousness.
I was, in fact, trying to evoke a type of direct communication with the ethical realm 
and I was foregrounding the ethical order. I was trying to show that moral values 
form part o f the texture of the everyday world (in its concerns with turn-taking, 
promise-keeping, justice and fairness, impartiality, care etc.) whilst at the same 
time constituting a major element in our imaginings of a better world - and which 
have become so much a part of the discourse of management and leadership 
development in its advocacy of the 'vision' and the 'mission'. I was, following, 
Gibran (1980) and the transpersonal psychologies of Houston (1987) and Heron 
(1988) setting out to evoke a mode of perception attuned to the sacredness, fine­
ness and delicacy of the everyday.
T h is  a sp ira t io n  w as  set w ith in  the  f ram ew o rk  o f  a  social en co u n te r  e m b o d y in g  
status concerns. M uch  and  M ahapatra  (1995) exam ine  the  social identity o f  Kalasis 
in O rissa  and  sh o w  h ow  persons w ho  are recognised as truly adep t in v is ionary  and 
ecs ta tic  s ta tes  en jo y  m ore  social p res tige  than  they  w o u ld  o th e rw ise  have  i f  they
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were 'ordinary' persons. They find that Kalasis also acquire a social importance or 
'centrality' that they would not emerge if  they did not have Kalasi status. The 
prestige they have is sustained by the visible life-style of the Kalasi. This is more 
disciplined, austere and devoted to worship than others.
I have already indicated the 'suspect' status of the tutorial staff at Bramshill and the 
elaborate nature of my preparations (along with its function of equipping me with 
a kind of psychological armour and weaponry) illustrates a part of my strategy for 
coping with the discomfort of knowing that I was such a suspect person. I was, for 
example, reminded of the status problems I had when an officer I had taught a 
number of years previously joined the 'Managing People' module as part of his own 
professional development plan. A few days after my work he sent me a long letter 
commenting upon his experience during the ethics unit and included the following:
"I had forgotten how much difficulty some police officers have with civilian 
instructors and in this particular case the approach is very different from  
conventional police training, presenting a cultural barrier to be overcome. Great 
efforts were made to present the work in a comfortable, caring environment and the 
use o f  music and video suggests someone going out to meet his audience.... I  think 
students did become engaged, animated and energised and I  sensed that many were 
less hostile to you, the tutor, at the end o f  the day. "
And yet, there still remains a similarity between the Kalasi and myself-as- 
practitioner. Thus, as I claimed the status of an ethicist I came under pressure - if 
I were not to be an impostor - to be perceived as an exemplary person. This was 
particularly demanding because a central theme in the folk narratives of police is 
the image of humanity as fallen. How was I to cope with the demands of appearing 
as an exemplary person? Logically and most absurdly this meant that I would have 
to embody the moral virtues of a latter day Christ and the intellectual virtues of a 
contemporary Socrates. This I knew, was both impossible (I did not have the 
capacities) - and dangerous. Kazantzakis (1977) had reminded me how sainthood 
was a perilous undertaking.
In  practice , it m ean t tha t I had to try and b ecom e an icon o f  tolerance, im partia lity , 
reasonableness, em pathy  and benevolence. It m ean t tha t I could  no t afford  to  upse t 
anybody . T h is  la tter p roved  to be rem arkab ly  difficult. O n  a n u m b e r  o f  o cca s io n s  
ind iv idua ls  (o r even  the m ajority  o f  m odu le  partic ipan ts)  w o u ld  find e v id en ce  for 
a 'lack o f  ethics' on m y part i f  they were able to perceive that I m igh t be d isqu ie ting  
or d is tu rb in g  pe rsons  in the  group.
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Much and Mahapatra report that a Kalasi, because her work is now the work of the 
Goddess, becomes more central in her household. Kalasis are also accorded a 
special position in the local and wider community. People come to them for advice 
on all sorts o f matters. These increased social contacts mean that Orissa Kalasis 
also come to have access to a greater stock of knowledge and their status also 
confers on them greater autonomy than is normally accorded to 'ordinary' village 
women.
The social position 'ethicist' functions in a somewhat similar way. Although the 
status of tutor may be 'suspect' the position legitimates access to the stories police 
have to tell about moral matters. In consequence, the ethics tutor comes to hear 
about the nature of the moral dilemmas police face and the nature of the moral 
ethos of the organisation. The ethical character of police and policing are given 
further expression within the different learning structure - and most obviously 
through to life in the 'ethics plays'. I had regular glimpses into the backstage 
features of policing. These glimpses were extended through the medium of the 
ethics questionnaires. Together they revealed the moral difficulties in policing and 
relative unfamiliarity of making salient ethical concepts and discourse in decision­
making and problem-solving.
However, what this analysis underlines is the problematic nature of the practice of 
ethics education with police groups. If  the social status of the practitioner is 
suspect, an unusually large amount of effort must go into the staging of 'ethics 
education'. Once staged - as the data reported in earlier chapters shows - there 
remain a number of moments when the progress of the educative experience may 
be derailed. In trying to provide a thorough account of this tendency for derailment 
to occur, I shall conclude this chapter by re-visiting the institutional context that is 
'Bramshill'.
Bramshill as distinguished from  the University College and from  the police 
'university o f  life'
G a m e  and  M etca lfe  (1 9 9 5 )  ex am in e  the  cu ltura l fo rm s and  prac tices  co n s ti tu t in g  
th e  in s ti tu tions  o f  the  acad em y ' and  note:
"Academic thought generates physics, medicine and nuclear bombs, it produces 
doctors, lawyers, architects and sociologists, it remakes our self-understandings 
... But fo r  all its power and excitement, academic thought remains one form o f
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knowledge among others, neither transparent nor absolute. It is a specific 
institutional product." (Game and Metcalfe 1995: 7)
Whilst Game and Metcalfe do not list those other forms of knowledge it seems 
reasonable, following Elbaz (1981) and Tongue (1997) to distinguish the 
'theoretical knowledge' that is produced by the academy with the 'practical 
knowledge' created by practitioners in their dealings with the experiences and 
phenomena of practice. Game and Metcalfe move on to illustrate how academic 
production is characterised by a daily dependence on the discipline, organisation, 
management and power that constitute the institution that is the university. If  the 
university is a producer of academic thought and knowledge what does Bramshill 
produce? Richards (1999) has highlighted the role Bramshill plays in relation to 
'inducting' police leaders and managers into the appropriate executive style required 
by the Home Office in the practice of policing. Thus, Bramshill is constituted to 
produce Home Office thought in police practice. Put somewhat differently, 
Bramshill is a conduit for 'state thought' or 'administrative thought'. It is designed 
to produce persons who will abide by the emerging rules governing policing. It is, 
therefore, concerned to generate a type of rulership. However, whilst Bramshill is 
constituted to produce this distinct form of thought, the power it has at its disposal 
to achieve this objective is incomplete. Game and Metcalfe demonstrate how, in the 
university, the researcher/lecturer and student are structured into a type o f power 
relationship which reprises the archetypal encounter between God and Moses and 
resonates with the practices of ancestor worship. 'School' - the university institution 
- is a place where the academic researcher/lecturer can context his or her work 
within a patrilineal and 'high priestly' tradition. The dice of power are, as it were, 
loaded on their side rather than that of the students. Their knowledge of the works 
of the 'founding fathers' accords them authority. To contest the stories academics 
come to tell is a risky business - unless it is done by fellow academics. The 
examination and/or grading process continues to shore up the considerable power 
of the university institution.
In  con trast,  the  tu to r  at B ram sh ill  has  no  such  trad it io n  an d  fo rm  o f  k n o w le d g e  
u p o n  w h ic h  to  base  his  or h e r  au thority . T he re  is no  set o f  tex ts  e s tab lish in g  the  
fo u n d a tio n s  fo r  the  p rac tice  o f  po lice  leadersh ip  an d /o r  p o lice  m an ag e m e n t .  
M oreover,  w h ils t the organ isation  is designed  to 'refine' o r 'transform ' its in takes o f  
po lice  o ff icers  - so tha t they  b ecom e ex em p la rs  o f  H o m e  O ffice  th o u g h t  - the  
cu ltural trad it ion , w ith  its p riv i leg ing  o f  'practical kn o w led g e ',  rem a in s  d eep ly  
sceptical o f 'o u ts id e '  interference. In consequence  the au thority  o f  the  tu torial s ta f f  
is p e rm an en tly  in je o p a rd y  and p e rm anen tly  vu ln e rab le  to  con tes ta tion  by  the
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individual police officer or groups of police officers. Dissent, acts of resistance and 
subversion are frequent occurrences during the middle-management programmes 
of study at Bramshill. The audience has the power to be critic and destroyer. One 
way of understanding this dissent is to see it as a response to the way Bramshill 
serves to demean the practical knowledge of the police practitioner that has been 
developed in the 'university of life'. For very many police middle managers, 
whatever is staged at Bramshill, the sacred order, is staged in a context that is 
'removed from reality'. Its mouthpieces (the tutorial staff), therefore, are 'out of 
touch’. Yet they have the 'temerity' and 'gall' to try and 'tell me how to my job'. 
Bramshill, an apparently comfortable and privileged world, represents the 
quintessential opposite of the 'real worlds' of Coventry or Newcastle or Bristol city 
centres on a Saturday night.
Bramshill thus becomes a location where a contest takes place between attempts 
to ensure that police adopt the attitudinal and behavioural requirements o f new 
policy and new law and attempts by police to resist alterations to their values 
hierarchy and definitions of reality. This process of contestation helps to explain 
both the tenseness surrounding the staging of ethics education and the one almost 
constant finding concerning the overly academic and theoretical nature of its 
content.
Much and Mahapatra conclude their discussion of possession oracles by suggesting 
to their readership that the subject of their study would, in conventional 
psychology, fall under the heading 'personality'. This allows them to contend that 
personality forms or components can be regarded as skills. This idea emphasises 
the idea that 'features of personality function to articulate the organism with the 
object environment'. They write:
"The object environment is social - animate and inanimate, but always 
communicative or symbolic and meaning laden. Different cultures and various 
social systems within them, emphasise and privilege rather different personality 
skills." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 82)
It remains possible, therefore, that despite all my attempts to design and produce 
a valued ethics education, it may be the case that my skills of personality were 
insufficiently developed to help me 'articulate' with the animate persons situated 
within the production processes of Bramshill.
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Chapter thirteen
Governmental rationalities in police leadership training and development
"The content o f  discipline is nothing but the consistently rationalised, methodically 
trained and exact execution o f  the received order, in which all personal criticism 
is unconditionally suspended and the actor is unswervingly and exclusively set fo r  
carrying out the command. In addition, this conduct under orders is uniform. Its 
quality as the communal action o f  a mass organisation conditions the specific 
effects o f  such uniformity. Those who obey are not necessarily a simultaneously 
obedient or an especially large mass, nor are they necessarily united in a specific 
locality. What is decisive fo r  discipline is that the obedience o f  a plurality o f  men 
is rationally u n i fo r m (Weber 1967: 235)
In this chapter I shall deepen the exploration of a theme raised in the previous 
chapter concerning Bramshill as a 'site of contestation'. I shall attempt to show how 
the practice of police leadership and management, as well as the 'official' police 
'training designs', can be understood in terms of complex and competing governing 
rationalities.
In November 1998 I presented a brief account of the main findings of my research 
- as they are described in the middle section of this dissertation - to a group o f six 
tutors within the Police Leadership Faculty at Bramshill. The group had been 
convened to help me develop an interpretation of the data. Following Winter's 
(1998) suggestions concerning the development of theory in action research, I 
asked them to 'speculate' upon the data and to suggest how they would begin to 
explain the findings. In the discussion that followed my colleagues concluded that 
my ethics teaching resulted in a 'clash of knowledges' along with a resultant 
'censure' which attended this 'clash'. In this way, they opened up the idea that my 
'presentation' of an ethics education to the particular client group was linked - 
somehow - to a conflict between different forms of knowledge. My work was 
understood in terms of a political struggle - involving specialised 'academic' 
knowledge on the one hand struggling against and being resisted by 'practical' 
knowledge on the other. In the discussion which follows I shall summarise how the 
line of inquiry -which their remarks provoked - led me to explore the governmental 
rationalities characterising police leadership itself and their training within the 
context of Bramshill.
I think it reasonable to argue that, in the context of Bramshill, an ethics education 
experience 'stands' for something. It is not entirely disinterested. It implies a
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critique of the present and a critique of the self. It suggests a better state of affairs. 
It is also situated within a wider ’programme1 framework concerned with the 
’making up' of police. The 'make up' of persons has been a central concern of 
Foucault and so it was to the development of some of Foucault's ideas, initially in 
the field of criminology, to which I turned. There was, however, a further reason 
to explore my work within a Foucauldian framework. Rabinow (1991), in his 
introduction to the nature of Foucault's thought, points out that Foucault himself 
believes we are engaged in political struggles all the time, the purpose of which is 
to alter power relations. Here, then was the direct and explicit link between ways 
of understanding my work and a wider theoretical structure.
Foucault's (1991) analysis of the modalities of power and his reflections on 
'Governmentality' provide a fairly direct entree to examining governance in the 
educational setting. In Foucault's (1994) text 'On Governmentality' he traces 
significant shifts in the very idea of government itself. He suggests that from the 
Renaissance onwards the concept of government was extended from an initial 
concern with the nature of the state and how best a ruler might guard his or her 
power to the governance of almost every conceivable human activity including 
families, households, children, religious orders and provinces. Political thinking 
was therefore deployed across that extensive range of human activities and it was 
concerned with how each activity could be best accomplished. For Foucault, 'best' 
meant 'most economical'. With an eye to the micropolitical Foucault elaborates 
upon the notion of good government as follows:
"The art o f  government... is concerned with ... how to introduce economy, that is 
the correct manner o f  managing individuals, goods and wealth within the fam ily  
.... how to introduce this meticulous attention o f  the father towards his family, into 
the management o f  the state." (Foucault 1994: 8,10)
Government thus became concerned with the population - its life, care and growth 
- as a whole and with this central concern a new regime of disciplinary power took 
hold. Foucault (1991) analyses the emerging 'disciplinary technology' in detail and 
persuasively argues that its aim was (and is) to forge a 'docile body' that may be 
used, transformed and improved. Whilst the prison came to represent, in its purist 
form, the production of such docile bodies, Foucault illustrates the pervasiveness 
o f disciplinary technologies and observes:
"Is i! surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which 
all resemble prisons?” (Foucault 1991: 228)
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It became possible for me to explore the notion of the 'governance' of a 'classroom' 
within a relatively closed institution (The Police Staff College) and to view 
individual police officers as arranging themselves along a continuum from 'docile 
bodies' to 'resisting subjects'.
First, I examined Foucault's idea of 'governmentality' and 'governmental 
rationalities'. Then I developed a genealogy of police leadership and management 
practices - which relied, in part, on deductions deriving from the way police were 
portrayed in historical research - and finally I turned to examine the micrologics of 
power involved in the tutor/client relationship and encounter at Bramshill.
In the first section, I shall illustrate the idea of a 'governmental rationality' by 
reproducing Garland's (1997) description of'economic' rationality. I shall then 
characterise two other rationalities at play in police leadership and management. 
In addition I shall simply note that, although attenuated, there are some signs of a 
'critical' or 'emancipatory' rationality at work in the practice of police leadership 
and management.
I shall then move on and attempt to provide a plausible account concerning the 
genealogy of contemporary police leadership and management training and 
development that finds itself manifested at the Police Staff College, Bramshill. This 
account will locate the college within a complex structure of centres of calculation 
exercising 'power at a distance'. It will also illustrate how the staff/student 
relationship can be understood in terms of a specific encounter within wider and 
longer chains of actors and it will claim that the practice of police leadership 
training and development is subverted both by those competing rationalities within 
police leadership as well as by the resistances and value preferences of the student 
'subjects'. In this latter part of the discussion I shall describe a 'Social Darwinist - 
elitist' governmental rationality which, somewhat tacitly, characterises aspects of 
police leadership and management and which can play a significant role within the 
'educational encounter'.
Governmenial rationalities
G arland  (1997) d iscusses  h o w  fruitful the  g o v e rnm en ta l i ty  ana ly t ic  an d  th e  w id e r  
F o u cau ld ian  a p p ro ach  can  be w h en  the field o f  c r im in o lo g y  in genera l and  c r im e  
control in pa rticu la r  are studied in these  term s. H e h igh ligh ts  the  w ay  in w h ic h  an 
econom ic  rationality  is m anifested both in the 'reading' o f  the p roblem  o f  c rim e and 
in those  s tra teg ies  to do w ith its m anagem en t,  c o n ta in m en t and  'reduc tion '.  
G overnm enta l rationalities can take a num ber o f  form s and G arland  argues tha t 'the
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idea of a 'governmental rationality’ is of crucial importance in pointing us towards 
a quite specific dimension of crime control that otherwise goes unnoticed'. He is 
keen to clarify the nature of a 'governmental rationality' and does so by contrasting 
the idea with that which it is not: thus, a governmental rationality is not equivalent 
to a policy statement nor the legitimatory rhetoric of officials used to put a 'gloss' 
upon the practice of institutions. Simply stated:
"The idea o f  'governmental rationalities' refers instead to the ways o f  thinking and 
styles o f  reasoning that are embodied in a particular set ofpractices. It points to 
the form s o f  rationality that organise these practices, and supply them with their 
objectives and knowledge andforms o f  reflexivity" (Garland 1997: 184)
Garland is quick to make the observation that rationalities are practical rather than 
theoretical or discursive entities. Indeed, they are forged in the business of problem 
solving and attempting to make things work. He then suggests that it seems 
plausible to argue that a new rationality for the governance of crime and the 
governance of criminal justice is coming into existence. Garland describes this 
governmental style as one organised around economic forms of reasoning. In 
contrast to social and legal rationalities (which he perceives to have been the 
predominant forms for most of the twentieth century) an economic rationality, 
developed first in the private sector, appears to enjoy a certain pre-eminence in 
criminal justice 'practice'. In identifying the pre-eminence of this rationality 
Garland's thought accords with Bourdieu's (1998) critical observations concerning 
contemporary politics. Bourdieu reflects upon 'the silence of the politicians' and 
contends that 'they are terribly short of ideas that can mobilise people'. He believes 
that this is partly because the new professionalisation of politics has led to the 
exclusion of inspired personalities and partly because a new political class has 
learned that it is better to talk of management rather than self-management and that 
they must take on the appearances (that is to say, the language) of 'economic 
rationality'.
Garland moves on to explicate the nature of an economic rationality - and, in so 
doing, he clarifies the nature of a 'governmental rationality'. Garland portrays 
economic rationality as follows:
"By an 'economic' rationality, I don't mean simply that value-for-money 
considerations and fiscal restraint have nowadays become predominant and 
explicit aspects o f  crime control discourse and practice - though this is certainly 
a feature o f  the contemporary scene. I mean to point to (i) the increasing reliance 
upon an analytical language o f risks and rewards, rationality, choice, probability,
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targeting and the demand and supply o f  opportunities - language that translates 
'economic'forms o f  reasoning and calculation into the criminological field; (ii) the 
increasing importance o f  objectives such as compensation, cost-control, harm- 
reduction, economy, efficiency and effectiveness; and (Hi) the increasing resort to 
technologies such as audit, fiscal control, market competition and devolved 
management to control penal decision making." (Garland, 1997: 185)
So, described, a governmental rationality manifests three features. First, its specific 
concepts stem from an overall form of reasoning derived from an identifiable 
practical deliberative enterprise - such as politics, economics, law or morality. 
Second, the particular objectives to which the practice aims are consistently related 
to the underlying deliberative enterprise. Third, distinct and distinguishable 
technologies are employed and deployed to control the conduct o f human actors. 
Whilst an economic rationality as identified by Garland might adequately 
characterise the 'foregrounded' style of thinking in certain 'centres of calculation' 
- such as the Treasury, the Audit Commission, the Home Office (albeit not 
exhaustively so) and ACPO - I contend that at least two other such styles of 
thinking co-exist within the practice of police leadership and management. Police 
leadership and management training and development stands in a curious 
relationship to these governmental rationalities. It has to respond to all these 
rationalities such that it equips police leadership with their appropriate concepts and 
techniques but it is also enjoined - at least if it is to be education at all - to expose, 
justify and critique those same rationalities. Perhaps this rationality might be 
conceived as a meta-rationality concerned with 'truth and critique'.
I also contend that these other rationalities compete with and subvert an economic 
rationality.
O f these two, the first is perhaps the most powerful of all. I understand it as an 
archetypal rationality - more arational (Egan, 1985) than rational - which I describe 
as a 'moral panic' rationality. The second I see as more related to the development 
of special and relevant police knowledges. I describe this as a 'socio-political 
professional' rationality.
T he  B rix ton  riots, the  Scarm an report (1981) on  the  B rix ton  riots, the  M ac P h e rso n  
report (1999) on the death  o f  S tephen L aw rence  and its attendant 'issues' a long  w ith  
'even ts ' such  as the  m iner 's  strike and the ability  o f  the  m ed ia  to  p o rtray  a p p a ren t  
social d ram as  o f  national conseq u en ce  all con tribu te  to a c o n s tru c tio n  o f  rea lity  
m ade  sense  o f  in te rm s o f  a 'deep structure ' m oral panic  ra tionality .
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The analytic language that derives from 'moral panic' forms of reasoning includes: 
the threat of chaos and disorder, the danger of a descent into anarchy, the loss of 
'face', an emphasis upon moral contrasts, and, the invocation of a timeless struggle 
between the forces of law, order and the 'good' and their opposites.
The important objectives enmeshed within this rationality are connected with 'panic 
reduction'. They include: community reassurance, combating crime and disorder, 
'cleaning up' the streets, establishing trust and confidence in the probity of police 
and, the responsibilising of the citizen.
The technologies deployed include the discourse of persuasion, 'manicured' image 
management, 'community consultation', press releases, symbolic manipulations 
(e.g. the 'crime statistics') and the cognitive structuring of 'reality', the 
manipulation of fear, and all the anthropological paraphernalia - symbols, myths 
and arationalities - protecting the appearance of those social conditions securing 
control, progress and the ultimate triumph of the 'right' and the 'good'.
The 'moral panic' rationality moves in to foreground when it is no longer possible 
to rely upon police competence in a technical sense or when it is no longer possible 
to sustain the image of police as fair and just. Miscarriages of justice, abuses of 
power and the perceived failure of police to live up to the demands of human rights 
provisions and standards all occasion the subsequent expression of 'moral panic' 
rationality. The role of the media is especially significant in this respect. The 
presentation of policing issues in the media along with the media penetration of the 
police organisation has ensured that moral panic rationality is constantly nourished 
and mobilised.
In contrast to a 'moral panic' form of rationality is a cool socio-political 
(professional) rationality founded upon ideas fundamental to the very constitution 
of police in a liberal democracy. This rationality is rooted in the conceptual 
frameworks established for the 'modern' police that were articulated by Colquhoun 
(1806), Peel (1829) and, Rowan and Mayne (1829) and more recently by Newman 
and Laugharne (1985), ACPO - through its Statement of Common Purpose and 
Values (1990) and, the Quality of Service Committee report, 'Getting Things Right' 
(1992). It also embraces Foucault's three distinct rationalities of governing which 
I elaborate below.
T h e  sty le  o f  reason ing  em braced  by this rationality is non-critical and functionalist. 
It d is tingu ishes  a set o f  functions for police and applauds the acquisition o f  re levant 
sp ec ia l is t  k n o w led g es .  T h e  analy tic  language tha t derives  from socio-po litical
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rationality includes references to the primary objects of policing, the rule of law, 
the maintenance of order, securing the 'Queen's Peace', science, professionalism, 
and responsibilities.
Its objectives are to uphold the law, secure social peace, prevent crime, apprehend 
criminals, prosecute offenders, protect the innocent, deliver on a wide menu of 
responsibilities, and inculcate 'civility' and reasonableness amongst the citizenry.
The technologies a socio-political rationality employs are all those associated with 
the specialist knowledges, methodologies and technical aids that have gradually 
accumulated over the history of policing itself. Most recently, these include, at the 
macro-organisational level, 'Problem-oriented-policing', 'Zero-tolerance' and 
'Intelligence-led policing'. Specialist squads, support groups, the targeting o f local 
criminals and criminal families, neighbourhood watch, inter-agency collaboration, 
corporate plans, clear standards, statements of what is expected from all staff, 'best 
practice' exemplars, surveillance, scientific aids, crime pattern analysis etc. all 
constitute technologies supporting the achievement of the traditional socio-political 
purposes of the police.
This rationality is probably mobilised in the context of reflection upon the founding 
principles of policing and assumes what Taylor (1997) describes as the 'Whiggish' 
view of police history.
I should add that, in theory at least, it would be possible to find a 'critical' or 
'emancipatory' rationality at work in the practices of police leadership and 
management. If such a rationality exists at all it is, at best, underprivileged. 
However, the value frameworks of'Equal opportunities', 'Managing diversity' and 
the feminist critique of patriarchal society - along with the 'rebirth' of'ethics' - all 
provide foundations for the expression of such a rationality.
A genealogy o f  police leadership and management training
B efo re  I ad v an ce  an acco u n t co n ce rn in g  the  ances try  o f  p o lice  lead e rsh ip  an d  
m a n a g e m e n t  tra in ing  it is sensib le  to re fe r  to Foucau lt 's  g en ea lo g y  o f  the  m o d e rn  
state. This  shou ld  enable  m e to gain som e sort o f  purchase  upon  the  m ore  spec if ic  
p rac tices o f  tha t training. G arland provides a sum m ary  o f  Foucault 's  gen ea lo g y  ( o f  
the  m o d ern  state) by desc r ib ing  how , acco rd in g  to  F oucau lt,  s tate  p o w e r  is 
o rg an ised  a ro u n d  a series o f  ra tionalities , each o f  w hich  is d is t inc t  in te rm s  o f  its 
ob jec t ives , its w ays  o f  kn o w in g  and the sub jec ts  to w h o m  it is add ressed . T h o se  
th ree  ra tiona lities  are: 'ra ison d'etat', 'police ' and 'liberalism ' - each  o f  w h ic h
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emerged quite separately in different parts of Europe in the period between the 16th 
and 18 th centuries.
Raison d'etat was a reaction to the religious wars that engulfed Europe for centuries 
following the Reformation. Rather than have the state subordinated to religion in 
the form of 'divine command', a more secular state emerged which was more 
concerned with the creation of national wealth. The creation of wealth meant that 
states were increasingly brought into economic competition with one another. To 
create wealth and to compete effectively, new technologies of governance had to 
be developed. The state needed facts, information and knowledge of itself. So, the 
objective of'Raison d'etat' was self-knowledge. The first duty of the state was to 
know itself. In consequence, statistics began to be accumulated - statistics which 
attempted to describe the empirical facts as a basis for the practice of statecraft. Its 
distinct way of knowing was that of social science and its subject was the well­
being of the population.
The development of measurable forms of knowledge gave rise to 'policing' - which 
can be described as a general programme of detailed regulation (from which the 
specialist agency called police emerged in the nineteenth century). The objective 
of 'police' was the promotion of public tranquillity and security and all those 
additional conditions that might promote the flourishing - the wealth, health and 
prosperity - o f the population. Its way of knowing was the focused accumulation 
o f details concerning the conduct of the individuals and groups comprising the 
population. As Garland writes:
"Its programme envisaged a minutely detailed knowledge o f  the population, its 
habits and activities, obtained by means o f  censuses and close inspection, as well 
as an encyclopaedic range o f  regulatory controls governing everything from trade 
and foodstuffs to manners and dress” (Garland 1997: 177)
The subject of'police' was the control of the population. Garland argues that, like 
raison d'etat, the science of police helped to forge the idea of 'population' as an 
entity with its own inherent dynamics and laws of development and in so doing 
created a new practicable object of governance.
L ib era l ism  o ffe red  a con tras t  to the  po lic ing  p ro jec t o f  to ta l su rve illance , 
k n o w le d g e  and  contro l. T he  ob jec t ive  o f  liberalism  w as  an oppos it ion  to  the  
'po lice ' ra tiona li ty  o f ' to ta l  contro l ' and  to adm in is tra tive  d esp o tism  as well as the 
sec u r in g  o f  those  cond itions  tha t w ou ld  lead to social p rosperity . Its w ay  o f  
k n o w in g  w as to stay  c lose  to the gra in  o f  hum an  ex p er ien ces  and  u nders tand  the
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economic and social subjects who make up the population. Liberalism took as its 
subject the human actors within the economy and the civil society along with the 
delicate art of government and the facilitation of'natural' interactions.
Foucault's genealogy of the modern state provides a lucid 'analytic' within which 
to locate both the constitution of the modern police as well as the more specific 
practices of police leadership and management training. Indeed much of the 
controversy concerning the establishment of the new police at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century can be theorised in terms of the clash between the rationalities 
of total control and liberalism. In general terms 'raison d'etat' encouraged a social 
scientific perspective and has culminated in the concept of police science. The 
rationality 'police' (as distinct from that corpus of people, the police) has 
culminated in surveillance, intelligence gathering and intelligence-led designs for 
police organisations as well as control mechanisms such as performance indicators. 
Liberalism finds expression in concerns with human rights, ethics and a close 
attention to the principles of policing. Thus, each of the major rationalities can be 
shown to exert a major influence on police practices.
To discover the governmental rationalities embodied in police leadership and 
management training I have turned to histories of the police as well as certain 
archival materials in order to provide a more specific and detailed account. First I 
shall try to indicate how the 'new police' were bom as part of the Foucauldian 
rationality 'police' - and that their contemporary 'make-up' continues to express the 
adversarial character lying at the very basis of policing itself. To do this I will make 
extensive reference to Palmer's (1988) study of police and protest in England and 
Ireland between 1780 and 1850. By way of continuing the ‘story’ I shall also 
include reference to Petrow’s (1987) study of the increasing duties of the 
Metropolitan Police between 1870 and 1914. I shall then turn to consider, more 
specifically, the governing rationalities in police leadership and management 
training and development.
The adversarial foundations to police and policing
P alm er (1988) has authored an extrem ely com prehensive  and detailed his tory  o f  the  
'new ' police  in the  U nited K ingdom . His w o rk  draw s from  the m ost com ple te  range  
o f  h is to ries  - tha t w ere  availab le  to h im  - inc lude  a rch ive  m ateria ls  - from , fo r  
ex am p le  the  Public  R eco rds  Office. P a lm er sh o w s  h o w  the  n ew  po lice  in Ire land  
(b e g in n in g  w ith  the  D ublin  police in 1786) served  as a 'laboratory ' and  te s t in g  
g ro u n d  for the  su b seq u en t in troduction  o f  po lice  into the  M etro p o lis  in 1829. H e 
am asses  con v in c in g  ev idence  to support his v iew  tha t the new  police  w ere  created
362
primarily to quell the rising levels of popular protest. From its inception, the main 
purpose of the new uniformed police was to maintain the King's (or Queen's) peace.
Palmer's work is primarily concerned with examining the social and political 
context shaping the creation of police in the period between 1780 and 1850. His 
analysis helps to develop insights concerning critical social-psychological features 
embedded in police history and tradition. Palmer's work makes it possible to 
uncover experiential themes emerging in the unfolding history of police. Here I 
shall indicate how police were initially structured (or formed) as gens d'armesand 
I shall suggest that police have continued, since their very beginnings, to be 'made 
up' in an adversarial combative culture.
Palmer begins with a criticism of the early histories of the English police finding, 
on the one hand, the popular pre 1920 works to take a complacent and inaccurate 
view of police as a home grown institution descended from the Saxon tithingman, 
and, on the other the 'more scholarly ' works of Melville Lee (1901), Moylan 
(1929), Reith (1938, 1943, 1948), Hart (1951) and Critchley (1967) to be 'steeped 
in Tory bias'. Moreover, these works mythologise police officers; so, he writes:
"Policemen (sic) emerge as heroes warding o ff revolution and performing miracles 
in bringing order out o f  chaos." (Palmer 1988: 7)
He moves on to build upon Bailey's (1981) notion that it is possible to distinguish 
two schools of historical thought amongst the historical works explaining the 
emergence of the English police - the 'consensual' historians and the more recent 
'conflict' school. Amongst the consensual historians he (Palmer) identifies Reith 
(1938), Browne (1956), Radzinowicz (1948 - 68), Critchley (1967), Tobias (1979) 
and Miller (1977). For Palmer, these historians argue that the architects of the new 
police - Peel, Chadwick and Benthamist social thinkers - were reformers acting 
outwith narrow class bias with a 'benign regard for the public interest'. Their 
designs for a new police were taken to reflect a rational attempt to impose impartial 
order and to introduce efficiency into certain of the country's civil institutions. In 
contrast, the 'conflict' historians such as Hart (1955), Silver (1967), Foster (1974) 
and Philips (1977) believe that the foundations of the new police were based on a 
class-based need to secure state power in the face of a gathering and strengthening 
working class radicalism and popular public protest. Palmer summarises the view 
o f the conflict historians as follows:
"Class conflict, not social consensus, provided the spur to the creation o f the new 
police. ” (Palmer 1988: 8)
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The contrast so drawn proves, however, to be facile. Palmer finds that the 
'consensual' historians show that the police reformers were, in fact, acting as if they 
were enlightened statists. They were aware both of the opposition from within the 
elite to a proposed new police and the threat to the establishment from working 
class radicalism. The conflict historians downplay the resistance shown by that 
same establishment and exaggerate the 'threat from below'. So, Palmer argues that 
it would be more accurate to adopt a middle position and to base the origins of the 
new police as somewhere between the enlightened statist and conflict schools. He 
writes:
"Chadwick, Peel and the other police proponents were, I  believe, seeking to 
establish a new principle o f  governance - law enforcement above local or petty 
interests - but they were also inevitably enmeshed in the values o f  their own class. 
They were revolutionaries in both their impatience with local civic "rights and 
liberties " and their disrespect fo r  the traditional value systems o f  working class 
culture over both they wanted to ride roughshod." (Palmer 1988: 8)
However, Palmer subsequently emphasises the particular significance o f the 
emerging working class claim to be included within the process of governance 
(through, inter alia, securing the right to vote). This, specifically roused to action 
the 'enlightened statists'. Somehow, a design for police had to be created that would 
both fend off riot and insurrection and that would discipline the less privileged 
classes. This allows Palmer to support Storch's (1975) idea that the new police were 
created to embody a certain type of missionary function. Palmer writes:
"This convergence o f  the state’s imposition o f  norms o f  social order (police) and 
the workers assertion o f  their rights (protest) has led a recent scholar, Robert 
Storch, to see the new police as "missionaries" bringing alien values o f  work and 
discipline to a reluctant proletariat." (Palmer 1988: 8)
W hils t  P a lm e r  m akes  no re fe rence  to Foucau lt 's  sc ience  o f  d isc ip line  an d  th e  
d ev e lo p m en t o f  the  carceral society  it w ould  be possib le  to redescribe  b o th  h is  and  
S torch 's  analyses  in F oucau ld ian  term s w here  the  n ew  po lice  can  be u n d e rs to o d  as 
an  ex tens ion  o f  the  state 's  d isc ip linary  apparatus. H is to r ians  are  un ited  in f in d in g  
tha t the  c rea tion  o f  the  n ew  po lice  w as unre la ted  to  q ues tions  o f  o rd in a ry  crim e. 
Thus, s tudents  o f  police h ighlight the fact that the  early  police em phasis  w as  on the  
m ain tenance  o f  order. It w as only  later that im portance  began to be accorded  to the 
de tec tion  o f  crim e. So, P a lm er  writes:
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"In explaining police origins, I  would argue that i f  in the formative period 1829 - 
56 the authorities' dominant motivation had been to apprehendfelons and prevent 
serious crime, the new police forces would have developed rather differently; we 
would expect to see, early on, efficient detective units and constables skilled in 
crime detection rather than drilled in military style patrolling." (Palmer 1988: 9)
Palmer notes that the new police were created amidst alarms and concerns raised 
by actual and anticipated civil commotions. The production of police as a device 
to quell popular resistance to government can be taken to constitute a more general 
theory of police with international application.
From the outset the new police needed to be disciplined to secure the state’s 
objectives. There is considerable evidence that a great deal of care went into their 
construction - a construction reflecting a paramilitary modus vivendi. So, for 
example, Commissioner Rowan, acting on Peel’s instructions, drafted a plan for a 
force in London organised along military lines. 'Lengthy discussions' according to 
Reith (1948) led to the decision that police should be uniformed. Although the 
police were unarmed - in the sense that they carried neither pistols nor cutlasses - 
they did carry a truncheon (which was initially hidden from view). Palmer surfaces 
a particular feature of the new police which suggests how their psychological 
experience is likely to make for an unusual occupational culture. He writes:
"In the initial recruitment o f  1829 - 30 it appears that the commissioners gave a 
preference to men with military backgrounds ... But many o f  these men found  it 
difficult to adjust to the civil and often solitary duties o f  a policeman." (Palmer 
1988: 300)
Thus, although Peel and Rowan valued discipline at least a major part of the 
practice of policing involved coping with solitariness. Self-discipline (or self- 
determination) was a feature of the police experience. A different form of discipline 
was also at work - and to a remarkable degree. Thus, of the first 2,800 constables 
enrolled 2,238 were at some point dismissed. The main reasons were drunkenness, 
lack of punctuality and lack of discipline. Police, on the one hand were subject to 
exacting disciplinary requirements that were imposed upon them through the 
militaristic nature of their organisation. They also had to show self-discipline and 
self-regulation as they patrolled and interacted with the citizenry.
F o r  those  o ff ice rs  w ho  did w ith s tand  the p ressu res  o f  the  early  po lice  ex p er ien ce  
they  su b se q u e n t ly  had to cope  w ith  'civil co m m o tio n s ' and  w ith  hostile  re sp o n ses  
from  sec tio n s  o f  the  popu la tion . T h ey  had to learn the  tech n iq u es  o f  rio t con tro l
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and came to perfect - in the very first years of their establishment - the baton 
charge. Thus, a salient feature of the early police experience was its association 
with combat. Pringle (1955) notes that the force was 'opposed and hated by all 
classes of the general public whilst Reith (1948) claims that almost everyone had 
a reason to dislike the police. Palmer amasses considerable documentary evidence 
indicating how reviled the police were in various quarters. It would, therefore, be 
reasonable to assume that the police will have experienced a distance between 
themselves and the 'people' and that this will have been augmented by their crowd 
control functions.
Another significant aspect of police practice helping to establish 'distance' between 
police and the people most immediately affected by their presence was their 
participation in a wider social trend - discussed by historians such as Thompson 
(1967), Malcolmson (1973), Hearn (1978) and Storch (1982) - which attempted to 
shape the values and conduct of the less privileged class(es). Thus, as constables 
began the practice of'moving people on' and insisting to gatherings of workingmen 
that they should 'break it up' and 'go about their business', they enacted policies 
concerned with transforming working men into time-oriented, sober and diligent 
workers. Moreover, the police presence at fairs, the races and wakes, their 
suppression of gambling, prize fighting and popular blood sports were, as Palmer 
puts it, 'visible signs of Evangelical and Radical sentiments that sought to 
"improve".'
For Palmer the practice of 'moving people on' was 'especially resented' and 
'workers resentment' was also related to the fact that they perceived the constable 
as an ex-working man who had little to do and yet enjoyed both job security and 
wages that were higher than most labourers and factory workers. In return the 
police resented the abusive comments to which they were suspect. They were 
having to adjust to the requirements of patrolling, the long hours of shift work and 
the fact that they only had one day free from work in every five weeks. Thus, the 
adversarial nature of police-citizen encounters and feelings of hostility and 
resentment in the police-public relationship characterised some of the primordial 
experiences of the new police in England and Wales. Whilst police went on to 
develop their investigative and community relations functions - and to secure a 
large measure of public support - it is probably unwise to underestimate the impact 
of that fundamental part of policing concerned with maintaining public order. As 
Holdaway's (1983) study of the police occupational culture shows, a central notion 
held by the police he observed was that their 'territory' was on the verge of chaos.
P alm er finds four factors underly ing  the exp ress io n s  o f  hostili ty  to w ard s  the  first
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o f  the new county police:
- their military nature
- the perception that their primary use was against crowds and the Chartists rather 
than criminals
- their monitoring and missionary function in relation to the workingman
- the fact that police were often strangers or outsiders 
On this latter point Palmer writes:
"jFrom time immemorial, English policing had been rooted firmly and locally in the 
parish. The revolution brought about in those counties adopting the 1839 County 
Police Act involved the introduction o f  strangers to the parish ...many English 
constables were strangers to their county o f  service, and many more whose 
counties o f  birth and police service were the same were strangers to the parishes 
where they worked. Like the New Poor Law, the civil army o f  uniformed strangers 
was visible evidence o f the new intrusiveness o f  the state into the parish... '(Palmer 
1988: 450)
The military nature of police was reflected in the composition of the Chief 
Constables appointed to command the first county forces established in 1839 - 40. 
Two were 'professional police officers' with 'professional police experience', five 
were army officers, three were navy officers and the remaining two were civilians. 
Although the history of the English county police is relatively scant Palmer is 
confident enough to assert that:
"Each force, being locally controlled, reflected local circumstances and needs and 
the personality o f  its Chief Constable." (Palmer 1988: 453)
T h e  d isc ip l in a ry  p rac tices  o f  the  m ilitary  are rev ea led  in the  a s ton ish ing  ra tes  o f  
d ism issa l  re co rd ed  in the  h is to rica l records. So, in add ition  to the  ev id en ce  
c o n c e rn in g  the  L o n d o n  and  Irish  police , M id w in te r  (1969), for exam ple , in his 
s tu d y  o f  the  police  in L ancash ire  show  that one  quarte r  o f  the  m en w ere d ism issed
- m a in ly  for d runkenness . O ther fam iliar causes o f  d ism issal w ere  neg lec t o f  duty, 
b reach  o f  the  regu la tions , and , insubord ination .
A s P a lm e r  d raw s his m onum en ta l  s tudy  to a c lose  he notes  tha t a l te r  the  m id ­
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nineteenth century 'all of the police forces in England and Ireland did maintain 
their military character'. Gradually, with the 'decline in major crimes' police began 
to take on a number of administrative tasks - and, for the first time in his text, 
Palmer introduces the idea of'service' to the public. He writes:
'The police, increasingly thick on the ground after midcentury, justified their 
expense by acting as servants o f  the public. In both countries they inspected 
weights and measures, enforced vagrancy laws, assisted Poor Law guardians, 
registered dogs and supervised animals' diseases, enforcedfishery and game laws, 
and carried out the decentennial census. In England they watched juveniles and  
controlled (sic)prostitutes. "(Palmer 1988: 533,534)
Palmer also suggests that from 1850 onwards the police - who were 'just another 
agency of government' - became 'a conservative bureaucracy'.
Petrow (1987) in his doctoral thesis which examined the methods used by the 
Metropolitan police to control or regulate perceived moral threats to the social 
order (such as habitual criminality and prostitution) in late nineteenth century 
London argues that the police 'were crucially important agents of the State 
enforcing laws which they helped to draft' and which 'largely embodied the moral 
values of politically active middle-class reformers'. Thus, the police were neither 
in fact, 'the autonomous and impersonal enforcers of a politically neutral law' nor 
were they the 'servants of the public'. He contends that English politics, between 
1870 and 1914, was preoccupied with the moral welfare o f the nation. The 
preoccupation, according to Petrow, stemmed from two sources: widespread urban 
poverty, and, industrial decline. He notes:
"Searching fo r  the causes o f  poverty and industrial decline, middle-class reformers 
tended to blame 'the great problems o f  crime, drink and vice' emanating mainly 
form the thirty percent at the bottom o f  the social scale, which threatened to 
undermine the moral values o f  respectability, work, discipline and the family, upon 
which social stability supposedly depended..." (P e tro w  1987: 1)
P e tro w  traces  the  w ay s  in w h ich  the  M etro p o li tan  P o lice  w as  u sed  by  su cc e ss iv e  
L ibera l and  C o n se rv a tiv e  g o v e rn m en ts  u n d e r  the  co -o rd in a t in g  d irec t io n  o f  the  
H o m e  O ffice  'to ex p er im en t w ith  va rious  m ethods  o f  contro l '.  H e  finds th a t  o f  all 
ad m in is tra t iv e  agenc ies  'it w as the  police ' w ho  w ere  'central to the  State 's  a t te m p t 
to im pose  a certain  social d isc ip line  on the  w o rk in g  class  th ro u g h  law'. A l th o u g h  
the M etropolitan  police w as orig inally  established as part o f  a need to secure  o rd e r  
P e trow  sh o w s  how  the force cam e to rep resen t the p resence  o f  central au th o r i ty
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throughout the basic fabric of daily life. He indicates the expanding nature of police 
duties and function in the following paragraph:
"According to one estimate, in 1829 seven Acts o f  Parliament related to the duties 
o f  the Metropolitan Police; by 1961 there were 'as many as seventy five'; between 
1861 and 1868 'scarcely a session o f  Parliament' ended without further duties 
being added relating to the supervision o f  a vast multitude o f  details o f  more or less 
importance' on 'an immense variety o f ... subjects'; between January 1868 and 
January 1978 a further thirty Acts were passed 'entailing new duties and 
responsibilities'; and the trend continued until 1914. These duties were so extensive 
... that they limited 'in almost every direction the freedom o f  action o f  every 
Londoner'." (Petrow 1987: 12)
The work of the Metropolitan Police - whose numbers grew from 9,160 in 1870 to 
22,048 in 1914 - demanded a large degree of administrative ability on the part of 
the leadership; Petrow points out that each of the five Chief Commissioners 
responsible for the administration of the Metropolitan Police (from 1869 until the 
second decade of the twentieth century) either had extensive military, or similarly 
extensive colonial police administrative experience. He also draws attention to one 
origin of that feature of the psychology of police, namely, cautiousness, 
watchfulness and reserve, when he mentions an observation by Chief 
Commissioner Edward Henry; so, he writes:
".. as Henry spelled out in 1910: 'where new legislation is imposed it is naturally 
incumbent upon the Police to proceed with caution in order that the real intention 
o f  such legislation may be elucidated and proper effect given to it from the f i r s t ...'" 
(Petrow 1987:13,14)
Petrow’s research supports the Foucauldian identification of Police as a major entity 
within the newly emerging science of discipline. He found that as public order 'was 
gradually established' from 1829 onwards, the emphasis in police work 'began 
increasingly to be placed on enforcing the law against those groups of people who 
were 'responsible for sustaining various immoral activities'. The police came, more 
and more, to use 'methods such as supervision, surveillance, clandestine 
investigation and information gathering. They also co-operated with bureaucratic 
departments, other than the Home Office, such as the Foreign Office and the 
Commissioners of Inland revenue.
T o g e th e r ,  P a lm er  and  Petrow 's  w ork  poin ts  tow ards  a police  exper ience  roo ted  in
369
its hierarchical command structure and disciplined military nature. Crime fighting 
and crime investigation along with the 'service' orientation emerged as core modes 
of police experience after the middle half of the nineteenth century as the police 
organisation(s) increasingly became established as conservative bureaucracies. His 
analyses provide the historical underpinnings to understanding why police deploy 
the language of battle in their discourses. This characteristic was picked up by 
Palmer himself in his summary of the 'English police today' where he drew from 
Rhind's (1981) discussion on the need for police accountability. Palmer writes:
"The English police today... represent "a peculiar British compromise". The forty  
three forces act independently but are accountable to Home Office standards o f  
professionalism. The system is a delicate balance o f  intermeshed obligations and 
sometimes unclear lines o f  authority; at a time when police work is increasingly 
scientific and professional, the police feel more than ever "beleaguered by bodies 
exerting pressure upon them." "(Palmer 1988: 541)
Rhind - a former tutor at the Police Staff College, Bramshill - was acutely aware 
of the readiness with which police would become defensive and hostile towards 
reform and change initiatives. That this remains a strand in police responsiveness 
was acknowledged by Bunyard (1993) - a former commandant of the Police Staff 
College - when he found that the police were perceived by the others in the 
criminal justice system as 'difficult artisans'.
In short, the police are so structured that their experience comes to render them 
'difficult' and 'intractable'. Their discourse is marked by the metaphors of combat 
and war. In part, because all police are susceptible to the language forms o f their 
culture (and to its modes of apprehending reality), their leaders and managers, who 
are promoted from within and who all serve - at some point on the 'front line' as 
constables - are liable to sustain these forms of discourse. I shall return to consider 
the implications of this in my discussion concerning the micro-logics of power in 
the teaching encounters at Bramshill. Before that I shall try to uncover the 
governmental rationalities at play in the provision of police leadership development 
and training.
Governmental rationalities and the provision o f  police leadership development 
and training
W hen the M etropolitan  Police Act becam e law on July 19 1829 and Sir R obert Peel 
app o in ted  the  first tw o C om m issioners ,  C o lone l C harles  R ow an , a  re tired  o fficer, 
and R ichard  M ayne , a barrister, i f  there  w as an y th in g  tha t could  be ca lled  po lice
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leadership and management training it lay in the patterns of interaction contributing 
to the social construction of these and similar persons. To that extent it would be 
absurd to ignore the impact of social class and exclusivity in relation to the 'make­
up' o f the first police leaders and managers. However, apart from the 
commissioners there existed a deliberate policy to recruit men who, as Critchley 
(1967) puts it 'had not the rank, habits or station of gentlemen'. Critchley elaborates 
briefly on the formation of the new police in the metropolis by noting that there 
was 'to be no caste system as in the Navy or Army' and that the ranks up to 
superintendent 'were to be drawn, typically from ex-warrant officers and Non 
commissioned officers'. He adds that promotion to higher rank was to be given to 
men from within the force. Critchley himself claims that the new police were 
supposedly constituted in something of an egalitarian manner and states:
"From the start, the police was to be a homogenous and democratic body, in tune 
with the people, understanding the people, belonging to the people, and drawing 
its strength from  the people" (Critchley 1967: 52)
However, it is difficult to imagine how a uniformed and disciplined service - 
especially one constituted within the context of a class system and its associated 
ideologies - could, in truth be democratic and, social historians such as Storch 
(1975) have rejected Critchley's notion of a police belonging to the people and have 
argued instead that the new police reflected an extensions of the bourgeoisie's 
control over the 'dangerous classes'.
Critchley (1967), Emsley (1996) Taylor (1997) all include details allowing certain 
inferences to be drawn about the nature of police leadership and management but 
there appears to be scant detail concerning the actual training, development or 
education they received in relation to their responsibilities. After observing that 
some of the early chief constables of the smaller borough forces could 'strike terror' 
into the young constables of their forces, Critchley includes the text of an address 
by the Head Constable of the Liverpool police to young men joining the force in 
1879 and thinks that it illustrates a 'paternal attitude' of the chief constable towards 
the rank and file. Interestingly that address includes the following passage which 
is suggestive of the 'formation' of the supervisory ranks:
".. ask yourself the question, Do I  know the name o f  the veiy street in which I  have 
been walking fo r  the last three hours, or the name o f  the church "whose lofty spire 
points to heaven?" I f  you thus make your duties the subject o f your conversation 
and thoughts, you will get to be intelligent, and intelligence with good conduct 
leads to promotion ... " (Critchley 1967: 149)
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Emsley reports that in the wake of the Parish Constables Act (1842) which directed 
that the parish constables were to be supervised by new superintending constables 
appointed by the quarter sessions the fact that:
"The superintending constables, many o f  whom were recruitedfrom the London or 
new county forces, had considerable difficulties in smartening up the part-time 
parish constables; they were professionals, yet those who they supervised were not " 
(Emsley 1996: 49)
Taylor in his exploration of the development of police forces from 1830 - 1914 
describes a number of trends including the transition from very high turnover rates 
and short-term careers to more stable forces characterised by well established 
internal hierarchies along with the beginnings of a new sociology of police. In the 
late nineteenth century Taylor finds that:
"There was a cadre o f  experienced men in senior position, many o f  whom, 
especially in the borough forces, had worked their way up through the ranks. There 
was a body o f  practical experience to hand on and, perhaps not coincidentally, the 
1880's saw a number o f  training initiatives developed to ensure that recruits were 
aware o f  the rudiments o f  the job. Educational classes were also introduced fo r  
existing officers and, at the same time, the appearance o f  such publications as 
Bicknell's Police Manual, which was first published in 1877, was a further means 
o f  ensuring a minimum standard o f  knowledge o f  their responsibilities within the 
law among police constables. Most importantly, policing was being seen as an 
occupation with its own sense o f  identity and worth." (Taylor 1997: 66,67)
However despite these developments, a select committee was appointed in 1908 (to 
look into settling the matter of a weekly rest day for police officers) and surfaced 
deeper issues concerning the quality of police leadership. Critchley remarks that the 
police service the Edwardians had inherited was 'leaderless and lacked inspiration1 
and that policemen were 'groping for a sense of unity and means of corporate 
expression'. Those deeper issues concerning the quality of police leadership were 
eventually to lead to the creation of a police college. Villiers (1997) contends that 
for the first one hundred years of its existence Peel's dictum that leadership would 
be found from within the service itself remained unchallenged.
T he  P o s t-w ar  com m ittee  (set up in 1944) conside red  h ig h e r  po lice  tra in in g  and  
reco m m en d ed , inter alia, se tting  up a national po lice  co llege  the  ob jects  o f  w h ich  
w ere:
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"To raise the standards and reputation o f  the police service by giving to selected 
officers who have shown promise and passed the prescribed qualifying tests an 
opportunity o f  receiving higher education and training designed to f i t  them fo r  the 
higher ranks o f  the service, or more briefly, a liberal education ..." (Scollan 1982 
: 19)
Whilst it is possible to make educated guesses on the nature o f the processes of 
induction concerned with developing police leaders and managers over the first one 
hundred years or so since the creation of the new police in the metropolis, the 
establishment of the Police College (later to become the Police Staff College) in 
1948 allows a much more certain picture to emerge. Villiers (1997) provides a 
relatively thorough discussion of the history of the college and this history makes 
it possible to uncover the governmental rationalities embodied in higher police 
training. The 1946 Police Post-war committee had observed that 'the growth of the 
broad outlook, the quality of leadership and the independent habits of mind1 were 
all essential requirements if a senior police officer 'were to command the respect 
o f his (sic) men and the confidence of all classes of the community'. On 1 April 
1948 Ryton-on-Dunsmore became the site for the college. Villiers asks: 'What are 
we to make of the Police College's beginnings? (at Ryton-on-Dunsmore). Drily, he 
observes: 'then as now some attention was paid to what went on in class'. The 
conditions were 'rough and ready' and yet, a great deal can be gleaned from an 
analysis o f the curriculum at the college.
In the very earliest days two courses, 'A' and 'B' were run. Course A - the Junior 
Course for potential inspectors - lasted from 15 June 1948 until 26 November 1948. 
It was organised into a six day week with each day (except Saturday - which was 
a half-day) beginning at 8.50 a.m. and finishing at 5.50 p.m. The course consisted 
o f General Subjects, History and Law, Police Administration, Police Duties, Crime 
and the treatment of offenders, Traffic and Communications, Physical Education, 
D rill, 'Questions and Answers', as well as certain more enigmatic sessions entitled 
'Recapitulation and Conferences'. A closer inspection of the timetable reveals the 
fact that a large number of either senior police officers, specialists in police subjects 
as well as public servants and figures - lectured to the course on a very wide range 
o f topic areas assembled in a rather haphazard order.
W h at ra t io n a li t ie s  are exp ressed  in th is  educational p rocess?  T he  e co n o m ic  
ra t io n a li ty  G arlan d  has d esc ribed  seem s en tire ly  absent. W hils t  the  co llege  i tse lf  
a n d  the  spec if ic  cu rr icu lum  co n ten t  m igh t be an ou tg ro w th  o f  'm oral panic ' 
ra t io n a li ty  (in the  sense  o f  t ry ing  to secure  an effective  po lice  leadersh ip ) the re  is
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nothing on the formal curriculum which directly reveals this rationality. In addition, 
there is an absence of a 'critical' or 'emancipatory' rationality. There are the first 
glimmerings of the new 'managerialism' - in the form of two lectures, one on 
'Personnel Management' and the other on 'Incentives in industry'. Overall, the 
college modus operandi appears to interweave the Foucauldian governmental 
rationalities of control (police), raison d'etat and liberalism - into what I have called 
a 'socio-political' professional rationality. However, it would be naive to overlook 
the meanings of the rituals and symbols manifested across the wider college 
regime. These suggest that a more implicit 'Social Darwinist - elitist' rationality was 
at work sustaining a conception of human social order based upon a hierarchical 
and graded valuation of human worth. Later in this chapter I shall return to explore 
this idea.
For something more than the first ten years of its life the college offered the bulk 
of its courses to middle-aged sergeants and inspectors but in 1961 the Government 
announced the introduction of two new courses. The first, an accelerated promotion 
course, was for 'exceptionally able' young men and women, whilst the second, the 
senior staff course, started in 1963 as a means of training selected officers for the 
highest posts in the service. Critchley, in discussing the senior course (subsequently 
to be called the senior command course) describes how it was 'adapted and 
modernised' with the aid of a team of specialist inspectors from the Department of 
Education and Science. According to Critchley, the review of the course by those 
inspectors was important for two reasons:
"In the first place it marked a recognition that the senior police officer o f  today 
requires a thorough grounding in management and scientific studies as well as the 
training in police duties, liberal studies, and trends in society, that was thought to 
be adequate ten years ago. In the second place the review heralded the start o f  an 
association between the police and academic educationists which is bound to affect 
many concepts o f  police training that have hitherto owed more to tradition and 
commonsense than to educational theory." (Critchley 1967: 319)
The Police Training Council, created in 1971, with a duty to keep under review all 
aspects of police training was, for Critchley, an expression of the formalisation of 
that 'association' between police and educationalists.
M ean w h ile ,  V illie rs  illustra tes h ow  the  ear lies t and  c o m p lex  g o v e rn m en ta l  
ra tionality  expressed  in the practice  o f  police leadersh ip  and m a n ag em en t tra in ing  
began  to find i ts e lf  in som e sort o f  com petit ion  w ith  a 'new ' con tender .  T h u s ,  in 
1968 - som etim e  after the college had m oved  from Ryton to B ram shill - the  H o m e
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Office archives reveal that their economic adviser asked, in a memorandum, how 
it could be possible to justify the expenditure of scarce public funds on the 
provision o f residential general culture courses in the Hampshire countryside. 
Together these developments illustrate the gathering complex of forces shaping the 
evolution of police leadership and management training. So, for example, Villiers 
discusses the 'era of management', the 'rise and fall of facilitation' and the 'new 
fashion' o f 'learning from experience'. Police leadership training had become 
increasingly unstable. It reflected what Baudrillard (1994) has described as the 
'acceleration of all exchanges'. In very broad terms this could be theorised in terms 
of the condition of postmodemity. However, an alternative perspective - and 
explanatory framework - derives from the concept of 'govemment-at-a-distance'.
Government at a distance
Rose and Miller (1992) note that as post-war 'welfare states' in the West and 
centralised 'party states' in the East have come under challenge, contemporary 
political debate has demonised the state and presented it as malign and potentially 
monstrous. On this account only a life 'beyond the state' is one worthy o f the free 
autonomous human being. But Rose and Miller challenge this conception of an 
opposition between the state and civil society by asking how, in fact, rule is 
exercised in advanced liberal democracies. They offer the following complex 
proposition - which, as a description of an actual state of affairs seems surely to be 
the case - concerning the nature of political power in those democracies:
"Political power is exercised today through a profusion o f  shifting alliances 
between diverse authorities in projects to govern a multitude offacets o f  economic 
activity, social life and individual conduct. Power is not so much a matter o f  
imposing constraints upon citizens as of'making up' citizens capable o f  bearing a 
kind o f  regulatedfreedom" (Rose and Miller 1992: 174)
R o se  an d  M il le r  u n d e rs tan d  'governm ent ' in  the  liberal d em ocra tic  s tate  as an  
h is to r ic a l ly  con s ti tu ted  m a tr ix  w ith in  w h ich  are  a rticu la ted  the  hopes, w ish es  and  
ca lc u la t io n s  o f  au tho rit ie s  th a t  seek  to  shape  the  be liefs  and  co n d u c t  o f  o the rs  in 
d e s ired  d irec tions . P la in ly , the  design  and  prac tice  o f  po lice  leadersh ip  and  
m a n a g e m e n t  tra in ing  is one  such  instance o f  governm en t so understood . H ow ever, 
the  h is to rica lly  consti tu ted  m atrix  com prises  m an y  entities all o f  w h ich  'endeavour 
to adm in is te r  the lives o f  others in the light o f  conceptions o f  w hat is good, healthy, 
n o rm a l,  v ir tuous , e ff ic ien t o r  profitable '.
T h e  po litica l ra tiona lity  o f  liberalism  estab lishes  a realm  ou ts ide  'politics ' into
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which the state - in any direct sense - may not enter. Instead, liberal government 
seeks to manage this realm or domain without destroying its existence and its 
autonomy. Rose and Miller argue that this is made possible through the activities 
and calculations of a 'proliferation of independent agents' and 'experts' - such as 
doctors, hygienists, managers, planners, parents and social workers. Importantly 
they add:
"And it [liberal government] is dependent upon the forging o f  alliances. This latter 
takes place on the one hand between political strategies and the activities o f  these 
authorities and, on the other, between these activities andfree citizens, in attempts 
to modulate events, decisions and actions in the economy, the family, the private 
firm, and the conduct o f  the individual person " (Rose and Miller 1992: 180)
Power then, in the modern liberal democratic state, is a matter of networks and 
alliances within which, as Garland (1997) puts it, 'centres of calculation' exercise 
'government-at-a-distance'. Thus, power is not straightforwardly a matter o f 
imposing a sovereign will, but instead is a process of enlisting the cooperation of 
chains of actors who 'translate' power from one locale to another. Garland also 
recognises that this process allows the 'subjects of power' to resist or raise private 
objections to the activities of the authorities.
Police leadership and management training can be understood in terms of a set of 
shifting alliances not only between centres of calculation themselves but also in 
terms of the activities of the 'authorities' who construct and deliver the training. At 
a micropolitical level the activities of those latter authorities is experienced by the 
'subjects of power’ who enjoy a freedom to resist or object to the 'authorities'.
Government-at-a-distance for police management and leadership training can be 
viewed in terms of a highly complex flow and exchange of power. The 'centres of 
calculation' include Parliament, The Home Office, the tripartite system (Chief 
Constables, Police Authorities and the Home Office) concerned with the 
administration and running of police forces, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (HMIC), The Audit Commission, The Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO), The Police Federation, Royal Commission reports, The Police 
Research Group (PRG), the Press and Media, and Bramshill. All these sources 
problematise police training simply because they reveal a gap between the real (i.e. 
the current knowledges and practices of police) and the ideal.
G o v ern m en t-a t-a -d is tan ce  th rough  its centres  o f  ca lcu la tion  sugges ts ,  requ ires ,  
adv ises ,  em p h as ises  and expec ts  the con ten t o f  police  m a n ag e m e n t  t ra in in g  to
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embody a number of rationalities - which might take as their foundational form the 
Foucauldian genealogy of the welfare state. In other words, police management 
training should reflect ’raison d'etat', 'police' and 'liberalism'. However, whilst 
'raison d'etat', 'police' and 'liberalism' coalesce in the cool socio-political 
professional rationality the centres of calculation have had to draw from moral 
panic rationality and economic rationality in their exercise of power.
I shall now, illustrate briefly, some of the ways in which the centres of calculation 
have embodied the three different rationalities.
Moral panic rationality has been expressed as a result of all those phenomena 
evoking anxieties about police themselves and the essential security of those who 
get to have a voice in the wider political arena. Richards (1985) identifies a number 
of 'incidents, investigations and inquiries' from the 1960s onwards which, 
cumulatively, began to erode public confidence in the integrity and competence of 
the police service. Amongst these incidents he includes the riots of 1981, the 
Yorkshire Ripper investigation and inquiry, Michael Fagan, Grunwick, Lewisham, 
and Southall and the death of Blair Peach. He was able to observe that these and 
similar happenings:
"Lent credibility to the growing accusations about abuses o f  suspects while in 
custody, racism, corruption, the excessive use o f  force in effecting public order, and 
scepticism about police effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with crime " 
(Richards, 1985: 15)
In addition, the miner's strike and the analysis of police violence (Scraton 1985), 
the 'high-profile' miscarriages of justice involving the 'Birmingham six' and the 
'Guildford four', The portrayal of police in 'fly-on-the-wall' television 
documentaries, revelations made by police officers themselves (in the media) 
concerning police sexism and racism, and the MacPherson inquiry into the tragic 
death of Stephen Lawrence have all led certain 'centres of calculation' to respond 
with a variety of measures designed both to control police and reassure the public. 
The Operational Policing Review (1990) in its strategic focus concerned with 
policing in the 1990s (authored by police officers) acknowledges the fact that 'a 
series of police scandals has raised questions over police integrity'. The review 
recognises that scandals do occur from time to time and capture media attention but 
its authors point out that 'recently' there has been a succession and they note 
'Stalker, Wapping, the acquittal of the Guildford four, Kent crime figures and 
allegations concerning the West Midlands Crime Squad'. The review moves on to 
say:
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"To this might be added’ though not in the same sense o f  being scandal, the 
damaging effects o f  the Hillsborough tragedy. A series o f  critical newspaper 
articles have questioned not only the competence and integrity o f  the Service, but 
again drawn attention to apparent inadequacies o f  training, organisation, 
complaints procedures and leadership." (Operational Policing Review 1990, 
section 7: 5)
Moral panic rationality finds expression in new legislation e.g. P.A.C.E., new 
policy emphases e.g. Ethics and codes of ethics, and, new concepts e.g. 'The duty 
of care'. The Scarman report - with its many recommendations concerning training, 
supervision and management can, in part, be seen as an instance of moral panic 
rationality. Foster (1998) in her Report on Police Training and Recruitment to the 
Home Affairs Select Committee succinctly captures the prevalence of moral panic 
rationality throughout police as a whole when she notes that a characteristic of 
police officers at all levels of the organisation is that they, the police, represent the 
'thin blue line' maintaining order amongst chaos in an increasingly hostile public 
and political climate.
Socio-political professional rationality itself reflects the hopes of the enlightenment 
and is situated within that stream of thought predicated upon the idea of 'progress'. 
It is expressed whenever the 'fundamental' purposes or 'objects' of police are 
revisited and re-stated. In relatively recent times, for example, the Scarman report, 
in addition to moral panic rationality, reflected a socio-political rationality. Thus, 
in Part V of the report, ’Policing - Proposals and Recommendations' Scarman 
develops the application of two policing principles - 'consent and balance' as well 
as 'independence and accountability' - to the maintenance of public order in a multi­
racial society and, in the course of his discussion observes that the police are now 
professionals with a highly specialised set of skills and behavioral codes o f their 
own. He argued that in virtue of the new professionalism of the police they ran the 
risk of becoming distanced from the community and this led him to commend the 
debate on policing precisely because it 'restated' points fundamental to the British 
policing tradition - including the importance of policing by consent.
Following Scarman particular emphasis was placed upon re-securing an ethos for 
the police finding expression both in processes of community consultation and in 
ACPO's Police Service Statement of Common Purpose and Values in October 
1990. In addition, the development of'professional knowledge' has grown through 
the research activities of'centres of calculation' such as the Police Research Group 
and the National Crime and National Operations faculties established within
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National Police Training at the Bramshill site.
Socio-political rationality lies at the heart of the Crime and Disorder Act with its 
emphasis upon redefining the core purpose of police in terms o f ’crime reduction' 
effected through multi-agency collaborative partnerships and finds specific 
expression in the Home Secretary's insistence that police policies should be 
'evidence-led'.
Economic rationality began to seek prominence from the 1960s onwards as 
successive governments attempted to control public expenditure. Between 1969 and 
1974, the Home Office tried to introduce the Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting system (P.P.B.S.) the intention of which was to encourage police 
managers to use budgeting information to help them make decisions about the most 
effective use of their resources. It is expressed, in a relatively explicit form, in the 
Home Office circular, 114/1983 entitled 'Manpower, efficiency and effectiveness'. 
This circular observes that - as a result of a marked increase in police strength - the 
cost o f police services has 'increased substantially'. The circular continues by 
saying:
"After this rapid growth a period o f  consolidation is desirable, not least because 
the constraints on public expenditure at both central and local government levels 
make it impossible to continue with the sort o f  expansion which has occurred in 
recent years. Yet the workload shows no sign o f  diminishing. I f  the police service 
is to deal with this situation and retain public confidence it is essential that it 
should make the most effective use o f the substantial resources now available to it." 
(Home Office circular 114/1983: 1,2)
In the subsequent text the circular defines the criteria that would govern the Home 
Secretary's assessment of bids for increases in establishments the first of which 
states categorically that additional posts will not be authorised unless he (or she) 
is satisfied that the force's existing resources are used to best advantage. To that 
end, the Home Secretary would 'look to' HM Inspectors for their professional 
assessment of whether resources are directed 'in accordance with properly 
determined objectives and priorities'.
T h e  A u d it  C o m m iss io n  fu r th e r  e laborates  e co n o m ic  ra tiona lity  e spec ia lly  in the  
1990 p o lice  paper: 'E ffec tive  po lic ing  - pe rfo rm an ce  rev iew  in po lice  forces '. In 
th a t  p a p e r  its au tho rs  no te  tha t  w h ils t  the  police  m ade  co nsiderab le  p ro g ress  w ith  
its m a n a g e m e n t  sy s tem s th ro u g h o u t  the  decade  o f  the  e ighties, the  a ttem p ts  to 
im p ro v e  'perfo rm ance  rev iew  systems' had only m ixed success. The paper provides
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a critique of performance review practices including the fact that of poor 
monitoring of cost-effectiveness before detailing the improvements needed. The 
paper then provides a perspective on the 'police manager' as follows:
"The management style in the police service should be governed by the fac t that its 
officers are all professionals, paid salaries commensurate with other public sector 
professionals. Management systems should delegate responsibility to them fo r  
taking decisions using individual initiative... sub units and individuals should have 
the freedom to contribute to quality o f  service in the ways best suited to local 
circumstances.
The corollary is that they should be held accountable fo r  their actions. Better 
measurement o f  output makes line managers more accountable and reduces the 
need fo r  the centre to make detailed decisions about the resources used. 
Strengthening the performance review system is as much a matter o f  culture as o f  
management systems." (Audit Commission 1990: 2)
This is a significant observation because it begins to formalise the role of the new 
professional manager in the police service and the 'making up’ of a cost conscious 
'subject of power'. Most recently, Foster (1998) advocates that the police service 
should seek and attract highly qualified recruits because they will not only be more 
professional but will also 'save the organisation money'. In an extremely clear 
expression of economic rationality she refers to the work of Carter and Sapp (1989) 
who state:
"Police ... must be concerned with reducing liability risk not only because it is an 
ethical responsibility but also because o f  the pragmatic implications o f  resource 
management." (Carter and Sapp 1989: 163)
She develops the theme of economic rationality by referring to Guyot (1991) who 
has pointed out that organisations staffed by professionals do not often bear the cost 
of the professional training but place that burden upon the individual. Foster herself 
can be located within a more or less influential 'centre of calculation' - the 
University - directly involved with the training and development of police leaders 
and managers.
It seem s va lid  to argue tha t cen tres  o f  ca lcu la tion  co n tin u e  to in fuse  po lice  
leadersh ip  and m an ag em en t w ith the ex trao rd inary  ch a llenge  o f  reco n c il in g  th ree  
pow erful rationalities. T he  challenge is m ade even m ore dem and ing  because  o f  the 
'cha ins  o f  actors ' involved  in the pow er trans la t ion  and  po w er co n su m p tio n
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processes.
Nonetheless, because police leadership and management training takes as its 
responsibility the presentation of the new skills, knowledges and concepts wrought 
from the work of the centres of calculation, it necessarily involves grappling with 
the three rationalities - even when those rationalities are in conflict or demand more 
attention.
In the next section I shall examine the micrologics of power where the tutor meets 
the 'client' against this backdrop of governmental rationalities.
The micrologics o f  power
Whilst Bramshill (as the National Police Training site where a proportion o f police 
leadership and management training occurs) might have claims to be itself a 'centre 
of calculation' it is also the locale where the training actually occurs. In terms of the 
governmentality analytic, the individual tutor has the problem of governing the 
'client' group of police officers who occupy 'managerial' roles. That same tutor may 
be attempting to enact one or more rationalities, such as fostering ways of thinking 
and acting within an economic rationality or developing an analysis of the Crime 
and Disorder Act within the tradition of socio-political rationality or even providing 
a critique of the occupational culture and thereby embracing moral panic 
rationality.
Power, though is both given to and arrogated by the 'client' - who might also 
conceptualise him or herself as the 'customer' - in the form of formal/official, 
informal/unofficial and naturally expressive or directly communicative feedback 
mechanisms. So, for example, throughout the last twenty five years the staff at 
Bramshill have utilised a variety of instruments to secure data concerning the 
'evaluation' or valuation of the various 'inputs' that have taken place on courses. (In 
addition, overall course evaluations have also taken place.) These instruments have 
variously been entitled, 'Course evaluation', 'Course critique' or more recently, 
'Quality of Service' questionnaires. Not only has the 'input' been graded on some 
form of rating scale but a space has been provided for free text response (should the 
'client' wish to elaborate upon their experience). Moreover, the feedback has often 
been given anonymously. In consequence, the tutorial staff have been made aware 
of the way their work has been received and 'evaluated'.
T h e  in fo rm al feedback  m ech an ism  w orks  its w ay  th ro u g h  the  co n v ersa t io n s  tha t 
o c c u r  as  a resu lt  o f  social in teractions  and  encoun ters . T h ese  take  p lace  in
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corridors, over meals, in bars, back in the setting and context o f an individual's 
home force - and includes the observations of other members of the tutorial staff 
at Bramshill. These forms of feedback are in addition to those more immediate 
signals that occur during the actual tutor - client group encounter.
There is an unusual dance of power in terms of the relationship between the tutor 
and client group within police management training. A dance cannot, by definition, 
continue for too long if one or both parties refuse to lead or follow. If the material 
the tutor works with is confronting, disturbing, challenging, critical, 'difficult' or 
paradigmatically oppositional then it is hard to sustain the dance. Who, though, is 
out of step?
The staff generally recognise that they are engaged in a process that they come to 
describe as 'survival'. Different members of staff would adopt different survival 
strategies. Some take on a jovial, genial persona and teach from a basis of apparent 
ignorance or place themselves 'one down' in relation to police. Others use humour 
and jocularity to keep the students amused (and distracted). Others again, would 
use highly impactive and emotive video as a kind of shock tactic. These (and other) 
strategies all reflected ways of coping with the occupational culture. As one 
member of staff put it:
'To survive you fin d  yourself having to conform to the occupational culture.'
So, the tutorial staff develop a variety of survival strategies - keeping one step 
ahead, avoiding being trodden on etc. - as they attempt to manage the 'resistances' 
and 'private objections' of the individuals within the client group.
Leadership and management training events within Bramshill reveal a curious 
reversal of the more usual dynamics of power in professional development settings. 
Thus, rather than the client having to impress the tutor (in relation to their 
professional knowledge and managerial skills), the tutor has to impress the 
client(s). This is an ambiguous situation. It illustrates a refusal by the client to be 
a mere object of power but it also implies the refusal to be subjected to any 
governmental rationality.
I th ink  it is poss ib le  to accoun t for th is  p h en o m en o n  by exp lo ring  som e fea tures  in 
the  'm ak in g  - up' o f  police. To do this I shall refer no t on ly  to cer ta in  F o u cau ld ian  
concep ts  bu t a lso  to B ourd ieu 's  (1985) no tion  o f  'habitus '. I shall su g g es t  tha t, in 
add ition  to m oral panic, socio-political and eco n o m ic  ra tiona lities  tha t  can  be 
d isce rned  in po lice  leadersh ip  and m an ag em en t p rac tice  there  is a lso  a 'Social
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Darwinist - elitist’ rationality expressed sotto voce in terms of 'we know best'. 
Foucault has stated that:
"The goal o f  my work during the last twenty years has not been to analyse the 
phenomena o fp o w er... My objective, instead, has been to create a history o f  the 
different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects." 
(Foucault 1982: 208)
His exploration of the production of such subjects finds three modes o f their 
objectification. The first mode concerns ’dividing practices’ - where the subject is 
given both a social and personal identity. The second mode for turning human 
beings into objectified subjects is called by Rabinow (1984) 'scientific 
classification'. The 'divided off person can be studied and viewed through the 
conceptual frameworks of the different natural and social sciences. The third mode 
o f objectification concerns, as Foucault puts it, the way 'a human being turns him 
or herself into a subject’. Whilst in the first two objectifications the person is 
basically passive and constrained in the process of self-formation people perform 
a variety o f operations on their own bodies, souls, thoughts and conduct (This is 
probably why the French intellectuals describe, somewhat pejoratively, manuals 
on self-management as 'psycho self-service').
Police are, once they accept the identity of'recruit', divided off from the rest of the 
citizenry and inducted into a 'disciplined service'. As Rabinow writes:
"Discipline proceeds from an organisation o f  individuals in space, and it requires 
a specific enclosure in space. Once established, this grid permits the sure 
distribution o f  the individuals who are to be disciplined and supervised. In a 
factory, the procedure facilitates productivity; in a school it assures orderly 
behaviour; in a town, it reduces the risk o f  dangerous crowds, wandering 
vagabonds, or epidemic diseases" (Rabinow 1984: 17)
So d iv id e d  in space , they  b eco m e  sub jec t to  Foucau lt 's  'sc ience  o f  d isc ip line ' 
(F i l l in g h a m , 1993), w h ic h  has  five principles:
- S p a tia lisa t ion : a p lace  for everyone  and the  p lace  ind ica ting  w ho  and  w h a t  a 
p e rso n  is
- M in u te  con tro l o f  ac tiv ity  (espec ia lly  th rough  the use o f  t im e tab les)
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- Repetitive exercises (such as drill, recitation etc.)
- Detailed hierarchies (where each level of the hierarchy keeps watch over the 
lower ranks)
- Normalising judgments: disciplinary power both rewards and punishes. That 
which transgresses its dictates tends to be defined not only as bad but as abnormal.
Like the prison, the factory, the school and the hospital, the police organisation uses 
space, the control of activities, repetitive exercises, hierarchies and normative 
pressures to ’make-up1 the body/thought of its members. In this process police are 
differentiated from the citizenry. Police discourse confidently includes references 
to the 'we': W e are a 'can-do' culture'; 'We came up with the idea o f  partnership
- the government kidnapped our idea1, 'Only we know what is going on1, 'If we were 
organised we'd be dangerous'', 'We like structure - we prefer it that way'.
However, citizenship is not a term extensively used in police discourse. Persons are 
aggregated into a more amorphous category: The public. Once police are 'separated 
off they exist within a relatively steep hierarchy within which a careful 'Social 
Darwinist - elitist' rationality is enacted. Profiles of the police occupational culture 
(after Johnson and Scholes) show it to be drenched in rituals and routines which 
serve as technologies sustaining a world-view that is more or less overtly 
'supremacist'. This is difficult to describe precisely because it is neither officially 
condoned nor explicitly expressed. It is manifested more as a fractal form of a 
wider cultural pattern of social division and gradings. It is reflected in such 
observations as: 'I've spent most o f  my professional life climbing the ladder - 
getting out o f  the mass'; 'The people (in area X) really are an underclass' and is 
expressed through the acquisition and mimicry of the upper middle class symbols 
of the bourgeoisie.
T h e  analy t ic  language  o f 'S o c ia l  D arw in is t  - e litist' ra t iona li ty  is o ften  m a n n e re d  
and  d iscreet. It refers  to  h ie rarchy , supero rd ina tes  and  subord ina tes ,  leve ls  o f  
c iv ilisa tion , levels  o f  d eve lopm en t,  lineage, and  b reed ing . It reflec ts  p a te rn a lism  
and accep ts  the  'es tab lishm ent'.  It uses concep ts  such  as 'the front line', 'the tro o p s  
on  the  g round ' and  even  'the boys and girls', as w ell as 'o u t there ' (m e a n in g  the  
suspec t w o rld  o f ' t h e  public ') . Peop le  are 'in the  know ' o r  'stupid '.
Its ob jectives  are to achieve the correct and w orthy  order, to 'm anage ' (i.e. con tro l)  
d ivers ity , the  accura te  g rad ing  o f  ind iv iduals  and  social g roups , the  'correc t ' 
d is tribution o f  the good, the proper organisation o f  society  - a long  socio-b io logical
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lines, education and re-education, training and re-training.
Its technologies are rewards for model behaviour and punishments for deviation 
within a 'detailed hierarchy', rituals confirming levels of status and esteem, an 
economy of power symbols, power structures, control structures, the cultivation of 
fear, rhetoric, the privileges of command, exclusion, and a strategy of change 
management where change is a design 'to stay the same'.
Although this rationality is distinctly conservative and 'traditional' and might be, 
in genealogical terms, headed for extinction, it is sustained by the exclusive 
communities of discourse enjoyed by police leaders and managers and the very 
heritage of the police organisation itself. Lest this analysis be taken as inaccurate 
I should like to defend it by citing the type of evidence emerging from cultural 
audit processes.
Since 1991 one of the educational structures used on the leadership development 
programmes at the Police Staff College, Bramshill has been a version of the 
cultural audit process suggested by Johnson and Scholes. After the briefest of 
introductions to the notion of occupational culture small groups of police leaders 
and managers have been asked to generate information concerning the types of 
symbols, rituals and routines, stories and myths, organisational structures, control 
structures and power structures that characterise, or are expressed in, their police 
organisations. These data allow certain interpretations to be made concerning the 
way that social interaction is both shaped and shapes police behaviour and 
experience.
To exemplify some of those 'shaping' processes I have selected from recent data 
generated by police middle-managers in the early part of 1998. In response to the 
question, 'What rituals and routines are practised in the police organisation?' groups 
(six per group) of middle managers produced the following types of list - along 
with the meaning they were able to attach to the practice:
R itu a l/R o u tin e :  'Initiation ceremonies /  attestation o f  newcomers'
M ean in g :  'Do people f i t  in?'
R itu a l/R o u tin e :  'The wind-up'
M ean in g :  'Testingpeople - they need to be able to 'take it"
R itu a l/R o u tin e :  'Humour valve'
M ean in g :  'The functions o f  humour - release o f tension, showing hardness ...'
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Ritual/Routine: 'Drinking - nights, earlies, lates (shifts)'
Meaning: 'Bonding, unwinding, acceptance, fear'
Ritual/Routine: 'Morningprayers'
Meaning: 'Control, a need to know'
Ritual/Routine: 'Meetings, bloody meetings'
Meaning: 'Control, information dissemination'
Ritual/Routine: 'Tea making and other menial tasks'
Meaning: 'Know your place'
Immediately these data point to patterns of interaction indicating that police are 
inducted into cultural forms which are hierarchical ('know your place', 'control') 
and demand certain sorts of psychosocial responses if the individual is to be a 
fully-fledged cultural member or player ('bonding', the acceptance and use of a 
certain sort of humour etc.).
The dividing and disciplinary practices of police create (after Bourdieu, 1985) a 
distinct 'habitus' - a disposition of dispositions. This 'habitus' has been explored 
from the onset of the sociological, anthropological and psychological study of 
police (Banton, 1964, Skolnick, 1967, Neiderhoffer, 1967, Wilson, 1968, 
Rubinstein, 1973, Ker Muir, 1977, Reiner, 1985, Brown, 1992). Lodged within a 
steep hierarchy - where power is perceived to be used as a weapon over others and 
the self - and 'normalised' - police become disposed to denigrate non-police and 
to see them as 'mere civilians'. In consequence, the 'exchange' process in the 
context of police leadership and management education is rendered unusual. 
Bourdieu's outline of a theory of practice illustrates how social practice is 'all a 
question of style'. The educator (or trainer) finds him or herself operating in ways 
analogous to gift exchange. They offer the gift of practical or theoretical 
knowledge. The 'feedback' mechanisms reveal that the gift is rejected. The 
adversarial, suspicious, dismissive habitus of the client group prejudges and 
condemns.
Conclusion: The problem
T he  g o v e rn m en ta l i ty  thesis  and the concep t o f  g o v e rn m en t-a t-a -d is tan ce  are  
rem arkab ly  i l lum inating  in the unders tand ing  o f  police  m a n ag em en t tra in ing . T he  
clien t g ro u p  exerc ises  a high level o f  pow er ov e r  the  tu to r  and m a k es  the
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government o f the ’learning setting' especially problematic. The content o f police 
management training embodies a number of rationalities but it is not at all clear 
whether any of these rationalities are truly congruent with the modal rationality of 
the client group. It is not entirely clear what this rationality is although students of 
the police occupational culture point to its gnostic character.
I want to argue that police management training continues to be liable to 
domination by a moral panic rationality - which finds itself having to emphasise the 
image-management of police. The emphases within police management training 
emerge as responses to crises. Government-at-a-distance through' centres of 
calculation' determine those patterns of emphases that are designed to continue to 
reassure a citizenry fearful of threat and concerned with 'justice'.
The centres of calculation and their subtly or grossly different governing 
rationalities infuse the content and methods of police leadership and management 
training with conflicts and contradictions. A moral panic rationality is always likely 
to resurface because of the 'deep structure' moral values underpinning the modern 
liberal, welfare or even neo-liberal state. Should police be perceived either as 
incompetent or unjust then the curriculum is, momentarily at least, dominated by 
the task of responding to the 'crisis' or the panic. So, the first problem stemming 
from the processes of power in the modern state concerns the instability of the 
curriculum.
The liberal governmental rationality has allowed a new police figure to emerge - 
the police officer as a customer or consumer of the training experience. Customers 
are intrinsically 'picky'. So, the more unpalatable, difficult, disturbing, paradigm 
breaking, challenging, critical or demanding the curriculum material and methods 
the less likely is the customer to be pleasured. Thus, the second problem for 
curriculum delivery lies in the 'resistances' and 'private objections' of the 'subjects 
o f power'. This is especially worrying because higher police training and 
development stands in danger of being little more than 'infotainment' or 
'edutainment'. As one senior police tutor on the staff at Bramshill remarked recently 
in a research seminar: "I don't think we ever get to the real issues"
It is the social interactions in the milieu of the police organisation - its occupational 
culture(s) - that come to 'make-up' police. Foucault has correctly identified a 
science of discipline which shapes and constrains the mind and body of its subjects 
and, uniquely, the police 'make up' themselves in terms, it seems, of a rationality 
like no other. It stems from Foucault's rationality 'police' (i.e. total control) and a 
distinct view of the nature of human nature: homo fallibilens.
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There are strong grounds for arguing that moral panic rationality will continue to 
exert a powerful influence upon the practice of police leadership and management 
because o f the significance granted to ethical concepts in the practices o f liberal 
democracies. The enquiry into the police investigation of the murder o f Stephen 
Lawrence conducted by Sir William MacPherson of Cluny resulted in the 
publication of a report which not only reproduced earlier concerns about the ethics 
of the police organisation voiced in the earlier part of the decade by Woodcock 
(1992) but also saw the expression of a rationality that, were it to be expressed, 
would cast police leaders and managers in the role of social philosophers 
attempting to enact a 'Human rights - diversity' governmental rationality. This 
rationality is nuanced less towards the 'panic' side of moral consciousness and 
experience but more towards a critical emancipatory rationality and is captured in 
Woodcock's (1990) critique of the police institution:
"What is happening to the police is that a nineteenth century institution is being 
dragged into the twenty first century. Despite all the later mythology ofDixon, the 
police never really were the police o f  the whole people but a mechanism set up to 
protect the affluent from what the Victorians described as the dangerous classes. " 
(Woodcock, 1990: 12)
Human rights considerations have come to the fore and one can confidently predict 
that police will be under especial pressures to meet their exacting criteria in the 
decades ahead. However, the fact that it is possible to discern competing or 
conflicting rationalities in police leadership and management - as well as within the 
provision of police leadership and management training - is not, it itself, 
intrinsically worrying. A dialectical view of reality would take such a situation as 
inevitable - and would see in it the basis for change. Equally, it is possible to 
understand the expression of economic, moral panic and socio-political rationalities 
as different moments in the search for accountability.
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Chapter fourteen
Action research and the genesis o f  professional knowledge: data gathering and 
analysis in support o f  educational conversations
"One does not teach what one does not know. But neither, in a democratic 
perspective, ought one to teach what one knows without first, knowing what those 
one is about to teach know, and on what level they know it; and second, without 
respecting this knowledge. One begins with that which is implicit in the reading o f  
the world o f  those about to learn what the one about to teach knows." (Freire, 
1996: 130)
In this chapter I shall describe and discuss the data patterns emerging from 
successive versions of the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire'. I shall similarly attend 
to the information generated by the 'Moral Ethos Questionnaire' and the subsequent 
’Organisational Ethics Questionnaire'.
These questionnaires were designed, primarily, to act as learning structures in the 
service of an 'ethics' education. The relative absence of teaching material - and 
particularly instrumentation to help facilitate awareness-raising, personal auditing 
and diagnostic processes, and, discussion amongst peers - meant that it was 
possible for me to construct a series of questionnaires that might make a 
contribution to these aspects of the overall educational experience.
In addition, I imagined that the data yielded by the questionnaires would enhance 
the quality of the content of the 'ethics unit', and, that the information would 
contribute new knowledge concerning the perceptions of and the psychological 
development of police managers - as well as the 'moral' character of police 
organisations.
I hoped that, through the process of introducing the information arising from the 
questionnaires to course participants, I might be assisted in achieving both the 
immediate goal of 'making ethics come alive' and also the deeper goals, for an 
ethics education, of'reinforcing moral resolve', increasing 'moral sensitisation' and 
'imparting moral expertise' described by Kleinig (1990). I also imagined that the 
data patterns might come to help contribute to a wider debate about the nature of 
police ethics and police integrity.
However, I should emphasise that despite discovering certain findings that have 
interested a number of persons in academic communities (e.g. Caless, 1998, Foster,
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1999) not one single reference was ever made to the data patterns emerging from 
the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire by any course participant in the written 
evaluations of the 'ethics unit'. On three occasions, however, individual officers did 
speak to me about the data. One noted h o w 'remarkable' the co-incidence was 
between his own responses to the questionnaire and the overall data pattern. 
Another said he was 'glad that at least some research'was 'takingplace' on the 
subject because it was 'sorely needed', whilst the third asked me if he could include 
some of the data in an essay he was completing for a first degree. I was informed 
by two staff colleagues - at different stages of the inquiry - that some groups of 
students resented providing data and information. They were, however, unable to 
estimate the frequency and pervasiveness of this sentiment.
Beginning the process o f  constructing a picture o f  the moral characteristics o f  
police managers and their organisation
In November 1993, a few months after laying the foundations for the inquiry, I 
included, amongst the teaching materials, a diagnostic instrument - which came to 
be known as the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire'.This first instrument was wide- 
ranging in scope and constituted the first occasion upon which I was attempting to 
gather information from a large group of police middle managers; I was more 
concerned, however, that the course participants use the instrument for discussion 
purposes in the service of educational aims .
72 Chief Inspectors were asked to provide written information to questions 
organised under the following five headings:
- Moral development - including an identification of the elements at the heart of the 
individual's moral code
- The moral dilemmas in policing
- S e lf -p e rcep tio n  o f  pe rsonal eth ical s tandards
- T h e  m ora l ch arac te r  o f  the  police  o rgan isa tion
- T he  re sp o n se  to  the  po lice  serv ice  s ta tem en t o f  eth ical p rinc ip les
I co llected  the ir  responses, sorted the data into a n u m b er  o f  s im ple  categories , and 
reflec ted  the  pa tte rn  o f  data  back  to the s tuden t group.
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Through using this first instrument I was able to begin developing a picture of the 
'moral world' of police leaders and managers. The main features emerging from the 
written responses to the questions were:
- A majority of officers described the core of their moral system as organised 
around moral principles such as 'justice' and 'equality'
- Immediate family members had exerted most impact upon the individual's moral 
development
- The police service had, in the long run, enhanced the moral development of a 
small majority of the respondents. 20% of respondents had experienced moral 
corrosion whilst another 20% found that the police experience had exerted both 
positive and negative effects
- The conduct of fellow police officers was identified most frequently as the source 
o f moral dilemmas
- A very large majority of respondents had experienced some type of moral conflict 
in the course of their career as a police officer
- A very large majority perceived themselves 'highly ethical'. Almost 80% had 
engaged in unethical conduct at some point in their police service
- The most commonly identified barrier to ethical behaviour within the police 
organisation was the 'police culture'
- A majority of respondents identified at least three ways to improve the moral 
character of the police organisation. The commonest response was to advocate a 
change in police culture
- Almost 60% of the respondents had a positive reaction to the draft statement of 
ethical principles
- Just under 50% of the respondents thought that if the police service were to adopt 
the statement of ethical principles then it would lead to improvements in the 
professional standards of police officers. However 50% thought that adoption 
would make no real difference to the conduct of the police
I was able to include these general findings in the actual lecture/presentation
391
content given to the successive intakes of police leaders and managers throughout 
1994.1 then began a more systematic process of data collection in the search for 
answers to a set of emerging questions.
Focusing the inquiry - the search fo r  information in support o f  an 'ethics 
education'
The decade of the 1990s had begun with the closely interrelated emphasis upon 
clarifying the ends, means and values of policing as well as the development of a 
'quality of service’ philosophy. Central to both lay the articulation and adoption of 
the police service statement of common purpose and values.
The first research version of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire sought to examine 
how police middle-managers conceptualised the purpose of the police service and 
the related primary duty of the police service. In addition, since the role 'police 
manager' necessarily carries with it additional obligations, the questionnaire 
examined the way police managers construed their primary responsibilities. Finally, 
and because the ethics educational experience was designed for police leaders and 
managers, I wanted to begin the process of understanding more about the moral 
character of the police organisation. The initial indicators from the first informal 
questionnaire had suggested that police culture (and the 'climate' of the organisation 
as a whole) contained features that constituted barriers to the expression of high 
ethical standards.
In consequence, the first version of the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire' asked four 
questions:
Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire (Version 1)
Question 1: What, in your opinion, is the most important objective or purpose of 
the police?
Question 2: What, in your opinion, is the most important duty of a police officer?
Q u es tio n  3: W hat, in y o u r  op in ion , is y o u r  m o s t  im p o r tan t  du ty  as a  p o lice  
m an ag er ,  ad m in is tra to r  and  superv isor?
Q uestion  4: W hat help  w ou ld  you like from  the po lice  o rgan isa tion  to sus ta in  and  
en h an ce  y o u r  m oral s tandards?
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Prior to administering the questionnaire I generated the following hypotheses (or, 
more accurately, ’conjectures’). These conjectures represented my general 
expectations in relation to the pattern of responses that would be revealed.
Conjecture 1: If the ACPO Statement of Common Purpose and Values had become 
integrated into the fabric of UK policing then a majority of respondents would refer 
to it (or substantial aspects of its content) in their answer to question 1
Conjecture 2: The ACPO Statement of Common Purpose and Values - as well as 
the draft statement of ethical principles - had provided authoritative statements 
outlining the role-related duties of police officers. If  these instruments had been 
integrated into the conceptual frameworks of police managers then the responses 
of a majority of respondents to question 2 would be related to these instruments
Conjecture 3: The anthropological and social scientific literature had presented an 
image of the police organisation as hierarchical and militaristic. At the same time, 
the police organisation embraced aspects of solidarity and a welfare culture. Police 
managers would, therefore, be likely to exhibit considerable variation in their 
response to question 3.
Conjecture 4: It appeared that the 'police culture' had become a 'catch-all' term for 
all police ills. In consequence, it would not be surprising if 'culture change' were 
to be identified as the most helpful way of providing support to the individual in 
relation to question 4. The police organisation had been depicted as a 'power' and 
'role' culture (Plumridge 1985). In consequence, police middle-managers - in virtue 
of their structural position - would be likely to show concerns about the quality of 
senior police leadership
60 Chief Inspectors responded to the questionnaire in the Spring of 1994 
Results
Question 1: What, in your opinion, is the most important objective or purpose o f  
the police?
26 d if fe ren t  ca tego ries  o f  re sp o n se  w ere  d is tingu ished . T h ese  w ere  a m a lg am a ted  
into 12 c o m b in e d  (agg reg a ted )  categories . T he  four la rgest ca tegories  w ere:
- T h e  pro tec tion  o f  life and property , to protect the innocent and society, to  protect 
the  p u b lic  from  the  'forces o f  evil' (N = 14)
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- The maintenance of law and order, to maintain order, to maintain the normal state 
of society (N = 9)
- Public safety 'in all its guises': The safety of the community and all individuals, 
public security and tranquillity 'such that each and every member of society can go 
about their daily lives without fear from others' (N = 9)
- Uphold the law and/or uphold the 'rule of law' (N = 7)
Discussion
At first glance the data suggest considerable variety amongst the responses to the 
first question. It would be tempting to say that there is a real difference of opinion 
amongst police leaders and managers in relation to their views concerning the most 
important purpose of police. This may be misleading. It is possible that the 
apparently different individual responses were trying to say the same thing. Thus, 
for example, the reply 'maintaining law and order' might have been understood to 
entail the 'protection of the community'. Similarly, 'upholding the rule of law' may 
have been understood as embracing the idea of public service.
In addition, the question itself might have been interpreted by several o f the 
respondents to mean that there was, in 'fact' (i.e. known by some ultimate authority) 
one aspect o f policing that was, truly, more important than the others. If  
respondents interpreted the question in such a fashion then they would have 
suppressed a response that might have tried to synthesise a number of police 
functions.
Nonetheless, it would have been possible to provide a more abstract and inclusive 
form of response e.g. by stating that the objective/purpose of police has been 
articulated in ACPO's Statement of Common Purpose and Values or to have used 
a more personal way of integrating the several ends and means of policing into a 
single coherent statement.
N o  responden t m ade any explicit reference to  the  varieties o f  defin ition  concern ing  
the  core  p u rp o se  o r  ro le  o f  police  tha t  have  been  su g g es ted  in the  acad em ic  
literature. N o r  did any  person  refer to the  m ore  s tandard  'official' d o cu m en ts  
d e f in in g  the  pu rpose(s)  o f  police  such  as the  o rig inal in s truc tions  to the 
M etropolitan  Police, the Royal C om m ission  on Police (1962) or the Scarm an report 
(1981). In re la tion  to 'C on jec tu re  1' the data  sugges ted  tha t  'official au thorita tive '
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definitions had not been internalised by the respondents.
The actual wording of the responses generated by the respondents to the first 
question shows that two-thirds brought some individuality to the way they 
expressed their responses. However, of this two-thirds only twelve officers 
introduced a distinctly discernible personal voice. The remaining respondents 
’borrowed’ their response from pre-existing and well-worn phrasings. At a much 
later phase of the inquiry process I was to learn that the police organisation was 
perceived by a majority of the middle-managers as a 'rules and procedures’ 
organisation - a consequence of which is to suppress individuality and autonomy 
as well as the habit of asking 'fundamental' kinds of question. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that the respondents were prone to cliche and the familiar.
Rather surprisingly, only five out of the sixty respondents reprised the much cited 
sentence from the original instructions to officers in the Metropolitan police i.e. :
"It should be understood, at the outset, that the principal object to be attained is 
"the prevention o f  crime." To this great end every effort o f  the Police is to be 
directed." (Instructions to the Metropolitan Police 1829: 1)
In fact, not one single respondent wrote simply: 'The prevention of crime' in 
response to the first question.
The largest category (N = 14) emphasised the importance of the 'protection' police 
provide to the people policed. If, to this category were added those categories 
emphasising the 'safety' afforded to the public by police then almost one half of the 
respondents would be included.
'Law enforcement' was chosen by only two of the sixty respondents. This, added 
to the relatively infrequent occasions when the word 'law' was used in the 
responses, suggests that police middle-managers do not limit their conception of 
the police purpose to something as narrow as the application of the law.
It might have been the case that the encompassing notion of'upholding the Rule of 
Law' would have been identified by police middle-managers as the most important 
purpose of police but this term was chosen by only two of the sixty respondents.
Im p o r tan t ly ,  the  idea  o f  police  w o rk in g  as partners  w ith in  the  m ore  genera l field 
o f  c o m m u n i ty  safe ty  and public  service  p rov is ion  w as  never explic itly  m en tioned  
by  an y  o fficer.
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Overall, the data suggest that different police managers do hold subtly (or perhaps 
significantly) different opinions on the most important o f police purposes despite 
the fact that the ACPO Statement of Common Purpose and Values had been 
published four years previously and had been both commended to the service as a 
whole and widely recommended for acceptance by police officers as providing an 
adequate answer to questions concerning the proper raison d'etre of police.
Question 2: What, in your opinion, is the most important duty o f  a police officer?
28 different categories of response were distinguished. The categories were 
amalgamated into 13 combined (aggregate) categories. The three largest categories 
were:
-T o  provide a service to the public (N = 14)
- Conduct expressing virtues (e.g. honesty) (N = 12)
-T o  protect life and property/preserve the quality of life (N = 11)
Discussion
Although Laughame and Newman (1985) had discussed a set of duties both of 
'function' and 'method', no mention was made of this potential resource either as a 
device to help effect a synthesis of the purposes of police - or as a way of providing 
an answer to the question concerning the 'most important duty' of police. Nor was 
any reference made to the draft statement of ethical principles as a source for 
defining the most important duty (or duties) of a police officer. In relation to 
'Conjecture 2' the data suggested that formal definitions had not become integrated 
into the discourse of the respondents.
T h e  re sp o n ses  to  q ues tion  2 sugges t tha t the  'Q uality  o f  Serv ice ' p h i lo so p h y  had  
b eg u n  to  be  em b raced  by  a lm ost one  fifth o f  the  responden ts .  T hus , 14 o u t  o f  60 
officers , m ad e  so m e  re fe rence  to  p ro v id ing  a 'service ' to  th e  pub lic . T h is  d a ta  
beg ins  to establish  a link w ith  W aters (1996, 1999) finding  that, in the  m ain , po lice  
m an ag e rs  w ere  no t averse  to the  'Q uality ' p h ilo sophy ; th is  p h i lo so p h y  w as 
b e co m in g  re la tive ly  pervasive  as a m anageria l doc tr ine  in po lic ing . T h e  second  
largest c a tego ry  (N =  12) noted that the m ost im portan t du ty  o f  po lice  w as  to 
d isp lay  c o n d u c t  w h ich  em bod ied  m oral virtue. T hese  o fficers , in the ir  responses , 
show ed  sim ilarities  o f  em phasis  with som e o f  the s ta tem ents  in the  d raft s ta tem en t
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of ethical principles.
A noticeable feature of the data was the lack of a discernible personal voice in the 
written responses. In the main, the responses were not original; they were 
derivative. So, for example, respondents reproduced pithy statements such as 'the 
prevention and detection of crime' or 'upholding the Queen's Peace' without any 
personalised elaboration. A 'personal' voice indicates that a person, has begun to 
embrace the Socratic injunction that we must 'think for ourselves'. The fact that 
only a quarter of the respondents provided some evidence that they had genuinely 
grounded their answer in an autonomous reflective process illustrates how a wider 
educational design process providing those same individuals with a 'reflective 
space' was likely to be an alien form of experience.
It could also serve as a rough indicator pointing towards the absence of autonomous 
self-managing and self-monitoring professionals. However, the third question did 
appear to draw out from the respondents a more personal voice:
Question 3: What, in your opinion, is your most important duty as a police 
manager, administrator and supervisor?
The responses were sorted into five categories:
- An expression of the new 'service philosophy' (N = 11)
Example: To enable the front line officers/supervisors to provide a service to 
members o f  the public and to give support and guidance to officers themselves
- Effectiveness and efficiency (N = 10)
Example: To make the most cost-effective use o f  the resources I  control towards 
achieving the stated/agreed aims o f  the service and within clearly identified 
priorities
- Managing in accordance with moral values/moral consciousness - including 
support and empowerment of colleagues (N = 32)
Examples: To lead by example and uphold the professional integrity o f  the force  
in general; To uphold the principle o f  ethics, discipline code etc. within the police 
service. In addition to stamp out bigotry, oppression, racial/sexual harassment o f  
colleagues
397
- An emphasis on achieving police objectives (N = 3)
Example: Ensure that the unit under my command is operating smoothly in 
conjunction with Police units towards the common aim o f  achieving the overall 
police objectives
- Miscellaneous (N = 4)
Discussion:
Emerging from the responses is, prima facie, something unmistakably 
commendable. These are impressive responses - even though they are contingent 
on the nature of the question. They suggest how important explicit ethical discourse 
might be in helping police practitioners to guide, influence and inform their 
decision-making and conduct.
Although the data were sorted into five categories an actual reading of the original 
responses shows how varied they are. Thus, the largest category, 'Managing in 
accordance with moral values/moral consciousness - including support and 
empowerment o f  colleagues’ includes a loosely associated collection of responses 
which directly or by implication include some moral features.
The data also shows that the relatively new 'service' philosophy and the somewhat 
older 'economy, effectiveness and efficiency’ philosophy (which itself was captured 
in Home Office circular 114 of 1983, and was an ancestor of the quality of service' 
philosophy) had come to provide ways of conceptualising the most important duty 
of police managers by twenty one (i.e. one third) of the respondents.
The most striking feature of the data is the amount of variety and contrast amongst 
the responses. The following comments exemplify this:
- To ensure that policing is implemented equally and fairly to internal and external 
customers which must be designed to meet the needs o f  the local community not 
political dogma
- To direct resources towards upholding the rule o f  law
- To support those I manage, and to encourage the most conducive environment 
and opportunities for free-thinking individualism and respect fo r others (police and
398
public)
- To provide the kind o f  guidance, direction and influence that enables my sta ff to 
maximise their potential
Thus, in relation to 'Conjecture 3' the data confirms the notion that there is 
considerable diversity amongst the middle-managers of the police service.
However, these responses inevitably raise the question of a possible contrast 
between espoused theory and theory in practice. Richards (1990) in the course of 
his analysis of police occupational culture asserts that police take on a chameleon 
character and become highly skilled at reproducing for their audience that which 
they think will seem appropriate (or satisfactory) for that audience. On this thesis, 
police will learn, rapidly, what it is they need to present whilst they are in 
'management mode'. In short, they 'learn their lines' quickly and well.
Question 4: What help would you like from the police organisation to sustain and 
enhance your moral standards?
The data were organised into five categories. (The responses of some respondents 
were sorted into more than one category)
- Senior (and other) management change - e.g. 'improved integrity' (N = 18)
Example: Acknowledgement that some wrongdoing does occur and that there 
should be greater training fo r  supervisors with a clear message to them that the 
responsibility lies with them as individuals
- A general organisation and/or culture change (N = 28)
Example: The establishing o f  a service wide culture that - to have standards is to 
be ' i n t o  belong, rather than to be ridiculed and isolated as an odd ball. 
Compulsory job  rotation for all officers every three years. Even a temporary lateral 
move to a diametrically opposed sphere o f work will spread knowledge, experience, 
and expertise throughout all branches o f  the service, and at the same time will 
destroy the canteen culture and clique mentality which leads to problems
- A  specific organisation change (N= 4)
Example: Regular meetings with peers which specifically deal with the subject
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ethics. Understanding on the part o f  supervisory senior management ranks
- No change needed (N = 9)
Example: I  am unconvinced that any external measures would fundamentally 
influence my moral integrity
- Allowing the person to be more able to be more of themselves (N = 6)
Example: I  should like always to be treated with respect and compassion in 
particular as an individual
- Miscellaneous (N = 7)
Discussion
In the course of designing for the ethics education experience I had studied an 
enormous range of television documentaries featuring police in action. On 
occasion, those documentaries had featured police managers - at both strategic and 
middle-management levels. Those managers had demonstrated a range of styles of 
interaction and distinctive ways of using discourse. All were instructive. However, 
and consistently, the response of course participants to the video clips I would use
- that featured police managers in action - was usually negative. Thus, for example, 
one exchange involving a strategic level manager and a 'business unit' manager - 
which, to my eye, seemed entirely reasonable, was ridiculed by my audience. The 
superintendent (the business unit manager) was going, in fact, to bUchastised',
1hung out to dry ', 'up against the firing squad', 'disembowelled' and worse, by the 
strategic level manager.
So, it was unsurprising that slightly more than one quarter of the respondents (18 
out of 60) identified 'senior management change' as a specific feature that might 
help them sustain and enhance their moral standards The wording of the question 
probably minimised the extent of the negativity that was likely to be felt because 
it asked what 'help' police managers would want. The police culture appears to be 
simultaneously a welfare culture and a culture of self-sufficiency. In general police 
managers would not be especially disposed to ask for or expect 'help'.
H a lf  the re sp o n d en ts  w an ted  to see a general o r  spec if ic  o rgan isa tiona l change . 
P lum ridge  (1988)  had underlined  the  ex ten t to w h ich  the  po lice  o rg an isa t io n  w as 
pe rce ived  as a m ix tu re  o f  a 'pow er' and 'role' cu ltu re  and  h o w  a m ajo rity  o f  its
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managers wished, in preference, for an ’achievement' (or even a 'person') culture.
Together, these two response themes support 'Conjecture 4'.
The data collected here was beginning to suggest that police managers were 
practising within a cultural milieu that departed from exemplary moral standards 
and that they wished for a more 'ethical' organisation.
The following remark is not atypical of communications made by police middle- 
managers in the discussion contexts which took place during the ethics education 
experiences. It not only points to the need for a culture change but also highlights 
the contradiction between the fact that the individual respondents tended to have 
a positive view of their own moral standards whilst participating in an organisation 
that was morally defective:
’ A culture change that puts the service second to the primary object o f  serving the 
public. An acceptance that honest self-criticism and self-appraisal is a positive 
thing, not one that can be used against the individual in selection fo r  
promotion/specialist posts. Currently it pays to fabricate.'
Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire (Version 2)
The second version of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire had four objectives.
First, I wanted to understand how police middle-managers would choose to 
characterise their 'moral code'. Would they, for example, portray themselves as 
persons who were 'principled' or morally expedient?
Second, I wanted to discover how 'ethical' they perceived themselves to be.
Third, I wanted to gather more data concerning how improvements might be made 
to the moral character of the police organisation.
Finally, and related to this latter point, I wanted to discover their reaction to the 
publication of the draft statement of ethical principles. A 'service wide' consultation 
process was taking place in relation to the statement of ethical principles and I 
thought that my data might help to inform that process.
A s w ith  the  first q u es tionna ire ,  this questionnaire  consis ted  o f  four questions . 
C o u rse  pa rtic ipan ts  w ere  asked  to provide w ritten  answ ers  to each question . T hey
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were also told that they would receive - on their return to Bramshill - a presentation 
describing the data patterns emerging. The constituent questions were:
Question 1. If  you were to describe your moral code in one or two sentences how 
would you do so?
Question 2. How ethical do you perceive yourself to be?
Each respondent rated themselves on an analogue rating scale ranging from 
'Extremely ethical' (100) to 'Extremely unethical' (0)
Question 3. If you were to improve the moral character of the police organisation 
what, in your view, would be the most effective way of doing so?
Question 4. The police service is developing a set of ethical principles. Please 
would you describe your reaction to such a set of principles. (Each respondent was 
given a copy of the draft statement)
Results: N = 63 Respondents (Chief Inspectors) - Late Spring of 1994
Prior to administering the questionnaire I generated the following 'conjectures':
Conjecture 5: Because of the 'moral muteness' of managers generally I imagined 
that the moral code of police middle-managers would be expressed in conventional 
terms - e.g. 'the golden rule'.
Conjecture 6: Jackson (1993) had suggested that people generally perceive 
themselves as 'ethical' rather than 'unethical'. I supposed that police middle- 
managers would incline towards the 'highly ethical' region of the continuum.
Conjecture 7: Police culture would be identified as the target' for change in order 
to enhance the 'moral character' of the police organisation
Conjecture 8: If police were change-resistant then a majority would have a form of 
negative reaction to the draft statement of ethical principles
Question 1. I f  you were to describe your moral code in one or two sentences how 
would you do
T he  data  w ere  sorted  into six categories:
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- Moral values/principles made explicit (including, rarely, a mention o f the 
importance of'hum an rights' concerns) (N = 22)
Example: The promotion and protection o f  human dignity in the face o f  ever 
increasing opposition - ultimately impossible to achieve
- The golden rule/a close variant of the golden rule/Christianity-referenced (N = 15) 
Example: To treat everyone as I  would expect to be treated
- The end justifies (or can) justify the means (N = 4)
Example: The end justifies the means - so long as it is an honest end (I leave 
'honest' to my own interpretation)
- A general non-specific response (N = 11)
Example: Adherence to a clear value system
- 'Original' statements (N = 8)
Examples: To maximise contentment o f  me and mine with smallest detrimental 
effect upon those surrounding and i f  possible to benefit greatest number in so 
doing; Do as you would be done by and (paradoxically) do unto others before they 
do you
- Miscellaneous (N =2)
E x a m p le :  A Kantian concept o f  the se lf from which the good action will be in 
accordance with the intrinsic worth o f  every individual. This concept o f  the se lf 
generates obligations from which correlative rights can be derived
Discussion
A  sm all g roup  o f  officers  (approx im ate ly  10%) adm it tha t the ir  m oral code  is best 
c h a rac te r ised  in te rm s o f  the  'ends ju s t i fy in g  the  m eans ' - o r  the  re la ted  'f lex ib le  
a c c o rd in g  to the  c ircum stances '.
T he  ca tegory  'a general non-specific  response' - included eleven respondents. These
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officers were unable to specify any content in relation to their moral code and 
suggested that they were, in fact, unfamiliar with explicit ethical discourse.
The category - 'The golden rule' - accounted for almost one quarter of the 
respondents. This is unsurprising except it does refer to a highly conventional way 
of summarising a moral code and points again towards the pattern o f response 
noted in relation to the first version of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire - i.e. a 
lack of originality.
To counter this, however, the category 'Moral values/principles made explicit' 
accounted for slightly more than half the respondents. Here, individuals chose to 
name specific moral values or specific moral principles as they characterised their 
moral code. Prominent among the responses were references to 'honesty' and 
integrity'. I was to learn that issues of 'honesty' and integrity' were particularly 
salient for police middle-managers when they addressed moral questions and 
reflected upon ethical issues. In relation to 'Conjecture 5' the content o f the 
responses indicates a mixture of 'conventional' and contrasting 'individualised' 
characterisations.
Overall, the data point towards an apparent diversity, difference, variety and non­
uniformity amongst police middle-managers.
Question 2. How ethical do you perceive yourself to be?
Each respondent rated themselves on an analogue rating scale ranging from 
'Extremely Ethical' (100) to 'Extremely Unethical' (0)
Data summary: (N = 63 Chief Inspectors)
Range: 9 9 - 19
M ean : 78.6  S tandard  dev iation : 14.27 
Discussion:
In general, police  m idd le-m anagers  perceive them selves  as h igh ly  ethical. A  m ean  
score  o f  78.6 is well above  the m id -po in t on  the  sca le  'ex trem e ly  e th ical ' to  
'ex trem e ly  uneth ical '.  T he  m odal interval w as 81 - 90.
O nly  one  person  rated him  (or her) s e l f  be lo w  the m id p o in t  and  to w a rd s  the
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'unethical' pole.
16 out of 63 rate (approximately 25%) themselves below the 75 mark. Thus, it is 
possible to assert with confidence that the respondents - as a whole - see themselves 
as 'ethical' rather than unethical'. This finding accords with a more general 
impression created by the responses across the different questionnaires.
'Conjecture 6' is confirmed by the data.
Question 3: I f  you were to improve the moral character o f  the police organisation 
what, in your view, would be the most effective way o f  doing so?
Overall, a total of 28 different (or differently nuanced) responses emerge in reply 
to this question. The responses were organised into thirteen themes. The three most 
commonly identified were:
- Different emphases on the part of senior managers (N = 12)
Example: The need fo r  senior managers to be seen and heard pressing fo r  change
- Culture and organisational ethos change (N = 13)
Example: Removing fear o f  speaking out and living out in the open. Officers who 
did not fear organisational reprisals are more likely to be prepared to say: 7 got 
it wrong - I'm sorry'
- New emphases in education and training (N = 20)
Example: Education let the police fully understand their role 
Discussion:
Whilst the question did not insist that the moral character of the police organisation 
was defective, the content of the responses conveyed a definite sense that the 
organisation could improve its moral character. So, for example, twelve 
respondents emphasised the need for change on the part of senior managers and 
included observations such as:
-  Only when the upper echelons improve and truly endorse a code o f ethics will the 
code achieve credibility in the rest o f  the organisation. The apple is rotten at the
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core
Overall, there was no shortage of different suggestions for improving the moral 
character of the police organisation - if police middle-managers were to take on 
such a task.
The largest theme - i.e. new emphases in education and training - attracted almost 
a third of the respondents. However, it may be even more significant that two thirds 
did not mention the contribution that the training school (and/or police 
training/development programmes) might make to raising the moral quality of the 
police organisation.
Only two officers noted that no change was necessary. The responses o f a small 
number of officers suggested the need to return to an original more disciplined 
service.
Once again, the data highlight the variability that appears to characterise police 
middle managers. Their responses range from the most basic and taciturn to the 
highly sophisticated and academic. Overall the data suggest that 'Conjecture T  was 
only partly supported.
Question 4, The police service is developing a set o f  ethical principles. Please 
would you describe your reaction to such a set ofprinciples, (Each respondent 
was given a copy o f  the draft statement o f  ethical principles)
The responses were classified into four categories:
- A positive reaction/agreement etc. (N = 31)
E x am p le :  7  am in total agreement'
- A  n eg a tiv e  reac tio n /u n n ecessa ry  etc. (N  =  11)
E x am p le :  'An insult to my own standards/principles’
- E q u iv o ca l  (N  =  13)
Example: Whilst the idea is good it has not been "sold" to junior officers in the best 
way. It is badly worded and comes over as yet more HQ waffle
406
- No indication of positive or negative reaction (N = 7)
Example: They reinforce the principles within which I  already work 
Discussion
A minority expressed a negative reaction to the draft statement of ethical principles. 
Almost a half expressed an unequivocal positive reaction. Some responses were 
classified as 'equivocal' because, whilst not expressing an absolute rejection these 
respondents perceived factors within the police organisation that compromised the 
value of the statement. Conjecture 8 was not fully supported.
The data also illustrates themes that typify police discourse. I have selected five 
such examples o f 'typical police voices':
The first voice identifies an apparently permanent characteristic of the police - i.e. 
defensiveness:
Example: I  support them hut feel they have been introduced too soon after other 
reforms thus falling into 'flavour o f  the month' syndrome. The police are at present 
in a defensive (as always) mood and this is not likely to fa ll on fertile ground. 
Incongruity with the discipline code.
The second voice illustrates the familiar appeal to 'culture change' as the solution 
to police problems:
Example: Its going to take a whole new culture to change the police behaviour. Its 
happening at the bottom but a policy statement is superficial - lip service
The third voice illustrates the way police anticipate how their colleagues will 
respond to 'reform' attempts:
Example: An excellent idea that the majority will only pay lip service to
The fourth voice expresses police resistance to 'outside interference':
Example: I see these principles as a back door con trick to introduce a replacement 
discipline code which will prove to be wider than it. Added to a lower level o f  proof 
o f  probability against officers on discipline matters, I see it as an erosion o f  police 
officers rights
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The fifth voice is a very good example of the type of dismissive, negative (and even 
paranoid) reaction that seems to exercise a disproportionate influence on police 
perception of themselves:
Example: I  dislike this 'show' type o f  statement. I  do not believe anyone believes 
i f  so it is worthless. My oath o f  office is sufficient and police officers should not 
resort to this propaganda.
Together, these voices reveal the difficulties facing police strategists because they 
illustrate the 'contrary', 'difficult' and 'defensive' nature of middle-managers.
The first two questionnaires had helped to demonstrate 'difference' amongst police 
leaders and managers attending the middle-management programmes o f study at 
Bramshill. The responses had revealed a contrast between some officers 
comfortable with reform and those who resented any form of interference from the 
'outside'. The data also suggested that a substantial minority (if not a majority) 
lacked confidence in the ethics of senior management; there was also evidence that 
changes to the police organisational and occupational culture might be welcomed. 
In the third version of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire I wanted to examine 
perceptions concerning the proper moral foundations of leadership. I also wanted 
to uncover the moral 'priorities' of police managers. From a small number o f moral 
values, which would they select as the most important'? I also wanted to clarify 
which values the middle-managers thought were most important in relation to the 
development of the police organisation. Finally, I thought that it was important to 
try and uncover the views middle-managers had about their own 'human' nature and 
their view of human nature generally. A part of police folklore asserted that police 
were cynics. Would they see themselves as cynics rather than persons who, 
following Ker Muir (1977) embraced the 'tragic' perspective? In consequence, I 
developed four questions as follows:
Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire (Version 3)
Q u es tio n  1: T he  po lice  serv ice  is exp lo ring  the  d ev e lo p m en t  o f  a 's ta tem en t o f  
shared  va lues ' w ith  an em phas is  on the  m ora l d im en s io n  o f  po lic ing . I f  y o u  w e re  
to  de f ine  th ree  va lu es  tha t  you  earnestly  b e lieve  po lice  officers  shou ld  g en u in e ly  
share  w h a t  w o u ld  those  th ree  va lues  be?
Q u estio n  2. P lease  rank  the fo llow ing  five 'm oral ' va lues  in te rm s o f  th e ir  
im p o r tan ce  to you: Tru th , B enevo lence , Loyalty , Justice , T o le ran ce
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Question 3: The 'Eight E' organisation: The 'Eight E' framework has been 
developed at Bramshill and it can usefully be used to facilitate the development of 
any police organisation. The eight 'Es' are:
Economy, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Education, Empowerment, Ethics, Ecstasy 
(Quality of Service) and Ecology.
Respondents were provided with short definitions of each 'E and asked to rank 
order them in terms of value for the developing police organisation.
Question 4a. Perspectives on human nature and on your own 'nature': Respondents 
were asked to indicate whether they viewed human nature as 'humanistic', 
'animalistic' or 'rational'. They were given short definitions of each perspective 
taken from Pfeiffer (1992).
Question 4b. Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a bipolar scale: cynic 
perspective versus tragic perspective. They were given short definitions of each 
perspective taken from Ker Muir (1977).
Prior to administering the questionnaire I generated the following 'conjectures':
Conjecture 9: The diversity of responses that had been provided by the different 
intakes of police managers gave me reason to believe that the responses to question 
1 would be similarly varied.
Conjecture 10:1 imagined that 'Justice' would be endorsed as the most important 
value.
Conjecture 11. The emphasis that had been placed on police effectiveness (through, 
for example Home Office circulars and the ACPO Quality of Service Committee) 
led me to anticipate that the 'effectiveness' would be identified as the most 
important value emphasis for the developing police organisation.
C onjectu re  12: Police  regularly  d rew  attention to the fact tha t their organisation  was 
m ad e  up  o f 'cy n ics ' .  T h ey  also seem ed to endorse  a negative v iew  o f  hu m an  nature. 
In c o n seq u en ce ,  th ey  m ig h t  p rofile  them selves  as 'cynics ' and, s im ila rly , m igh t 
inc line  to w ard s  an an im a lis t ic  v iew  o f  h u m an  nature.
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N = 64 Respondents (Chief Inspectors) - Autumn 1994
Question 1: The police service is exploring the development o f  a 'statement o f  
shared values' with an emphasis on the moral dimension ofpolicing. I f  you were 
to define three values that you earnestly believe police officers should genuinely 
share what would those three values be?
The most commonly identified value was ’Honesty’ (N = 47)
The second most commonly identified value was ’Integrity’ (N = 37)
These were the only values that secured an absolute majority endorsement.
Integrity and Honesty together were chosen by 28 of the 64 respondents.
Other qualities mentioned included ’fairness’ (N = 16), ’compassion, caring and 
understanding’, (N = 15) and ’justice’ (N = 11). Small numbers o f officers 
mentioned ’consideration for human rights’, loyalty, courage, impartiality. Other 
values mentioned once (i.e. by a single respondent) were: sincerity, valuing 
difference/diversity, reliability, respect, trustworthy, dignity, self-discipline and 
control, passion, professionalism, and, belief in democracy.
Discussion
In principle, because police work and its leadership is rooted in the executive 
function(s) o f government and requires conduct oriented towards securing social 
peace as well as the application of law it would have been perfectly plausible for 
police middle-managers to opt for any one of a wide range of values. However, the 
two values, ’Honesty’ and ’Integrity’ dominate. The data pattern coincides exactly 
with the pattern reported by Jackson (1993) - following an exercise examining the 
qualities of an ’ethical ’ person. Jackson's data was based on over twenty workshops 
involving adults in Australia. This appears to be a doubly significant finding; first, 
it indicates that police middle-managers share their emphasis with non-police; 
second it represents a relatively unusual moment when police as a whole 
demonstrates a commonality of response. Therefore, 'Conjecture 9' was not 
supported.
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Question 2. Please rank the following five 1moral' values in terms o f  their 
importance to you: Truth, Benevolence, Loyalty, Justice, Tolerance
The data showed the following mean rank order:
1. Truth - Mean Rank = 1.303, S.D. = 0.557
2. Justice - Mean Rank = 2.191, S.D. = 0.913
3. Tolerance - Mean Rank = 3.392, S.D. = 1.105
4. Loyalty - Mean Rank = 3.825, S.D. = 1.101
5. Benevolence - Mean Rank = 4.158, S.D. = 0.787 
Discussion
The data reveal a clearly defined pattern: a large majority rank 'truth* number one. 
O f those respondents who ranked 'truth' number 1, 35 ranked 'justice' number 2. 
Thus, an overall majority ranked 'Truth' 1 and 'Justice' 2. Benevolence was ranked 
lowest of the five values. Conjecture 10 was not supported.
One way of interpreting this finding is to recognise that police are trained to prove 
that something is the case 'beyond reasonable doubt'. In other words, police are 
socialised into an occupation where a straightforward priority obtains. They must, 
in principle, find the truth and present the truth. The emphasis on the 'search for 
truth' was particularly profiled in the early part of the 1990s by for example, police 
leaders such as Woodcock (1992) and Imbert (1992). (Moreover, the 'distance 
learning' reading material sent to course participants included extracts from 
Woodcock's paper advocating that police officers should increasingly come to see 
themselves as gatherers of evidence as they sought to uncover the 'truth'.) The 
'privileging' of the value 'truth' also correlates with the emphasis on 'honesty'. Put 
most simply, the honest person tells the truth.
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Question 3: The 1eight E r organisation
Data summary: The rank ordering of the eight 'E's was:
1. Ethics: Mean rank 2.190 S.D. 1.644
2. Effectiveness: Mean rank 3.269 S.D. 1.919
3. Efficiency: Mean rank 4.142 S.D. 2.213
4. Empowerment: Mean rank 4.286 S.D. 1.773
5. Education: Mean rank 4.635 S.D. 1.928
6. Economy: Mean rank 5.032 S.D. 1.874
7. Ecology: Mean rank 6.063 S.D. 1.925
8. Ecstasy: Mean rank 6.269 S.D. 2.009
34 respondents (out of 63) ranked 'ethics’ number 1. 15 out o f 63 respondents 
ranked effectiveness number 1.
Discussion
In the decade leading up to the date upon which the data were collected a 
considerable emphasis had been placed on improving the efficiency and the quality 
of service provided by public service sector organisations. The Home Office 
circular 114 of 1983 had stipulated the need for police organisations to be 
'effective, efficient and economic'. This value framework had been re-emphasised 
by the 'Quality of Service' committee in 1992. The formal content of the seminar 
at Bramshill had included presentations on 'Performance indicators', 'Value for 
money', ' monitoring the quality of service', 'Quality of management'. All these 
presentations reinforced and extended the underlying trend concerned with 
providing effectiveness, efficiency and best use of resources. The seminar also 
highlighted the developments concerning a code of ethics for police (and saw the 
publication of the draft statement of ethical principles).
Thus, it could  have been anticipated that 'effectiveness ' w ould  have  em erged  as the  
m ost valued  em phasis  for the developing  police organisation. H ow ever, an abso lu te
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majority selected 'ethics' as the most important value emphasis for the police 
organisation. Therefore 'Conjecture 11' was not supported. It was scarcely 
surprising that 'ecstasy' attracted the lowest overall rating; the choice of the label 
'ecstasy' was injudicious and did not allow the idea of providing a high quality of 
service to 'customers' to be appropriately considered.
The relatively low ranking for 'economy' reflects a disturbing phenomenon 
concerning the attitude police managers have towards the resources they expend. 
They are disinclined to include financial concerns and budgetary considerations in 
their discourse concerning policing priorities and police matters generally - except 
to complain about the difficulties they face with managing overtime payments.
Question 4. Perspectives on human nature and on your own fnature*
Question 4 a: Respondents were asked to indicate which of three views 
'Animalistic', 'Humanistic' and 'Rational' best described human nature.
Data summary
Animalistic N = 17, Humanistic N = 24, Rational N = 12, Mixed nature N = 8 
Discusssion
Generalisations made on police - both by themselves and by police scholars - could 
provide grounds for hypothesising that the 'animalistic' view of human nature might 
predominate in the responses to this question. However, only a third of police 
middle-managers come to indicate that they view human nature in these terms. 
Nonetheless, one third of the group constitutes a significant proportion and the 
attitudinal correlates of this view i.e. anti idealism etc. might go some way towards 
explaining the cool reception I experienced from numbers of police officers in the 
course of presenting an ethics education. The 'humanistic' view was the chosen by 
the largest number of respondents although it failed to secure an absolute majority 
of endorsements. The data again point to the variability of outlook that 
characterises police middle-managers and suggests that, in the face of such 
potentially profound levels of difference, it remains remarkably difficult to secure 
a shared positive response to strategic or educational initiatives.
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Question 4b
Respondents were asked to examine the contrast between the ’tragic1 perspective 
and the 'cynic’ perspective and then rate themselves on a scale from 0 (cynic) to 
100 (tragic). Scores below 50 incline towards the cynic viewpoint. Scores above 
50 incline towards the tragic viewpoint
Result: Mean = 59.492, Standard deviation = 21.464
Range of scores = 9 3 - 6
Discussion
Stated most crudely, the data suggests that, overall, police middle-managers incline 
towards a 'tragic' rather than a 'cynic' mode of self-conceptualisation. Conjecture 
12 was not fully supported. However, 40% of the sample show leanings towards 
seeing themselves as cynics. Again, this might go some way towards explaining 
why I frequently encountered an unenthusiastic audience and a negative valuing of 
my work. Thus, cynics have tended to 'give up on humanity' and remain 
fundamentally sceptical about 'ethics'.
Nonetheless, as the responses to the first question on version four of the Bramshill 
Ethics Questionnaire were to show, a majority of the police middle-managers in the 
sample group thought that the study of ethics could, in fact, lead to improvements 
in the overall professional standards of the police organisation.
Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire (Version 4)
Since 'ethics' had emerged as the value identified as 'most important' for the 
developing police organisation, I wanted to discover what respondents might think 
the study of ethics would achieve for police and policing. As my inquiry had 
progressed the quality and integrity of police leadership had come under national 
scrutiny. What, according to my respondents were the most important moral 
qualities of the police leader? I also wanted to clarify the positive and negative 
aspects of police culture in relation to the moral standards of police officers. In 
consequence I designed version four of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire as 
follows:
Q uestion  1: In yo u r  view, what, i f  any, contribution  to po lic ing  can be m ade  by the 
s tudy  o f  e th ics?
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Question 2: Leadership needs to be based upon a moral foundation. What, in your 
view, is the most important moral quality of a leader?
Question 3. Much has been written on the police occupational culture. What 
features of the police culture enhance the ethical character (moral quality) of police 
officers?
Question 4. What features of the police culture work against the ethical character 
(moral quality) of police officers? (Note: in essence, this question deals with the 
opposite 'pole' that was examined in Question 3)
As with all the previous questionnaires I developed a preliminary conjecture in 
relation to each question:
Conjecture 13.1 imagined that the study of'ethics' would be considered to make an 
improvement to police conduct.
Conjecture 14. If'honesty' and integrity' are identified as the most important moral 
values generally, then they would be selected as the most important foundations for 
police leadership
Conjecture 15.1 imagined that the virtues of police would be identified as positive 
moral force fields as well as the moral aspects of the police ends and means.
Conjecture 16. The social scientific literature on police had stressed group 
solidarity and pressures to conform. I thought that these pressures would be 
identified as the main barriers to ethical conduct.
The questionnaire was administered in the Spring of 1995: N = 50 Respondents 
(Chief Inspectors)
Question 1: In your view, what, i f  any, contribution to policing can be made by 
the study o f  ethics?
T w o  m ain  th em es  em erged :
T h em e  One: T he study o f  ethics is related to susta in ing and /or im prov ing  the moral 
qu a li ty  o f  the  po lice  o rg an isa t io n /  the  m oral tone  o f  co n duct/ the  m oral s tandards
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of policing, now and in the future: (N = 38)
Examples:
Ethics has a central part to play in policing. I f  we do not have ethics then the whole 
structure/organisation is open to corruption, poor standards which result in a poor 
or improper service to the public
There is a widespread ignorance o f  what ethics is and addressing that must be 
beneficial
An awareness that ethics is an important development stage in all individuals and 
as one grows older we learn that in ourselves we cannot accept anything less than 
complete ethics and it is to where we must get
It will raise the professional standard o f  the force
Is probably fundamental and instrumental to changing police culture and thereby 
raise professional and public esteem
Theme two: an 'educational' function: (N = 10)
Examples:
It will provide an opportunity to delve below the assumptions, and artifacts that 
have shaped our behaviour, rituals etc. that create our culture
The reasons fo r  change after the existence o f  the Police service (sic). Is there more 
to ii than miscarriages o f  justice? What are we about? The study may enlighten us
D iff icu lt  to  classify : (N  =  2)
Discussion
T h e  c o m m e n ts  sugges t  th a t  a  m ajo rity  o f  re sp o n d en ts  im ag in e  th a t  the  s tu d y  o f  
eth ics  cou ld  p lay  a s ignificant role in help ing  to enhance  the p rofessional s tandards  
o f  the  po lice  and the  m oral tone  o f  the  o rgan isa tion . T h is  f ind ing  links  to  the  
im p o r tan ce  g iven  to 'ethics ' as a value in the  d ev e lo p in g  po lice  o rg an isa t io n  th a t  
was revealed  by the third version o f  the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire . C on jec tu re  
13 w as  supported .
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Question 2: Leadership needs to be based upon a moral foundation. What, in 
your view, is the most important moral quality o f  a leader?
A majority identified honesty or integrity as the single most important moral 
foundation of the leader. The 'moral foundations' for leadership noted by the 
respondents were as follows:
- Honesty/Integrity (N = 27)
Examples:
Integrity. Many failures can be forgiven i f  the leader displays this quality e.g. 
rudeness, incompetence etc.
Honesty is o f  utmost importance as is integrity and fairness. I  believe Police 
officers must treat people with respect and impartiality. Treat others as you would 
want to be treated yourself
- Fairness (N = 6)
Example: Fairness and impartiality. No prejudiced or bigoted views - i f  the second 
is pu t into practice with junior officers or others - could create aggressiveness. To 
treat everyone on his/her merits and listen to all sides
- Compassion/care/regard for others - and 'treat people as one would wish to be 
treated' (N = 6)
Example: Compassion - a caring leader reaps the benefit o f  both internal and 
external customer care
- O th e rs  (N =  7)
- U n a n sw e re d  (N  =  1)
Discussion
T h is  da ta  pa tte rn  sugges ts  th a t  'trus tw orth iness ' and  those  a ttribu tes  con s ti tu t in g  
in teg rity  as it is co m m o n ly  unders tood  - i.e. 'uprightness ',  'w holeness ',  'soundness ' 
and 'honesty ' are perceived by police m iddle m anagers  to be o f  especial im portance
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in relation to the character and practices of the leader. Alternative conceptions, 
such as the 'just' leader or the 'caring' leader are not weighted by the group as a 
whole at the same level of importance. Therefore, 'Conjecture 14' is supported.
Again, this finding links with the earlier pattern where 'honesty' and integrity' were 
identified by police managers as the moral qualities they thought should be shared 
by police officers in general.
Question 3. Much has been written on the police occupational culture. What 
features o f  the police culture enhance the ethical character (moral quality) o f  
police officers?
Six themes emerged:
- Theme one: Moral values salient within the culture e.g. justice, altruism (N = 17)
Example: Sense o f  vocation, altruism, concept o f  service - particularly public 
service
- Theme two: Comradeship, team work etc. (N = 19)
Example: Mutual support in times o f  crisis. Co-workers can feed  o ff success o f  the 
good practice o f  others
- Theme three: The emphasis on 'service' (quality of service) to the public - helping 
the public - caring for the public (N = 16)
Example: Integrity, honesty, the desire to serve the public. A drive towards greater 
openness. The willingness to reflect and change
- Theme four: A willingness to change/openness (N = 2)
Example: A willingness to change, openness, and to be self-critical o f  our conduct
T h e m e  five: A  defin ite  sense  o f  be ing  on the s ide o f  th a t  w h ich  is 'r ight' - w e  are  
the  'good  guys ' (N  =  8)
E xam ple : A belief that the police are guardians o f  society which leads them to 
make decisions which they believe are fo r the general good
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Others (N = 4)
Discussion
The largest number of respondents (19 out of 50) picked out comradeship, 
camaraderie and team spirit as the feature of police culture helping to enhance the 
moral qualities o f police officers. This is complemented by the second most 
frequent response that identified the positive moral values salient within the police 
organisation. Significantly neither 'leaders’ nor 'leadership' nor police training 
emerged as chosen responses. However, again, the desires to ‘help’, ‘care for’ and 
‘serve’ the public were selected as positive moral force fields. In general here was 
some support for 'Conjecture 15'.
Question 4. What features o f the police culture work against the ethical character 
(moral quality) o f  police officers? (Note: in essence, this question deals with the 
opposite 'pole' that was examined in Question 3)
Four themes emerged from the responses:
Theme one: Adhering to group norms - following traditional practices - CID culture 
and the 'old boys club' - misplaced loyalty (N = 22)
Examples:
Being one o f  the hoys - requirement fo r  conformity
Peer pressure against 'whistle blowers' in the form o f ostracisation. Denial o f  equal 
opportunity etc.
The belief that the team is all important. This also lead to misguided action
The feeling that we can't be wrong/we can't have made a mistake, closing o f  ranks, 
a failure to respond to criticism
- Theme two: Pressures to get resuIts/Quantity based results (N = 5)
Example: A misguided sense o f  duty (to get results), a tendency to help only those 
whom we think deserve it
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- Theme three: Rule bending/the end justifies the means (N = 6)
Example: An inherent sense o f  justice can result in reverse ethically - that the end 
justifies the means
- Theme four: Organisational character/culture - mistrust, denial o f equal 
opportunities (N = 18)
Examples:
Blinkered, tunnel vision. Single mindedness, unable to see the other side o f  the coin 
Racist and sexist attitudes 
Cynics - the thin blue line 
Others (N = 7)
Example: Chief officers not practising what they speak/advocate. Ethics is fo r  
everyone and must be seen in the work o f  the whole organisation. Chief 
officers/senior officers who push fo r  results regardless o f  the consequences or 
difficulties and will not listen to reason
Discussion
This latter data set allows an unusual insight into the judgements police middle- 
managers themselves make in relation to identifying those features of their culture 
which can be reasons for deviating form the highest standards of professional 
integrity. The most frequently recurring themes included references to the way 
group processes could thwart adherence to morally exemplary conduct as well as 
features of the occupational/organisational culture which were morally 
disappointing or worse. Conjecture 16 was supported.
Summary
T h e  first four vers ions  o f  the  B ram shill E th ics  Q uestionna ire  had  p ro v id ed  a v iv id  
sense  o f  the  com plex ities  o f  the police m anageria l world. O n som e issues - such  as 
the  m ost im portan t pu rp o se  or objective  o f  po lic in g  - there  ap p ea red  to  be  a 
m ultip l ic i ty  o f  perspectives. On others - such  as the  m oral a ttr ibutes  d e em ed  m os t 
im p o r tan t  and desirab le  for police  officers - there  w as a defin ite  c o n v e rg en c e  o f
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view. Many police middle-managers seemed to respond with remarkable candour 
and were not afraid to present a critical view of their organisation. The responses 
also captured the contrasts amongst the characters of police middle-managers. 
Some respondents were terse and taciturn. Others were staid and conventional. Yet 
others drew from processes of careful reflection and considered analysis. Thus, it 
would be misleading to oversimplify through providing a comprehensive set of 
generalisations about 'police managers'.
The different versions of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire had enabled me to 
present a detailed description of the response patterns to the different intakes of 
police managers. Even though this data was not referred to explicitly in the 'ethics 
unit' evaluations, it served to help me gain in confidence as I presented the subject.
At the beginning of the new Police Management Programme in 1995 I was able to 
provide one lecture/presentation outlining the data patterns. In addition, I 
constructed a more general version of the instrument (see Appendix O) which was 
used to stimulate discussion in small groups throughout the subsequent phases of 
the action research inquiry. This enabled me to begin the process of exploring 
'organisational ethics' by focusing on the construction of a 'moral ethos' 
questionnaire
The M oral Ethos Questionnaire
The Moral Ethos Questionnaire was derived directly from the work of Snell (1993). 
I have discussed his work in chapter 5 of this dissertation. He proposes an 'original' 
model not only composed of six types of moral ethos but also featuring sixteen 
dimensions that he describes as the 'salient properties of a moral ethos within 
organisations'. Snell believes that these sixteen dimensions may be regarded as 
variables which are not, however, entirely separate and discrete. It was his 
identification of the sixteen specific dimensions that led, immediately, to the 
development of a questionnaire (see Appendix P) expressly designed to begin the 
process of mapping the 'moral ethos' of police organisations. An example of a 
dimension is 'moral tone': Snell characterises this (by means of contrasting 
opposites) as follows:
'How fa r  are people expected to hold to 'high'principles or, rather, does action 
tend to be expedient or exploitative?'
I developed a questionnaire examining police middle-managers perception of the 
moral dimensions of their organisation. Each dimension was characterised by two
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questions intended to represent two ends of a continuum. The answers to those 
questions provided first glimpses of the moral properties of the organisation.
4 successive groups of middle managers attending the ’Managing People' module 
completed the 'Moral Ethos Questionnaire’ in the second half of 1996.
A total of 111 individuals completed the instrument (including 7 civilian 
managers).
The pattern of responses to each of the 16 dimensions can be summarised as 
follows:
- Moral tone: A slight tendency for individuals to indicate tha t:'People are 
expected to hold to 'high'principles'.
- Tightness: A slight tendency away from 'tightness' towards: 'There is room fo r  
individual judgment'.
- Deference to hierarchy: overall the respondents profiled the organisation as mid 
way between: 'The prerogatives o f  rank (pressures to obey 'rank') are strong' 
versus: 'People are allowed to challenge more senior members'
- Positional abuse: overall respondents profiled the organisation as very slightly 
towards: 'Power is used as a weapon over others 'rather than: 'People are careful 
not to take unfair advantage'.
- Spread of trust: A slight tendency to endorse the statement: 'People are 
suspicious o f  those they do not know'.
- Dependence on allegiance: A clear tendency to endorse the statement: 'Trust is 
important in running the organisation’.
- R eg u la to ry  form alisation: A  clear tendency  to  endorse  the  s ta tem ent: 'Duties are 
clearly spelt out' ra the r than: 'Roles and codes are unspecific’.
- A dherence : A  sligh t tendency  to endorse  the  s ta tem ent: 'People stick to what is 
expected o f  them'.
- R esp ec t  for d ignity : A slight tendency  tow ards  end o rs in g  the  s ta tem en t: 'People 
are valued in their own right'.
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- Intensity of political stakes: Overall the responses fell mid-way between: 'The 
consequences o f  losing in a conflict (within the organisation) are severe' and:
'People are 'safe ' among fellow members'.
- Concentration of power: A slight tendency to regard power as concentrated at the 
centre o f the organisation rather than being dispersed to the periphery
- Need for stability: A slight tendency to endorse the statement: T/ze organisation 
is very open to change'.
- Breadth of constituency: A clear tendency to endorse the statement: 'There are 
many influential organisational stakeholders' rather than: 'The organisation has 
responsibilities only to a few'.
- Openness to criticism. A moderate tendency indicating that the organisation: 'is 
open to and addresses public feedback and criticism'.
- Demands on loyalty: A moderate tendency to perceive that: 'a great
psychological commitment is required by the organisation'.
- Developmental openness: A moderate tendency for respondents to endorse the 
statement: 'performing one's role in the organisation extends one's talents, opens 
new horizons and yields significant se lf discoveries'.
Snell (1993) describes the specific quality of moral ethos resulting from pairs of 
dimension in combination. So, for example, a high moral tone combined with a low 
level of tightness results in an ethos of thoughtful self-regulation. By contrast, a low 
moral tone in combination with a high level of tightness produces an ethos that is 
characterised by an expedient ’get the job done at all costs'.
Table 3 represents the relevant description that may be applied to the results of 
combining the scores on pairs of dimensions. Thus, it may be read as a first 
summary of the overall moral ethos of the police organisation in England Wales, 
and Northern Ireland.
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Table 3
The quadrant in which the data fell as a result of combining the relevant
dimensions
Dimensions Description most characteristic o f the 
police organisation
1 and 2 combined Thoughtful self-regulation
3 and 4 combined Oppression and coercion
5 and 6 combined Secretive scheming
7 and 8 combined Strictly rule-bound
9 and 10 combined Intimate confrontation
11 and 12 combined Flux and transformation
13 and 14 combined Dialogue seeking
15 and 16 combined Symbiotic relationship
The Moral Ethos Questionnaire was used to gather more data in the first half of 
1997. A total of 100 respondents completed the instrument in the four module 
deliveries from February until May 1997.
Respondents were located in one of four quadrants (following the combination 
of pairs of dimensions) In total there were eight sets of four qaudrants
Table 4 indicates the highest frequency within any one of the eight quadrants.
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Table 4
The highest number of individuals within any one of the four quadrants of the 
two relevant dimensions (i.e. the modal client group profile)
Description of moral ethos Number of cases (out of 100)
Thoughtful self-regulation 33
Oppression and coercion 35
Secretive scheming 52
Strictly rule bound 51
Combat arena 32
Rigid command 35
Dialogue seeking 68
Symbiotic relationship 63
The Moral Ethos Questionnaire had provided original data and some insight into 
the 'moral force fields' at play in the police organisation. The instrument was 
succeeded, in early 1998 by an 'Organisational Ethics' questionnaire. This 
questionnaire, comprising three complementary sections, was designed to test the 
validity of the 'moral ethos' data and to establish the extent to which the police 
organisation approximated the 'quality' specification that had been articulated by 
police leaders such as Hirst (1992). 84 officers (Chief Inspectors and Inspectors) 
attending the Police Management Programme completed this instrument in the first 
half of 1998.
The 'Organisational Ethics Questionnairer
The questionnaire (see Appendix O) consisted of three parts:
- Part one included nine statements and respondents were asked to rate the extent 
to which they were characteristic of the police organisation
- Part two consisted of 8 pairs of contrasting statements and respondents were 
asked to indicate which statement was more characteristic of the police
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organisation
- Part three provided 3 sets of 6 descriptions. The descriptions each represented one 
of six levels o f organisational development ranging from ’fear-ridden’ to 'soul- 
searching'. Respondents were asked to identify, in each case, which description 
was most characteristic of the police organisation.
The data emerging from this questionnaire revealed the following patterns:
- The police organisation was profiled as a stage 4 (regulated) rather than a stage 
5 (quality-seeking) organisation. Thus a very large majority of respondents selected 
the following 'Stage Four' (regulated) characteristics as typifying the police 
organisation rather than the alternative 'Stage five' (quality-seeking) descriptions:
Stage Four (set 1)
Decisions are governed by formal procedures, rules and regulations. Quality 
criteria and standards are set by the law, official requirement, professional 
regulation or strict contractual agreement. Performance is subject to audit. There 
is room fo r  individual judgements within the bounds o f  set by the rules and 
procedures but bias and idiosyncrasy is deplored. The immediate answer to cases 
which would create a precedent is 'No', but these are referred upwards fo r  
arbitration
Stage Five (set 1)
The organisation stands fo r  a set o f  principles regarding justice, development, 
compassion, ecology etc. which serve to focus the actions o f  its individual members. 
Personal idiosyncrasies and differences in lifestyle are accepted among members, 
provided that these do not compromise core values. Rejecting the latter is 
incompatible with membership. A common feeling is o f  guilt: not doing enough, 
letting the cause or the side down.
Stage Four (set 2)
People are valued fo r  their expertise. So long as they follow clear rules and 
conventions, broadly understandable to others, and make a tangible contribution 
to the organisation, they will suffer no ill. The most painful lessons are resewed fo r  
those in marginal positions, i f  they expect equal treatment, fo r  in times o f  threat to 
the organisation and/or financial constraint they are the most vulnerable. Conflicts
426
typically stem from  disputes about resource allocation. There are established ways 
o f  settling them, either by reference to a professionally established hierarchy o f  
values, or by coalition and majority ruling. Should the performance o f  particular 
individuals become a focus o f  concern, form al counselling and disciplinary 
procedures may be applied.
Stage Five (set 2)
People are not ju s t vehicles fo r  policy: the organisation is also a supportive 
community. Those under stress and/or performing badly are helped to recover and 
improve. No one is 'written off. Those not suited to the organisation, due to values 
divergence, are helped to find  suitable alternative work. Policy decisions are made 
in a representative forum, accountable to diverse stakeholders. Disputes revolve 
around applying and refining values rather than discarding them, and are resolved 
by seeking a wide consensus among all stakeholder groups and encouraging win- 
win attitudes. The most painful lesson (for visionaries) is that one will not win 
others over unilaterally - decisions emerge slowly, through dialogue. One has to 
learn humility. In tough times, the prevailing argument is fo r  everyone to share 
some o f  the sacrifice and work fo r  better times.
- The respondents showed a modal response of 'moderate agreement' to the 
following statements:
'Overall, the people in the organisation are trustworthy (e.g. there is little if  any 
'backstabbing', people 'mean what they say and say what they mean' etc.)'
'The people in the organisation are very willing to spend time helping and 
supporting one another'.
'The people in the organisation enjoy considerable (but appropriate freedom) in the 
way they fulfil their work tasks'
'The different needs and sensitivities of the individuals in the organisation are 
respected and appreciated'.
- T h e  responden ts  show ed  a m odal response o f  neither agreem ent nor d isag reem ent 
to  the  fo l lo w in g  s ta tem ents :
'T he  people  in the organisation  (w hen  they are at w ork) are m ainly  interested in the
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well-being of the organisation rather than their own careers (i.e. the people in the 
organisation are not particularly selfish)'
'If people make mistakes in the organisation the emphasis is upon learning from the 
mistake rather than punishment'
'The managers in the organisation genuinely try to empower organisational 
personnel'.
- The responses revealed a bimodal distribution to the following statements (i.e. 
equal proportions of respondents endorsed 'moderately agree' and 'moderately 
disagree'
'In the organisation people are rarely, if ever, intimidated by other persons (who are 
members of the same organisation)'
'People in the organisation make sure that their decisions are guided by moral 
principles such as tolerance, justice and benevolence'.
Finally, respondents confirmed the data pattern revealed by the 'moral ethos 
questionnaire' and profiled the police organisation as 'mixed' in terms of its moral 
'health'. In addition, a small majority perceived that the leaders of the organisation 
put their own interests above the interests of the organisation.
Discussion
The most positive features of the moral ethos of police organisations revealed by 
the groups of respondents were: 'Thoughtful self-regulation', 'Intimate 
confrontation', 'Dialogue seeking', and, 'Flux and transformation'.
The constitutional position of the constable (an officer independent under the 
crown), the social psychological realities of independence and a relative absence 
of 'supervision' as well as the fact of discretionary powers might well be a 
constellation of factors prompting an organisational ethos of 'thoughtful self 
regulation1. Loyalty is inculcated in the service. Added to this are the structural 
features of police work - periods of inactivity in which officers find out about each 
other (hear the stories that colleagues come to tell) as well as the more active and 
'dangerous' occasions when 'backs have to be watched', where individuals need 
each other for support, 'back up', 'corroboration' and 'assistance', and, conditions are
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designed such as to facilitate 'intimate confrontation'.
The other 'stage six' (after Snell 1993) characteristics could be deductively arrived 
at through acknowledging a genuine desire or wish by police in the United 
Kingdom to police by, and, with consent. Police also embrace, for the most part, 
an appreciation of'difference'. This work at Bramshill reveals a positive disposition 
to promote a high quality of community and ethnic relations i.e. 'dialogue seeking'. 
The organisational structure has the capacity to respond to environmental changes 
because directives from the centre allied to a capacity to form and reform, squads, 
project teams and specialist task forces etc. promotes an ethos of 'flux and 
transformation'.
But, other features of the police organisation can be isolated and identified which, 
through socio-political processes or social-constructivist means, generate less 
positive features of the moral ethos. These areas might properly be taken as a focus 
for leadership, managerial and cultural change processes: the military/colonial 
legacy bequeathed to the police organisation coupled with the dynamics of 
hierarchy - badges of rank, the notion of differentially valued classes of personnel 
etc.- as well as institutional phenomena such as the 'discipline code' and a curiously 
pervasive paternalism (in the language of transactional analysis there is a particular 
emphasis upon the 'rescuer' style during many intraorganisational interactions) - 
together provide a ground upon which an ethos of oppression and coercion can 
grow and, even, flourish.
Whenever I presented the data, the attribute, 'secretive scheming' - as an 
organisational 'characteristic' - was never challenged or doubted by those police 
officers in the middle managerial ranks of the service. The culture does seem to be 
one where 'deals' are struck in the never ending quest to 'mind one's back' and to 
secure some kind o f safety zone for personal and professional operation.
The overall picture points to something puzzling and something immensely 
difficult to articulate. On the one hand, police impress as morally sophisticated or 
morally courageous or 'good, upright and conventional' citizens. Moreover, such 
a moral outlook is not merely a reflection of the characterological virtues which 
Aristotle began to map. Police genuinely wish to establish dialogue with the people 
policed, genuinely wish to police by consent and to develop morally principled 
organisation and leadership. On the other hand - and simultaneously - police seem 
wedded to 'terms of engagement' which veer towards the deceptive and deceitful, 
the calculating and guileful, as well as a stance of resistance to much of the 
disinterested and 'theory/practice' commitments (the straightforwardness) of the
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other professions.
Police, it seems, take nothing at face value. Everything, for them, heralds a 
potential deception; everything is,in potentia, 'not quite what it seems'. 'Time will 
tell', seems to be the psychological attitude, and, sooner or later, an 'indiscretion' 
or moral stain will be revealed. 'The truth will out' if one were to 'wait and see'. 
If this analysis is fair, then it is to the sociologists, the social anthropologists and 
the social psychologists - as well as the personality theorists - that we must look for 
explanatory concepts, theories and ideas. The patterns described here should be of 
especial interest to police strategists and senior management. Considerable work 
needs to be done to achieve the ethos specifically articulated in the 'Quality of 
Service* committee's 'manifesto', 'Getting things right' (1993). Using the rich 
descriptions provided by Snell (1993) would be one concrete starting point to 
facilitate diagnosis and discussion concerning the moral health of police 
organisations.
Standing in contrast to those less positive features concerning the organisational 
moral ethos is the overall ethical tone emerging from the responses to the 
'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire'. Perhaps it is the individual who, ideally, would 
like to be 'ethical' in his or her practice of policing but who finds that a set of 
organisational pressures subverts his of her good intentions. If this is the case, then 
an 'ethics education' that seeks to promote human flourishing and combat human 
limitations through the provision of a comprehensive set of ethical skills will have 
much to offer the individual practitioner.
Conclusion
There are, plainly, some grounds for optimism concerning the moral ethos of police 
organisations. There are also grounds for optimism concerning the 'moral 
sensitivity', 'moral resolve' and 'moral expertise' of police in the middle managerial 
ranks of the service. This outcome of the inquiry process suggests that, in general, 
police middle-managers estimate that some of the 'surrounding' or 'enveloping' 
moral force fields in the organisation are likely to coincide with the 'Quality of 
Service' committee's strategic agenda for the police service. The overwhelming 
majority of police officers who have participated in this inquiry report that 'things 
have improved', 'things have changed', and, 'things are different now'. However, 
during and subsequent to the 'case study' emphasis it appears that the pressures to 
meet performance targets has threatened to lead to a lowering of the overall moral 
tone of police organisations.
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Notwithstanding, at the beginning of the new millennium, it seems possible to' point 
to a mix o f characterological virtues, professional aspirations and commitments, as 
well as an increasingly informed managerial consciousness that, together are 
striving to embrace an ethos of customer service, social sensitivity and 
commitments to high levels of professional integrity. Set against this are those 
features of an occupational culture - based upon a complex constellation of social 
psychological and socio-political features of police - which conspire to distance 
police from any consistent and meaningful adoption of the moral highground.
This research suggests that there are foundations in place which posit a police 
committed to human rights provisions, the 'duty of care', and, in broad terms, those 
sorts of dispositions specified in the police service statement of ethical principles. 
In support of the claim that police middle managers are well placed both to lead 
ethically and are disposed to create ethical organisational forms and practices I 
should point to those patterns discernible from the questionnaire/survey data: thus, 
the majority o f officers have a self image that is very highly or highly ethical. 
Significantly, the police experience is seen more to facilitate the enhancing o f a 
personal moral system than exerting a corrosive influence on such a system. 
Moreover, only a minority of respondents have a negative attitude towards the 
police service statement of ethical principles.
I would wish to add, however, the following sobering qualifications to these 
contentions. I notice a contrast between those claims to the highest ethical 
standards which police managers are likely to make for themselves and a certain 
'unforgivingness' that many are, in fact, prone to exhibit. It seems that the moral 
virtues of benevolence, tolerance and mercy are not writ large in the generalised 
moral expressivity of police. Indeed, they are often in short supply.
Furthermore, I still encounter many individual police managers who seem not only 
distant and remote from the urges towards the new professionalism but who also 
seem reluctant to value the demands for continuing learning, education and 
development. Perhaps too much of the career trajectory of police is tied to 
individual status needs and the long-term promise of security through a generous 
pension. To this extent I remain somewhat disappointed, and, I would argue that 
a great deal still needs to be done to approach, genuinely, the exacting demands of 
a full blown 'quality' culture.
R aib o rn  and  P ayne  (1996) correc tly  identify  the co n f lu en ce  b e tw een  w id e ly  
e ndorsed  ethical va lues  and the specifications for total quality  organisations. T here  
is su ff ic ien t  ev id en c e  from  the m oral e thos questionnaire  and  the  o rgan isa tiona l
ethics questionnaire to suggest that some of those key values e.g. empowerment, 
involvement, trust and helpfulness are compromised and sometimes subverted 
within the police organisation because of the established pattern of its moral ethos.
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A concluding chapter
Concluding the project: A summary o f  the major learnings and a statement 
concerning the place o f the subject, 'ethics' on the police leadership development 
curriculum at Bramshill at the dawn o f the new millennium
"I'd moved to Vermont ....I 'd  written one book, and then nothing in the two years 
following its publication. I  began teaching in September; in September I  began 
writing again, writing poems entirely different from those o f  Firstborn. This 
difference was intended, at least hoped for. What you learn organising a book, 
making o f  a pile o f  poems an arc, a shaped utterance, is both exhilarating and 
depressing; as you discern the book's themes, its fundamental preoccupations, you 
see as well the poems' habitual gestures, those habits o f  syntax and vocabulary, the 
rhythmic signatures which, ideally, give the volume at hand its character but it 
would be dangerous to repeat. Each book I've written has culminated in a 
conscious diagnostic act. A swearing off." (G luck, 1999: 17)
In this chapter I shall begin with a brief review of a range of publications and 
developments concerned with the moral aspects of policing in order to illustrate 
how the ethics of police remains a continuing strategic concern. I shall include 
reference both to the HMIC report into ’Police Integrity’ (1999) as well as 
Laughame and Newman's (1985) analysis of the principles of policing. The latter 
work, with its emphasis upon the need for police to uphold the 'Rule of Law', 
thereby places human rights considerations at the heart of the police mission and 
purpose. To the extent that police strategic discourse has consistently and explicitly 
recognised the need for the police to embrace the concept of citizen as a bearer of 
rights then the police organisation finds itself relatively well-placed to adapt itself 
readily to the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998. This review will help to 
provide a context within which to locate the current approaches to 'ethics education' 
on the police leadership and management development curriculum at Bramshill.
I shall th en  describe  the  actual fo rm  in w h ich  ethics, as a subject, is p re sen ted  on  
d e v e lo p m en t p ro g ram m es  and  courses w ithin  the  institutional con tex t o f  B ram shill  
a t the  d aw n  o f  the  n ew  m illenn ium . I shall also p rov ide  a sum m ary  con ce rn in g  the 
m a jo r  learn ings  em erg ing  from  the action research process  w hich  began  in the  first 
p a r t  o f  the  d ecad e  and  w h ic h  to o k  as its goal the  a ttem p t to  secure  'ethics ' on  the  
p o lice  lead e rsh ip  and m an ag e m e n t  dev e lo p m en t cu rricu lum . In th is  last sec tion  I 
in c lude  a b r ie f  ou tline  o f  so m e  o f  the know ledge  genera ted  by the  project.
In co n c lu s io n ,  I will end  w ith  a c losing  v ignette  con ce rn in g  reactions  by po lice  to
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my presentation of the subject ‘ethics’ on the middle-management programme at 
Bramshill. The fact that my work has been re-established on that programme 
provides positive evidence for the effectiveness of the individual educational action 
research process that began in the winter of 1992.
Part One: Ethics and police strategic concerns in the latter part o f  the twentieth 
century
The decade of the 1990s reveals a curious but elegant symmetry in relation to the 
police strategic discourse on ethics. It began with an especial emphasis upon the 
moral dimensions of policing and it ended with an emphasis -  via the concept of 
‘police integrity’ with those same concerns. In October 1990, the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) published its statement of common purpose and 
values. This short statement identified both the valued ends and the morally 
acceptable means of policing. In the same year, the several authors o f the 
Operational Policing Review published their findings amongst which they included 
36 recommendations positioned at both the strategic and tactical levels of the police 
organisation. The first of those recommendations was concerned with the complex 
issue of the integrity of police and was phrased in the following way:
" The police service sees its integrity as paramount and its commitment to the 
highest values should be re-emphasised and stated at every opportunity." 
(Operational Policing Review, 1990: 9)
The relatively abstract concept of 'integrity' can refer to the manifestation and 
development of those proper and/or exemplary standards of conduct commensurate 
with filling a social role. Thus, in the context of policing, it embraces notions of 
duty, obligation and the appropriate styles of conduct that should be expressed both 
inside and outside the organisation. Police ‘integrity’ is therefore both a cause and 
effect o f the social interactions that create and sustain police culture.
W o o d c o c k  (1991) v o iced  m a jo r  conce rns  w ith  the  na tu re  o f  po lice  cu ltu re  an d  
b eg an  to  u n d e rl in e  aspec ts  o f  the  c h an g in g  co n tex t  o f  p o lic in g  th a t  m ig h t  h a v e  a  
m a jo r  im p ac t on tha t  culture . A  part o f  th a t  co n tex t  co n ce rn ed  the  g a th e r in g  
s ignificance that needed  to be accorded to hum an  rights considerations. H e be lieved  
tha t 'm ajo r  change ' for police  culture w as 'in the  w ind ' and he im ag ined  tha t 'rights ' 
issues  w o u ld  play a m ajo r ro le  in c h an g in g  aspec ts  o f  the  po lice  cu lture . H e  also , 
and  subtly , po in ted  to the need  for the police  occupa tiona l cu ltu re  to take  i t s e l f  as 
an index o f  the ex ten t to w hich  fairness and im partiality  w as ex tended  to the  pub lic  
policed .
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These emphases were followed by Woodcock's (1992) landmark paper, 'Trust in 
the police - the search fo r  truth'm. which he explored the consequences o f ’comer- 
cutting' in the working culture of the police and recommended that the 'full weight' 
of the service be put behind both the statement of common purpose and values as 
well as the draft statement of ethical principles which was published in December 
1992 at Bramshill by the 'Quality of Service' committee. Again, whilst the 
statement gave an extensive coverage to the major moral dimensions of policing 
it also made reference to the importance of ‘upholding fundamental human rights’. 
Thus, the fourth of the statements (in that draft statement of principles) read as 
follows:
7 aspire to uphold fundamental human rights, treating every person as an 
individual and display respect and compassion towards them.' (ACPO Draft 
Statement o f Ethical Principles, 1992)
Woodcock included the following observations concerned to capture some of the 
experiential realities and the consequences of those realities that lie at the heart of 
(and help to generate the very fabric) of police practice:
"I believe that an everyday proximity to the effects o f  violence and an everyday 
experience o f  competing moral imperatives have a corrosive effect on policing 
culture, which tends to make most police officers uninterested in the fine details o f  
procedure.
The police working environment is one in which some procedures compete with 
others - the impetus o f  investigation versus the rights o f  suspects - so that crime 
control is in conflict with due process. From the beginning o f  a police officer's 
career he or she finds that the demands o f  the tasks in front o f  him or her tend to 
overwhelm the procedures laid down to deal with them. There is a constant sense 
o f  urgency in the police world which often leads to corner cutting." (Woodcock 
1992:2)
Woodcock moves on to examine the reasons for 'corner-cutting' and 'expediency' 
and suggests that the actions of the 'misguided' reflect a collective failure as 
supervisors. This concern about the quality of 'supervision' (and therefore of 
management and leadership) was reprised by Bunyard (1993) in the Frank Newsam 
memorial lecture, 'the future o f  policing' - which itself reflected the work of the 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993. Bunyard devoted a specific part of 
his address to the subject of supervision within which he made a number of
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significant observations and recommendations. Bunyard recognised that although 
there have been relatively recent improvements in managerial and supervisory 
styles nonetheless 'there remain needless elements' of Rowan's nineteenth century 
quasi-military approach. (My own research on the nature of the moral ethos of the 
police organisation supports his assertion. Thus, for example, a substantial 
proportion of police managers indicated that 'oppression and coercion' constituted 
one of the ways of characterising the psychological character o f the organisation.)
He also observed that detectives experienced little in the way of'supervision'. He 
moved on to say:
"Unsurprisingly, left to their own devices and free to apply their own individual 
ethics to their work, the standards o f  detectives vary widely." (Bunyard, 1993: 8)
He continued by making a reference to a cultural characteristic of detectives and 
the related importance of police supervision:
"Many detectives openly admitted to members o f  the Royal Commission that they 
regarded it as their duty to 'make sure the guilty were convicted' and i f  necessary 
to bend the rules. The irony is that their attempts to 'improve' the evidence to gain 
convictions, have caused police officers in general and detectives in particular to 
be widely disbelieved by juries.
The role o f  supervisors is absolutely fundamental to the future ofpolicing. There 
needs to be a very strong and purposeful drive towards quality assurance at all 
levels. Senior officers should set priorities and standards and really know what is 
happening within their area o f  responsibility and be accountable fo r  it. "(Bunyard 
1993:8)
Not only does Bunyard surface concerns about the quality of 'supervision' within 
the police service as a whole but his writing presciently foretells the model of 
supervision advocated by Smith (1999) in HMIC's 'police integrity'.
L ee  (1 9 9 3 )  c o m p le m en te d  the  em erg ing  co n sen su s  c o n ce rn in g  th e  im p o r tan c e  o f  
police  e th ics by  a ttem pting  to identify the  appropria te  param eters  o f  the  field itself. 
H e  u n d e r l in ed  the  p r im acy  o f  po lic ing  by  co n sen t  and  n o ted  the  ex ten s iv e  m ora l 
co m p lex ity  a t ta ch in g  to the  po lic ing  o f  a liberal dem ocracy . H e also  s tau n c h ly  
advoca ted  the  need  for police to adopt a code  o f  ethics (Lee, 1992) as a support  for 
po lice  p ro fess io n a lism  and ethical po lic ing .
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Zander (1994) presented a seminal paper on the ‘ethics of crime investigation by 
the police5 in the first seminar of its kind to take place in the United Kingdom at 
Bramshill in January of that year. He examined ‘what can and should be done5 to 
alter conduct and made eleven significant points. These included the need ‘to 
acknowledge that unethical conduct may not be uncommon5, the need ‘to stop 
condoning unethical conduct5, and, the need ‘to improve supervision and 
monitoring o f police work in criminal investigation5. Zander argued that it was 
difficult to over-emphasise the importance of these matters for the well-being of the 
criminal justice system - and he concluded that ‘it is excellent that the police 
service is beginning seriously to grapple with the issues5.
Police leaders continued to endorse the importance of moral standards in policing 
as they contributed to programme of professional development at Bramshill. Grieve 
(1994) for example portrayed police as ‘sentinels in the mist5 -  evoking an image 
of police holding the moral line in the face of moral ambiguity and opacity. Sir Paul 
Condon (1995) elegantly contended that it was ‘better to lose performance than 
integrity5. Whitehouse (1996) introduced the ‘thoughts of the police service5 on 
moral and ethical issues facing the police service to the multilateral meeting, 
convened in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe, to help develop police in the 
newly emerging liberal democracies of eastern Europe.
The specific interest in police ethics was paralleled by a somewhat wider interest 
in the ethics of public servants. Thomas (1993) published a collection of papers 
taking as their subject the teaching of 'government ethics'. These included 
discussions of the ethics of civil servants and other public servants but also, in an 
Appendix, Thomas included Richards (1985) original text, 'A plea fo r  applied 
ethics' - which, itself, constituted one of the first explicit works by an ethicist 
concerned with the teaching of ethics to police in the United Kingdom - as well as 
a postscript authored by Richards some eight years after his paper first appeared. 
In that postscript he remarked that, on re-reading his original work, he experienced 
'a deep sense of deja vu'. He points out that when, in 1983, he wrote the article, the 
police service was the subject of considerable criticism. Ten years later he observes 
that:
"They are still the object o f  intense criticism, and yet during the last decade the 
service has been the subject o f  strenuous attempts at reform ..." (Richards, 1993 : 
676,677)
A lth o u g h  so m eth ing  o f  a 'm anageria l revolution ' had, accord ing  to R ichards, taken  
p lace  in po lic ing , the  serv ice  as a w hole  had not m anaged  to secure  com ple te  trust
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and confidence in the quality of its moral ethos. So, Richards asked:
"How might ethics be expected to contribute to these [reform] measures to further 
improve police practice? " (Richards, 1993: 677)
He answers this question by recommending that more attention be paid to some of 
the findings in social psychology - especially in relation to our knowledge about 
the behaviour of individuals in groups (such as conformity to group norms e.g. 
Brown, 1986) and in relation to our responses to authority such as the 'Becket 
syndrome' (e.g. Milgram 1974) - which identify the circumstances that make 
difficult the to exercise clear and independent judgement - and which, therefore, 
subvert integrity. For Richards, this knowledge must be applied to the workings of 
the police culture. He suggests that:
"This may enable us to ameliorate the worst effects o f  such processes in future. 
Applied ethics will enable us more readily to identify such situations, and match 
our 'oughts' to our 'cans' in ways that are more sensitive to our human limitations 
and thus help to avoid deleterious practices." (Richards 1993: 679)
The work of Thomas was followed, in 1995, by the publication of the report by the 
Lord Nolan, entitled, 'Standards in public life' (Cm 2850-1) This report was 
presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister of the day and it includes an 
observation made by an Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan police which, 
again, points to problems intrinsic to police discretion:
"It is apparent that guidelines where matters are left to the judgement o f  individuals 
are not effective." (Veness, in Nolan, 1995: 88)
Nolan made a small number of recommendations intended to have application 
across the entire public service. These included a 'restatement' of the seven 
principles of public life, namely, 'selflessness', 'integrity', 'objectivity', 
'accountability', 'openness', 'honesty', and 'leadership'. The meaning of each term 
was subsequently defined. So, for example, 'openness' means that:
"Holders o f  public office should be as open as possible about all the decisions and 
actions that they take. They should give reasons fo r  their decisions and restrict 
information only when the wider public interest clearly demands. " (N o lan , 1995: 
14)
T he  N olan  report a lso  reco m m en d ed  that all public  bod ies  shou ld  d raw  up  'C o d es
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of conduct' incorporating the seven principles of public service and the report made 
references to the need for there to be 'education' in relation to the observance of 
these and other principles.
In addition to outlining a number of recommendations the first report of the Nolan 
inquiry included a short review of standards in public life throughout the twentieth 
century. This review culminated by including references to 'current public opinion' 
concerning different occupational groups. The report refers to a survey conducted 
by the Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) organisation, which, in 
1983 and again in 1993, offered respondents a list of different occupations and 
asked:
’Would you tell me whether you generally trust them to tell the truth or not?'
In 1993 both doctors and teachers attracted a figure of 84% (i.e. 84% of 
respondents believed that, generally, such persons could be trusted to tell the truth) 
whilst the police attracted a lower figure of 63%.
The gathering disquiet about and interest in police ethics was given authoritative 
academic foundations in 1996 with Kleinig's publication, 'The ethics of policing'. 
Kleinig's comprehensive work explored, in three parts, 'professional ethics' 
including his analysis of the moral foundations of policing, 'personal ethics' in 
which he examined the major categories of ethical dilemma experienced by police 
practitioners, and, 'organisational ethics' where he discusses the nature of authority 
and accountability as well as the ethical challenges for police management.
Kleinig's scholarly work was complemented by the coming together of a range of 
persons in the United Kingdom to form the Police Ethics Network -  an independent 
and non-profit making organisation founded in London. The second publication of 
the network appeared in 1999 and emphasised its applied or practical nature. It 
stated that:
"The Network consists o f police officers and other individuals who share a common 
interest in exploring, at both strategic and operational levels the ethical issues o f  
working in the fie ld  o f  criminal justice within a diverse, multicultural society. Much 
o f  the work in this fie ld  has been overly theoretical and somewhat obscure, often 
divorced from  the day-to-day realities o f  contemporary policing. Policing faces 
challenges and tough decisions in the context o f ethical tensions and pressures to 
compromise personal values. " (Police Ethics Network, 1999: 4)
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Again, the 1999 network publication included references to the absence of'training 
in ethics'. So, one discussant remarked:
"Why should the police service be thinking about ethics? I  think it's rather like 
interview technique training in the police service. It's a very basic requirement and 
yet the nettle was not grasped fo r  many years. It was a long time before officers 
were taught how to talk to witnesses and suspects. Similarly with ethics, I  think. It's 
such a core thing to the police service, and yet there's no training, there are no 
support mechanisms in place fo r  police officers who are involved on a daily basis 
doing a very difficult jo b ." (Police Ethics Network, 1999: 6)
As a factual claim this remark is not entirely true. However, it does continue to 
point to a perceived dearth or absence of proper professional development across 
the police service as a whole. It does prompt the question ‘How far has the field of 
criminal justice ethics education developed?’ since Sherman’s (1982) original 
monograph set an agenda for developing this field of practice. A part of the answer 
was supplied in 1997 by Kleinig and Leland Smith following the 1996 workshop 
examining criminal justice ethics teaching held at the Institute for Criminal Justice 
Ethics in the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York. Kleinig and Leland 
Smith edited a collection of papers presented at the workshop; in the introduction 
to this collection they point out that from 1990 onwards a gradually increasing 
number o f texts designed for courses in criminal justice ethics became available. 
They cite seven such works; Pollock Byrne (1994), Schmalleger (1990), Cohen and 
Feldberg (1991), Braswell, McCarthy and McCarthy (1996), Souryal (1992), Close 
and Meier (1994) and Kleinig (1996). The relative recency of these achievements 
builds upon the earlier work of Heffeman and Stroup (1985) and Elliston and 
Feldberg (1985) and provides Kleinig and Leland Smith with a justification for 
their view that 'criminal justice ethics courses are only now coming of age'. After 
their review of the general development of the subject 'police ethics', Kleinig and 
Leland Smith organise the papers in their collection under four headings:
- A im s  in c rim ina l ju s t ic e  e th ics  educa tion
- In teg ra t in g  c rim ina l ju s t ic e  e th ics  into the  cu rricu lum
- S tra teg ies  in te ach in g  crim ina l ju s t ic e  e th ics
- E v a lu a tin g  the teach in g  o f  crim inal ju s t ic e  eth ics
T hey  reco g n ise  tha t the  w eakes t aspec t o f  teach ing  crim inal ju s t ic e  e th ics  is in
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relation to its evaluation. In relation to 'strategies in teaching criminal justice ethics' 
they observe:
" there is strong backing fo r  a pedagogy that centres on, or at least has a 
significant place fo r  case studies." (Kleinig and Leland Smith, 1997: xvii)
They move on to cite the work of Whitbeck (1997) - who distinguishes between 
using five kinds of case materials and the skills needed for each kind of case - and 
Winston (1997) who illustrates how using a particular incident which is embedded 
in a larger social context, can 'provide a particularly rich moral resource'.
Whilst their work represents an exceptionally useful exposition of critical issues in 
the teaching of criminal justice ethics within an educational setting, it could not 
consider the teaching o f ethics in something as distinct and particular as the 
institutional context of Bramshill, devoted, as it is, to 'higher police training'. Thus, 
the contributors never make mention of the resistance or hostility of students to the 
basic educational situation. As this project has shown, the tutor, at Bramshill, has 
first to become accepted by the student groups, before the study process can 
properly get under way.
Villiers (1997), following his long association with police leaders and managers in 
the United Kingdom, published 'Better Police Ethics’; this work was designed to 
help the working police officer make informed and thoughtful choices when 
confronted with actual ethical dilemmas. In common with the contributors to 
Kleinig and Leland Smith (1997) he defends the use of case studies in 'police 
ethical training' and, like them, he includes a method (in his case the 'Warmambool 
method') to be used as a logical and systematic approach to help with ethical 
problem solving. To the extent that Villiers produced his work independently of the 
authors such as Davis and Welfel featured in Kleinig and Leland Smith (1997) 
there is some evidence for the existence of a partial consensus of opinion amongst 
ethics educators in relation to some of the elements making for an effective 
educational design.
As the decade entered its latter stages two developments sustained the momentum 
given to the moral aspects of policing: the Human Rights Act 1998 and HMIC’s 
(1999) report on ‘Police integrity’.
Whilst the Nolan report clarified the standards of conduct expected from public 
servants in the United Kingdom, a wider programme of modernising politics, 
through, inter alia, constitutional reform, was initiated by the new Labour
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government in 1997. Before the general election the labour party published a 
consultation document, 'Bringing Rights Home' that set out the case for 
incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into the law of the 
United Kingdom. The subsequent White Paper explained the proposals contained 
in the Human Rights Bi\\: Rights Bought Home. In the preface to that White Paper 
the Prime Minister noted that it was right to 'increase individual human rights' and 
he moved on to say:
"The Bill marks a major step forward in the achievement o f  our [government's] 
programme o f  reform. It will give people in the United Kingdom opportunities to 
enforce their rights under the European Convention in British Courts rather than 
having to incur the cost and delay o f  taking a case to the European Human Rights 
Commission and Court in Strasbourg. It will enhance the awareness o f  human 
rights in our society." (Home Office: Bringing Rights Home 1997: 1)
The main reasons prompting this aspect of constitutional reform stemmed from the 
fact that it was both a costly and a lengthy process taking a petition concerning an 
alleged infringement of convention rights to the European Commission, and, the 
rights detailed in the Convention were no longer actually seen as 'British rights'.
In order to 'bring rights home’ the government set out to make it unlawful for public 
authorities to act in way that was incompatible with the Convention rights. Police 
were defined as 'Public authorities'. So, as the new millennium approached, the 
police were, through this definition, subject to the incorporation of the European 
Convention into British law. The White Paper noted:
"A person who is aggrieved by an act or omission on the part o f  a public authority 
which is incompatible with convention rights will be able to challenge the act or 
omission in the courts. The effects will be wide-ranging. "(Home Office: Bringing 
Rights Home: 8)
T he  W h ite  p ap e r  - and  the  su b seq u en t leg is la tion , the  H u m a n  R igh ts  A c t  1998 - 
cam e to p rov ide  unprecedented  backing  for the  righ ts-based  aspects o f  po lice  eth ics  
tha t had  been  p ro m u lg a ted  and  advoca ted  ov e r  the  p reced in g  tw o  decades . T h e  
p a ss in g  o f  the  H u m an  R igh ts  A c t in 1998, led to the  c rea tion  o f  an  A sso c ia t io n  o f  
C h ie f  P o lice  O fficers  (A C P O ) 'H u m an  R igh ts  W o rk in g  G ro u p ’. H o w ev e r ,  b e fo re  
I e x am in e  the  d ev e lo p in g  response  o f  the  po lice  serv ice  to  the  A c t I sh o u ld  
a ck n o w led g e  the ev idence  w h ich  poin ts  to a m ore  general s tra teg ic  aw are n e ss  o f  
the  n ew ly  e m erg in g  'rights ' cu ltu re  (G earty , 1999).
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This awareness is reflected in the Association of Chief Police Officers' (1998) 
revision of policing priorities which found expression as the 'overarching aims and 
objectives o f the police service' and included a statement of the purpose of the 
police service, a synopsis of the guiding principles governing police action and a 
succinct identification of the main aims of the service. This statement emphasised 
the 'helping' role o f the police in relation to securing a 'safe and just society'. In 
addition, the police service was reckoned to be explicitly concerned with the 
promotion and observance of individual and community rights and responsibilities. 
The statement phrased the policing purpose as follows:
" To help secure a safe and ju st society in which the rights and responsibilities o f  
individuals, families and communities are properly balanced." (ACPO, 1998)
The guiding principles began with the following statement that recaptured the 
emphasis taken in 1990:
“The police should carry out their functions with integrity. ” (ACPO 1998)
In May 1999, the ACPO Human Rights Working Group issued a newsletter - which 
already found itself included in the study material for the Accelerated Promotion 
Course in June of that year. The newsletter asserted that the 'human rights agenda 
heralds a new era in policing' and went on to summarise, for its readership, the 
impact and consequences of the act on police. It noted that:
- Police officers and managers will need to consider the European Convention on 
Human Rights principles when exercising their professional judgements
-The Police Service will need to review its policies and procedures for compliance 
with convention rights
- Staff will need to be trained in awareness of convention rights
- The service will need to assist in an audit of legislative compliance
Just as ‘human rights’ issues, in part because of the passing of the Human Rights 
Act, were becoming increasingly 'foregrounded' in police thinking, the MacPherson 
report examining the reasons and causes of the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence 
was published in the Spring of 1999. This report, inter alia, found that police 
organisations were 'institutionally racist'. Therefore, it underlined how relevant and 
appropriate were those earlier concerns with the moral quality of policing services.
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Finally, in June 1999, reprising the theme of'integrity,1 Her Majesty's Inspectorate 
of Constabulary published the results of their inquiry into police integrity. The 
Inspection made specific mention of Newbum's (1999) literature review and 
conclusions concerning how both to understand, and to develop ways (of 
attempting) to prevent police corruption. This important review included a 
conclusion: 'Towards 'ethical' policing'. Newbum made eleven 'key points' that, for 
him, summarised the general messages arising from his review. In themselves, his 
points enjoin police managers and leaders to seek ways of preventing malpractice 
and corruption. He notes, for example that ‘Police corruption is pervasive, 
continuing and not bounded by rank’, that ‘the boundary between 'corrupt' and non­
corrupt' activities is difficult to define, primarily because this is, at heart, ‘an ethical 
problem’ and that ‘continued vigilance and scepticism is vital.
Newbum continues with a thoughtful discussion of ways to work with the empirical 
findings and, in the course of his discussion, once again draws attention to the 
absence o f training for police officers in ethics. He states:
"Relatively little emphasis, i f  any, is put on ethics training fo r  new recruits or fo r  
those in service. Indeed, statements or codes o f  ethics, where they exist, often tend 
to be little more than general statements o f  intent which simply sit in folders or 
hang decoratively on office walls, rather than living documents which inform day- 
to-day practice and are the subject o f  active discussion and debate. Without doubt, 
a much more sustainedfocus on what might constitute 'ethicalpolicing' is not only 
a key challenge fo r  the police service in the next century, but an important element 
in the attempt to control corruption." (Newbum 1999: 48)
Newbum's work was incorporated into HMIC's inspection into police integrity and 
demonstrates yet again concerns to achieve an ‘ethical police’. The Inspection itself 
was conducted, according to its authors:
'... against a background o f  increasing concern that on occasion the level o f  
integrity within the sew  ice fails to reach the desired standard. " (H M IC  1999: 72)
In add ition , the  In spec tion  em braced  co m p reh en s iv e  te rm s  o f  re fe ren ce  th a t  
inc luded  d e te rm in in g  the  ex ten t to w h ich  the  Po lice  Serv ice  w o rk ed  w ith in  the  
'sp ir it o f  the  s ta tem en t o f  co m m o n  p u rp o se  and  values. ' It seem s, the re fo re , 
reasonab le  to  co n ten d  tha t the m oral d im en s io n  o f  po lic in g  has fo und  i ts e lf  
co n tin u in g  to  a ttrac t  consis tency  o f  a tten tion  in po lice  s tra teg ic  th ink ing . It a lso  
seem s possib le  to argue that the drive tow ards  es tab lish ing  a 'perfo rm ance  culture '
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is also part of a more general application of moral values criteria - especially those 
values subsumed under the idea of accountability.
The formulation of the priorities in policing by the association of police officers in 
1998 could be said to have reflected a subtle shift in emphasis. So, the sanctity 
accorded to the 'prevention of crime1 - which was still privileged by Laughame and 
Newman in 1985 - has been succeeded by concerns with securing the 'rights and 
responsibilities' of the citizenry. In the same way that Laughame and Newman 
(1985), the ACPO Statement of Common Purpose and Values (1990), and, 
Woodcock (1992) provided an authoritative and exclusively police-generated 
'backing' for the exploration of ethics in relation to police leadership practice and 
development in the first part of the decade, the HMIC examination of police 
integrity provides a revitalisation and re-enchantment with the practice of ethical 
leadership and ethical policing at its end. The Inspection report suggests, by 
implication, that there remains an important role in higher police training for the 
provision of skills in 'principled' or 'ethical' police leadership and that, if Bramshill 
is to remain a site within which higher police training takes place, then a part of its 
function will be concerned with the provision, ideally, of a valued and effective 
'ethics education'. What, though, did the Inspection discover? I shall, in the next 
short section, elaborate upon some of the detail of the HMIC exploration of'police 
integrity'.
Her Majesty's Inspection into 'Police integrity'
The Inspection was carried out between July 1998 and January 1999 by a team of 
police officers, Home office civil servants and civilian support staff. The authors 
of the report assert that it was initiated because of 'evidence that the public were 
becoming increasingly concerned about a suggested decline in the integrity of the 
police.' The authors continue:
"Whether or not the Police service is now healthier than at any time in its short 
(sic) history, it is a fac t that the public's confidence in it has been declining in 
recent years. The high profile miscarriage o f  justice cases arising from  earlier 
police activity were followed in 1998 by concern over the actions o f  a handful o f  
ch ie f constables, and by the emerging consequences o f  the Commissioner o f  the 
Metropolitan Police seeking to root out corruption in the Capital's police - 
addressing issues with greater effectiveness than previously, ironically, exposes 
them to public attention. There has also been understandable concern about the 
apparent inability’ o f  the police on occasions to deal impartially with different 
sections o f  society, with ethnic minority issues predominating. " (HMIC 1999: 7)
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Four inquiry teams of police and civilians were constituted and each team 
concentrated upon one of the following areas:
- Management and systems to maintain integrity
- Prosecution of offenders and complaints and discipline
- The public interface and public perceptions
- Personnel and training
A precis of the findings of this Inspection were presented in an executive summary 
which was supplemented by a number of chapters elaborating the details o f the 
findings. Appendix B summarised the responses of the chief constables to an 
‘Inspection5 questionnaire asking for their personal views on a wide range of 
‘integrity5 issues. A close reading of the text suggests that the Inspection team was 
critical of the quality of police leadership in relation to ’standards'. Thus, for 
example, the author(s), in relation to whether or not there existed 'reinforcement of 
the Statement of Common Purpose and Values5 wrote:
"The questionnaire asked fo r  details o f  subsequent actin to re-enforce the SCPV  
and how corporate values are communicated to new and existing sta ff and the 
public. A wide variety o f  responses were received but many mentioned were 
uninspiring and o f  a very passive nature." (HMIC 1999: 76)
Additionally, the authors observed:
"When asked i f  any specific document had been published to their forces on 
expectations o f  integrity, few  forces appeared to have undertaken such an 
exercise." (HMIC 1999: 78)
They added, in relation to processes (including training) for maintaining integrity, 
the following:
"The questionnaire asked i f  the concept of'integrity' featured specifically in their 
internally run training courses. Overall, few  forces responded with any specific 
details o f  how these issues are included in internal training to help maintain 
standards." (HMIC 1999: 78)
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The Inspection report moved on to include an analysis of the theories advanced by 
chief constables to account for lapses in integrity. Fourteen 'causes’ are cited - 
paramount amongst which are the nature of supervision and management. The 
Inspection report states:
"The main theme o f  the responses was that supervision at middle-management level 
and the leadership from  the top were vitally important." (HMIC 1999: 84)
Thus, once again, the HMIC report reproduces a leitmotif running through the 
study of police and policing. It reflects concerns about the quality of supervision, 
management and leadership in relation to the embodiment and expression of moral 
standards in the police service. In addition, although the Inspection report seemed 
determined to emphasise that only a small minority of police staff were manifesting 
'bad behaviour', it appeared to raise serious doubts about the ability of police 
managers to fit the requirements of their role. So, it made the following 
observations:
"The Inspection found many chief officers have no personal systems to inform them 
directly on the health (sic) o f  integrity within their functional responsibilities. Too 
often reliance is placed on the fac t that authority has been delegated, forgetting  
responsibility remains theirs. Many admitted they only became aware o f  problems 
after they had occurred ... But the most important point is every supervisor, at 
every level, should have their own systems to become aware o f  issues before they 
progress to becoming serious." (HMIC 1999 (Executive summary): 3)
"The most important factor in bringing about the necessary improvements in all 
aspects o f  integrity is the quality o f  leadership provided by all police managers. 
The chief officer team should demonstrate commitment and firm  leadership in the 
drive to create and maintain integrity within their force, and they should at all 
times give out a consistent message to their staff in other words ’practice what they 
preach'"  (HMIC 1999 (Executive summary): 3)
These remarks (and the one hundred and twenty five questions the Inspection report 
includes as a 'good practice' guide) serve to underline the continuing emphasis on 
the standard and quality of police ethics. That emphasis has, to a certain extent, 
been given fresh impetus by the ascendancy, in the last part of the decade, of a 
human rights perspective. It is to this that I now turn.
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The steady rise o f  the human rights* emphasis
Immediately after the Second World War, a part of the response to the Nazi 
atrocities was captured in the slogan, 'Never again'. In the effort to ensure that those 
atrocities were not repeated the General Assembly of United Nations famously 
developed and then, on 10 December 1948, adopted and proclaimed the 'Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights'. The current Secretary General o f the United 
Nations, Kofi Annan, introduces the 'Declaration' by reminding its readers that:
"Following this historic act, the Assembly called upon its member countries to 
publicise the text o f  the declaration and to "cause it to be disseminated, displayed, 
read and expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions, 
without distinction based on the political status o f  countries or territories". " 
(Annan, 1999: 3)
The emphasis on the importance of human rights, has not only a long history in 
moral and political philosophy, but also in the philosophical thinking on police. 
Laughame and Newman (1985), in their analysis of the duties of police, provide 
perhaps the most extensive discussion of the way in which 'human rights' and the 
idea of a moral law together inform the priorities of the police function. Cherrett 
(1997) notes the strong connection between their work and the subsequent final 
form of the ACPO statement of Common Purpose and Values (1990).
At least a part of the impetus behind their analysis was the Policy Studies Institute 
report (1981) examining the conduct of the police of the Metropolis as well as the 
Scarman report (1981) into the Brixton disorders. These latter reports had 
highlighted shortcomings in terms of the way police understood and expressed their 
duties. Richards (1999) (personal communication) pointed out that Sir Kenneth 
Newman, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, recognised that if police were 
not able to be kept under surveillance by their supervisors then they would need 
some form of'internal surveillance'; this would be the main function of a code of 
ethics (or its equivalent). Laughame and Newman subsequently sought to articulate 
such a code of ethics - which came to find itself expressed as a 'code of 
professional duties'.
The work of Newman and Laughame is, though, much more than the promulgation 
of a code of professional duties. It represents an attempt to provide a thorough 
analysis of the principles that should govern policing within, as Newman puts it in 
the forward to the work, 'the new requirements of a vibrant democracy'. Laughame 
and Newman were also concerned to help develop the police organisation in such
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a way that it could move from a 'comparatively-inward looking’ profession to one 
which was 'more attuned to other people's needs.'
Laughame and Newman's work is especially significant because it is cast, in part, 
in a jurisprudential framework through its emphasis on appreciating the meaning 
of the term, 'The Rule of Law'. In their analysis of the 'Policing Principles o f the 
Metropolitan Police', Laughame and Newman begin with a statement of police 
objectives. They assert that:
"The primary aims and duties o f  the Metropolitan Police are to uphold the Rule o f  
Law, to protect and assist the citizen and to work fo r  the prevention and detection 
o f  crime and the maintenance o f  a peaceful society, free o f  the fear o f  crime and 
disorder. They will carry out these aims and duties in consultation and co­
operation with others in the community. " (Laughame and Newman 1985: 9)
Subsequently they provide a rationale for this framing of the police objectives 
through and explanation and expansion of the main phrases in their statement. As 
they turn to the meaning of the 'upholding the Rule of Law' they emphasise a 
complex of concepts attaching to the term which, importantly, include the traditions 
and achievements of human rights. They clarify the idea of 'Rule of Law' as 
follows:
"The phrase 'Rule o f  Law' is a general term, o f  wide meaning, incorporating a 
number o f  the ideals and principles which are crucial to the process o f  government 
andjustice in a free society. It includes also some o f  the provisions on human rights 
propounded by bodies such as the Council o f  Europe and the United Nations. " 
(Laughame and Newman 1985: 40)
The primary requirement of the police to uphold the 'Rule of Law' involves two 
inter-related duties. First, according to Laughame and Newman, police must apply 
the law of the land as enacted in statutes or as established by the Common law. 
Second, they stress the fact that upholding the 'Rule of Law' in its 'full sense' means 
that police must keep within prescribed powers, abstain from arbitrary action and 
respect the rights and freedoms of all citizens. Laughame and Newman are keen 
to place the very idea of the 'Rule of Law' within a tradition of rights and values 
that are 'maintained by British society as a whole' and which provide a set of 
principles for the correct governance of policing. They identify six such principles, 
the first of which underlines the need to respect the individual rights and freedoms 
of all citizens. As they develop the content of their principles they note that the 
fundamental values of British society are underpinned by procedure and legal rules
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and assumptions which they subsequently turn to identify. The rights, values and 
entitlements they describe reflect a long tradition of political liberalism, given 
especial force by Mill (1859) concerned with creating a just, free and orderly civil 
society. Laughame and Newman find the following 'of particular importance in the 
context of police duty':
- The presumption of innocence
- The right to free speech
- The right to free association
- Restrictions on powers of arrest and detention
- The right to silence
- The right to access to legal advice
- The prohibition of discriminatory behaviour towards individuals, classes of 
persons and minority groups
- The observance of suspects rights
- The requirement of reasonableness when acting upon suspicion
- Integrity in the collection and presentation of evidence
- Respect for human dignity
- The need to use only such force as is necessary to accomplish a legitimate 
purpose
In addition they argue that the 'British ideal' of policing is that it should be shaped 
by the consent of the population and that such consent depends upon the 
observance, by the police, of the individual's rights and liberties.
The primacy given to the idea of the 'Rule of Law' by Laughame and Newman was 
not matched in the subsequent ACPO (1990) Statement of Common Purpose and 
Values - which simply remarked that the purpose of the Police Service was to 
'uphold the law fairly and firmly' - nor in ACPO's (1998) statement of the
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overarching aims and objectives for the Police service. In that latter publication, 
one of the three main aims of the police service is to 'contribute to delivering justice 
in a way which secures and maintains public confidence in the rule of law.' No 
longer is the idea of the 'Rule of Law' given quite such a profound emphasis. Nor, 
I want to add, should the subtlety of the fact that it is no longer expressed using 
capital letters be ignored. Whilst Laughame and Newman's work did not enjoy the 
prominence it might have deserved (Cherrett 1997) the importance of the concept 
of the Rule o f Law continued to be central to Richards' teaching of ethics to the 
most senior leaders in the police service whenever he addressed them at Bramshill. 
Moreover, it seems possible to argue that, if the richness of meaning constellated 
by the term the 'Rule of Law' was rather overlooked in police strategic thinking, the 
importance given to the study of human rights increased as a direct result of the 
passing of the Human Rights Act (1998). Most obviously, in March 1999 the 
executive seminar programme at Bramshill under the stewardship of Villiers, in 
conjunction with the British Institute of Human Rights, organised a two-day 
'Police training seminar' entitled, 'Understanding Human Rights and their effect on 
Police work'.
In concluding this review of the sustained commitment given throughout the 1990s 
by police leaders to the importance of police ethics, moral standards and the respect 
for human rights, the separate themes were conjoined by Crawshaw, Devlin and 
Williamson (1998) in their publication that argued for a change in police culture 
driven by embracing and expressing an enhanced human rights consciousness. This 
publication was itself complemented by Crawshaw5 s (1999) teaching manual 
designed to help present human rights programmes to the police themselves.
This review has shown that ‘police ethics5 and human rights considerations have 
featured as major strategic, culture change and organisational development 
concerns for police leaders throughout the 1990s. I attempted, throughout the 
decade, to support the culture change process through the provision of learning 
structures and learning designs on the middle-manager programme(s) at Bramshill. 
It remains puzzling (and, in truth, indefensible) that the inclusion of the subject 
‘ethics5 rests less upon coherent and consistent educational decision-making by the 
leaders of the institution but more on an admixture of student preference and tutor 
dispositions. My colleagues have noted that, had it not been a change in relatively 
junior staff at Bramshill, then ‘ethics5 might still be excluded from the middle- 
manager programmes.
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Part Two: Teaching ethics at Bramshill: the current position
Ethics is included as a named subject on the curriculum of the Strategic Command 
Course (the most senior course) and it also continues to be included on the 
Operational Commanders Programme (a short programme for senior 'business unit' 
managers within the police service). It has reappeared on the Police Management 
Programme. It receives sustained attention on the Accelerated Promotion Course
- the course for the 'high-fliers' in the police service. I shall outline the specific 
detail of the different educational designs on those separate courses at a later point 
in this section. In addition to my own endeavours, two other Bramshill tutors have 
taught the subject and I shall begin with a summary of their teaching experiences.
Reflections on teaching ethics to police leaders and managers: the view from  
practitioners
In 1998, Villiers authored a short paper, 'Teaching ethics to police officers: 
experiences and reflections' which, along with Richards (1998) briefing to the 
Council of Europe and my own publications (Adlam 1998b, 1999) constitute, I 
think, the sum total of public statements concerning 'ethics education' which have 
been made by tutors operating within the contemporary leadership and 
management development context at Bramshill. Certain additional statements 
concerning the teaching of senior police officers have been made by tutors as a 
result of their work at Bramshill (e.g. Foster 1998) and I shall make selective 
reference to those statements in the following discussion.
Villiers begins his reflection on the teaching of ethics to police leaders and 
managers at Bramshill by observing that, in general terms, the staff are concerned 
to review and raise ethical standards within the police as an explicit part o f the 
institution's activities. He points out that the difficult question is not why ethics 
should be taught but how to do it. He then moves on to consider some of the 
methods tried and, in so doing, he highlights the difficulties that are encountered 
with each method. To underline the fact that the teaching of ethics has been 
problematic, he lists the following barriers that he has regularly encountered:
- A n ti- in te l lec tu a lism
- N a iv e te  th ro u g h  to cyn ic ism
- T he  desire  for certa in ty
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- Playing the game: ethics as the new fad
- Confusion over moral and cultural relativism
- Management that is seen to lack integrity
Here, I should note that each of these ’barriers' was repeatedly displayed by some 
members of the client groups that I took throughout the duration my inquiry.
Villiers suggests that the original and preferred general teaching model adopted by 
the Police College in its early years - which featured a lecture followed by 
discussions with a 'directing staff present to spot and emphasise key points' is no 
longer regularly practised. He recognises that, notwithstanding my own research 
process, no 'formal evaluation' of the effectiveness of different ways of teaching 
ethics has been attempted. To the extent that he is referring to conventional 
evaluation research his statement is factually correct. In the absence of such a 
formal evaluation programme he notes that the tutors responsible for designing and 
delivering ethics programmes continually attempt to monitor and evaluate the 
impact o f those programmes and their effectiveness by informal means. Those 
informal means include regular, intense and serious discussions amongst the 
tutorial staff. Villiers believes that those discussions have led to a number of 
'generally agreed' conclusions. First he considers the lecture:
" The lecture can be helpful in teaching and promoting ethics, provided that the 
lecturer has some credibility in this area. In the police world, that credibility does 
not arise from  the lecturer's grasp o f  moral philosophy as a discipline, nor on his 
(sic) ability to relate abstract concepts to real life dilemmas - although, other things 
being equal, this is a useful asset. Credibility means that the lecturer has wrestled 
with the sort o f  moral dilemmas police officers face. In other words, he must work 
or recently have worked as a police officer or something like it, and he must have 
been in the arena himself and faced Caesar's thumb. A background in 
administration or training is irrelevant. The police officer gains credibility from his 
experience on the streets." (Villiers 1998: 2)
It follows, from his description, that civilian tutors, unless they can represent 
themselves as 'similar' to police lack 'credibility'. But Villiers moves on, as I have 
noted in an earlier chapter, to provide a devastating comment on the difficulties that 
a 'credible' police lecturer encounters: they are deemed to be morally dubious 
because it is assumed they that will have had to act unethically. So, not only is the 
non-police tutor liable to lack credibility but the police tutor is seen as hypocritical,
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disingenuous and incongruent.
By way of consolation, Villiers suggests that senior police officers can have an 
effect as lecturers because they are able to warn a police audience that the climate 
has changed and that previous indiscretions will 'no longer be tolerated'. Wittily he 
adds:
".. we believe that exhortations and warnings come under the general heading o f  
ethical discourse. Let us not be too discriminatory!" (Villiers, 1998: 3)
Next, he considers the more thorough and 'academic' route to 'achieving ethical 
progress'. Villiers clarifies his understanding of this approach as follows:
"By this I  mean that we give out reading lists, set and mark essays, encourage 
student-led syndicate discussion, conduct tutorials and the like. The problem with 
this method, which is the best way to inculcate a deep and clear understanding o f  
ethical issues in those who accept its discipline, is that it is a discipline, and a strict 
one. We are aping what happens at a University, and neither the Police College 
students nor sta ff may be willing or able to do it. Bramshill was not set up as a 
Police University, and .... there is no general move to the academic method." 
(Villiers, 1998:3)
If the lecture method is problematic and the 'academic' method is beyond the 
institutional capability of Bramshill, then, for Villiers, the staff consensus has it that 
tutoring in ethics at Bramshill is a matter of'pragmatic experimentation'. He asks, 
'How, then, do we teach ethics?' and notes that:
"As in other parts o f  the curriculum, to some extent we proceed simply by trial and 
error - or occasionally by trial and success." (Villiers 1998: 3)
This is an important observation and can be taken as a form of corroboration for my 
account and especially for my way of characterising the second major phase of the 
inquiry i.e. Eclecticism and pragmatics'.
H e m e n tio n s  th ree  m e th o d s  for teach in g  ethics. F irst, he  considers  the  u se  o f  ro le  
p lay  and  p sy ch o -d ram a  - and he recogn ises  tha t  th is  m ethod , w ith  the  h e lp  o f  
p ro fess iona l actors, is n o w  in co m m o n  use at B ram sh ill  and  th a t  it rep re sen ts  an 
a ttem pt to exp lo re  the  e thical aw areness  and ‘c a p a c i ty ’ o f  the  po lice  m an ag e rs  on 
its d e v e lo p m en t p rog ram m es . Second, he g ives  cu rso ry  a tten tion  to  'p ro jec t  w ork '
- in v o lv in g  an ex am in a tio n  o f  police  from  the m oral po in t o f  v iew  - w h ich  he
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dismisses as something which does not create 'a model for further progress'. Third, 
and finally, Villiers considers the use of'case studies'. Again, a careful reading of 
his text is important because it reveals, again, the daunting nature of tutoring at 
Bramshill. In his attempt to reflect the consensus of staff opinion at Bramshill, 
Villiers writes:
"... the right use o f  the right case study is probably the most effective way to 
generate real ethical debate in syndicate, although what is learned therefrom 
remains open to many interpretations. The sort o f  case studies often used in moral 
philosophy involve making a forced choice under life-threatening or tragic 
circumstances. Police officers will not usually engage with these in class, whatever
their experience in real life However, it is possible to create and use realistic
and. challenging case studies which point towards general ethical principles." 
(Villiers 1998: 4)
This is an important observation, because my own findings suggest that through the 
medium of creating plays and playlets, police officers developed powerful and 
often authentic 'living' case studies for the benefit of their peers, and that these 'case 
studies' make it possible to develop the application of ethical principles and 
analytical skills.
As he concluded his review Villiers mentions that:
"Many police officers simply want to compare their ideas on ethics and its 
challenges with those other people who face similar dilemmas. On the assumption 
that the group is likely to achieve a better solution than the individual - a hotly 
debatable assumption under some conditions, but nevertheless one with some 
validity - it is to the public good that police decision-makers should have their 
mental processes exposed to scrutiny, i f  only the scrutiny o f  their peers... Peer 
analysis can be devastatingly incisive and questions such as; 'What was wrong with 
that?' or 'What other options were there?' or 'What would you have done?' can lead 
to significant gains ..." (Villiers 1998: 5)
To sum up, Villiers' brief review of the attempt to teach ethics at Bramshill 
illustrates its many difficulties - although the willingness of police officers to Talk’ 
and to execute the tasks they are set means that, serendipitously, their ethical 
discourse may be enhanced.
Richards (1998) has continued to emphasise the importance of the idea of 
upholding the 'Rule of Law' as the fundamental priority in policing. He also
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advocates that courses in police ethics should, at least in the context o f the United 
Kingdom, begin by addressing and debating the meaning o f ACPO's (1990) 
statement of common purpose and values. His concern lies more with uncovering 
an appropriate content for police ethics education rather than trying to discover the 
most effective methods from among a variety of learning structures.
He entitles his most recent (unpublished) paper, ’The British police service 
statement o f  common purpose and values: its ethics and implications fo r  policing’
- which includes references to the actual teaching of ethics. A part o f the 
significance of Richards' paper lies in the fact that it is written after he, himself, had 
spent two decades both developing and teaching police ethics to senior manages in 
the police service.
He begins by noting that the ACPO Statement of Common Purpose and Values was 
developed by police officers in the hope that it would help fellow practitioners 
bring some certainty of purpose to their difficult and demanding roles. In other 
words, the statement of common purpose and values attempted to provide a general 
framework of answers to questions about the ethics of policing. Richards indicates, 
however, that these questions were never made explicit. He believes that seven 
questions are presupposed by the statement. They are:
- What professional, legislative and public needs must we fulfil to meet the 
demands o f our roles?
- What are the values that we should defend during our daily practice?
- What sort of moral world should we strive to uphold?
- Are the values and ethics that we represent similar to or different from those of 
the public we serve?
- How do we harmonise police values and needs with public values and needs?
- What part should a police code of ethics play in helping to solve the problem 
challenges raised by these questions?
How can I be prepared through training and education to meet the ethical demands 
of my policing role?
In his subsequent text, Richards stresses the way the ACPO Statement of Common
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Purpose and Values attempted to harmonise the values of the public and the police
- through, for example, insisting that policing by consent would be jeopardised if 
police were to deviate from seeking morally worthwhile ends in a morally 
acceptable manner. He also underlines the fact that the Statement of Common 
Purpose and Values itself was embedded in a wider and far-reaching 'Quality of 
Service' programme initiated in October 1990 and that a major part of the 
implementation of that programme was focused upon training 'with the statement 
playing a key role'.
Richards recognises that it is not uncommon for police codes of ethics to be at the 
core of ethical training within a police service. He regards them as:
"... authoritative statements that are often used to encourage officers at all levels 
to reflect on their experiences o f  policing, on the moral dilemmas that they have 
faced  or might face, and to rehearse their critical moral reasoning and moral 
decision-making in the safety o f  the training room. " (Richards, 1998: 9,10)
Here, he appears to place more faith in ‘code ethics’ than does, for example, 
Sherman(1982).
Richards then goes on to analyse, painstakingly, the Statement of Common Purpose 
and Values as a moral code and, thereby shows how it has entered (or might enter) 
into British police training as a 'valuable educational and training tool'. Richards 
finds that the statement of common purpose and values measures up well to three 
main purposes of morality. First, it enjoins police officers to cultivate those 
dispositions which lead us, generally, to avoid harming others, to treat others with 
sympathy and benevolence, to act honestly and to act fairly - and, in consequence 
to act as an antidote to our limitations. Second, the statement supports those 
activities which, generally, promote human flourishing and which protect those 
social arrangements that help us to secure those desirable outcomes. Third, the 
statement is partly designed to help morality safeguard its own possibility by 
striving to guarantee a zone of freedom where choice - and therefore moral choice
- can, itself, be expressed. Thus, for example Richards points out that the phrases 
in the statement that 'urge the police to reflect public priorities and respond to well- 
founded criticism' help prevent the police from becoming too insular and 
professionally arrogant. Their 'openness' to variation and difference provides them 
with a constant source of'choice-making' scenarios.
T h e  carefu l ana ly s is  o f  the  moral con ten t o f  the  A C P O  s ta tem en t a llow s R ichards  
to  sh o w  how , necessarily , it m ust be a valuab le  dev ice  to use w hen  focus ing  upon
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ethics in police training and education. He adds:
"In the training environment, the nature o f  the moral consensus represented by a 
code can be explored, along with such dimensions o f  policing as the moral identity 
o f  the police role, the setting o f  that role by the rule o f  law, the practical moral 
dilemmas faced, on a day-to-day basis, by police officers, the exercise o f  discretion, 
the use o ffo rce ..." (Richards, 1998: 19)
As he draws his paper to a conclusion Richards, as a teacher of police ethics, makes 
a remark about the relationship between theory and practice in an activity such as 
policing. Elsewhere (Richards 1999, personal communication) holds that practice 
precedes theory defending his position by asking the question, 'Just as cooking 
preceded recipes, did morality exist before the subject 'ethics?' In his paper, he goes 
on to argue that in the practical business of cooking, theory is likened to a recipe. 
Moreover, a recipe is an abstraction from the practical 'business' of action and 
conduct in the kitchen. The statement of common purpose and values might be 
taken as a ‘recipe5 encouraging police officers to debate how they have both 
succeeded and failed to follow its guidelines. Richards continues to press his 
metaphor home by claiming that:
".. the best way o f  encouraging a thorough exploration o f  the practical and moral 
kitchen that is policing is as age-old as the symposiums o f  Plato. It is that o f  
producing a lively, open learning climate in which police practitioners can engage 
in the logic o f  question and answer, with critical attention to the moral pros and 
cons o f  police practice." (Richards, 1998: 21)
Significantly, he is not willing to make compromises in his approach to teaching 
ethics; the last remark in his text is emblematic of his personal commitment to re­
creating an educational context similar to the symposia of Plato. He is not prepared 
to relinquish his educational beliefs and he contends that a 'thorough' exploration 
of the moral aspects of policing is something that cannot be avoided if the 
programmes of study are to reflect professional integrity and, in the longer term, 
to have any real effect. He himself attempts to promote and engage in such a 
'thorough' exploration of police ethics during the relatively infrequent occasions he 
is able to address the Strategic Command Course, the most senior course at 
Bramshill. However, Richards (1999) (personal communication) has conceded that 
few police officers genuinely relish a truly critical and philosophical approach to 
the study of ethics and that alternative approaches, whilst more superficial, might 
now be better designs if police leaders and managers are to test their conduct and 
decisions against, inter alia, frameworks of ethical principles.
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A source corroborating the findings of Villiers and Richards has emerged form the 
work of Foster (1998). In her submission to the Home Affairs committee 
concerning how police training and recruitment might be improved, she makes a 
number of points about some general response patterns and characteristics of the 
police (as a whole) that thwart training endeavours. Foster, a university lecturer, 
arrives at her conclusions partly as a result of her extensive knowledge of police 
research and partly on the basis of her teaching experience in Bramshill itself. She 
finds the following number of impediments to the overall educational process:
- An indifference to or lack of awareness of research
- An absence of an awareness and understanding of the broader context in which 
policing takes place
- A feeling in police circles that time spent out of the classroom (during the training 
experience) is not productive
- A devaluing of the principles underlying reflective practice
These tendencies themselves reflect some of the core elements of the police 
working and occupational culture i.e. a bias for action, the cult of the 'practical 
police officer' and ‘insularity’.
The observations of Villiers, Richards and Foster - along with the earlier remarks 
made by Plumridge (1988) and my own writings - constitute the sum total of 
published material in relation to teaching on management and leadership 
development programmes at Bramshill. Despite the difficulties ‘ethics’ has 
managed to establish itself patchily on the curriculum. I shall now summarise how 
it manifests itself on those programmes.
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Ethics and the Strategic Command Course
At the very beginning of the Strategic Command Course, Richards underlines the 
central importance that must be given to the moral dimension of policing. The staff 
of the programme report that the ethical dimension is made salient in the majority 
of syndicate discussions that follow the various lectures and presentations. One 
half-day is devoted to a 'dilemma workshop' run by the Institute for Global Ethics 
during the middle part of the course. Course participants are invited by the Director 
of the Institute, a few days before the workshop to complete an 'assignment'. They 
are briefed as follows:
"We much prefer to use fresh, real-life material rather than canned case studies. 
So, would you please come with at least one example, drawn from  your own 
personal experience, o f  a challenging ethical dilemma that you have faced  or 
witnessed.” (The Institute for Global Ethics, 1999 - memorandum to SCC 
participants)
Course participants - during the workshop itself - are provided with a definition of 
ethics, a subsequent exploration of dilemma paradigms (such as 'truth versus 
loyalty' and 'justice versus mercy') before considering how to resolve ethical 
dilemmas. Three 'principles' for tackling dilemmas are advocated; they are:
- 'Do what is best for the greatest number of people'
- 'Follow your highest sense of principle'
- ‘Do what you want others to do to you'
In this way, the Institute for Global Ethics tries to create an environment that 
releases the energies of the participants as they examine the nature of their 
experience with ethical dilemmas. At the same time, the three principles - for 
resolving dilemmas - represent an attempt to offer solutions to ethical problems. 
This design has received positive feedback from course participants.
I should also add that the staff of the Strategic Command Course prepare reports 
on the students of that course and that the content of the reports can have a bearing 
on an individual's future career prospects. It is, therefore a risky move to adopt an 
overly negative view towards the learning structures that have been organised by 
the staff of the programme.
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Ethics and the Operational Commanders Programme
The Operational Commanders Programme (mainly composed of superintendents) 
features a half-day session given over to 'ethical issues in police leadership'. A 
presentation - along with questions to the directed to the speaker (a senior police 
officer who offers what he describes as a 'road show') - is then followed by 
syndicate discussion facilitated by the tutorial staff.
However, I should add that the course director (personal communication) remains 
unconvinced that the deep and significant issues in police leadership and 
management are properly addressed.
Ethics and the Police Management Programme
The Police Management Programme included until the autumn of 1998 a session, 
on the Managing Operations module entitled 'Principled leadership' - which was 
concerned with the moral aspects of police management - but this was then 
discontinued. During the final stages of writing this dissertation 'ethics' has been 
reintroduced as a half-day long unit. The pattern of feedback has begun to show, 
consistently, a very positive response and a positive valuation of the educational 
experience.
Ethics and the Accelerated Promotion Course
In my role as Director of the Accelerated Promotion Course I was able to build 
upon many of the key learning points emerging from the action research process. 
The subject 'ethics' has received an unequivocal positive evaluation from the client 
group. The explicit commitment to ethics is reflected in a vision for the course; it 
seeks to 'develop leaders with justice, integrity and humanity'.
The course includes a one-day introduction to ethics and policing on the Sergeants 
course. This is followed by a week-long reconvention which takes as its theme, 
'Integrity in police supervision, management and leadership'. At a later stage of the’ 
programme, course participants examine the moral component of leadership. It has 
also been possible to identify, on the Inspectors phase of the programme how to 
present the subject in such a way as to achieve the three aims for ethics education 
that were specified by Kleinig (1990).
T he  design  for e x am in in g  the sub jec t 'ethics' on the Inspectors ' course  beg ins  w ith  
an ex am in a tio n  o f  the  basis  o f  each individual's  claim  to lead. Specifically , course
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participants are asked by a consultant: 'You have made a claim to lead: upon what 
moral foundations do you base your claim? This half-day long session is followed 
by a review, conducted by a member of ACPO, of some of the moral pressures 
impacting upon police strategic leaders and the service as a whole.
Then, in another half-day session, an experienced, sophisticated, and, informed 
police leader examines, through the use of an actual practical example (policing 
demonstrations involving environment protection protests), how to enhance moral 
sensitisation, inspire moral resolve and develop moral expertise. A part o f this 
analysis includes an extensive dialogue with the student group which is encouraged 
to identify the components involved in the unfolding scenario. It is here, I think, 
that one can identify four ingredients that enable the teaching event to achieve 
those aims o f ethics education identified by Kleinig.
- First, the presenter has a relatively thorough grounding in the subject ’ethics', 
introduces it in a way that suggests something of its inspirational and challenging 
nature, and has integrated the concepts of the subject into their everyday discourse.
- Second, the presenter has developed the ability to make general comments about 
working with a moral consciousness and that this will, at some point involve 
making painful decisions. Moreover, in the context of policing, it must be 
recognised that in making decisions it will be impossible 'to please everybody'.
- Third, the presenter examines and presents a vivid, accessible and personal case 
study full of decisional dilemmas - and invites the participants (or learners) to 
identify the ethical issues that are involved.
- Fourth, the presenter is sufficiently self-aware not to be perceived as 
sanctimonious nor as coldly rule-bound. In short, the presenter must show 
appropriate humility.
Kleinig and Leland Smith (1997) have found that there is strong support on the part 
of criminal justice ethics educators for 'a pedagogy' that gives a significant place 
to case studies. My research, along with the conclusions of Villiers (1998) and a 
personal communication from Richards (1999) agrees with this view.
In add ition  to the  specific  teach ing  o f  e th ics  on the  po lice  leadersh ip  and  
m a n ag e m e n t  d e v e lo p m en t p rogram m es, a short th ree  day course , en titled , 'B e tte r  
Police  Ethics ', w h ich  is run four tim es year  con tinues  to a ttrac t su p p o r t  from  an 
average  o f  fif teen off icers  per course. T h e  cou rse  i tse lf  em p lo y s  a n u m b e r  o f
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'expert' visiting speakers - a number of whom are members of the Police ethics 
network.
Finally, and most recently, the study of human rights - following the enactment of 
the Human Rights Act (1998) - has been the subject of a special seminar organised 
at Bramshill. An emphasis upon the importance of supporting and appreciating 
'human rights' has also been included as a special study area on the Accelerated 
Promotion Course. In July 1999, a group of student presenters on that concluded 
that the passing of the Human Rights Act was a ''phenomenal opportunity' for the 
police service and offered the service the possibility of achieving the highest 
standards of professional policing
Part Three: A summary o f  the learnings emerging from  and the achievements 
o f  the research inquiry
It is not a straightforward task to conclude my inquiry with an identification of the 
main learnings that have emerged over a period of study that has lasted for more 
than six years. The process of action research generates data, information, 
explanations and conduct at many different epistemological levels. It involves 
personal development, the focus upon a practice (Tongue, 1997), and the challenge 
of attempting to effect change; it involves the management of a research approach 
and the search for new knowledge; it entails making knowledge claims; and, it is 
a socio-political process located in local and distinct contexts where the praxis of 
human enterprises unfolds and expresses itself.
Lewin (1946) acknowledged the 'multi-variable and multi-discipline' nature and 
character of managing change in real, concrete social situations and the inquiry I 
have reported here simply and obviously underlines this fact. Because of the 
complex and holistic nature of 'action research' I have no option but to leave out 
most of the detail of the learnings and achievements emerging from the study; I 
have left out the extraordinary and heartfelt poems crafted by a handful of my 
students - poems speaking of hope abandoned and left on my lectern as emblems 
of lives not quite ruined; I have left out the remarkable tragic drama of an 'ethics 
play' featuring the mysterious death of a child and the wretchedness of suspicion 
left hanging -left dangling - over the beleaguered and desperate parents; and I have 
left out exploring the meaning of particular responses related to my 'ethics' teaching 
- such as the piece of rock from the site of the concert at which Bob Dylan played 
in 1969 on the Isle of Wight (something 'from Desolation Row') or the setting of 
the detail of social trends in the United Kingdom to the Paul Simon and Art 
Gaifunkel's 'The sounds o f  silence'.
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Moreover, many of the learnings have to remain unarticulated. Gluck (1999) has 
noted how somethings just cannot be said; they are felt - like awe - and elude 
language.
Many of my learnings really constitute reminders of or refinements to older 
learnings - such as the delicacy that is needed if  someone- anyone - begins to 
discuss another domain of practice (such as policing) when that same person is not 
a selfsame practitioner; so to do, risks the charges of arrogance, insensitivity and 
indignity.
Here, I want to begin the review and precis of the learnings emerging from the 
inquiry by revisiting an issue raised in the introduction to this dissertation. In my 
introduction I noted that my work was ’fired by hope and ideals'. At the beginning 
of the project I drew - in equal measure - from some of the great philosophers as 
well as from writings more passionately commonplace. I set out to create an 
experience that would do some sort of justice to these writings and that would come 
to achieve a practical goal. I understood that the process of individual educational 
actin research could support me in my 'struggle and adventure'. The research 
reported here tries to indicate how an ethics education was designed and developed 
in the pursuit of that practical goal. So, major learning is that the form of action 
research adopted in my work represents the expression of a deeply creative process. 
It is analogous to experimental art; its reception remains uncertain. Each 'delivery' 
or 'performance' of the ethics unit was like a reworking of a theme. Each shift in the 
phase of action research was analogous to the investigation of a new expressive 
medium, or subject matter of artistic genre. The artist 'signs' his or her work; it 
reflects the choices made by and the value preferences their person. This feature 
of action research allows the approach itself to carry the potential for a responsible 
form of personal liberation. The practitioner has a freedom to make something out 
of their part of the world - to leave their imprint on it. Because action research 
unfolds its moments over time it benefits form the enriching inclusions o f new 
ideas, new knowledges and the incorporation of older learnings - sometimes in 
fresh and unexpected ways. So for example, Levi's (1986) allusive and 
metaphorical work, 'The periodic table' offered me new ways of thinking about my 
work itself and the possibility of freshness and wonderment that lay, in fact, in each 
occasion I taught 'ethics'. Levi reflected on his work analysing rock samples taken 
from a mine as follows:
"For the first time after seventeen years o f  schoolwork, o f  Greek verbs and the 
history o f  the Peloponnesian War, the things I had learned were beginning to be
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useful to me. Quantitative analysis, so devoid o f  emotion, heavy as granite, came 
alive, true, useful, when part o f  serious and concrete work... The analytical method 
I  followed was no longer a bookish dogma, it was put to the test every day, it could 
be refined, made to conform with our aims, by a subtle play o f  reason, o f  trail and 
error. " (Levi 1986: 71)
As I lived out the inquiry process I was re-invigorated by Terkel's (1975) 
conclusion that 'work’ is about a search for daily meaning as well as daily bread, 
for astonishment rather than torpor as well as 'for a sort of life rather than a 
Monday through Friday sort of dying1. And, as the inquiry progressed I began to 
infuse the learning design with these kinds of sentiments. Increasingly, fragments 
from literary sources were included in the presentations and resource materials 
accompanying the teaching sessions. I referred, for example, to Heaney's (1990) 
poem 'Digging', to Auden's (1995) 'Refugee blues' and Joseph's (1987) 'Warning' 
and, differently, to Paine's (1969) 'The Rights o f  Man' - and, again, to Plato's 
'Phaedo'. My own practice increasingly sought to embody and express these 
conceptions and modes of experience.
If  it is the case that the form of inquiry described here approximates to a more 
general creative process then it may reflect an unusual amalgam of scholarly 
pursuit and artistic endeavour. Recently, Gluck (1999) has drawn attention to the 
similarities and dissimilarities between these two types of endeavour. She writes:
"It is commonplace among many creative writers that passion is exactly what the 
academic lacks; we live, we tell ourselves, turbulent, invested lives, whereas 
academics invest their narrower energies in a kind o f  historical tidying-up service, 
their zeal fo r  detail compensating fo r  lack o f  creative intensity. But the passion fo r  
knowledge I  see among scholars is as much a quest as what drives any artist - it too 
seeks illumination, but the terms (and results) o f  illumination differ from  the 
artist's." (Gluck 1999: 1)
The similarity of the two endeavours lies in the passionate quest for illumination. 
Gluck then moves on emphasise the difference:
"I have learned... deep respect fo r scholarship: opinions and beliefs no matter how 
compelling or moving, cannot answer to that name." (Gluck 1999: 1)
In d iv id u a l  educa tiona l action  research  consti tu tes  an ap p ro ach  to k n o w led g e  tha t 
can  e m b race  both pass ion  and the genesis  o f  ju s tif iab le  and  w arran tab le  assertion . 
It o ffe rs  the  possib il i ty  o f  a r r iv in g  at som eth in g  m ore  than  'op in ions  and  b e l ie f .
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Individual educational action research (as I have presented it in this account) leads 
to the telling of a teacher’s story. As Carter (1993) points out, the focus of such 
stories ’often ranges beyond the immediate technical issues' o f curriculum and 
classroom lessons 'to encompass teacher's biographies'. Thus:
" ...teaching events are fram ed within a context o f  a teacher's life history, as a 
result, the central themes are often moral and philosophical, having more to do 
with feelings, purposes, images, aspirations, and personal meanings, than with 
teaching method or curriculum structures in isolation from personal experience or 
biography. It is teaching... 'up close' rather than 'out there’. ” (Carter 1993: 7,8)
The process of individual educational action research facilitates the telling o f a 
teacher's story and because of the nature of the 'action/reflection' cycle I think that 
the process is iconoclastic. It is iconoclastic in at least two ways. First, during the 
reflection process, at some point, a basic question is raised concerning the need to 
identify whatever it was (or is) that lay behind a perception or decision. And so, 
gradually, the action researcher is led to examine his of her self - in terms of modes 
of construing, the actual quality of emotions, the pattern of bias in judgements and 
so on. Therefore, and inevitably, aspects of the self of the researcher are laid bare 
for scrutiny and for criticism. The limitations of the person are made salient. 
Established (and comforting) self-conceptions are demolished. This is the first way 
in which educational action research is iconoclastic.
It is also iconoclastic in a more general way. It leads the researcher to examine the 
situation of practice within which they too are embedded. In so doing, it begins to 
expose and confront the nexus of power relations and sectional interests sustained 
by and sustaining the context of practice. It radicalises the action researcher and 
surfaces problematic truths about the dominance of the arational over the rational 
and the truth of politics over the politics of truth. This second iconoclastic feature 
of action research raises searching question for the action researcher - at the heart 
of which is the most basic of all: 'Do I opt for the comfortable and expedient life 
of graceful and sophisticated expert craftsmanship or do I conduct the political 
struggle concerned to effect justice and rationality in my situation of practice and 
beyond?'
In add ition  to th ese  spec ific  c laim s tha t I have  m ade  c o n ce rn in g  the  fru its  o f  
ind iv idua l ed u ca tiona l action  research I have  o rgan ised  o th e r  learn ings  a g a in s t  a 
fram ew o rk  a d v an c e d  by Freire (1996). H e finds tha t there  are fou r  m a jo r  
c o m p o n en ts  to the  basic  situation o f  educa tiona l p ractice . T h ese  are:
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- A person who instructs or teaches
- The person (or persons) who learn
- The content
- The methods used 
He writes:
"The firs t observation I  make is that any educational practice always implies the 
existence o f  (1) a subject or agent (the person) who instructs and teaches; (2) the 
person who learns, but who by learning also teaches; (3) the object to be imparted 
and taught - the object to be re-cognized and cognized - that is, the content; and (4) 
the methods by which the teaching subject approaches the content he or she is 
mediating to the educand." (Freire 1996 : 108)
Freire's straightforward conceptualisation of these basic components allows me to 
organise a summary of the learnings emerging from this study. I shall also make 
reference to a number of achievements and conclude with some recommendations 
for the teaching of ethics to police leaders and managers. However, Freire makes 
no mention of the context in which the educational enterprise is situated. The study 
reported here took place within an unique institution and the fact that, despite the 
consistent importance given to police ethics and police integrity by police 
strategists, it was, temporarily, discontinued on the Police Management 
Programme. I shall therefore include reference to the 'context* in which the study 
took place.
In the sections that follow I will, in turn deal with learnings in relation to the 
content of ethics education for police, the methods (or strategies) for its delivery. 
I shall then comment upon significant features of the client group before making 
some observations about myself. Last, I shall mention two key learnings in relation 
to the context.
The Content
- Achieving a new understanding o f  the role ofpolice in liberal democracies
A s I b u ilt  the  actual co n ten t  o f  e th ics  educa tion  I took, initially , m y lead from
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writers who had a long experience with the subject. Kleinig (1990) had argued that 
the aim of ethics education should be threefold: moral sensitisation, increasing 
moral resolve and the development of moral expertise. To achieve these goals he 
argued that the content of ethics education should include four areas; an 
introduction to moral philosophy, the study of codes of ethics, case studies and 
lastly, ’middle level enquiries’ which took as their focus topics such as discretion, 
loyalty and impartiality. Richards (1985) had argued for a study of applied ethics, 
the goal of which was to make moral dilemmas more tractable and had concluded 
that the most helpful normative ethical framework for police was a sophisticated 
utilitarianism. He also, cryptically, stressed that 'critical thinking' would be the 
ultimate aim of an ethics education.
As I came to present a content for ethics to police leaders and managers I found 
myself understanding ethics as that which was supportive of and central to the ends 
and means of policing. Whereas Kleinig defended a conception of police in terms 
of social peacekeepers, I went beyond his characterisation and argued thatt/ze 
purpose o f  police was to help secure those conditions within which humans learn 
and learn well.
I arrived at this position after some four years of developing the subject. I presented 
these thoughts for the first time in the winter of 1996 to a group of very senior 
ranking police officers. I was delighted with the calm acceptance o f such a 
definition. One feature of action research is the steady encouragement it gives to 
the process of reflection on practice and thereby the most fundamental questions 
connected with the ends and means of any enterprise are, necessarily, raised. 
Without the process it is far less likely that I would have asked the kinds of 
question that I did and for which I was able to provide some sort of answer.
In the light of such a definition of the role of police in a liberal democracy it 
becomes clear that the police are essentially in the business of producing moral 
products - helping to secure those conditions in which the citizenry can both enjoy 
the pursuit of human flourishing and avoid the worst consequences o f human 
limitations and liabilities.
Significantly , g iven  such an understanding  o f  the  role o f  police, an ethics for police  
should  com e to include a content which exam ines those features o f  ourselves w hich  
m ay im pede  o u r  ability  to secure  the  conditions for learn ing  and  good  learn ing . In 
o the r  w ords , w e  need  to ensure  tha t w e are not at the  m ercy  o f  o u r  ow n  u n a w are  
d is tresses  o r  p sy ch o d y n am ics  tha t both d is to rt  o u rse lves  and  constra in  the  life 
possib il it ies  o f  those  around  us. In consequence , a part o f  the  e th ics  ed u ca tio n  I
468
created, included biography work, the 'unravelling' (Heron 1989) or 'unveiling' 
(Freire 1996) of our personal nature, and, the exploration of the social construction 
not only of men and women but also of police themselves. In addition, the work of 
social psychologists has illustrated how the individual is influenced by a number 
of the characteristic features of human groups - such as conformity to group norms, 
and, obedience to authority. Thus, a part of the content of the ethics education I 
presented included an examination of those relevant findings.
So, rather than limiting the content of ethics to the conventional discourse of 
descriptive, normative and analytical ethics, I have widened the scope to include 
the achievements of the personal development psychologies as well as a more 
conventional social psychology.
- Achieving an extended answer to the question, 'What should we expect from  
police leaders?'
Schein (1976), in his discussion of social interaction, highlights the importance of 
'face'. He suggests that when we inhabit a social role we make a claim to be a 
certain kind of person - and that important 'work' goes on to ensure that we sustain 
and validate the 'face' that we claim. Schein's observation and Keeble's (1997) 
question, 'What is the basis o f  your claim to lead?' led me to ask the general 
question, 'What should we expect from  police leaders?’
Building upon Frankena's (1973) characterisation of the 'good' person which 
included 'a disposition to find out and respect the relevant facts' I suggested (Adlam 
1998c) that we should, similarly, expect from police a disposition to find out and 
respect the relevant facts of policing. From police leaders and managers we should 
expect an additional knowledge concerning those facts relevant to the leadership 
of a police organisation. I found five such categories of fact:
- T h e  h is to ry , n a tu re  of, and, p u rp o ses  o f  po lice
- L e a d e rsh ip  o f  an  o rg an isa t io n  in the  pub lic  d o m a in
- K n o w le d g e  o f  the  p rac tice  o f  p o lic ing
- K n o w le d g e  o f 'w o r k ' ,  o rgan isa tions  and  the  'con tem pora ry '
- Personal k n o w le d g e  and k n o w led g e  o f  the  social construc tion  o f  pe rsons
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I developed a first draft of these ideas in the spring of 1998 and, subsequently they 
were adopted by the newly constituted 'Leadership faculty' at Bramshill as part of 
its 'leadership development' framework. (The original draft paper is used to support 
the teaching content on various programmes of study at Bramshill.)
- Developing an enhanced appreciation o f  the moral ethos ofpolice organisations
During the study I developed the 'moral ethos' questionnaire and later, the 
'organisational ethics' questionnaire. Whilst the primary purpose o f both 
questionnaires was to help elicit considered discussion on the part of course 
participants, the data patterns emerging from the two instruments threw some light 
onto the ‘moral health’ of the police organisation. The data also suggested, in part, 
why the teaching experience at Bramshill is difficult and uncomfortable for its 
tutorial staff. In Adlam (1998b) I included some of the details emerging from the 
'moral ethos' questionnaire.
Middle managers from across the United Kingdom provided the following modal 
descriptions of the police organisation:
Dimensions 1 and 2 (i.e. 'moral tone' and 'tightness') combined to reveal the modal 
description: 'Thoughtful self-regulation'. However, almost as many respondents 
provided the description; 'Permissive self-indulgence'
Dimensions 3 and 4 (i.e. 'Deference to hierarchy' and 'Positional abuse') combined 
to reveal the modal description: 'Oppression and Coercion'.
Dimensions 5 and 6 (i.e. 'Spread of trust' and 'Dependence on allegiance') 
combined to reveal the modal description: 'Secretive scheming'.
Dimensions 7 and 8 (i.e. 'Regulatory formalisation' and 'Adherence') combined to 
reveal the modal description: 'Strictly rule-bound'.
Dimensions 8 and 9 (i.e. 'Respect for dignity' and 'Intensity of political stakes') 
combined to reveal the modal description: 'Combat arena'. However, almost as 
many respondents provided the description: 'Supportive community'.
D im en s io n s  11 and  12 (i.e. 'C oncen tra tion  o f  pow er' and  'N eed  fo r  s tab il i ty ')  
co m b in ed  to reveal the  m odal descrip tion : 'Rigid command'
D im en s io n s  13 and  14 (i.e. 'B read th  o f  consti tuency ' and  'O p en n ess  to c r i t ic ism ')
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combine to reveal the modal description: 'Dialogue seeking'
Dimensions 15 and 16 (i.e. 'Demands on loyalty' and 'Developmental openness') 
combine to reveal the modal description: 'Symbiotic relationship'.
Four descriptions o f the organisation are 'endorsed' by a majority of the client 
group. They are:
- Secretive scheming
- Strictly rule-bound
- Dialogue seeking, and
- Symbiotic relationship
It would, therefore, be sensible to recognise that amongst the descriptions noted 
below, these four characteristics are likely to be dominant features of the police 
organisation.
Whilst this data points towards some positive 'moral force fields' in the 
organisation, other features are less positive. These latter areas -  such as ‘secretive 
scheming’ - might properly be taken as the focus by police strategists and change 
agents for culture change initiatives.
Thus, the inclusion of the structures designed to help examine the moral character 
o f the organisation not only revealed problematic organisational features but also 
provides a framework and set of concepts that might be deployed by police leaders 
in their interventions to development both 'quality' organisations and 'organisations 
fit to house the human spirit’.
The Methods
- Moving towards a way o f  'delivering' ethics education which maintains an idea 
o f  educational 'integrity' but meets the needs o f  a 'mixed ability' police managerial 
group
In the  early  s tages  o f  m y research  I a t tem p ted  to find a w ay  o f  p resen ting  the  
su b jec t  w h ich  to o k  acco u n t o f  all those  variab les  ove r  w h ich  I had  control. 
U nw itt in g ly ,  I th o u g h t  tha t i f  I w as suffic ien tly  d isc ip lined  and  canny  I cou ld
471
identify those aspects of delivery that would appeal to and please the audience. So, 
I developed beautifully illustrated computer screen based presentations and selected 
from a range of riveting and beguiling films and television programmes. I did 
everything in my power to identify and present an attractive subject matter. Yet 
underneath these moves and manoeuvres something was telling me that I was a 
'living contradiction' (Whitehead, 1989). To that extent, I was helped by Holden 
(1995), who provides an account where he contrasts one set of motives - those of 
the educator - with another set - those of the classroom manager. The former 
defend practices in terms of a genuine educational rationale whilst the latter 
organise practices in order that the days pass smoothly and without too much fuss. 
As I reflected upon my efforts I realised to my horror that I was not providing any 
real education at all. In fact, I was quite unwittingly, enacting and reproducing a 
positivist ideology. Underneath it all, I was proceeding on the basis o f the 
assumption that if I was sufficiently ingenious to identify all those variables 
contributing to student experience I could manipulate them in such a way to secure 
the outcomes I wanted. This was a very disturbing realisation that left me feeling 
both depressed and alienated. I went through a period of self-disgust and described 
my work as 'infotainment'. Nonetheless, it was an important moment in the enquiry 
process because I realised that the methods used at Bramshill for evaluating the 
educational experience (i.e. based upon the leamer-as-customer/consumer) play 
into the hands of very questionable educational goals because they focus upon 
crude aspects of the learner experience and not the developmental processes - such 
as the development of concepts through discourse and debate - provoked by the 
learning structures.
As a response to this realisation, I drew support from several sources in the 
literature. One such was Rudduck's work on innovation and change from which I 
derived a more defensible way of creating an overall 'learning design'. What style 
of teaching - what methods - would be commensurate with the outcomes towards 
which my project was aiming? Rudduck (in the context of an humanities project) 
frames it in the following way:
"The teaching style must be one that supports the exploration o f  evidence in the 
pursuit o f  understanding. I f  pupils are to arrive at a sense o f  responsibility fo r  
action, then they must be sure that the judgement that determines action is based 
on careful weighing o f  evidence and sensitive consideration o f  different 
perspectives. They have to realise that in the complex arenas o f  social action, 
answers cannot be dictated but must be constructed responsibly by individuals. The 
process o f  construction is fostered by dialogue that is cjuestioning, critical but 
essentially co-operative. Through such dialogue, the individual learns how to
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manage the task o f  looking at issues from  different angles - a task that he or she 
may at times have to manage alone in adult life, without the support that fellow  
questioners provide in the classroom." (Rudduck, 1991: 20)
Increasingly, my methods have come to try and create the sorts of condition which 
enable the type of processes to take place which Rudduck identifies. So, for 
example, the opportunity to create plays representing ethical dilemmas in policing 
along with the subsequent analysis fosters 'dialogue that is questioning, critical but 
essentially co-operative'.
- The evolution o f  styles of'ethics education’ culminating in one that was grounded 
in 'personal experience, practical concerns and individual wishes'
After the 'reconnaissance' phase the inquiry process adopted different 
methodological emphases but, until the last design, a proportion of the client group 
showed a continuing rejection and devaluation of anything 'academic'. In 
consequence, I came, in the last phase of the project, to adopt an informal approach 
which elicited from the client group their preference from a range of activities. 
With this approach, the proportion of time I spent addressing the group and the 
reliance I placed on technological supports was reduced. The evaluation data 
suggested that this method - which actively played down the academic aspect of the 
subject 'ethics' - was likely to be most effective with a mixed ability group of police 
middle managers.
- Achieving a range o f  learning structures
By the end of the project I had created more than twenty different learning 
structures for the 'ethics unit' which constituted a method of delivering the unit 
marked by variety and contrast.
- The failure o f  the attempt to conduct 'collaborative' action research
T h e  c lien t g ro u p  reac ted  n ega tive ly  on  the  tw o  occas ions  I a ttem p ted  to  in troduce  
a g e n u in e ly  co llab o ra t iv e  w ay  o f  w o rk in g  w ith  the  c lien t g roup . A sp ec ts  o f  the  
p o lice  cu ltu re  and  the  da ta  e m erg in g  from  the  m ora l e thos  ques tio n n a ire  p ro v id e  
ve ry  c lea r  re a so n s  w h y  such  an a ttem pt w o u ld  fail. A  sen io r  po lice  o ff ice r  
co n d u c t in g  a doc to ra l enqu iry  us ing  an action  research  ap p ro ach  con tended  tha t 1 
w ou ld  never, on short p rog ram m es  such as the Police M an ag em en t P r o g r a m m e d  
able to build a sufficient level o f  trust fo r 'collaborative action research' to have 
a cat's chance in hell\
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The client group
- learning to adjust to particular characteristics o f  the client group
It was the client group that exerted the most massive influence upon the inquiry 
process. Students of police generally hold that there is something distinctive about 
interacting with police officers - especially when they are aggregated into groups.
The social scientific literature on police supports this observation. On the one hand, 
ethnographic studies identify a powerful occupational culture into which 
individuals are socialised and from which shared values, outlooks and constructions 
of reality emerge. On the other hand psychological studies focusing upon the 
psychological development of police provide suggestive evidence not so much for 
a 'police personality' but more, the accentuation and clustering of particular 
character traits along with certain, more specific, learned patterns of response. For 
example, one such pattern of response is to remain enigmatic, taciturn and 
unresponsive in social situations where there is an uncertainty of outcome. It is 
known, in police parlance as ’Don't show out’. Another is to 'Face people down' 
by gazing at them fixedly and for longer than the culturally accepted duration. So, 
police are generally depicted as suspicious and mistrusting in their outlook, 
sceptical of the value of theory and somewhat anti-intellectual. They are also 
'experts' on the distinction between the 'real world' and some inaccurate 
romanticised or idealised alternative - which, they think, are those held by non­
police professionals. So, whilst the contributors to Kleinig and Leland Smith's 
(1997) quite properly debate the efficacy of different approaches to the teaching of 
criminal justice ethics, they are able to assume a broadly willing and docile body 
of students. This is not the case with the middle management groups of students on 
leadership and management development courses at Bramshill. Here, the first task 
of the tutor is to earn some sort of standing or credibility with the student body 
before any sustained and rigorous study can begin.
I c am e  to  rea lise  th a t  o ften  the  educa tiona l in teg rity  o f  m y  w o rk  w as  u n d e r  th rea t  
as I tried to find w ays o f 'sa tisfy ing ',  'pleasing' o r 'placating' the  participants. B uried  
b en ea th  m y  ch o ice  o f  film  such  as 'Bridge on the river Kwai' or 'A man fo r  all 
seasons' or even , 'Mutiny on the Bounty' illustra ting , as they  do, a  ran g e  o f  
conside ra tions  w ith  w hich  ethics deals, was a recognition  that the  con ten t appea led  
to deep-structure  features o f  police culture. As H olden (1995) observes, m y  success 
d e p en d ed  upon:
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" ...the canny use o f  techniques and tricks designed to subdue and mollify the class" 
(Holden, 1995 :141)
In the last analysis I think my tactics were defensible because, as this study has 
shown, it is fundamental, if a topic area is to be included on the curriculum, that it 
excites a positive valuation from the client group. This choice of video played some 
part in that process.
- The data emerging from  the interviews following the 'ethics unit
The data emerging pointed both to a very gradual increase in the proportion of 
participants who asserted that they valued their experience of ethics education and 
to one constant problem. It appeared that, by the end of 1996 - i.e. three years after 
reintroducing the subject 'ethics' to the middle manager programme - the majority 
were valuing and appreciating the process.
The one constant problem or theme recurring in most of the interviews concerned 
the problem with 'theory'. The theoretical components were either seen as too 
'difficult', too 'abstract' or 'irrelevant'. This finding remains a problem for me 
because without some reference to the nature of ethical reasoning, types of ethical 
theory and conflicts emerging between different ethical principles it is difficult for 
me to argue that we would be 'doing' ethics at all. However, in the 'final' design 
reported in the fourth research cycle I did succeed in reducing the 'academic' 
content to a minimum and focused upon the 'raw' lived experience of the client 
group.
The interview data also demonstrated the following four dimensions or features, 
which, in terms of the way they are managed by the educator, make a considerable 
difference to valuation of the ethics education experience. So, I want to make four 
statements concerning how ethics education should be conducted in order for it to 
be valued by this client group: the issues described are necessary (but not sufficient 
nor exhaustive) conditions which need to be. met if a positive evaluation of ethics 
education is to occur.
-  'Cognitive structuring' versus 'Assuming a positive disposition towards learning':
U nless  very  carefu l p repara to ry  w ork  is done  to o rien t pa rtic ipan ts  to w ard s  the  
sub jec t  'ethics' inc lud ing  illustrations dem onstra ting  its con tem porary  s ignificance, 
im portance  and everydayness, participants m ight choose to devalue the subject. The
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initial assumption of many within the client group was that here was yet another 
‘dose’ o f moralising. Worse, ethics was construed as something which would be 
used to ’beat1 police. Ethics educators cannot assume that participants will have a 
positive disposition towards the subject.
- 'Real-world basis' rather than 'Purely theoretical':
Ethics needs to be grounded in the perceived 'real world’ concerns of the clients. To 
be positively valued, it needs to be demonstrated either by readily identifiable 
example, with videos showing police grappling with problematic ethical dilemmas, 
or, as 'the plays and playlets revealed in this study, by the dramatic presentations 
of the participant group itself. However, a very fine line has to be discovered here 
between a catalytic educational event and passive voyeurism.
- 'Emotional commitment' versus 'Disinterested raconteur/rapporteur':
The evidence I have collected indicates that the personal commitment of the ethics 
teacher a) to the subject and b) to the adherence of generally accepted moral 
principles such as tolerance, benevolence and justice is appreciated and valued by 
the participants. Espoused theory and theory-in-practice should not be too 
disparate. Participants, generally, do not like an intellectual and disinterested 
approach. They preferred to see a more impassioned approach.
- 'Giving a permission to be' versus 'Taking the moral highground'
Grounding the content of ethics education in a 'search for the good life' - within 
which permissions are clearly given to participants to express themselves, to 'be' 
themselves, and, to recognise that the 'good life' will be a mixed life of the sensual, 
the aesthetic and the moral is preferable to that alternative where participants sense 
that ethics educator has 'taken the moral highground'. Participants wish to see ethics 
educators as tolerant and forgiving.
- The achievement o f  a significant re-evaluation ofpersonal and/or professional 
purpose on the part o f  a small minority o f  the client group
T h ro u g h o u t  the  dura tion  o f  the  study a sm all n u m b e r  o f  po lice  o ff ice rs  w ere  
substan tia lly  affected by their experience  w ith the  'eth ics education ' unit. N o t  on ly
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did three officers volunteer to help with the delivery of the module but a small 
number of others, in conversation with me, made the following remarks:
"Ethics changed my life"
"Isuddenly realised that 'integrity' was our business"
"I found  enlightenment in ethics "
"It was unforgettable - 1 think about it everyday now"
"Looking at ethics was the most significant experience in my life"
In addition, some persons made changes to their life situations as a result o f the 
module. So, one officer chose to take out a grievance against his force on the 
grounds of racial discrimination. Another opted to pursue a Masters degree that 
offered the chance to deepen the study of ethics. Lastly, other officers chose to 
utilise some of my educational materials in local training and development 
initiatives.
Learnings in relation to m yself
- The benefits o f  'self-awareness'
One of the particular problems I experienced as I presented ethics education was 
the relentless and puritanical scrutiny to which I was subjected. I was criticised for 
examining certain issues because some members of the client group thought that 
the topic areas might upset others in the group. This, they reported was 'unethical1. 
So, there are particular pressures upon whoever delivers an ethics curriculum to 
be as free from hidden agendas and dysfunctional psychodynamics as possible. 
Inevitably, this means that the ethics educator will have done considerable 
'personal' work in order to unveil their own social construction (with all its 
conventional limitations) and distresses.
I am certain that, had I not spent two years working intensively on such a process 
I would either have slipped into glib moralising or the unaware filling of distressed 
roles such as 'persecutor' or 'rescuer'. I will never be entirely certain that I was free 
of such liabilities however. And yet, I always remembered that whatever the 
response to myself or my work was, there were good reasons for it. Everyone has 
their story to tell.
B ecau se  o f  m y  re la tive ly  increased  co n fidence  - so m e th in g  w h ich  is a  d irec t  
o u tc o m e  o f  ac tion  research  and  critical reflec tion  - m y w o rk  w as ab le  to  m o v e  
to w a rd s  a m ore  inform al s ty le  o f  in teraction ' w ith  the  c lien t g roup  and  I w as  ab le
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to offer, at each point of the design, a choice of activity.
I was also able to risk trying out new activities:
The first, entitled, 'The play's the thing' was a design making reference to the 
device used by Shakespeare in 'Hamlet' (where there is a play within the play). 
Plays can reveal truths but in a way that is slightly distanced from actual 
threatening reality. We are, therefore, protected from ourselves. In order to help' 
bring ethics to life' I indicate that sometimes we discover and manage truth by 
using structures such as theatre which are, as I have noted above, one step removed 
from our daily affairs. So structured, we set out to script and enact plays which 
reproduce policing moral dilemmas in areas such as 'loyalty', 'deception' 'power' 
and 'discretion'.
The second was to use the vehicle of psychosynthesis and the recapitulation of the 
learners' individual life journey and personality development as a way of achieving 
insights into those particular experiences and social phenomena which had 
constructed the person as he or she 'is'. In the light of such insights, each learner is 
given the opportunity to 'remake' themselves.
Third, building on Mackie's (1977) view that it is to literature we should look for 
portraits of the 'good life', I used and provided a wide range of literary text ranging 
from poetry (e.g. Walt Whitman, Rupert Brooke, Jenny Joseph, Philip Larkin and 
Seamus Heaney), to religious and semi-religious writings (e.g. The Dhammapada, 
Gibran's,'The Prophet') and the specific works of philosophers (e.g. Socrates, 
Machiavelli, Luther, Rousseau, Mill, Kant, MacIntyre and Lyotard).
- learning about my limitations
This study has illustrated that I was always liable to criticism from members of the 
client group and that sometimes this criticism was caustic or malevolent. I think 
that some of the learning structures I chose reflected my desire to 'show 'em' that 
I was tough enough to 'take anything'. The fact that some of these structures (such 
as certain video material) reflected a form of retaliation is not at all commendable. 
Nonetheless, there is personal learning here because it confronts me with a 
limitation to which I am subject.
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The Context
- The power o f  the arational over the rational
At the beginning o f the account reported here I provided a description of the 
context in which the project took place. I shall conclude this final chapter by 
emphasising the triumph of the arational over the rational in the curriculum 
management of courses for police leaders and managers at Bramshill.
Throughout the last decade of the twentieth century an unprecedented emphasis 
was given, in policing, to a ‘quality of service’ philosophy and to police ethics. 
However, although I continued to explore how best to create and deliver a 
positively valued ethics education and despite the fact that I am able to produce 
evidence for some success of my designs, the ethics unit was discontinued from the 
Police Management Programme. The main reason for the discontinuation was 
because the subject was 'difficult' and that this could elicit negative affect from a 
proportion (sometimes a majority and sometimes a minority) in the group. As a 
result, subsequent 'inputs' from other tutors could be affected - and the overall 
effect would be a poor evaluation for the module.
Thus, arational factors, rather than rational factors, can be shown to be more 
important in aspects of educational decision making within the institutional context 
of Bramshill.
- Cultures in conflict
T h e  n a tu re  o f  d e c is io n -m ak in g  at B ram sh ill  i ts e lf  re flec ts  ten s io n s  b e tw ee n  
d if fe ren t  cu ltu res .  T h e  rise  o f  the  idea  o f 'q u a l i ty  o f  service ' and  the  d e m an d s  o f  a  
p e rfo rm an ce  cu lture  com bine  together to generate  'satisfaction' m easures  w h ich  are 
ba sed  o n  th e  s tu d en t  ra tings  o f  the ir  experience . C o -ex is t in g  w ith  th is  cu ltu ra l  
p a ra d ig m  is a c o m m itm e n t  to  the  p ro fess iona l d ev e lo p m en t  o f  po lice  leaders  and  
m a n ag e rs  w ith in  a  c o n tem p o ra ry  social context. T h is  en tails  co n fro n tin g  ha rd  
q u es t io n s  an d  ha rd  facts  (such  as ins titu tional rac ism ) w h ich  are  un lik e ly  to  e lic it  
a w a rm  a ffec t iv e  g low . M o re  p ro found ly , B ram sh ill  is charac te rised  by  d iffe r ing  
occupa tiona l cu ltu res  and an identity  fragm ented  by the  creation o f  three  faculties. 
It has  lost its iden tity  as 'The  Police  S ta ff  C ollege ' and  b eco m e  a N ationa l P o lice  
T ra in in g  site. In co n seq u en ce  its cu rricu lum  con ten t is rendered  uns tab le  and
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subject to individual preference.
A closing observation
On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the U.N. Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Amnesty International took out a full page ’advertisement' in a 
national newspaper entitled, 'You have the right to remain silent'. The text in that 
advertisement began:
"This week marks the 50th anniversary o f  the Universal Declaration o f  Human 
Rights. Well, happy bloody birthday human rights. We'd love to celebrate the fine  
words set forth by the General Assembly o f  the United Nations in 1948. But they 
are words that have been written a million times over in the blood o f  those who 
have been murdered, massacred and mutilated in the last fifty  years " (Amnesty 
International, in the Independent on Sunday newspaper, 13. 12. 98)
Yet, despite these bitter words, the text of the United Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights and that of other human rights documents continues to inspire a 
sustained quest for justice on the part of students attending programmes o f study 
at Bramshill. I think that this is so because human rights can be enjoyed as 
'possessions' or entitlements by each and every person in virtue of their own 
personhood. Duties, by contrast, are a trifle more burdensome as are the virtues. 
But with rights, humans are both individualised and made one of a piece. In 
advocating the importance of human rights any person safeguards their own liberty 
and simultaneously excites a positive emotional charge from others. In the context 
of Bramshill, this study has underlined how important it is to excite such a positive 
emotional charge in the face-to-face situation of the training arenas.
A final recommendation
T h is  re sea rch  and  th e  reports  o f  tw o  fe llo w  tu to rs  w h o  h av e  b e en  c o n c e rn e d  to  
p re sen t  'ethics ' to  po lice  leaders  and m anagers  finds tha t there  are  in d ica tio n s  th a t  
one  s tra tegy  is like ly  to  succeed  both  in secu rin g  the  necessa ry  p o s i t iv e  v a lu a t io n  
and  p ro v id in g  a real d ep th  o f  analysis . T h is  invo lves  en g ag in g  the  c l ien t  g ro u p  
e ithe r  th ro u g h  u s in g  a 'real life' case  s tudy  tha t  has faced  an  ac tua l p o l ic e  
p rac ti t io n e r  or invo lves  the  g roups  o f  pa rtic ipan ts  in p resen tin g  an  u n fo ld in g  and  
representa tive  d ram atic  perform ance. H ow ever, in both cases the tutorial s ta f f  need  
to be ab le  to facilitate  the  'm oral sensitisa tion ', the s tren g th en in g  o f  m ora l reso lve  
and the exploration o f  moral expertise that K leinig  (1990) astutely advoca ted  as the  
a im s  for po lice  e th ics  education . Th is  app ro ach  em b races  and  ex ten d s  the
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suggestions of both Villiers (1998) who emphasised the efficacy of the 'case study' 
method and Richards (1998) who contended that the most effective form of ethics 
education lay in the recreation of the types of dialogue enjoyed by Socrates, 
Aristodemus, Aristophanes and other guests reported in Plato's 'Symposium'.
Closing vignette: ‘We took a holiday from  ethics9
The nights were drawing in. Now, when the sun shone it was less brilliant than it 
had been in the summer months. But more light flooded into the interiors of the 
buildings at Bramshill.
A new member of the tutorial staff had become interested in my research and had 
decided that the topic 'ethics' should be included on the erstwhile 'Managing People' 
module of the Police Management Programme. The module had been re-titled 
'Advanced People skills'. He invited me to run a half day session on the module; it 
would be called 'ethics and leadership'.
Quite unexpectedly, after an absence of eighteen months from the middle-manager 
programme, 'ethics', as a named topic, was scheduled to make its re-appearance on 
that programme in late October 1999.
As I prepared for the session I recalled the challenge - perhaps it was an injunction 
- issued to me by Bob Brownhill, the social philosopher and supervisor of my 
inquiry project.
He had said: 'Ifyou are doing 'action research' you don't ju st give it up. You fin d  
a way o f  continuing. You don't give up hope.'
I had come very close to giving up hope and yet, here, and again, I had the chance 
to make ethics 'come alive'. Is it the case that, just as in art, some themes never 
quite go away? Did this turn of events confirm some of the ideas of the 'depth 
psychologists' such as Jung or the insights of the poets such as Whitman?
D ep th  p sycho log is ts  have  likened  the  hu m an  m in d  and  the  unconsc ious  to  the  still 
w a te rs  o f  a lake. E x p e r ien ce  and  sensation , d iscou rse  an d  in te rven tions  b e co m e  
peb b les ,  and  s tones , and  b o u ld e rs  s lipp ing  u n o b tru s iv e ly  o r c la t te r ing  lo u d ly  into 
those  sam e still waters. Q uie tly  or noisily, they  break  the surface, only, apparently , 
to d isappear .  But, they  rem ain , unnoticed , cease less ly  ex er t in g  the ir  e ffec t on the  
eco lo g y  o f  the  liquid  system .
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Similarly, Whitman, in his 'song of myself has written:
"Whoever degrades another degrades m e ... and whatever is done or said returns 
at last to me, and whatever I  do or say I  also return." (Whitman 1995: 33)
And so, on a fine October afternoon, I walked across to the mansion at Bramshill, 
entered by the West gate, set my papers down on the grand piano in the ‘Chapel 
Drawing Room5 and readied myself for action. I wondered at the contrast between 
my first hesitating attempt to talk about ethics some six years earlier and the 
informed confidence in my learning and knowledge as a new century approached.
The group consisted of twenty Inspectors and Chief Inspectors. It was the second 
day of their programme. What struck me, as I discussed the nature of'ethics', the 
particular aspects of policing that accentuate ethical complexities, and, the issue of 
ethical leadership was the contrast within the group between a minority of officers 
who showed some form of animation and responsiveness with the enigmatic, 
expressionless, impassitivity of the majority. This latter group observed me with 
- and this was the problem - with what? I made points, developed arguments, 
declaimed on this, opined on that. Their gaze bored into me. It was uncomfortable.
After a while, I moved on to examine some of the data patterns emerging from the 
various versions of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire. This included a reference 
to the fact a large majority of the respondents rated themselves at the 'highly 
ethical' point on a continuum ranging form the 'extremely ethical to the extremely 
unethical'. I asked the group how this might be accounted for if there was a 
simultaneous finding that the 'organisation" was not especially 'ethical'. I also 
mentioned that, as member of staff, I had not always thought that programme 
participants meted out 'fair' treatment to the course tutors. I tried to say all this 
without any touch of rancour.
At this point, one officer, remarked, 'What do you expect? You put yourself on 
offer.'
I had often heard members of police staff say that anyone who addressed groups 
of police officers 'put themselves on offer'. I suddenly realised that I had never 
asked what it was that they meant by this expression.
And so I replied: 'Yes, I've heard this expression, people put themselves 'on offer' 
before. But what does it mean?'
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'It means', he said, 'that you put yourself on offer to be shot down'
'Is that it?' I replied. ’Whoever comes in here faces a metaphorical firing squad?' 
'Yes’, he said, 'But that can be fun  fo r  the performer.'
'Oh well', I remarked wryly, 'To avoid the big guns o f  the artillery, I've got the 
HMIC 'Integrity' report fo r  you to have a look at - it provides something a bit like 
an 'integrity test'. ’
I handed out the executive summary of the report - and small groups chatted away 
as they roamed over the recommendations. I concluded the session by making a 
reference to something one of my colleagues had said when he first tried to 
introduce ‘ethics’ as a subject to police leaders and managers. He had remarked:
'You can’t take a holiday from ethics ’.
There was a pause. And then, with great conviction one officer announced:
‘That’s exactly what we have done fo r  the last few  years. We did take a holiday 
from  ethics. ’
The unit evaluation showed a perfect fifty-fifty split between those who took 
considerable value from the unit and those who had gained little or no value. I 
thought about their response and how I had not done enough, in the eyes of the 
institution, to guarantee the survival of my work.
Two evenings later, in the sports hall - when I was about to take part in a team 
game, 1 saw one of the module participants.
'Well', I said to him, I've looked at the course evaluation o f  my work. Do you think 
I  should try and continue? - the feedback wasn’t too bad but it wasn't too good  
either.'
7 loved it', he said. 'Mind you, Rob, its all down to the first ten minutes. You've got 
to get them in the first ten minutes. Some o f them thought you were ’ha lf a beer'.'
'What's 'half a beer'?', I asked.
'Half o f  beer? - You know - it means 'queer' - gay. 'He immediately added:'/ knew
you weren't because I'd  checked up on you before the course began.'
When I mentioned this story to a police officer colleague on the staff at Bramshill 
he simply said:
'That's police culture fo r  you.'
Appendices
Appendix: (A picture o f  Bramshill9
A selection ofphotographs illustrating aspects o f  the institution
A 'Passing Out ' parade in fro n t o f  the M ansion
A ‘Passing O u t’ parade marching to the fro n t o f  the M ansion
\
fThe M ansion  -  Rear view
The M ansion - Sitle view
The oak panelling in the M ansion
W " ,M / Palu,
The prom inent display o f  N P T  and police in the M ansion
<
Reception for the Students  on the Police Management Programme
The Dining Hall
Y
A notice board at the entrance to the Dining Hall
The Bar in the M ansion adorned with gifts from visitors to Bram shill
<
Syndicate Facilities for the Police Management Programme
Lecture Room Facilities for the Police Management Programme
Staff Study for staff  on the Police Management Programme
Computing Facilities -  A Computer Crime Course in Progress
■~i
Foxley Hall - The home o f  the National Crime Faculty
o p e r a t i o n  r1 n ig m a
BrilainV bijtgest murder inquin.
The Home Secretary\ Jack Straw, visiting Bram shill
*3
The Reception area at Bramshill
The main Dining H all at Bram shill
Q
A 'self-developm ent'process involving Inspectors in a typical 'Syndicate Room
A sm all Lecture Theatre at Bramshill
\ o
The Television Studio - Training in progress
The 'Briefing Room Foxley Hall
w
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Appendix A
Selected documents from Richards' (1982) original 'Police Ethics Exercise'
- Introduction to the programme
- Programme timetable
- Towards a police professional ethic
- Police and the professional ideal (authored by Norman Greenhill)
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POLICE ETHICL COURSE
I n t r o d u c t i o n
I t  i s  n o t  th e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  t h i s  in p u t  to  te a c h  p eo p le  how to  be m o ra l .  B e s id e s  
b e in g  a  p r a c t i c a l  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  in  th e  time a l l o t t e d  such  an e x e r c i s e  would be 
p resu m p tu o u s  in  th e  ex tre m e .  Every  member o f  th e  c o u rs e  w i l l  be p r a c t i c e d  in  
g u id in g  b o th  h i s  p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e  l i f e  a c c o rd in g  to  th o s e  fundam enta l p r i n c i p l e s  
which a r e  an in d i s p e n s a b le  p a r t  o f  a good u p b r in g in g .  R a th e r  i t  se e k s  to  f o s t e r  a 
c r i t i c a l  aw aren ess  o f  th e  way in  which such p r i n c i p l e s  t o g e t h e r  w i th  c e r t a i n  
v a lu e s  make t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  s u c c e s s f u l  p o l i c e  p r o f e s s io n a l i s m .  In  d e v i s in g  
th e  c o n t e n t  o f  th e  i n p u t  we have been m indful o f  th e  l e a d e r s h i p  and t r a i n i n g  r o l e s  
o f  o f f i c e r s  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e i r  more d i r e c t  o p e r a t i o n a l  c o n c e rn s .
Many have a t t e s t e d  to  th e  rem a rk ab le  achievem ent o f  th e  B r i t i s h  P o l i c e  S e r v ic e  i n  
b e in g  a b l e  t o  combine a  h ig h  o rd e r  o f  p u b l ic  a c c e p ta n c e  w i th  th e  d i s c h a r g e  o f  i t s  
d u t i e s .  T h a t  i t  h a s ,  th ro u g h  th e  one hundred and f i f t y  o r  so y e a r s  o f  i t s  
e x i s t e n c e ,  managed to  p o l i c e  i n  a  g e n e r a l ly  m ild  and u n a g r e s s iv e  way sa y s  much f o r  
b o th  p o l i c e  and c i t i z e n s .  ‘ However, a  very  c o n s id e r a b le  c h a l le n g e  now f a c e s  th e  
s e r v i c e  i f  i t  i s  t o  c o n t in u e  p o l i c i n g  in  t h i s  s t y l e .  D uring  th e  p a s t  t h i r t y  y e a r s  
t h e r e  have been c o n s id e r a b le  s o c i a l  changes in  B r i t i s h  s o c i e t y  which have 
a f f e c t e d  a l l  s e c t i o n s  o f  th e  community and hence b o th  p a r t i e s  to  th e  p o l i c e - p u b l i c  
r e l a t i o n s h i p .  J u s t  to  i n s t a n c e  some o f  th e  main ones  r e l e v a n t  to  th e  p o l i c e :  
th e  amount o f  u n p o p u la r  law s th e  p o l i c e  have been r e q u i r e d  to  e n fo rc e  h as  in c r e a s e d  
( f o r  exam ple , law s r e l a t i n g  t o  t r a f f i c ,  d rugs  and p o rn o g ra p h y ) ; th e  developm ent o f  
p r o t e s t  m arches  a s  a r e g u l a r  o c c u r re n c e ;  the  r i s e  o f  w e l f a r e  a g e n c ie s  which have 
d im in is h e d  th e  s e r v i c e  f u n c t io n  o f  the  p o l i c e ;  th e  in c r e a s e d  aw areness  on th e  
p a r t  o f  c i t i z e n s  o f  t h e i r  l e g a l  r i g h t s ;  the  c o n t in u in g  a r t i c u l a t i o n ,  th ro u g h
grow ing a n t i - a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m  among many p e o p le ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  among young Deorie 
th e  combined e f f e c t  o f  changes  b ro u g h t  abou t by th e  P o l i c e  A ct,  196*+ and a 
programme o f  am algam ating  p o l i c e  f o r c e s  to  form l a r g e r  u n i t s ,  has  been to  weaken 
de m o c ra t ic  c o n t r o l  g e n e r a l l y ;  the  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  p o l i c e  s t r a t e g i e s  which have 
in c r e a s e d  e f f i c i e n c y  b u t  a t  th e  p r i c e  o f  a l o s s  o f  d i r e c t  c o n t a c t  w ith  th e  p u b l i c ;  
th e  in c r e a s e  o f  p o l i c e  pay and s t a t u s  which has d i s t a n c e d  them from some s e c t i o n s  
o f  th e  community which th e y  p o l i c e .  The p o l i c e ,  knowing t h a t  th e y  c an n o t 
e f f e c t i v e l y  p o l i c e  w i th o u t  th e  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  p u b l i c  and c o n s c io u s  t h a t  many o f  
th e se  f a c t o r s  might work to  im p e r i l  a good p o l i c e - p u b l i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  have 
i n i t i a t e d  th e  m o d e rn is a t io n  o f  t r a i n i n g  programmes, o rg a n is e d  c o n f e r e n c e s ,  
a p p o in te d  community r e l a t i o n s  o f f i c e r s  and changed p o l i c i n g  s t y l e s .  I t  i s  in  th e  
s p i r i t  o f  such i n i t i a t i v e s  t h a t  t h i s  in p u t  hopes to  make a  c o n t r i b u t i o n .
With i t s  t r a d i t i o n  o f  s u c c e s s  and r e s o u r c e f u l n e s s ,  th e  B r i t i s h  P o l i c e  S e r v i c e ,  
when c h a l l e n g e s  a r e  made to  i t ,  can u s u a l l y ,  by e x p lo r in g  th e  i n t i m a t i o n s  o f  i t s  
own p r a c t i c e ,  i d e n t i f y  v a lu e s  and p r i n c i p l e s  by which to  f u r t h e r  g u id e  i t s  
dev e lo p m en t .  T h is  we have sought t o  do. By making e x p l i c i t  th o s e  v a lu e s  and 
p r i n c i p l e s  which a r e  r e l e v a n t  to  th e  p r a c t i c e  o f  p o l i c e  p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m  i n  
B r i t a i n ,  we hope to  show th e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  which th e y  can  make to w ard s  s u s t a i n i n g  
good p o l i c e - p u b l i c  r e l a t i o n s  and th e  s t a n d in g  o f  th e  S e r v ic e  and i t s  members.
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POLICE ETHICS EXERCISE
Programme for the Junior Command Course on Monday, 13th., Tuesday, 1^ -th, 
and Wednesday, 15th. of December, 1982._________________________ _
Place
Monday. 13th. December
General Introduction to the Programme The Deputy Commandant Assembly Hall 
The Character of the United Kingdom Mr. Watt *
Mr. Greenhill
- Seminar I
The Idea of Professionalism
- Seminar II i 
Film: The Offence ~
Impartiality, Discretion and X cfS
Due Process - Seminar III ^
Syndicate Rooms 
Assembly Hall 
Syndicate Rooms 
Assembly Hall
Syndicate Rooms
Tuesday, l^th. December
Roles and Values - Seminar IV 
Ethics : an introduction
2. ‘Zyt/k/
Mr. Richards
Exemplary Moral Tales - . / <
Case Studies and Discussion ^
Police-related Case Studies
- Discussion
Syndicate Rooms 
Assembly Hall
Syndicate Rooms 
Syndicate Rooms
Wednesday. 15th. December
Police-related Case Studies
- Discussion
Syndicate Rooms
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POLICE ETHICS EXERCISE
TOWARDS A POLICE PROFESSIONAL ETHIC 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
To understand fully the function of a professional ethic it is necessary to 
understand what part morality plays in human life generally. I believe that 
the views put forward here as to that part will stand up to our critical 
understanding and enjoy the broad support of those who give thought to such matter
Morality - Its Purpose
Moral discourse, like any other mode of discourse, has a limited scope. Not all
uses of such words as 'good* , 'ought' and 'right' are moral uses. Examples:
•  *
'That is a good car'. 'To get to Birmingham by the quickest route you ought 
to use the M5'. 'That is not the right way to tighten a nut';
When are the questions about rule bound activity moral questions? The best way 
to answer this is to come to understand the distinctive role of morality in 
human living. Once we see the overall rationale or function of morality, we can 
come to understand readily enough what questions are moral questions, what 
considerations axe moral considerations, and what reasons can count as good 
reasons in ethics. What is the point of having moral institutions, practices 
and rules?
Rather than try to catalogue all the rationales for morality I will state and 
explain “a central one, a."rationale that would remain central no matter what 
additional ones morality might have. It is by virtue of this rationale that 
one can come'to understand that - arid why - certain reasons must be good reasons 
in ethics.
The Human Situation: an exercise in philosophical anthropology
Human beings have many diverse and frequently conflicting wants, needs and interes 
Given these, there are also persistent limitations built into the human condition 
which are such that things axe liable to go badly - badly in the non-moral sense 
that human wants,needs and interests are likely to be frustrated in large measure.
The limitations: limited resources - competition - need for co-operation; 
limited information - lack of knowledge often frustrates human purposes; limited 
rationality - human beings do have some ability to perceive alternate courses 
of action, to appreciate what there is to be said for or against alternatives, 
to make a choice or decision, and to act appropriately - but this ability is
limited.} limited intelligence - power of rationality and depth of comprehension} 
limited sympathies - in the pursuit of wants,needs and interests human beings have 
a strong tendency to discount the feelings, needs, wants and interests of others. 
These limitations should be read off against a background of physiological and 
psychological vulnerability and approximate equality.
To counter-act these limitations we need some socially recognised device more 
pervasive and ubiquitous than the law - and without which the law could not 
operate. The device must be such that the parties to it, if they reason with 
average rationality, will regard it as equitable, and it must be sufficiently 
comprehensive and stable to enable the agents involved to form some expectations 
concerning ranges of permissible human behaviour regarding each other. It is 
such a role that morality plays in human life} it is that sort of system of social 
control. I should add that morality is fundamental to practice: it both sets
the standards for it and makes mutual co-operation possible.
All this suggests the following definition of 'morality*. By 'morality' is meant 
a system of principles whose main purpose is to protect the interests of other 
persons as well as the agent and which present themselves to the agent as checks 
on his natural inclinations or spontaneous tendencies to act.
Having provided this definition and emphasised the social control character of 
morality, it is now necessary to specify what kind of system of social control is 
required and indicate its salient features.
A Normative Ethic
A morality which meets the requirements outlined above, with their emphasis upon th<
harms which are resultant from some fundamental features of the human situations,
would be utilitarian in the sense that it takes human-well-being as its foundation.
My claim at this juncture is that the required system of social control which will
serve to check harms and promote well-being can be generated by one ultimate moral
«
principle:
An act ought to be performed if and only if the sum of preferences of the 
of the -persons involved is favourable.
If 'pleasure' is defined as roughly, a preferred state of consciousness then this 
becomes:
One ought to act if and only if its effect is to maximise happiness among 
all concerned.
Besides being more workable this is very much the traditional hedonistic act- 
utilitarian formulation.
Three features of moral principles ought to be noted.
a) They axe prescriptive. So, 'You ought to do A' strongly prescribes doing A, 
or, more simply, expresses a strong desire that A be done. One way of attending 
to the world is to be concerned to describe it and we present our observations 
about what is the case in the form of statements. But when the object of our 
attention is either to maintain things as they are or to change things,then we 
express our desires in the form of prescriptions and they are the language of 
doing. All practice has this concern and its prescriptions are larded with words 
concerned to effect practical activity such as 'will', 'must', 'should', 'ought'. 
Moral prescriptions are a species of such practical prescriptions.
Care should be taken not to confuse prescriptions with descriptions. It is all 
too easy to pass deductively from a description to a prescriptions from an is 
to an ought. That is to infer directly from 'Bombing is the cause of horrible 
suffering ' to 'Bombing ought to be stopped'. For a valid argument what is 
required is the expression of a suppressed major premise - a moral prescription- 
to the effect that 'An act ought not to cause horrible suffering'.
We should note too that prescriptions do have a descriptive content. If I say 
'Close the door' then the demand for action will only make sense if the door 
referred to is open. This is important for moral prescriptions in general and the 
ultimate moral principle in particular. Given the rationale for morality which . 
has been sketched out, they are meant to cope with the conditions of this world 
not all possible worlds. .
b) They are universalisabie. This unwieldy expression is, in effect, a demand for 
rational consistency. If I say you opght to do.-A, I implicitly affirm that 
everyone ought to do A in identical circumstances - and that includes me if I were 
in your position (i.e. the same circumstances aside from location in space-time and 
the individuals involved). This feature builds in a formal principle of fairness
"as far as the ultimate moral principle is concerned. Universalisability demands 
that we apply a moral principle impartially and without regard to who a person is. 
We are to neither accord privilege nor deny it. Strict impartiality is required 
of us. When it comes to summing preferences or calculating which action would 
maximise happiness each person to be affected by the action enjoys equality of 
consideration - the right to have his preferences or happiness considered. As 
the Utilitarian Bentham put it, 'Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than 
one'.
c) Overridingness . If we commit ourselves to moral principles and are sincere
0 * 1  lough
in our commitment we shall treat them as overriding other prescriptions , 00 *
to visit my sick friend' overrides 'I ought to cut the lawn because it looks.' untidy' 
given that only these two courses of action are open to me. The moral prescription 
overrides the aesthetic. An ultimate moral principle has the feature of overriding 
all other moral principles.
There is one more feature that needs to be noted about the application of moral
\
principles and it is of great importance. Moral judgements are not sound if they 
depend on mistaken factual beliefs. This may be brought out with the following three 
line moral argument!
1. I will so act as to maximise the happiness of all concerned.
2. Conditions XYZ will maximise the happiness of all concerned.
3* Therefore I will act to bring about conditions XYZ.
The second premise is factual and had my factual judgement been wrong then I should 
have acted wrongly. Often moral disagreement is disagreement about facts, not 
principles.
Having said all this about moral principles in general and the ultimate moral principle 
in particular, how is it to be used to direct out actions?
A Two Tier Moral System
A superhuman mastermind could, no doubt, apply the ultimate moral principle directly. 
He would have superhuman powers of thought, superhuman knowledge and powers of 
prediction and no human weaknesses. When presented with a novel situation, he would 
be able at once to scan all its properties, including the consequences of alternative 
actions and frame a universal principle (perhaps a highly specific one) which he 
could accept-for action in that situation', no’matter what role he were to occupy in it. 
Being perfectly rational and lacking partiality to himself, he will act on that princij 
if it bid him to act.
Critical and Intuitive Moral Thinking
For the most part we are not like this and we regulate our lives by-the.’application of
'intuited' moral principles. We just do not have the time or the capacity in most 
instances to apply the ultimate principle. So we direct our lives according to 
principles which exhort us to keep our promises, to make reparation for past wrongs, 
to care for our parents and children, to act with honesty, to respect the rights of 
others - and one could go on. Indeed, so habitual is our application of such 
principles that they inform our perceptions and we are hardly aware of applying them 
at all.
The suggestion here is that principles,to the extent that acceptance of them will
normally, but not necessarily always.lead to what the ultimate moral principle require
should be adopted. And not merely adopted but inculcated.
Once inculcated then, many moral issues would be resolved, as they axe, by 
'intuitive thinking'. Those directing their lives by them would become strongly
averse to infringing them, would feel strong compunction if they did so and would
be highly indignant if others infringed them.
There will still, however, be a very important role for' 'critical thinking* , the 
application of the ultimate moral principle. It will play a vital part in
selecting intuitive moral principles and will lead to some being justified and
others being modified or rejected. For example, the intuited principle that one 
ought not to take human life might be modified if rescue in an extreme hostage/ 
terrorist situation would otherwise be impossible. Given the importance of facts 
in moral judgement and an ever-changing world we need to be on the alert to review 
our moral commitments to be sure that they are still the ones which will normally 
lead to utility - maximising acts (the ones we ought to perform).
Critical thinking has a further function? that of resolving conflicts between 
intuited principles. Often we are t om between keeping a promise and offering 
help to somebody. Critical thinking would have a part to play in this. Again, 
suppose a racist organisation seeks to reserve a public hall for a meeting and it 
is obvious that if the meeting is held them will be incitement to racial hatred 
and a danger of violence. The public authority , on the advice of the police, 
refuses to make the hall available ( it controls the hall). The racist organisatioi 
then protests that it is being denied its right to free speech. The public 
authority protests the right of minorities not to have hatred preached at them and tl 
right of the public to be protected against outbreaks of violence. H em is a typical 
case of a conflict between rights. Again,critical thinking should be brought . 
into play. Intuitive thinking.flounders.in such .situations. .. Further,, arid allowing 
that generality is the opposite of specificity; that of the two principles 'Never 
kill people ' and 'Never kill people except in self-defence* the first is more 
general than the latter, and intuitive moral principles must be general. This is 
for two reasons? they must be simple enough to be learned and also able to handle 
a fairly wide-number of situations. Fortunately the world is such that they can do 
this, them are sufficient similarities between situations, in relevant respects, 
for general principles to get a hold. Sometimes, in unusual situations, they do 
not do their job very well and they do not lead to maximising happiness. For 
example on this basis, in certain situations, we would wish to make an exception 
to 'Never kill people' to allow for self-defence. Again critical thinking would 
have a place. Hence, with the plethora of intuited moral principles and the rights, 
dutied and obligations to which they give rise, the ultimate moral principle, 
through selection and arbitration, would fit a system of moral social control for 
its task in counter-acting the limitations of the human situation.
Morality and the Good Life
A number of further features should be noted about the character of 'morality* 
as envisaged here. In the first place it is tolerant of the vast majority 
of human goals. People, obviously and fortunately are different, have different 
capacities and different notions of what they expect to find satisfactory.
In consequence they embark upon any number of different ways of life; become 
artists, sportsmen, bankers, men of action or religious recluses. Morality 
allows for all of these and more. This is because its business is to propound 
principles to which, by and large, our conduct should conform in the pursuit of 
our valued ends, whatever those ends may be. A note of caution is in order 
here. Morality does set limits upon what is allowable in the pursuit of 
personal ends and condemns some ends as immoral. For example, the ambitious 
musician with a sick wife is morally required to forego at least some of 
his ambitions to care for her and morality condemns achieving the perfect 
murder as an end. In general, people who recognise exactly the same intuitive m< 
principles and who conform to them equally satisfactorily in all they do, may 
nevertheless be doing quite different things, living quite different lives, 
pursuing widely differing ends. In that sense there is no one way in which 
morality requires them to live.
But does morality require a particular way of life . in the sense that it dictates 
a supreme goal or good, the character of which ought to determine the character 
of one's life generally? From the foregoing remarks there seems no reason, 
to think so. What of the life that makes morality itself the goal.? Perhaps 
a remark of the moral philosopher C ,D.Broad is appropriate here, '.. A -healthy - 
appetite for rightousness, kept in due control by good manners, is an excellent ' 
thing; but to "hunger and thirst after " it. is often merely a symptom of moral. 
diabetes*. Morality itself does not seem to require that we make it the sole 
end of our lives . In keeping with this while it does demand that its 
principles be overriding, it does allow for the operation of other non-moral 
principles which function as guides to conduct. For instance, a sportsman 
may regulate part of his life according to the principle,' I will practice morning 
and night' and the artist bind himself according to the principle 'I will practic 
my brush technique until it is perfect'. Such principles are neither 
universalisable nor overriding.
To summerise all this, morality is concerned to counter the limitations of 
the human situation and prescribes conditions within which lives are to be 
lived and valued ends pursued. But for any good life much wore ii,3 ;qequire41i^ han
simply that those conditions should not be transgressed. Indeed, an unsuccessful, 
unhappy life may well be led*1 in strict conformity to moral principles.
Morality and the Liberal Democratic State
It is one of the remarkable achievements of modem liberal democratic states 
that they generally facilitate a wide range of life-styles for their citizens 
in a manner which broadly satisfies the demands of morality. In Britain there 
is a high degree of public order because social control is largely effected 
voluntarily by a citizenry who generally adhere to intuitive moral principles. 
This same population also, through its democratic political arrangements ^ brings 
into existence rules which are enacted by the Queen - in - Parliament and 
upheld by the Sourtsj in short ,the law. Such laws are both substantive and 
procedural and one of their functions is to reinforce with an elaborate battery 
of sanctions and penalties those intuited moral principles which are central 
to social-control. Under the same arrangements the Police Service as a public 
body is entrusted to uphold the law, prevent crime and promote public tranquility 
and individual police officers are invested with rights and duties which define 
their role, provide them with authority and give them the necessary powers to 
discharge their duties. Because the Police Service observes the same 
morality, the same system of social control, as that adopted by the generality 
of citizens its services are valued by them. The requirements of 
professionalism,when observed, serve to sustain the police role and the value 
placed upon it.
A BQLICE PROFESSIONAL ETHIC
That I intend to use the same procedure for developing a professional ethic that 
I used when developing-a rationale for morality as such should come as no 
surprise at this stage. - Morality is t o t h e  limitations of the human 
situation as a police professional ethic is to those factors which impede the 
essential relationship of trust and confidence which a profession hopes to enjoy 
with its clients. If for no other reason, it is prudent for the police to be 
concerned about this relationship because, in a liberal democratic society, 
without the general support of citizens, their work would be impossible.
By*professionals*is meant a body which provides a service deemed both essential 
and worthwhile by its clients, exercises skills resting upon a systematic body of 
knowledge and is governed by a concern for principles and values which sustain 
both the commitment of members to each other and to their clients.- A code 
of ethics is therefore a requirement of professionalism and it is through 
honouring its code that a body is enabled to earn and enjoy the status of a 
profession.
What then are the intuitive moral principles which suggest themselves for a 
police professional ethic appropriate for the British Police? One fundamental 
source lies in the tradition of the Service itself. It has been well served, 
for example, by the principle which exhorted it to treat the public with civility. 
Another source is the human rights provisions of such bodies as the Council of 
Europe and the United Nations. A third way of proceeding takes account .of .those 
practices which tend to undermine public confidence and trust in its service. if 
these are thought undesirable then intuitive moral principles may be devised to 
counter-act them. This is, of course, the strategy employed above for morality 
itself. The principles themselves will implicitly point to the undesirable 
practices that they are framed to counter-act so I will hot reherse the practices 
here. The contributions of the other two sources should be fairly obvious.
SUGGESTED POLICE ETHICAL CODE 
AS A BRITISH POLICE OFFICER AND CITIZEN I WILL ON BEHALF OF MY FELLOW-CITIZENS
detect and prevent crime,apprehend offenders, protect persons and property, and 
by preserving public tranquility maintain the Queen's peace
do my duty and, when situations demand it, be a credit to the Police Service by
doing it to the limits of my capacity
•;
be fair and impartial" to all people,no matter what their social position,race or ... 
creed, and actively seek the support -and-goodwill of my fellow-citizens
have a compassionate respect for the dignity of the individual and behave to all 
with courtesy, self-control, human understanding and tolerance
never use more force than is necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose nor 
subject anybody to any form of cruel,inhuman or degrading treatment
strive continually to increase my professional skills so that I can exercise my 
discretion with ever greater skill and judgement
uphold the law,observe due legal process and obey orders which conform to such law 
and process
keep matters of a confidential nature secret unless the performance of police 
duty requires otherwise
act with honesty and integrity towards colleagues and fellow-citizens and be 
mindful of the reputation of the Police Service
The code is deliberately presented in this form to resemble an oath. It is also 
intended to be reasonably memorable and to foster professional pride and self-respeci 
in any officer who endeavours to apply it. All the principles in it have the 
quality of overridingnessj they override non-moral principles. The fact that a 
police officer is the subject of them does not affect their universitality because 
his role characteristics - rights and duties as a police officer - are part'of the 
circumstances of any situation within which, as an individual, he may find himself. 
Thoughtful consideration of the principles should reveal that they meet the 
requirements of critical moral thinking, provide moral guidelines for the police 
code and qualify as a professional ethic.
It is intended that they be inculcated through training programmes. There will be 
situations in which the principles of the code come into conflict with each other.
To resolve them is an excercise of discretion guided by critical moral thinking and 
it is intended that, as far as is possible, the resolutions of such conflicts will 
correspond to the scale of ranksi the graver the situation in which such a conflict 
arises .the higher the rank of the officer applying his critical moral thinking. 
Training programmes will also take this requirement into account.
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POLICE AND THE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL
I n t r o d u c t i o n
1.1  The s e a r c h  f o r  an  e t h i c  o f  p o l i c i n g
Human b e h a v io u r  i n  every  s p h e re  i s  n o rm a l ly  s u b je c t  to  m ora l 
e v a l u a t i o n  i n  te rm s o f  some code o f  c o n d u c t ,  w hether fo rm a l o r  
in fo rm a l .  T here  i s  f r e q u e n t l y ,  how ever,  a  problem i n  d e c id in g  
which- p a r t i c u l a r  coae i s  a p p l i c a b l e  i n  th e  c o n te x t  i n  q u e s t i o n .  
U n iv e rs a l  s t a n d a r d s  a r e  seldom o f  p r a c t i c a l  r e l e v a n c e :  ' s i t u a t i o n a l
e t h i c s '  a r e  c a l l e d  f o r .  O ccu p a t io n s  p ro v id e  j u s t  such  s i t u a t i o n a l  
c o n te x ts  i n  which codes o f  p r a c t i c e  o p e r a t e ,  and 'p r o f e s s i o n s '  a r e  
a  c a te g o ry  o f  o c c u p a t io n s  i n  which su ch  codes  a re  more fo rm a l ly  
e s t a b l i s h e d  th a n  in  o th e r  o c c u p a t io n s .
The o b j e c t  o f  t h i s  paper i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  to  examine th e  i d e a  o f  a 
p r o f e s s i o n  -  or. more s t r i c t l y  o f  1 p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m 1 -  and to  c o n s id e r  
w hether  th e  o c c u p a t io n  o f  p o l i c i n g  may p r o p e r ly  be c a l l e d  
p r o f e s s i o n a l .  The answer t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  w i l l  have c o n s id e r a b l e  
r e le v a n c e  to  th e  s e a rc h  f o r  a  p o l i c i n g  e t h i c .
1 .2  The prob lem  o f  d e f in i n g  a  p r o f e s s i o n
A number o f  o c c u p a t io n s  n o rm a lly  e n jo y  p r o f e s s i o n a l  s t a t u s ,  w h i l s t  
s e v e r a l  more make p r o f e s s i o n a l  c la im s  w hich a r e  n o t  e n t i r e l y  g r a n te d  
o u t s id e  t h e  o c c u p a t io n  i t s e l f .  An ex a m in a t io n  o f  p r o f e s s i o n s  and 
would-be p r o f e s s i o n s  le a d s  t o  th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a  number o f  
common, though  n o t  u n i v e r s a l ,  - f e a tu r e s - a n d . . . i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  combine 
th e  most s a l i e n t  o f  th e s e  t o - c o n s t r u c t  a - l o g i c a l l y  c o h e re n t  ' model 
p r o f e s s i o n 1 o r  paradigm o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m .  ( I t  s h o u ld  be em phasised  
t h a t  th e  te rm  'm o d e l '  h e re  i s  n o t  e v a l u a t i v e  b u t  m ere ly  d e s c r i p t i v e ) .  
M oreover, r a t h e r  th a n  p ro d u c in g  a  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  o c c u p a t io n s  i n t o  
th o se  t h a t  a r e  p r o f e s s io n s  and th o s e  t h a t  a r e  n o t ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  
i d e n t i f y  p r o f e s s i o n a l  a t t r i b u t e s  ( ' p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m ' )  and to  sp eak  
o f  one o c c u p a t io n  b e in g  more o r  l e s s  p r o f e s s i o n a l  th a n  a n o th e r  and i n  
what r e s p e c t .
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2. The parad igm  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l i s m
2 .1  Components o f  th e  paradigm
The parad igm , c o n s t r u c t e d  from a  com parison  o f  su ch  o c c u p a t io n s  a s  
th o s e  o f  d o c to r ,  la w y e r ,  t e a c h e r  and s o c i a l  w o rk er ,  c o n s i s t s  o f  
t e n  c e n t r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which r e l a t e  to  t h r e e  u n d e r ly in g  f a c t o r s .
These f a c t o r s , ,  th e  c o r n e r s to n e s  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l i s m  a r e : -
( i )  the  s o c i a l  v a lu e  o f  th e  work;
( i i )  th e  t e c h n i c a l  s k i l l  r e q u i r e d  to  do th e  work;
( i i i )  th e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  work e x e r c i s e d  by i t s
p r a c t i t i o n e r s •
These 'c o r n e r s t o n e s ’ th e m se lv e s  r e s t  on what may be term ed th e
«
f o u n d a t io n  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l i s m ,  which i s  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  th e  
p r o f e s s i o n  and i t s  c l i e n t s ,  w he the r  s een  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
te rm s .  The e ssen ce  o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  m i n i s t e r i n g  to  th e  p r e s s i n g  
n eeds  o f  th o se  who, owing to  th e  i n t r i n s i c  c i rc u m s ta n c e s  o f  t h e i r  
c o n d i t i o n ,  canno t manage f o r  th e m se lv e s  b u t  must r e l y  on th e  s e r v i c e s  
o f  o t h e r s .  T h is  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  one o f  c o n f id e n c e  and 
t r u s t  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  c l i e n t  and o f  c a p a c i t y  and commitment on th e  
p a r t  o f  th e  s u p p l i e r  o f  th e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  s e r v i c e .  T e c h n ic a l  p r o f i c i e n c y ,  
s o c i a l  esteem  and a  l a r g e  m easure o f  autonomy a p p e a r  to  be n e c e s s a r y  to  
th e  a d e q u a te  f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
 2 .2  The ~ t e r i c e n t r a l "  ' c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s " o f  ~ p ro fe s s io n a l i s m ......................... ............
S o c i a l  v a lu e  o f  th e  work:
( i )  E s s e n t i a l  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  ( e s p e c i a l l y  h a n d l in g
p e o p l e ' s  e m e rg e n c ie s ,  c r i s e s  e t c . ) ;
( i i )  High p u b l i c  es teem  and s o c i a l  s t a t u s  en joyed  by 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s ;
( i i i )  High deg ree  o f  p r i d e  i n  b e lo n g in g  to  th e  p r o f e s s i o n ;
T e c h n ic a l  s k i l l :
( i v )  E x p e r t i s e  based  on a  s y s t e m a t ic  body o f  knowledge 
(a p p l ie d  s c ie n c e  o r  s tu d y ) ;
(v )  High s t a n d a r d s  o f  ad m iss io n  and f i t n e s s  to  p r a c t i s e ;
( v i )  Lengthy c a n d id a te  t r a i n i n g  and c o n t in u e d  commitment t o  
l e a r n in g ;
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I n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  work:
( v i i )  Autonomous c o n t r o l  by th e  p r o f e s s i o n  (codes  o f  e t h i c s  
o r  d i s c i p l i n e  r a t h e r  th a n ,  o r  in  a d d i t i o n  t o ,  e x t e r n a l  
l e g a l  o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l s ) ;
( v i i i )  I n d iv i d u a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a c t i o n s ;
( i x )  Moral o r  v o c a t io n a l  commitment t o  th e  s e r v i c e  a s p e c t
o f  th e  work;
(x )  F u n c t io n a l  e x c lu s iv e n e s s  and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n .
2 .3  F u r th e r  ’p r o b l e m a t i c 1 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  found i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s .
( i )  B u r e a u c r a t ic  o r g a n i s a t i o n
The p r i n c i p l e s  o f  b u re a u c ra c y  and p r o f e s s io n a l i s m  a r e  i n  
many ways a n t i t h e t i c a l .  Though b o th  a r e  conce rn ed  w ith  
th e  p r o v i s io n  o f  s e r v i c e s ,  th e  fo rm er i s  more co nce rned  
w ith  r o u t i n e  e f f i c i e n c y  and q u a n t i t y ,  th e  l a t t e r  w i th  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and q u a l i t y .  They a r e  n o t ,  how ever, 
in c o m p a t ib le  ( e . g .  h o s p i t a l  m e d ic in e ) .
P r o f e s s i o n a l  g r a d i e n t
There i s  o f t e n  a  g r a d i e n t  betw een  th e  most h ig h l y  s k i l l e d  
members o f  a  p r o f e s s i o n  and th e  a n c i l l a r y  workers^who a r e  
r e l a t i v e l y  u n s k i l l e d  b u t  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l l y  e s s e n t i a l .  The 
l a t t e r  may be s a i d  t o  be p a r t  o f  th e  " ' g r e a t e r ' p r o f e s s i o n 1 
though  n o t  th e m se lv es  s t r i c t l y  p r o f e s s i o n a l .
R e s t r i c t i v e  p r a c t i c e s
Some su p p o se d ly  p r o f e s s i o n a l  p r a c t i c e s  a p p e a r ,  on c l o s e r  
e x a m in a t io n ,  t o  be d e s ig n e d  to  s e rv e  th e  narrow  i n t e r e s t  o f  
th e  members o f  th e  p r o f e s s i o n  a t  th e  expense  o f  t h e i r  c l i e n t s .  
T h is  may be s a id  t o  be un ion ism  i n  th e  g u is e  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l i s
' S e m i - p r o fe s s io n a l i s m '
T each ers  and s o c i a l  w orkers  sometimes l a y  c la im  to  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  s t a t u s  b u t  f o r  a v a r i e t y  o f  r e a s o n s  f a i l  to  
a c h ie v e  i t .  Two f a c t o r s  may be m entioned  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ; -  
( a )  l a c k  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  autonomy in  th e  l a r g e  
m a jo r i t y  o f  p r a c t i t i o n e r s ;
(b )  dub ious  t e c h n i c a l  base  o f  th e  ' p r o f e s s i o n a l 1 
s k i l l s  conce rned  ( i - e .  t e a c h in g  and s o c i a l
( i i )
( i i i )
-if-
3* P o l i c e  and th e  paradigm  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l i s m
3 .1  R a t in g  on th e  t e n  f a c t o r s
I t  i s  n o t  im m ed ia te ly  c l e a r  t h a t  p o l i c i n g  i s  a  p r o f e s s i o n a l  o c c u p a t io n  
a k in  t o  m e d ic in e ,  a r c h i t e c t u r e  o r  even th e  law . I t  i s  con tended  
h e r e ,  however, t h a t  o n ly  a  c lo s e  ex am in a t io n  o f  p o l i c e  work and 
o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  b o th  a s  th e y  a r e  and a s  th e y  might f e a s i b l y  become, 
i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  th e  t e n  components o f  th e  paradigm w i l l  r e v e a l  
th e  n a t u r e  and e x t e n t  o f  th e  s i m i l a r i t y  o r  d i s s i m i l i a r i t y .  C e r t a i n
i t  i s  t h a t  th e  h e lp in g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  and o th e r  a s p e c t s  o f  th e
f o u n d a t io n  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l i s m  d e s c r ib e d  above a r e  p r e s e n t  i n  p o l i c e  
work even  i f  th e y  a r e  sometimes g iv e n  l e s s  em phasis  th a n  th e y  m e an t .
T here  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  space  h e re  to  c o n s id e r  a l l  t e n  f a c t o r s  i n  d e t a i l  
b u t  s u f f i c e  i t  t o  sa y  t h a t ,  a t  th e  r i s k  o f  o v e r - 6 i m p l i f i c a t i o n ,  i t  i s  
p o s s i b l e  to  r a t e  c u r r e n t  p o l i c i n g  co r re sp o n d en ce  w i th  eac h  f a c t o r  a s  
h ig h ,  m odera te  and low a s  f o l l o w s : -
H igh: f a c t o r s  ( i ) ,  ( v i i )  and ( v i i i )
F l u c t u a t i n g  h ig h /m o d e ra te :  f a c t o r s  ( i i )  and ( i i i )
M odera te :  f a c t o r s  ( i v ) ,  ( v ) ,  ( i x )  and (x )
Low: f a c t o r  ( v i )
3 . 2 .  The f u r t h e r  "p rob lem atic*  f a c t o r s
I t  i s - a l s o  - p e r t i n e n t  to  c o n s id e r  th e  p o s i t i o n . . o f  p o l i c e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  
t h e  p r o b le m a t i c '  f a c t o r s :  b u r e a u c r a t i c  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l
g r a d i e n t ,  r e s t r i c t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  and s e m i - p r o f e s s io n a l i s m .  None o f  
t h e s e  d i s q u a l i f i e s  p o l i c e  from p r o f e s s i o n a l  s t a t u s .
I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  th e  f u r t h e r  p r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  p o l i c e
*+.1 I m p l i c a t io n s  o f  th e  enhanc ing  o f  t e c h n i c a l  p r o f i c i e n c y
I t  would a p p e a r ,  i f  th e  * p ro fe s s io n a l ism  r a t i n g s '  o f  th e  p r e v io u s  
p a ra g ra p h  a re  v a l i d ,  t h a t  i t  i s  i n  th e  a r e a  o f  t e c h n i c a l  s k i l l  t h a t  
th e  g r e a t e s t  d i s c re p a n c y  betw een c u r r e n t  p o l i c i n g  and th e  parad igm  o f  
p r o f e s s io n a l i s m  l i e s .  For r e a s o n s  o f  economy, overcom ing t h i s  would 
a lm o s t  c e r t a i n l y  in v o lv e  f o r m a l i s in g  a  p r o f e s s i o n a l  g r a d i e n t  be tw een  
th e  f u l l y  p r o f e s s i o n a l  ( s a y ,  S u p e r in te n d e n t  and a b o v e ) ,  th e  se m i-  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  ( s a y  I n s p e c to r  and C h ie f  I n s p e c t o r )  and th e  s u b - p r o f e s s i o n a l  
( s a y  S e rg e a n t  and P .C . )  A ch iev ing  t h i s  would im ply a  more p r o f e s s i o n a l
/ . . .
s e n i o r  p o l i c e  management and a  l e s s  p r o f e s s i o n a l  S e rg e a n t  
and P .C . -  more p r e c i s e l y ,  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  autonomy and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  th e s e  ra n k s  would be d im in is h e d .
^ • 2 .  P r o f e s s i o n a l  e t h i c s
P a r a d o x ic a l l y ,  a l th o u g h  i t  i s  a rg u ed  t h a t  p o l i c e  p r o f e s s io n a l i s m  
may be enhanced c h i e f l y  by a c h ie v in g  g r e a t e r  t e c h n i c a l  p r o f i c i e n c y ,  
a t t a i n i n g  a  more f u l l y  p r o f e s s i o n a l  s t a t u s  w i l l  a l s o  in v o lv e  
more a t t e n t i o n  to  p r o f e s s i o n a l  e t h i c s . T h is  i s  p r i n c i p a l l y  
because  p r o f e s s io n a l i s m  im p l ie s  a  h ig h  degree  o f  au tonom y/freedom  
from e x t e r n a l  c o n t r o l ,  r a t h e r  th a n  b ecause  o f  any s u b s t a n t i a l  
e t h i c a l  shortcom ings*. However, c u r r e n t  te n d e n c ie s  tow ards  
enhanced p o l i c e  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y ,  by d im in sh in g  autonomy a l s o  
ru n  c o u n te r  t o  p r o f e s s i o n a l  s t a t u s  (an d ,  in d e e d ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
s t a t u s  f o r  p o l i c e  i s  sometimes opposed on th e  v e ry  g rounds  t h a t  
i t  i s  c o n t r a r y  t o  th e  need f o r  g r e a t e r  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y ) .  I t  i s  
to  be e x p e c te d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  p r e s s u r e s  tow ards  g r e a t e r  t e c h n i c a l  
p r o f i c i e n c y  and g r e a t e r  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  w i l l  s im u l ta n e o u s ly  p u l l  
i n  o p p o s i t e  d i r e c t i o n s .  Such c o n t r a d i c t o r y  f o r c e s  w i l l  p ro b a b ly  
p roduce a  k in d  o f  dynamic e q u i l ib r iu m  o r  ’moving b a l a n c e ’ .
F o r ' f u l l e r  t r e a tm e n t  o f  th e  above t o p i c , '  and a d d i t i o n a l  r e f e r e n c e s ,  
see. . ’/ P r o f e s s i o n a l i s m  i n  th e  P o l i c e  S e rv ic e "  by the .  p r e s e n t  w r i t e r ,  
i n  D.W. Pope and N.L. W einer, "Modern P o l i c in g "  (Croom Helm 1981 )
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Appendix B
Contrasting case studies of'action research'
- Reid (1982) included in Carr and Kemmis (1994)
- Armstrong (1981) included in Nixon (1981)
1Appendix B
Contrasting case studies o f  action research
Cair and Kemmis (1994) include a study by Reid (1982) which meets their various 
criteria by which inquiry work may be described as ’full’ action research.
I shall describe her study in some detail here because it both illustrates 
’emancipatory' action research and it can be used to serve as a template against 
which other studies may be compared - to determine whether or not they can 'be 
called 'full' action research. This characterisation of 'full' or 'real' action research 
needs to be treated with caution however in the light of Whitehead's (1989) 
discussion of action research - which places the living 'I' at the heart o f the research 
- and Reason and Rowan's (1981) sourcebook on 'new paradigm research' - in which 
they include an outline of 'the new paradigm research manifesto'. This manifesto 
makes it entirely possible to conduct a more individualised or personal strategic 
action research.
I will now turn to provide an account of Reid's study in order to illustrate action 
research understood more as the enactment of a critical social science embracing an 
appropriate research methodology for educational practitioners in 'educational' 
situations.
A case study of'emancipatory* action research
The study involved Reid, an advisory teacher, in an investigation of the role of 
language in learning in the classroom. This was a particular concern of a national 
working party into the role of language in learning; fhe working party wanted to 
examine the notion that students learn through using language. It followed from this 
that teaching and learning strategies 'which recognised and extended children's own 
language could more surely engage children in particular learning tasks.' From this 
proposition, the slogan 'negotiating the curriculum’ was fashioned.
In a negotiated curriculum the following sequence of steps would take place: first, 
at the invitation of teachers, students would identify what they already knew about 
a subject. This would constitute a personal 'starting point’. Second, students would 
decide what more they would like to know about the subject. Third, they would 
consider the ways and means to find out what they wanted to know. Fourth, after 
negotiation with peers and teachers they would implement plans to find out more 
about that which they had defined they wanted to know. Lastly, they would evaluate
2the success of their enquiries by reflecting on what they had learned in the light of 
their initial aims and plans.
In this process, the teacher would function in these enquiries in three ways:
- a stimulus and catalyst for students (exciting reflection, for example, on the part 
of students)
- A resource and helper, providing ideas and information
- a constraint and boundary setter/maintainer, limiting the scope of enquiries. This 
was particularly in terms of a) relating individual student plans to others in order to 
facilitate collaboration and b) to die areas in which the teacher was willing and: able 
to act as a resource.
In order to explore the idea of curriculum negotiation further, Reid ’borrowed’ a 
class of thirty four, year 9 students for sixteen periods over eight weeks in 1979. 
Carr and Kemmis describe Reid's approach to curriculum negotiation in the 
following way:
"Curriculum negotiation involves giving students a voice in die choice and  
development o f  learning opportunities in the classroom: both the'what' and the 
rhowf o f  curriculum. As a stranger to the class Reid needed a topic area which 
could interest the students rapidly; it was the International year o f  the child, so  
Reid chose the topic 1Kids in schools'... in the spirit o f  negotiating the curriculum; 
Reid was thus constituting the class as a reflective and self-reflective com m unity  
o f  participant researchers.1 (Carr and Kemmis 1994 :171)
An analysis of the situation shows that Reid was creating five separate levels o f  
reflection. They are:
1. Students substantive reflection on the topic of *kids in schools'
2. Students' self -reflection on the processes by which they pursued their 
investigation of die topic
3. Reid's reflection on the practices involved in negotiating the curriculum; i.e. Reid 
as teacher
4. Reid's reflection on these practices as educational practices within the broader
3framework of strategies for English teaching with what she was concerned as an 
advisory teacher in English; i.e. Reid as advisory teacher
5. Reid’s self-reflection on her own processes of reflection and enquiry; i:e: Reid as 
teacher/researcher.
At the conceptual level I wanted to aim towards this process of negotiating the 
curriculum with the participants on the police leadership and management 
development programmes at the Police Staff College: So, ideally, I wanted to 
include:
1. Participants substantive reflection on the topic ’ethics and management in the 
police organisation'
2. Participants’ self-reflection on the processes by which they pursued their 
investigation of the topic
3. My own reflection on the practices involved in negotiating the curriculum in the 
specific cases
4. My own reflection on these practices as educational practices within the broader 
framework of strategies for ethics teaching
5. My own self-refection on my own processes of reflection and inquiry
It is here that Carr and Kemmis identify key criteria by which studies" are understood 
by them to be action research studies. Thus, Reid’s study demonstrates that at each 
of the levels of reflection that have been organised, participants were collaboratively 
involved in reflection and self-reflection. They were planning, acting, observing and 
reflecting together. The classic Lewinian process has been reproduced: The 
conditions of participation and collaboration, characteristic of critical social science, 
were, therefore, fulfilled in the study.
Throughout Reid's study the students kept journals recording their activities and 
progress as did Reid herself. These data provided not only a documentary record but 
also stimulated and recorded reflection and self-reflection on the processes. Carr and 
Kemmis describe the role and function of the journal keeping process in terms of 
facilitating a critical perspective in the following way:
"Keeping a journal helps participants to become....'reflexive spectators’ who reflect
4on their actions and transform their ideas and their future action in the light o f  
reflection. In these ways, the study was beginning to develop an critical 
perspective: it was creating the conditions under which the participants could 
consider their own interests (as students, teacher, etc.) and\ perhaps, how they 
related to wider social interests.
Perhaps also, the topic 'kids in school' ( f o r  students) and 'the negotiated 
curriculum' (for Reid and the other teachers and advisers she worked with) began 
to provoke an emancipatory interest in how schools and teaching are shaped and  
form ed that is, in ideological questions), and in how they might be made better 
(through changing conditions o f  communication decision making and educational 
action)." (Carr and Kemmis 1994 : 173)
However, Carr and Kemmis comment that they remain uncertain as to the degree 
that the study realised emancipatory intent.
Lastly, before a re-iteration of the ’basic' action research spiral of cycles - planning, 
acting, observing and reflecting, Carr and Kemmis point out that the study was truly 
practical both for student and teacher. It engaged them directly in considering fheir 
own practices and in modifying those practices in the light of reflection and self 
reflection. Carr and Kemmis illustrate the specific practical aspects of flie study as 
follows:
'For students, it provided an opportunity to think about their learning practices 
and the conditions o f  their learning; fo r  Reid as a teacher, i t  provided an 
opportunity to reflect on the practices o f  negotiating the curriculum; fo r  Reid a s  
advisory teacher, it provided an opportunity to reflect on curriculum negotiation 
in relation to other teaching practices in English; fo r  Reid as teacher- researcher, 
it provided an opportunity to reflect on action research as a way o f  improving 
teaching.' (Carr and Kemmis 1994 : 173)
If this study does offer a template for emancipatory action research embedded 
within an emerging critical social and critical educational science paradigm it is 
identified in terms of the following characteristics, criteria and intentions.
- The study is conducted in the spirit of an inquiry into social practices and 
processes
- The study has three foci of concern: a) improving the practice itself; b) improving 
understanding of the practice; c) improving the social circumstances in which the
5practice occurs
- The study is conducted with full or increasing participation of those involved with 
the practice in question
- The study proceeds with the full increasing collaboration of those involved and 
affected by the practice
- Through the establishment of participative and collaborative methods and 
processes the study develops through a sequence of steps; planning, acting, 
observing and reflecting
- The study is established to promote and develop levels of reflection and self­
reflection on both substantive questions and the development of personal and 
practical knowledges
- The study develops towards a critical perspective through creating the conditions 
under which participants can consider their own authentic interests (after Fay, 1985)
- The study provokes and promotes an emancipatory interest in how practices are 
shaped and formed. In its way, the study provides the conditions for developing a) 
critical theorems; b) organisations for enlightenment; c) organisations for strategic 
action
In this way, Carr and Kemmis provide a detailed description of one way to proceed 
as an action researcher in ways congruent with a wider critical theorist stance;
In contrast to Reid’s approach, there are a number of published case studies 
featuring detailed descriptions of attempts to improve the quality of education in a 
specific situation of practice conducted independently of a critical theory 
framework. Here I shall refer to one such study in order to illustrate how a 
practitioner attempted, through the meticulous observation of children, to enhance 
his understanding of the way children developed their knowledge. The study itself 
can be located within a tradition of inquiry which sets out to help teachers and 
educators acquire knowledge appropriate to their profession.
A case study concerning an individual teacher's professional interest
In Nixon's (1981) collection of papers illustrating the practice of action research by 
teachers he includes four pieces of research featuring developments in the classroom
6itself. The most individual in its focus is that written by Armstrong who investigates 
the 'case of Louise and the painting of landscape'. He introduces his work with an 
observation concerning the 'distance' between the 'high hard ground' of research- 
based theory and technique and the 'swampy lowland' of practice (Schon, 1987). 
Armstrong writes:
"How are we to understand the growth o f  understanding? Most attempts by 
students o f  human development have been made outside the classroom; in 
laboratories and clinics, or in the studies and libraries o f universities and research 
institutes. Or i f  research has taken place within classrooms, it has been conducted 
by outsiders who have played little part in the daily life o f  the class, least o f  all in 
teaching. Participant observers have not, fo r  the most part, been observant 
participators. It is commonly assumed that the requirements o f  objectivity oblige 
us to eliminate teaching from the list o f  serviceable research techniques: The 
unfortunate consequence is that we deprive ourselves o f  a powerful, i f  rarely 
articulated\ source o f  evidence and insight as to the nature o f  intellectual growth. 
"(Armstrong 1981 : 15)
In the autumn of 1976 Armstrong began his inquiry which, through reducing the 
daily pressures of teaching, would open the way for sustained observation of pupils’ 
thought and action, throughout one academic year Armstrong focused upon a large 
class (numbering 32) of 8 to 9 year old children recording his observations" 
interpretations and speculations about the 'significant' events takingplace in the 
class. Throughout the process he worked alongside the permanent teacher of fhe~ 
class who helped to authenticate his observations and interpretations: In the course 
of his description Armstrong came to be impressed with the 'appropriative sldlf of 
the children:
"The more closely Stephen [the class teacher] and I  studied the various 
absorptions o f  the children in our own class the more impressed we were by the  
evidence o f  their appropriate skill, whether as writers or artists, scientists or 
inventors, however primitive their technique or limited their understanding: It 
seemed to us that from  their earliest acquaintance with the various traditions o f  
human thought - literature, art, science, mathematics - our pupils were engaged 
in a continual struggle, by turns satisfying andfrustrating, to make use o f  whatever 
limited knowledge, skill and experience they possessed to examine, extend and 
express in an appropriate form their own particular understanding o f  the world in 
which they lived, to 'reproduce knowledge in fruits o f  their own, as Coleridge once 
put it. " (Armstrong 1981, 18,19)
7Armstrong turns to tell the story of a particular example of appropriation which 
takes the form of a very detailed and sensitive examination of the artistic 
development of one pupil, Louise. Armstrong accepts his research is anecdotal but 
he takes this form of expression to be a ’richer sense of the particular’ which is 
’indispensable’ for the theory and practice of education as a whole. His account 
endorses his appreciation of that part of the art of teaching which consists o f 
eliciting, analysing and seeking to make more reflective the thought and action of 
others.
He illustrates how the landscape painting of Louise reflected the story of previous 
events, the way she increased her powers of visual representation and how she 
developed two styles of painting - over the course of the spring and summer of 
1977.
Armstrong’s work stands in sharp contrast to the self-conscious, self-critical, critical 
and collectivist approach practised by emancipatory action researchers. It 
emphasises uncovering some of the detail concerning learning and development in 
a real and concrete situation of practice.
Appendix C
The programme details o f the first 'trial' re-introduction of 'ethics' to the police 
middle-management development programme
[ p ) £ P < a < 3 ^ l 3 < 2 < s ] Q  < 3 ^ 0 < 3
JCC Programme for 21 Jane 1993
film
T o  r e l a t e  e t h i c a l  t h e o r y  t o  p r a c t i c a l  p o l i c e  d i f f i c u l t i e s .
Content and timings
0 9 0 0  -  0 9 3 0  f i m p h i t h e o t r e
R o b e r t  f i d l a m  [ A p p l ie d  h u m a n i s t i c  p s y c h o l o g i s t ]
E t h i c s  a n d  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  h u m a n  l i m i t a t i o n s  -  talk.
0 9 3 0  -  1 0 0 0
N e il R i c h a r d s  [ M o r a l  p h i l o s o p h e r :  D i r e c t o r  o f  S h o r t  C o u r s e s ]
W h a t  d o e s  i t  m e a n  t o  h a v e  i n t e g r i t y ?  -  talk.
1 0 0 0  -  1 0 3 0  
Q u e s t i o n  a n d  a n s w e r .
1 1 0 0  -  1 2 3 0  A m p h i t h e a t r e
B r e n d a n  G i b b - G r a y  [ D e t e c t i v e  c h i e f  s u p e r i n t e n d e n t :  C o - d i r e c t o r ,  S h o r t  C o u r s e s ]
P r a c t i c a l  e t h i c a l  i s s u e s  -  talk & structured experience.
1 2 3 0  -  1 2 5 0
P a r t i c i p a n t s  w ill b e  a s k e d  t o  o p t  f o r  o n e  w o r k s h o p  e a c h  f r o m  t h e  r a n g e  o n  o f f e r .  
1 H 0 0  -  1 5 H 0  L o c a t i o n s  t o  b e  a n n o u n c e d
E t h i c s  W o r k s h o p s .
1 6 0 0  -  1 8 0 0
C o u r s e  w o r k s h o p s  a n d  t u t o r i a l s .
Choices
T h e  c h o i c e  o f  w o r k s h o p s  w ill i n c lu d e :
P a u l  F o r r e s t e r  ( J C C  s t a f f ]
FI broken-down old war-horse screams In pain: equal opportunities.
N o r m a n  G r e e n h i l l  [ S o c i o l o g i s t :  C o l l e g e  s t a f f ]
Professions and professional ethics. ................................
V o d n a  M u r r e l l - A b e r u  [ J C C  s t a f f !
Ethical career deuelopment.
M a r g a r e t  S c o r e r  [ L a w y e r ,  m a g i s t r a t e ,  E u r o p e a n i s t ,  s e n i o r  c o m m a n d  c o u r s e  s t a f f ]  
Everything you've always wanted to  know about equal opportunities, 
but were afraid to  ask.
K e ith  S h i p m a n  [ C h ie f  s u p e r i n t e n d e n t ;  SC C  s t a f f ]
How an area commander manages an ethical culture.
B e r n a r d  S l e ig h  [ J C C  C o u r s e  d i r e c t o r ]
Ethics and public life.
P e t e r  V il l ie r s  [ J C C  s t a f f ]
How far can you go? The ethics o f leadership Investigated In regard to stress. 
R o b e r t  A d l a m  P e t e r  V i l l i e r s  B r a m s h i l l  D i r e c t i n g  S t a f f
Appendix D
Excerpts from Colquhoun's (1806) 'Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis'
Appendix D
Colquhoun and the constitution o f  the new police
Writing in an evocative and persuasive style, Colquhoun (1806) articulates a moral 
basis for police stemming in part from a traditional concern with law and order but 
also from a 'scientific' concern with the prevention of crime and those conditions 
facilitative of crime and delinquency. It is also possible to discern, in his writing, an 
appeal to the moral status and dignity of such a policing function.
Part of Colquhoun's intention in writing the treatise is made clear in his dedication 
of the work to the Sovereign, 'who has graciously condescended to approve of the 
Author's efforts, "To establish a System of Morality and good Order in the 
Metropolis"'. However, his vision of the main purpose of the Police is made clear 
in his 'Preface', in which states:
"Police in this Country may be considered as a new Science; the properties o f  
which consist not in the Judicial Powers which lead to Punishment, and which 
belong to Magistrates alone; but in the Prevention and Detection o f Crimes, and  
in those other Functions which relate to Internal Regulations fo r  the well ordering 
and com fort o f  Civil Society.
The Police o f  the Metropolis, in every point o f  view, is a subject o f  great 
importance to be known and understood; since every innocent and useful Member 
o f  the Community has a particular interest in the correct administration o f  
whatever relates to the Morals o f  the People, and to the proiect ion o f  the public 
against Fraud and Depredation.
Under the present circumstances o f  insecurity, with respect to properly and even 
life itself, this is a subject which cannot fail to force itself upon the attention o f  all" 
(Colquhoun, 1806 : Preface)
Colquhoun, at the outset, wished for a change in the 'Plan' of police so that the role 
of a police could be founded upon a 'preventative' basis. His treatise begins with 
a general view of the 'Evils existing in the Metropolis' and the causes from which 
they arrive before he moves on to proposing remedies by asserting the Necessity of 
a well-regulated Police'. So he writes:
"Next to the blessings which a Nation derives from an excellent Constitution and 
System o f general Laws, are those advantages which result from a well-regulated
2and energetic plan o f  Police, conducted and enforced with purity, activity, 
vigilance, and discretion. Upon this depends, in so great a degree, the comfort, the 
happiness and the true liberty and security o f the People, that too much labour and 
attention cannot possibly be bestowed in rendering complete the domestic 
administration o f  Justice in all cases o f  criminal delinquency " (Colqulioun 1806 
: 1,2)
Vividly - and perhaps a little melodramatically - Colquhoun captures the fear of 
crime present in the metropolis, as follows:
"In vain may we boast o f  the security which our Laws afford us i f  we cannot lie 
down to rest in our habitations, without the dread o f  a burglary being committed, 
our property invaded, and our lives exposed to imminent danger before the 
approach o f morning” (Colqulioun 1806 : 2)
Colquhonn moves on to analyse the causes of the general criminality in terms of a 
mix of contributoiy factors, including the nature of the various laws and the 
penalties attaching to law breaking - which are so severe that few wish to find a 
person guilty, the absence of some relevant laws, and, the absence of a ’plan of 
Police'. His catalogue of the many and varied, problems in relation to law and order 
in England is drawn to a conclusion by his identification of two major causes 
concerning the 'lamentable' state of affairs:
is it not fa ir to conclude, that the want o f  security which the Public experiences 
with regard to life and property, and the inefficacy f  the Police in preventing 
jrimes are to be attributed principally to the following causes? .................... .
1. The imperfections o f  the criminal code .............  .....
2. The want o f an active principle, calculated to concentrate and connect the whole 
°olice o f the Metropolis and the Nation; and to reduce the general to system and  
nethod, by the interposition o f  a superintending agency, composed o f  able, 
ntelligent and indefatigable men, acting under the direction and controul (sic) o f  
lis Majesty's Principal secretary o f  State fo r  the home Department. - On these 
lersons, it is proposed, should devolve the subordinate care and direction o f  the 
general Police o f the Metropolis ... " (Colquhoun, 1806 : 24,25)
^olquhoun's treatise documents the various 'evils' at large in the capitol city; these 
nclude chapters on the cause and 'progress' of small thefts, on burglaries and 
lighway robberies, on cheats and swindlers, on gaming and the lottery, on the
coinage of counterfeit money, on river plunder, on the plunder of the dockyards, on 
the receivers of stolen goods, as well as speculations upon the origins of criminal 
offences which, inter alia, acknowledges the impact of poverty and socialisation, 
before he turns to the detection of offenders where his proposals for a 'well- 
organised Police' emerge.
Colqulioun believed that some positive remedies - especially with his concept of the 
'science of police' - could be found, and, part of the solution lay in a system of 
police. So he argues:
"As it must be admitted, that the evils arising from  the multiplied crimes detailed 
in the preceding Chapters, render a correct and emerging System o f Police with 
regard to the detection, discovery and apprehension o f  offenders, indispensably 
necessaiy fo r  the safety and well-being o f  Society. " (Colquhoun 1806 : 382)
He then goes on to explain how this public service will be reformed so as to make 
improvements on the present offices, In this explanation he was keen to emphasise 
the need to applaud the respectability of the office of Constable and he regretted that 
'these useful constitutional officers destined for the Protection of the Public’ were, 
in fact, 'so little regarded, so carelessly selected, and so ill-supported and rewarded 
for the imminent risques (sic) which they run’. Against this, and any prejudice 
towards those constables and peace officers, Colquhoun is adamant and, trenchantly 
clear:
" The common Law, as well as the ancient Statutes o f  the kingdom; having placed  
extensive powers in the hands o f  Constables and Peace Officers -they are, on this 
point o f  view, to be considered as respectable - and it is in the interest o f  the 
Community, that they should support that rank and character in society, which 
corresponds with the authority with which they are invested. I f  this were attended 
to, men o f credit and discretion would not be so averse to fill such situations; and 
those pernicious prejudices, which have prevailed in vulgar life, and in some 
degree among the higher ranks in Society, with regard to (hief-takers, would no 
longer operate; for it is plain to demonstration, that the best Laws that ever were 
made can avail o f  nothing, i f  the Public Mind is impressed with an idea that it is 
a matter o f infamy, to become the casual or professional agents to cany  them into 
execution." (Colquhoun 1806 : 385,386)
Reminding his readers that the office of Constable is as old as the Monarchy of 
England, and recalling that the office was to be executed without malice, affection 
or partiality, he traces the governmental constitution of the office from Saxon times
4onwards. Finding it an office subject to low status, inappropriate reward and 
imperfect management, Colquhoun advocates reforms such that 'good and able men 
even look up to such a situation'. In short, Colqulioun wants the office of constable 
reformed so that it is psychologically attractive.
His subsequent designs and remedies can be read both as furthering and evolving 
a particular tradition of policing. He emphasises the prevention of crime and the 
peacekeeping role, impartiality, fairness and a proportionate use of force in the 
administration of the executive function, a proper appreciation of the significance 
and status of police and, an effective management of the police. He wanted to see 
proper rewards and emoluments for constables, appropriate numbers constituted to 
carry out their functions, and, proper management and training. The latter 
recommendation included the following counsel:
" .. it should be the business o f  the parochial Chief Constable ... to impress upon 
their minds the necessity o f purity, vigilance, and attention to orders - and o f  being 
humane, prudent and vigorous, in the execution o f  such duties as belong to their 
functions. "(Colquliounl806 : 407, 408)
Thus, Colquhoun's text illustrates less a reliance upon a contractarian rationale for 
police but a recognition that the office of constable is central to the wellbeing of the 
citizenry, an office which must be animated through the expression of a set o f 
characterological virtues.
Appendix E
A personal statement concerning my beliefs about education and learning
1Appendix E
A personal statement on ’education and learning'.
1. We - as human beings - have a natural potentiality for learning (unless our 
curiosity has been blunted by the experiences we have had in the educational 
system)
2. Although we are natural learners - much of our learning is likely to be more-or- 
less painful. That is. we have to 'struggle' (at least to some degree) to learn anything 
of significance.
This means that we have a rather ambivalent attitude towards learning 'things1 of 
significance.
3. Significant learning takes place when the subject matter is perceived by the 
would-be learner as having relevance to his/her own purposes.
For example, imagine the following contrasting circumstances. In the first instance, 
we take a course in statistics because we need it for analysing the data we have 
collected in a research project (in which we are veiy interested and committed). In 
the second instance, we find ourselves obligated to take a course in statistics, the 
benefits of which are not obvious to us, in order to fulfill the requirements of a 
wider programme of study, hi the first case we will attach meaning and significance 
to our learning. In the second instance the learning will take on quite a different 
character. We will probably do enough to 'get byV
4. Much significant learning is acquired through doing, 
hi this context, Rogers (1969) writes:
"Placing the student in direct experiential confrontation with practical problems, 
social problems, ethical and philosophical problems, personal issues, and, 
research problems, is one o f  the most effective modes o f  promoting learning. 
Illustrations range from the class group which becomes involved in dramatic 
production, selecting the play and the cast, designing and making the scenery, and 
costumes .... to much more sophisticated confrontations. I have always been 
impressed with the fact that brief intensive course for individuals on the firing line 
facing immediate problems - teachers, doctors, farmers, counsellors - are 
especially effective because the individuals are trying to cope with problems which
2they are currently experiencing" (Rogers, C. 1969 : 162)
I take tliis observation as central to the emerging design tor 'ethics education’. It is 
far more important for us to examine 'problems' and issues experienced "by 
participants rather than to hnpose any overly specific content and methods.
5. Learning is facilitated when the student participates responsibly in the learning 
process.
When the learner chooses his/her directions, helps to discover his or her own 
learning resources, formulates his or her own problems, decides on his or her own 
course or courses of action, and, lives with the consequences of each of these 
choices, then significant learning is maximized.
6. Self-initiated learning which involves the whole person of the learner - feelings 
as well as intellect - is the most lasting and pervasive:
7. Independence, creativity and self-reliance are all facilitated when evaluation by 
others is of secondary importance. In other words the locus for judgment should 
come from within the learner him or herself.
8. The most socially useful learning in the modem world is the learning of the 
process of learning - a continuing openness to experience and incorporation into 
oneself of the process of change.
It is these - and related - principles that I wanted to lie at the core of the educational 
process underlying the provision of opportunities to inquire into the subject area, 
'ethics' - for managers and leaders in the police organisation. 1 wanted to derive the 
educational design for an ethics education - wherever possible - from these 
principles.
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Appendix G
The interview data from the first six interviews
Appendix G: The Interview data from  the first six interviews
Interview schedule
An exploration of the individual’s experience on the ethics unit of the Managing People module 
P 1
1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the^ ethics’ unit of the-Managing 
People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.
Intellectually challenging. Initially negative but I  wanted to 'tough it out' - Gradually became 
absorbed The low was - too theoretical in part. TkcAngk - p laylets. Enjoyable -dmEaho^gaad 
learning points.
2. On reflection, what if anything, did you learn from the unit?
Before this he wasn't aware of ethics in police context — now he  is. Will monitorFimseJfrnffiture 
and will not get carried away by other pressures (i. e. to get the job done).
3. What value do you assign to this part of the module?
He was prepared to do poem (an exercise) on Tuesday (the first 1ethics ’ day) and was 
disappointed with colleagues. So, he has gained from the iinit. Found this (The -unit) positive.
4. How might your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit influence your practice as a manager?.
Now more aware ofproblems and will look at himself and job more carefully and-critically. Will 
look at work situations more carefully and critically.
5. How, if at all, would you improve the ethics unit?
Difficult question: Would start from practical to get positive response and move towards the 
theoretical - but, K  is not sure. Difficult andJSob (the tutor) knows best.
6. Anything else?
No. Rob comes across as committed and he K____ has an affinity with Rob
Notes:
Classification: A
A) A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim 
(goal) of the Action Research process
B) A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first 
Action Research aim
C) A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the Action Research process has been 
achieved
This interview surfaces the following points:
1) The problem of the content being 'intellectually challenging' - which, in this case created an 
'initially negative' response.
2) The high was the experience of the 'playlets' - which were 'enjoyable' but also contained 'good 
learning points'
3) A Tack of awareness' of ethics in police context
4) His intention - in the light of the 'ethics education' experience to 'monitor' himself in future
5) The intimation that organisational pressures 'to get the job done' may make adherence to 
ethical standards problematic
6) He was prepared to do an exercise e.g. share something (a poem) he was 'disappointed with 
colleagues' (who would not do the exercise)
7) Managerially he is now 'more aware' and will Took at himself and the job more carefully and 
critically'
8) Although he found it difficult to answer the question concerning 'how to improve the ethics 
unit' he would 'start from the practical and move towards the theoretical'
9) He thought that the tutor knew 'best' (how to deliver the content)
Interview schedule
An exploration of the individual’s experience on the ethics unit of the managing people module 
P2
1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit of the Managing 
People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.
’High' -an interest in the topic. (First two hours - 'dreadfully theoretical' - heavy going-found 
it difficult to understand and may have 'tumed-off. Why not pause after thirty minutes then relate 
to practice?). Role play o f moral dilemmas was very interesting. Reading from Pollock was very 
interesting.
'Low' too much on theoretical - not sufficiently based on practice
2. On reflection, what if anything, did you learn from the unit?
Emphasised moral dilemmas that police officers have. First training he had ever had on 'ethics'. 
He will get books out on ethics. It was interesting - and he had not thought o f various points
3. What value do you assign to this part of the module?
Looking at what we do and why and also what we don't do and why as police officers is 
interesting. But what can we do for those/to those who work under others?
(Comment: The last sentence is interesting but does not appear to be answering the question)
4. How might your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit influence your practice as a manager?
A difficult question. He has genuinely been wondering about this including things about 
complaints against police. The experience on the unit reinforces his own views and practices. 
But he is no longer on the ground - can he influence those on the ground? He will consider this
- it relates to 'discretion'.
5. How, if at all, would you improve the ethics unit?
Cut first part by at least 50% i.e. Rob's part - then bring in a police officer - a police scenario 
to show effect wrong decisions make later on (e.g. Guildford four) After Wednesday (the first 
day) was good - the role play and professional ethics. Rob's journey on Friday was fascinating
- he [the respondent] understood forty percent - the rest was over their head. Why redefine 
society? Was 'Ultima Ethica' relevant? - he thinks not
6. Anything else?
Nothing else
Notes:
Classification: B
A) A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim 
(goal) of the Action Research process
B) A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first 
Action Research aim
C) A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the Action Research process has been 
achieved
This individual surfaced the following points:
1) A 'high' experienced because he was interested in the subject.
2) The first two hours - i.e. the lecture/presentation defining ethics and describing the nature of 
three normative ethical theories was 'dreadfully theoretical' and this was linked with the 
psychological state of being 'turned off. The 'low' was 'too much' on the 'theoretical'.
3) This was the first training the interviewee had ever had with 'ethics education'/and the study 
of police ethics.
4) Despite his reservations with the theoretical aspects of the experience with 'ethics education' 
'it was interesting' and he 'intends to 'get books' on ethics.
5) His suggestions for improvement suggest cutting my own part/contribution by '50% and 
bringing in a police officer'. (In many ways I would love to do this - but the previous - and as it 
turned out, subsequent, experiences with using police officers did not prove successful)
Interview schedule
An exploration of the individual’s experience on the ethics unit of the Managing People module 
P3
1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit of the Managing 
People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.
The presentation was too 'high brow' - too academic or intellectual. The main points o f the 
presentation should be put in a modem day context - Policing or 'the environment' - it would be 
more relevant to what followed next (in the learning design)
2. On reflection, what if anything, did you learn from the unit?
Already happy with personal values and beliefs. The group discussion - attention was paid as 
to how to communicate these and moved on to explore those (people in the group) who are being 
managed in a positive way.
3. What value do you assign to this part of the module?
Useful to revisit this issue. Don't know how it fits in to the rest o f the course. Don't feel that 
adequate recognition has been given to the varying levels o f experience within the group.
4. How might your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit influence your practice as a manager?
Need to reflect more deeply when the course ends
5. How, if at all, would you improve the ethics unit?
Felt unit was O.K. apart from the opening address - (as already stated above)
6. Anything else?
None
Notes:
Classification: B
A) A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim 
(goal) of the Action Research process
B) A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first 
Action Research aim
C) A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the Action Research process has been 
achieved
1) The 'presentation was too 'high brow' - too academic' and 'The main points of the presentation 
should be put in a modem day context'. This respondent, therefore, makes two critical (or 
negative) observations.
2) The respondent states that he is 'already happy with personal values and beliefs'. This suggests 
a connection with one implication drawn by police leaders and managers in 'ethics education' 
events which concerns the possibility that their moral uprightness is being impugned.
3) In relation to the value assigned to this part of the module he states that it was 'useful to revisit 
the issue' but then hints at two features which compromise his/her positive feeling: 'Don't know 
how it fits into the ret of the course’ and 'Don't feel that adequate recognition 'has been given to 
the varying levels of experience with the group'.
4) In relation to improving the design, this respondent offers little - because 'Felt unit was O.K. 
apart from the opening address'
Interview schedule
An exploration of the individual’s experience on the ethics unit of the managing people module
P4
1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit of the Managing 
People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.
High - enabled him to take critical look at himself as an individual - his beliefs, his own stance 
and what he does in work place
Low - first input. Accepts theory important but timing wrong. Too late in afternoon for this 
important topic.
2. On reflection, what if anything, did you learn from the unit?
Most impactive thing was Rob's journey and 'child question' (i.e. Is the 'little person' that you 
once were 'there' any more?) This made him stop and reflect on himself as an individual a 
manager and a person
3. What value do you assign to this part of the module?
Extremely important. Awareness and appreciation of'where you are coming from' and help to 
think about things in the workplace
4. How might your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit influence your practice as a manager?
By taking stock ofself and being critical ofself will affect his management style. May well realise 
others have a different ethical standard to himself
5. How, if at all, would you improve the ethics unit?
Only criticism is the timing o f the important ethical/theoretical lecture. Rest good
6. Anything else?
No. An awakening for himself as an individual and manager. Reflection is vital. Argument this
p.m. was useful. Why wouldn't people take a chance. He, B_______ , wants to' put toe in'- but,
have issues been cleared?
Notes:
Classification: A
A) A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim 
(goal) of the Action Research process
B) A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first 
Action Research aim
C) A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the Action Research process has been 
achieved
1) This individual illustrates what might be taken as a significant achievement and which is 
something made explicit (through individuals volunteering this information) on each delivery 
of ethics education: he 'now begins to understand himself.
2) The initial presentation concerned with clarifying the nature of the subject 'ethics' and 
outlining three major normative ethical theories was badly timed - 'timing wrong'.
3) He assigns considerable value to the experience: 'Extremely important. Awareness and 
appreciation of'where you are coming from' and help to think about things in the workplace' 
Again, this reflects the achievement of the first Action Research goal.
4) This respondent illustrates the fact that it is sometimes an unusual activity (in this case a 
guided phantasy) was 'most important thing'.
5) An observation that other participants 'would not take a chance' indicating (again) the 
reluctance of individuals to participate fully.
Interview schedule
An exploration of the individual’s experience on the ethics unit of the managing people module 
P 5
1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit of the Managing 
People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.
a) In terms o f experience, it was massively significant - 1 got the opportunity to put a theoretical 
structure to the topic. I  have given a lot o f thought to the subject also'.
b) The highs were the presentation by Rob Adlam - very different, very articulate
c) The lows - the plays
2. On reflection, what if anything, did you learn from the unit?
My ethical stance is my own - lam  responsible for it. I  am not convinced that I  have the right 
to impose this on others. Also learnt (in some ways reinforced) that police personnel are not 
always welcoming o f something that is perceived to be different
3. What value do you assign to this part of the module?
Very high value
4. How might your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit influence your practice as a manager?
On a daily basis - more interested in the ethical judgments, rather than what we physically do
5. How, if at all, would you improve the ethics unit?
The playlets took too much time. There were learning points - but took too long to develop. A lot 
o f time was used up physically - it would have been better to have a bit more theory and then 
some discussion
6. Anything else?
This should be a standard item not only in the module but on all police courses
Notes:
Classification: A
A) A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim 
(goal) of the Action Research process
B) A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first 
Action Research aim
C) A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the Action Research process has been 
achieved
1. This respondent indicated that the experience was 'massively significant' - and now has a 
'theoretical structure' for the subject
2. He stated that a high was the presentation(s) - in contrast to some of the other respondents
3. Again, by way of contrast, the 'low' consisted of the 'plays' - the structures the course 
membership itself had the responsibility for designing and delivering
4. He assigned 'very high value' to the experience
5. He advocated including an ethics education experience on all police courses 
There is evidence of success at achieving the first goal for the Action Research process
Interview schedule
An exploration of the individual’s experience on the ethics unit of the managing people module 
P 6
1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit of the Managing 
People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.
The low was the first Ethics presentation on Wednesday p.m. It was pitched too high for 
comprehension
The 'high' points - the following two days: the theory was put into practice on Thursday and 
Friday and these aided the understanding o f the initial delivery
2. On reflection, what if anything, did you learn from the unit?
I  learnt what the term 'Ethics' meant and its application in the police environment
3. What value do you assign to this part of the module?
It is important - all about standard-setting and in relation to the whole module (i.e. Managing 
People). It is a fundamental principle o f understanding people and what people are all about
4. How might your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit influence your practice as a manager?
I  don't think it will influence practice - however, there is now a clear and deeper understanding 
o f what I  already do
5. How, if at all, would you improve the ethics unit?
Revisit the first presentation on 'Ethics': I  would 'tone it down' - make it simpler and easier to 
understand
6. Anything else?
None
Notes:
Classification: B
A) A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim 
(goal) of the Action Research process
B) A 'mix’ of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first 
Action Research aim
C) A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the Action Research process has been 
achieved
1. The low was the first 'ethics' presentation - 'it was pitched too high' for comprehension
2. This respondent indicates a lack of prior knowledge of'ethics' as a subject
3. The respondent assigned 'importance' to this subject
4. Although he does not believe that the experience will influence practice there is now a 'clearer 
and deeper understanding' of ongoing practice
Appendix H
An outline o f Lomax (1994) criteria for the 'quality assurance' o f action research 
reports.
1Appendix H
Lomax (1994) describes how action research studies and reports, sequentially, can 
test themselves for educational rigour against the following criteria:
Stage one is concerned with the educational intention(s) of the researcher(s). The 
three-criteria she surfaces here are:
- Research context explained
- Educational intention exposed
- Rationale given
Stage two highlights the development of strategies for action. The criteria here are:
- The link between reflection and action is established
- A collaborative intent is realised
- The research process is made transparent
- Ethical principles are developed and applied
Stage three focuses upon monitoring the action taken. Five criteria are provided:
- Comprehensive data is collected
- Data from different sources are confronted
- Patterns and contradictions are appreciated
- Analysis is exposed to critique
- Alternatives are considered
Stage four is concerned with evaluation. The sorts of question Lomax suggests liere 
are; ’Are the outcomes significant? Has there been any practical change? Has the 
researcher developed professionally? and she suggests that four criteria need to he 
met in this stage:
- The claims are important
- The explanations provided are convincing and authenticated
- Individual findings are related to critical professional discussion
- Further questions are generated
Stage five, the final stage of the process, features the reporting of the project. I 
should add that Lomax sees action research as 'a journey rather than a destination’ - 
so the presentation of the report should not suggest 'termination' or finality but hint
2at the continuation of learning and development. The criteria the report needs to 
meet are articulated by Lomax as follows:
- The report has clear frames of reference, is well-constructed and is written with 
minimum jargon
- The report presents succinct yet comprehensive accounts that describe the 
strengths and limitations of the research
- The implications of the research are spelt out and evaluated critically in relation 
to other sources of information
- The report provides sufficient information for readers to follow up issues that are 
of interest
Lomax emphasises the need for teacher action researchers in their research to be 
emancipated from the methodological strictures of the natural and social sciences: 
Her concern is to propose a set of criteria relevant to the field o f ’education1.
Appendix I
The questionnaire designed to elicit basic data from the client group in order to help 
with the preparation of the 'ethics education' design
Appendix I
lit  order to organise materials and methods fo r  the forthcoming'ethics education- 
on the 'Managing People' module and to help achieve the most value from the time 
at our disposal I  would be pleased if  you could spend a few minutes providing me 
with information concerning the following points and questions:
1. What is your age (in years and months)?
2. What is your length of service (in years and months)?
3. With which types of work have you spent most of your time in the police sendee 
e.g. Uniform, Traffic, CID, Mixed etc.
4. What is the estimated length of time you have spent on courses within the police 
service (excluding full or part time degree programmes)?
5. What is the highest level of academic qualification you have attained?
6. Please describe the nature and quantity (if at all) of your experience on courses 
with something labelled or described as ’ethics’
7. In relation to the forthcoming two day unit on ’ethics education’ what are you 
expecting to cover?
8. What topic areas would you like to examine during the two days on ’ethics’’?
9. With reference to the pre-course work on learning styles, which style are you (i.e. 
Activist, Pragmatist, Reflector, Theorist)?
Appendix J
The chronology o f  actvilies and structures included on the firs t (case 
study’ delivery
Appendix J
1
An outline chronology o f  the activities and structures included on the first 
fcase study' delivery.
My introduction outlined the aims and objectives of the unit and included a 
reference to the four ’learning log’ activities. This was followed by a short 
presentation concerned to describe the overall ’territory’ with which ethics was 
concerned before I screened a fifteen minute clip from the film ' S c h i n d l e r ' s  L i s t '  
which served as a prelude to a small group exercise concerned to develop a 
definition o f ’ethics’.
This was followed by another video clip from the film, ' F o u r  w e d d i n g s  a n d  a  
f u n e r a l ’ designed to illustrate Ker Muir's (1977) idea that 'we measure a life in 
terms of the moral distance a person has traversed'. This was supplemented by 
another short computer screen presentation designed to provide an orthodox 
introduction to the subject ethics including brief notes on its history. Course 
participants then had the opportunity to complete - in small groups - the 
Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire. This was followed by another short computer 
screen presentation reflecting the overall data patterns emerging from the 
questionnaire.
After lunch, I screened a more lengthy video featuring a management consultant 
attempting to introduce a 'quality' philosophy to a 'hi tech' factory. This served 
as a prelude to a brief discussion on the idea o f the 'moral ethos' of 
organisations. Course participants were then asked to complete and discuss the 
'moral ethos o f organisations' questionnaire (based on Snell's (1993) analysis of 
the levels o f moral development in organisations). The discussion was then 
followed by a computer screen presentation initially describing the different 
types of organisational moral ethos and then moving on to provide a description 
of the data patten emerging from the way police middle managers had profiled 
their organisation.
After tea, I returned to the idea of the 'personal' nature of our inquiry by using a 
short biographical video as a catalyst to a piece of work on the 'social 
construction of persons'. This involved small groups of participants using an 
exercise designed to examine the 'social construction of police' and this served 
as a 'closure' to the day. The second day began with a video trigger from the 
film ' M u t i n y  o n  t h e  B o u n t y ’ which was designed to illustrate the fact that ethics 
examines how we might deal with 'hard choices'. I then delivered a short 
computer screen presentation, entitled, 'What we may be' - which was followed 
by a 'biography' exercise that I had written for the unit.
2After coffee, I formed the overall group into four subgroups based upon their 
learning styles and asked them to create a learning activity examining ethics 
and policing that 'would be riveting, creative, profound and would move us all 
forward'. The groups presented the results o f their inquiries and endeavours 
after lunch. They were encouraged to 'use the techniques of theatre' in these 
presentations.
By way of conclusion, I suggested that, gradually we might be able to point to 
'moral progress' and I cited the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) and then concluded with a screening of the dramatic opening to the film, 
T u l l  M e t a l  J a c k e t ' which, some police officers had informed me, had, in an 
attenuated form, reflected aspects of their induction into policing some twenty 
years ago.
Appendix K
A statement o f  my educational objectives — made available to my client 
groups from  the Spring o f 1997 until Autumn 1998
Appendix K
’T h e s e  a r e  m y  e d u c a t i o n a l  o b j e c t i v e s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  e t h i c s  e d u c a t i o n  u n i t , S p r i n g  
1997.
I  a m  h o p i n g  t o :
-  E n g a g e ,  a n i m a t e ,  e n e r g i s e ,  e x c i t e  a n d f o c u s  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  l e a r n e r s
- E x p a n d  a w a r e n e s s  -  i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t  e t h i c s  a n d  t h e  m o r a l  
p o i n t  o f  v i e w
-  D e v e l o p  c o n c e p t s  - e . g .  t h e  m o r a l  e t h o s  o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  
o f  m a t e r i a l s  w h i c h  r e f e r  t o  n o r m a t i v e  e t h i c a l  t h e o r i e s  e t c .
-  E n h a n c e  t h i n k i n g  ( i n  p a r t ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  c o n c e p t s )
-  P r o v i d e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d f r a m e w o r k s  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  s e l f  a n d  o r g a n i s a t i o n
-  D e v e l o p  p o w e r s  o f  a n a l y s i s ,  e v a l u a t i o n ,  j u d g m e n t ,  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g
-  C h a l l e n g e  c o m p l a c e n c y ,  c o n f r o n t  i n a d e q u a c i e s  ( a n d  i n j u s t i c e s )  o f  c u r r e n t  s o c i a l  
f o r m s ,  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  t h e i r  p r a c t i c e s
-  H e l p  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  p r a c t i c a l  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  - e . g .  e v e n  b y  s i m p l y  p r o v i d i n g  
s o m e t h i n g  s u c h  a s  t h e  p o l i c e  s e r v i c e  s t a t e m e n t  o f  e t h i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s
-  E n c o u r a g e  a u t o n o m y  - t r u s t  a n d  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  p e r s o n s  t h e m s e l v e s  ( I  m e a n  b y  t h i s  
t h a t  I  a m  k e e n  t h a t  t h e  c u r r i c u l u m  s t y l e  o r  e x p e r i e n c e  i s  o n e  w h e r e  i n d i v i d u a l s  
m i g h t  ' s o r t  t h i n g s  o u t ’f o r  t h e m s e l v e s )
-  P r o v i d e  a  c a t a l y s t  f o r  l i v i n g  a  l i f e  a p p r e c i a t i n g  o n e ' s  o w n  a n d  o t h e r s  f l o u r i s h i n g  
( i n  c o u n t l e s s  a n d  m y r i a d  w a y s )  -  v a l i d a t i n g  a n d  l e g i t i m a t i n g  e t h i c s  a s  t h e  
p r o m o t i o n  o f  h u m a n  f l o u r i s h i n g  a n d  t h e  c o m b a t i n g  o f  h u m a n  l i m i t a t i o n s
Appendix L
An example o f  a completed experiential record
Appendix L
An illustrative experiential record
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module (PI 1)
Day 1. Coffee break
1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?
Concentrated
2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not 
understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.
Think, reflect, understand
3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, 
how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.
Apart from group discussion, no contribution from floor. Within group - low key discussion re 
- definition o f ethics but this work not used in class
4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?
Well prepared introduction to subject. Clear objectives. Up to date -1996
5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.
Useful scene setting
6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?) 
Enthusiastic. Dry sense o f humour. Could speak up at times.
1. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?
Attentive and with varying degrees o f perplexity /  understanding (from facial expressions)
8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole 
programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?
Sound introduction/overview o f course
An experiential record
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People1 module
Day 1. Lunch break
1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?
Focused
2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not 
understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.
Feeling challenged and uncomfortable about the ethics questionnaire
3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, 
how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.
More discussion
4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?
Good awareness raising and reflecting
5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc. 
Long-term benefits o f reflection
6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?)
Emphasis on punctuality. Good mix o f tutor-led student centred, text based (including videos) 
methods
7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?
High levels o f attention. Some concerns/ disquiet - feelings o f threat? Receptive.
8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole 
programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?
Focus on personal values
An experiential record
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module
Day 1. Tea break
1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?
Not as focussed - post prandial effects ?
2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not 
understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.
Observing (videos and others), discussing, feeling, reflecting (re video Sid's heroes)
3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, 
how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.
Poor quality discussion due to lack o f knowledge
4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?
Could have been a better separation o f personal/organisational issues. Pre-read would have 
been useful.
5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.
Impact o f  'Sid's Heroes' both immediate and longer term
6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?)
Starts before half the class have returnedfrom lunch - will he develop this ? Too academic for 
audience.
1. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?
Less attentive. Discussion more desultory.
8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole 
programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?
Examining organisational; ethos with reference to rules, openness etc.
An experiential record
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module
Day 1. Evening time
1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?
Had to make lengthy telephone call therefore missed half ofpresentation
2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not 
understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.
Thinking, reflecting - Connolley video
3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, 
how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.
Blank
4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?
"Moral distance" e.g. Connolley - not too clear how you would actually measure this.
5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.
Longer term benefit
6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?)
Blank
7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?
Getting tired!
8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole 
programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?
As a springboardfor reflection and learning log. Would suggest a more impactive end to day
An experiential record
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module
Day 2. Coffee break
1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?
Blank
2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not 
understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.
Thinking, feeling, understanding, observing, imagining
3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, 
how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.
Bligh - no contribution
Discussion re biography - entered sensitive/deep areas. Very self-analytical and acknowledged 
as worthwhile
4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?
Brief overview (at start) o f yesterdays programme and plan for today - good (see 3 re 
biography)
5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.
The value o f taking time to cast one's mind back but not in a nostalgic way
6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?) 
Difficult to decide whether sincere/flippant/playing games
7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?
Willing to participate even/especially when some areas personally exposed
8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole 
programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?
Varied methods. Most important is biography session
An experiential record
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module
Day 2. Lunch break
1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?
Maintained due to interest
2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not 
understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.
Thinking, imagining Education presentation [i.e. the plays]
3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, 
how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.
Discussion, good quality, decisive, scenario developed promptly. Consensus.
4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?
Involved, committed, satisfied
5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc. 
Reinforces ongoing programme
6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?)
Nil
7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?
Only own group
8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole 
programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?
Team work to develop learning experience for course
An experiential record
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module
Day 2. Tea break
1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?
Sustained due to involvement in discussion/presentations
2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not 
understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.
Thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, observing
3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, 
how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.
a) Good quality discussions/presentations
b) Case studies
4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?
Beneficial - long term benefits e.g. what to do on return to force
5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.
Not clear o f benefits/advantages (if any) o f working in activist/pragmatist etc. groups ?
6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?) 
Supportive o f group efforts
7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?
Good group efforts /  team work
8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole 
programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?
Exploration ofpractical policing issues from ethical view
8An experiential record
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module
Day 2. Evening Time
1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?
Variable. Not just because it is late and end ofprogramme
2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not 
understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.
Thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, observing, contributing
3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, 
how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.
Good quality thorough discussion examining range o f issues
4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?
The case studies should have been four not two - there was unnecessary duplication: 2 groups 
covering ground did not add value
5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.
Blank
6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?)
He took 'back seat' which was appropriate but a more detailed review o f progress made would 
have been useful to 'close' the course
7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?
To the end they sustained a high level o f interest, commitment and involvement
8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole 
programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?
The tM’o case studies did provide useful contrasts/comparisons highlighting both large and small 
scale ethical issues in the service and society in general
9Achieving the educational aims o f  the unit
Was I the tutor able to:
(1) - Engage, animate, energise, excite and focus the attention of learners?
- Yes - most o f the time
(2) - Expand awareness - indicating the nature of the subject ethics and the moral point of view?
- This was the greatest achievement o f  the course for myself (and others)
(3) - Develop concepts - e.g. the moral ethos of organisations, as well as the provision of 
materials which refer to normative ethical theories etc.?
- Yes - and I  intend to delve further because there was insufficient time to do justice to this
(4) - Enhance thinking (in part, through the provision of concepts)?
- Definitely
(5) - Provide information and frameworks for the analysis of self and organisation?
- Yes (see (3)
(6) - Develop powers of analysis, evaluation , judgment, decision making?
- Ethics should more overtly inform these aspects
(7) - Challenge complacency, confront inadequacies (and injustices) of current social forms, 
arrangements, institutions and their practices?
- Yes - to which I  would add the challenge/confrontation was at a personal level as well as an 
organisational/societal one
(8) - Help in the process of practical decision making - e.g. even, by simply providing something 
such as the police service statement of ethical principles?
- Yes - See (6)
(9) - Encourage autonomy - trust and confidence in persons themselves (I mean by this that I am 
keen that the curriculum style or experience is one where individuals might 'sort things out' for 
themselves)?
10
- Yes, reinforced existing principles and practices, enhancing underlying/pervasive framework 
o f morality, values and ethics in general at an individual (practical) level and at a philosophical 
(academic) one
(10) - Provide a catalyst for living a life appreciating one's own and others flourishing (in 
countless and myriad ways) - validating and legitimating ethics as the promotion of human 
flourishing and the combating of human limitations?
- See 9 above
Appendix M
A statement o f  the values I  was seeking to embody in the conduct o f  the 
(ethics education9 experience. This statement was given to participants 
in the client groups during the second and third phases o f  the action 
research process
1Appendix M
Values and the 'Managing People' module:
This module is for you, the people around you - both within and outside the police organisation
- and, for the service and the public as a whole. This is a critically important aspect o f the 
module. I  want the experience to be valuable and personally significant for you.
I  noticed an observation in a very recent work (1996) authored by three people committed to 
improving educational practice and the situations in which that practice takes place. That work 
is entitled, 'You and your action research', and is written by Jean McNiff, Pamela Lomax and 
Jack Whitehead. They include the following lines in their text - and this is something with which 
I  agree:
"As educators we are always faced with questions o f encouraging people to express values o f 
freedom, democracy, fairness and se lf determination without stifling these qualities through the 
imposition o f inappropriate conceptual structures and power relations. " (McNiff, Lomax and 
Whitehead, 1996 : 2)
From this observation, I  produced the following general values statement reflecting my stance 
towards the design and delivery o f the 'Managing People’module and the 'ethics unit'within the 
module:
I  hope that we will, consistently, be able to express:
- Freedom: Here, 1 understand 'freedom'to mean: the freedom to 'be' and the freedom to dissent.
- Democracy: 1 take 'democracy' to mean 'government o f ourselves by ourselves'.
- Fairness: By fairness' I  mean that we try to ensure justice and equality for all. I  think it 
important that everyone enjoys an equal voice and is given an equal hearing.
- Self-determination: 1 assume that we are autonomous agents capable o f making choices, and 
that we take responsibility for those choices, as well as the way that we use our time.
These are the most general values which 1 hope will underpin the experience you have o f the 
module and the ethics unit. Tell me i f  I deviate from these value commitments.'
The statement continued:
'Action research and ethics education:
For my action research inquiry concerned with creating an effective ethics education for police 
leaders and managers, I have developed a statement o f my educational values. 1 would like you 
to read and critique the statement. You may notice that I am aspiring to values which I do not 
really bring to 'classroom'practice or others which I do bring but which I have, for whatever
2reason, omitted to make explicit. The statement is organised under four headings although there 
is considerable overlap between them:
- General level
As an educator, I  value the development o f the 'educated' person. An educated person is: self­
determining, self-monitoring, self-adjusting, self-creating and self-transforming. An educated 
person is both autonomous and co-operative. An educated person both moves into and away 
from 'authentic' hierarchy. And, an educated person is creative - infusing life and work with 
ethical, aesthetic, technical and practical value and energy.
- Person level.
At the personal level, I  wish that I  and others might be:
Respectful, empathic, thoughtful, tolerant, questioning, searching, open-minded, self-aware, 
critical and self-critical in ways which protect and educate, maintaining commitments to 
benevolence and justice as cardinal moral virtues, conscientious, consistently demonstrating 
moral courage and a respect for the moral law, disposed to find out relevant facts, disposed to 
think clearly, committed to making a difference to the well-being o f persons and other sentient 
beings on this planet.
- Professional level.
At the professional level, I  value the stance and approach o f the 'professional'. That is I  am 
committed to the well-being o f clients, I  adopt methods and procedures based on theoretical 
knowledge and its derivative practices, and that I  and fellow professionals are autonomous 
agents ready and willing to provide accounts andjustifications for our actions.
I  value the thoughtfulfollowing o f both the letter and the spirit ofprofessional codes ofpractice.
- Ethics education level
This is what I  aspire to achieve in experiential terms for participants on the 'ethics'part o f the 
syllabus.
- Understanding and valuing the history o f ideas in relation to ethics
- Recognising the everyday and commonplace nature o f ethical reasoning and ethical action
- Focusing ethical principles and theories on the analysis o f policing and police leadership 
issues and practices
- Promoting and realising an active learning process on the part o f participants where, 
ultimately, agendas are co-operatively negotiated and learning structures are developed to meet 
participants wants, needs and interests
- Providing a learning climate within which participants have freedoms to learn and enjoy 
exploring ethics as a domain o f enquiry
-An afterword.
The framework established by Heron (1989) concerning 'client outcomes' to which persons in 
positions such as my own, might aim, has been a source o f inspiration and challenge to me and
3to my own process o f clarifying my educational values.
For Heron, certain client outcomes were 'ideals that illumine the more immediate interaction. 
They nurture and guide the facilitation process'. Those outcomes are:
- S e lf direction and co-operation
- Informed judgment and open communication
- Self-development and social change
- Emotional competence and interpersonal sensitivity
- Self-awareness and social perception
- Celebration o f self and others
I  have also been influenced by Rogers' remarks concerning the role o f the educator and that an 
emphasis should be placed on learning rather than teaching.
Finally, what I  wish to note is that I  am always extremely impressed with the kind of'work' that 
is exhibited by art and design students in the United Kingdom especially in their final degree 
shows. This work strikes me as a real achievement because (in the vast majority o f cases) it 
reflects not only mastery o f a medium or media, an understanding o f artistic conventions within 
an area o f the arts, something new and different and refreshing or challenging or provoking, but 
also a process o f enquiry. The work represents a point on a journey - and the journey is as much 
personal as it is concerned to be public art.
I  would like my work - and the experience o f participants who work with me - to mirror at least 
some o f that content and style which characterises the 'artistic' inquirer'.
Appendix N
The Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire (final version): Two completed 
examples
Appendix N
1
The Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire 
Two completed examples:
Example 1
1. If you were able to describe your moral code in one or two sentences, what would they be?
To live life honestly, fairly, being responsible and accountable for my actions. To be able to look 
people in the eye after every decision I  take
2. With respect to your life so far, who or what exerted the most moral influence upon you ? 
Parents/Self/Police
3. How would you describe the relationship between religion and morality? Which is more 
important i.e. religion or morality?
For my part I  see very little relationship as a moral code is something to live your life by. A 
religious code is for hypocrites (a cynical view but..!)
4. Police work is like no other work in all sorts of ways. How has it influenced your moral 
development? On balance, would you say that your occupational experience has served as a 
positive or as a negative force upon your moral development?
On the whole it has been positive
5. Police work is full of demanding and critical incidents. Could you describe an event which has 
had an effect upon your moral development? what was it and how did it influence you?
It was to do with dishonesty and I  came away from it with a clear ethical code
6. How hard do you find it to challenge a decision which you believe is morally wrong, but 
where the consensus is against you? (Please circle or tick the appropriate category below)
a) Extremely hard
b) Fairly hard
c) Neither hard nor easy
d) No real difficulty
e) No problem at all
7. Have you ever faced a demanding problem at work, where a decision was right from one point 
of view, and wrong from another? If so, what was it? What else can you say about it?
2The majority o f  these dilemmas have fallen into the area o f charging/cautioning or not. In that 
you gave official guidelines, moral decisions and the question o f success at court
8. What are the particular moral dilemmas a police manager faces?
The balance between work efficiency and personal problems 
The balance between a qualitative and quantitative approach 
There being no shared standards 
The hypocrisy o f the state
How confident are you, that if you face a moral dilemmas at work, the organisation will be able 
to help you resolve it calmly and effectively? (Please tick or circle the appropriate response)
a) Very confident
b) Fairly confident
c) Not very confident
d) Not confident at all
10. The police occupation confronts the 'big' questions of'law', 'morality' and 'personal values'. 
How ethical do you perceive yourself to be? (Please circle the appropriate response)
a) Very highly ethical
b) Highly ethical
c) Fairly ethical
d) Just about ethical
e) Moving towards the unethical
f) More unethical than not
g) Decidedly unethical
11. What factors within the police organisation help police officers to attain exemplary moral 
standards?
Officers are striving to get there mainly because o f exposure 
A drive to do a good job 
A new type o f recruit 
A change in moral behaviour in general
12. Conversely, what factors act as barriers to exemplary moral standards?
Dinosaurs in the service 
League tables
Government drives to a quantitative approach
13. If you were to improve the moral character of the police organisation', what, in your view, 
would be the most effective means of doing so?
3Go for a qualitative approach as opposed to a quantitative one 
Give praise where it is due
Get the judiciary to question its own ethical standards 
Also get the state to question its own ethical standards
14. What is your reaction to the set of principles set out by the 'Quality of Service' committee and 
published as the 'Police service statement of ethical principles'?
I  am happy with it, however, how does it translate to the operational officer?
15. If you were to choose one principle as most important, which would it be and why?
What does 'important' mean? I  would like to know more about personal accountability
16. If your organisation were to adopt an explicit ethical code
a) what impact would it have on you?
I  would be very supportive, I  feel the need for a standard I  may not agree with it completely but 
it is necessary
b) what impact would it have on the service as a whole?
The difficulty would be managing the consequences. For years people have manipulated figures 
(as does everyone) it would require an inner strength from the Government
Example 2
1. If you were able to describe your moral code in one or two sentences, what would they be?
Aspire to do right things - asserted principally by what may be determined deontological criteria. 
Utilitarianism is specifically rejected - the ends cannot justify the means
2. With respect to your life so far, who or what exerted the most moral influence upon you? 
Reading
3. How would you describe the relationship between religion and morality? Which is more 
important i.e. religion or morality?
It is futile in the present time and place to seek to divorce religious influence (Christianity) from 
contemporary views o f desirable morality. I  cannot meaningfully answer the second question at 
this time
4. Police work is like no other work in all sorts of ways. How has it influenced your moral 
development? On balance, would you say that your occupational experience has served as a 
positive or as a negative force upon your moral development?
My moral development has been largely independent o f the service.... conversely it has been a 
positive influence in a 'negative' way. That is to say whenever 'dilemmas' have arisen it has 
reinforced a determination to stick to my own rules rather than 'theirs'.
5. Police work is full of demanding and critical incidents. Could you describe an event which has 
had an effect upon your moral development? what was it and how did it influence you?
As a probationer in a large city it became apparent that it was expected that evidence would be 
'gilded' to ensure conviction or to minimise court attendances (officer A found an exhibit. The 
arresting officer, B, would say that he'dfound it, to save officer A going to court). There was not 
enough 'whistle blowing' but the determination not to participate was reinforced.
6. How hard do you find it to challenge a decision which you believe is morally wrong, but 
where the consensus is against you? (Please circle or tick the appropriate category below)
a) Extremely hard
b) Fairly hard
c) Neither hard nor easy
d) No real difficulty
e) No problem at all
7. Have you ever faced a demanding problem at work, where a decision was right from one point 
of view, and wrong from another? If so, what was it? What else can you say about it?
5Preventing an incursion o f 'new age travellers'. Right: enthusiastic support o f  
community/colleagues/supervisors. Wrong: interfering with alternative lifestyle; to live where 
one would wish; oppression o f the vulnerable
8. What are the particular moral dilemmas a police manager faces?
Speaking for myself relatively few. decisions have to be made supporting the freedom o f those 
to carry o f which I  disapprove: Blood sports for example. Another is where the interests o f the 
organisation compete with those o f the individual - working socially disruptive shifts for 
example.
How confident are you, that if you face a moral dilemmas at work, the organisation will be able 
to help you resolve it calmly and effectively? (Please tick or circle the appropriate response)
a) Very confident
b) Fairly confident
c) Not very confident
d) Not confident at all
10. The police occupation confronts the 'big' questions of'law', 'morality' and 'personal values'. 
How ethical do you perceive yourself to be? (Please circle the appropriate response)
a) Very highly ethical
b) Highly ethical
c) Fairly ethical
d) Just about ethical
e) Moving towards the unethical
f) More unethical than not
g) Decidedly unethical
11. What factors within the police organisation help police officers to attain exemplary moral 
standards?
A complaints and discipline procedure seen to be fair rather than vindictive - that is capable o f  
understanding weakness.
12. Conversely, what factors act as barriers to exemplary moral standards?
The Government - the Home Office - the Force - District requirement that ends are important 
... e.g. reduce burglaries, reduce violent crime. Without concerns for means, this is deeply 
corrupting. (Watch this space!)
13. If you were to improve the moral character of the police organisation, what, in your view, 
would be the most effective means of doing so?
6Relates to number 12 ... encourage in individual officers ethical (or, at least rule bound) 
behaviour. For example ethical interviewing is now an important new training initiative. Stop 
rewarding by promotion officers who lie, cheat and are self-serving.
14. What is your reaction to the set of principles set out by the 'Quality of Service' committee and 
published as the 'Police service statement of ethical principles'?
Neutral
15. If you were to choose one principle as most important, which would it be and why?
4. Upholding fundamental human rights. This underpins all others - however what is/is not a 
human right is open to argument (even agreed by charter). ECHR says can live where you will 
- Police regulations do not.
16. If your organisation were to adopt an explicit ethical code
a) what impact would it have on you?
Increase confidence (slightly) in challenging senior officers (especially very senior officers).
b) what impact would it have on the service as a whole?
A gradual improvement - clearly signalling behaviour is unacceptable can eventually lead to the 
acceptance that is unacceptable, finally to elimination; torture has been largely eliminated in 
this country.
Appendix O
The ‘M oralE thos’ questionnaire and the ‘Organisational Ethics’ 
questionnaire
P o l i c e  M a n a g e m e n t  P r o g r a m m e
Ethics, leadership and professionalism
Questionnaire
T h e moral ethos of police organizations1 
Profiling the moral ethos within the police organization
Introduction:
The most recent work of ethicists has taken us beyond the concept of organizational culture and 
has begun to identify the salient features of a distinctive moral ethos within organizations. In 
organizations we encounter moral 'force fields' which exert enormous pressures upon the 
decisions and actions of organizational members. They may even make the difference between 
organizational survival and collapse. The purpose of this questionnaire is to profile the moral 
ethos within the police organization (as you experience it).
For what reason should we profile such a moral ethos? The answer is that we need to take stock 
of the moral force fields in organizations so that we can make judgements concerning the 'health' 
of the organization. Change, if it proved to be necessary, could then proceed from a position of 
informed awareness rather than unproven assertion.
The aim of this questionnaire is to begin the process of developing an informed awareness 
concerning the moral character and climate of the police organization so that police leaders and 
managers can fill their managerial roles as effectively as possible.
Instructions:
This questionnaire explores your perception of the nature of the moral force fields within the 
police organization. Sixteen dimensions which make up the force fields will be described. Each 
dimension is defined by two statements. It is important that you imagine those two statements 
to be at opposite ends of a continuum. On reading the statements you may perceive that both 
apply to your organization but this questionnaire is interested in which statement best describes 
your organization.
Please read both statements and then tick the box which best describes your view of the 
organization. You have, for each dimension, a choice of eight responses. However, you must 
make only one choice for each dimension. The next page illustrates what you are asked to do by 
means of an example.
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An example:
If the moral ethos questionnaire for example included the dimension, 'Chief constable reverence' 
it might be completed as follows:
Dimension Chief constable reverence
A) Chief constables are revered
B) People are contemptuous of Chief constables
Response:
My organization is:
□ Very highly A
□ Highly A
0  Moderately A
□ Just A
□ Very highly B
□ Highly B
□ Moderately B
□ Just B
In this example, the respondent has decided that s/he perceives that the organization is 
'Moderately A'. This means that, after reading the two statements, the person decided that 
statement 'A' applied more to the organization than statement 'B' and that statement 'A' 
characterized the organization to a moderate extent.
2
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The moral ethos of the police organization - the sixteen dimensions:
In each case, please would you read each of the two statements and decide which one applies 
most to your organization. Then, please tick the box which describes the degree to which that 
statement characterises the organization.
Dimension 1 - Tone
A) People really do hold to high principles
B) Actions tend to be expedient and exploitative 
Response:
My organization is:
□  Very highly A
□ Highly A
□ Moderately A
□  Just A
□ Very highly B
□ Highly B
□ Moderately B
□ Just B
Dimension 2 - Tightness
A) Action and feeling are rigidly programmed (i.e. there is little sense of 'personal space' for 
individual feeling and action)
B) There is considerable room for individual judgement 
Response:
My organization is:
□  Very highly A
□  Highly A
□  Moderately A
□  Just A
□ Very highly B
□  Highly B
[2 Moderately B
□  Just B
1
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Dimension 3 - Deference to hierarchy
A) The prerogatives of rank (pressures to obey 'rank' and privileges accorded to rank) are strong
B) People are allowed to challenge more senior members 
Response:
My organization is:
□  Very highly A
□  Highly A
□  Moderately A
□  Just A
□  Very highly B
□  Highly B
Czf Moderately B
□  Just B
Dimension 4 - Positional abuse
A) Power is used as a weapon over others
B) People are careful not to take unfair advantage 
Response:
My organization is:
□  Veiy highly A
□  Highly A
□  Moderately A
□  Just A
□  Very highly B
□  Highly B 
[^Moderately B
□  Just B
Dimension 5 - Spread o f trust
A) People trust those outside their immediate circle
B) People are suspicious of those they do not know 
Response:
My organization is:
□  Very highly A
□  Highly A
□  Moderately A 
LT Just A
□  Veiy highly B
□  Highly B
□  Moderately B
□  Just B
2
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Dimension 6 - Dependence on allegiance
A) Trust is important in running the organization
B) All people have to do is operate procedures and follow instructions 
Response:
My organization is:
□  Very highly A 
Highly A
□  Moderately A
□  Just A
□  Very highly B
□  Highly B
□  Moderately B
□  Just B
Dimension 7 - Regulatory formalization
A) Duties are clearly spelt out
B) Roles and codes are unspecific 
Response:
My organization is:
□  Very highly A
□  Highly A 
□"Moderately A
□ Just A
□  Very highly B
□  Highly B
□ Moderately B
□ Just B
Dimension 8 - Adherence
A) People stick to what is expected of them
B) It is common for people to deviate from the standards expected of them 
Response:
My organization is:
□  Very highly A
□ Highly A
□ Moderately A
□ Just A
□ Very highly B
□ Highly B
Tj Moderately B
□ Just B
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Dimension 9 - Respect fo r  dignity/integrity
A) People are valued in their own right
B) People are used as pawns or tools 
Response:
My organization is:
□  Very highly A
□  Highly A
□  Moderately A
□  Just A
□  Very highly B
□  Highly B
□  Moderately B
□  Just B
Dimension 10 - Intensity o f political stakes
A) The consequences of losing in a conflict (within the organization) are severe
B) People are 'safe' among fellow members 
Response:
My organization is:
□  Very highly A
□  Highly A
□  Moderately A
□  Just A
□  Very highly B
□  Highly B
□ Moderately B
□ Just B
Dimension 11 - Concentration o f power
A) Power is widely dispersed
B) The power centre is strong compared with the periphery 
Response:
My organization is: .
□  Very highly A 
U Highly A
□  Moderately A
□  Just A
□  Very highly B
□  Highly B
□ Moderately B
□ Just B
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Dimension 12 - Need fo r stability
A) People seek to maintain the organizational order and maintain the status quo
B) The organization is very open to change 
Response:
My organization is:
□  Very highly A
□ Highly A
CT Moderately A
□ Just A
□ Very highly B 
d, Highly B
□ Moderately B
□ Just B
Dimension 13 - Breadth o f constituency
A) There are many influential organizational stakeholders - i.e. people and groups to whom the 
organization is responsive. These may range from staff and customers to future and as yet unborn 
generations
B) The organization has responsibilities to only a few 
Response:
My organization is:
□ Very highly A
□ Highly A
□ Moderately A
□ Just A
□  Very highly B
□ Highly B
□ Moderately B
□ Just B
Dimension 14 - Openness to criticism
A) The organization deters outside feedback or is defensive towards outside feedback
B) The organization is open to and addresses public feedback and criticism 
Response:
My organization is:
□ Very highly A
□ Highly A
□ Moderately A
□ Just A
□ Very highly B 
n, Highly B
□ Moderately B
□ Just B
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Dimension 15 - Demands on loyalty
A) A great psychological commitment is required by the organization
B) The emotional attachment to the organization is weak 
Response:
My organization is:
□  Very highly A
□ Highly A
□ Moderately A
□ Just A
□ Very highly B
□ Highly B
C Moderately B
□ Just B
Dimension 16 - Developmental openness
A) Performing one's role in the organization extends one's talents, opens new horizons and yields 
significant self discoveries
B) One has to suppress creativity and self-awareness is deadened 
Response:
My organization is:
□  Very highly A
□ Highly A
D Moderately A
□ Just A
□ Very highly B
□ Highly B
□ Moderately B
□  Just B
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1Organisational ethics  -  a questionnaire
The following questionnaire consists o f three parts. Please complete each o f the three parts 
and then hand the completed questionnaire into the facilitator who will score it and then 
return it to you. The data will remain confidential.
Name: Organisation:
Part One
Please read each statement and then place a tick in the box which, in your view, characterises 
the extent to which the statement describes your organisation
1. Overall, the people in this organisation are trustworthy (e.g. there is little if any hackstabbing', 
people mean what they say and say what they mean etc.)
Veiy
strongly
agree
Strongly
agree
Moderately
agree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Veiy
strongly
disagree
2. The people in the organisation (when they are at work) are mainly interested in the well-being 
of the organisation rather than their own careers (i.e. the people in the organisation are not 
particularly selfish)
Very
strongly
agree
Strongly
agree
Moderately
agree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Veiy
strongly
disagree
3. The people in the organisation are very willing to spend time helping and supporting one 
another.
Veiy
strongly
agree
Strongly
agree
Moderately
agree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Veiy
strongly
disagree
4. The people in the organisation enjoy considerable (but appropriate freedom) in the way they 
fulfill their work tasks
Very
strongly
agree
Strongly
agree
Moderately
agree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Very
strongly
disagree
5. In the organisation people are rarely, if ever, intimidated by other persons (who are members 
of the same organisation)
Veiy
strongly
agree
Strongly
agree
Moderately
agree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Very
strongly
disagree
6. The managers in the organisation genuinely tiy to empower organisational personnel.
Very
strongly
agree
Strongly
agree
Moderately
agree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Veiy
strongly
disagree
7. People in the organisation make sure that their decisions are guided by moral principles such 
as tolerance, justice and benevolence.
Veiy
strongly
agree
Strongly
agree
Moderately
agree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Veiy
strongly
disagree
8. The different needs and sensitivities of the individuals in the organisation are respected and 
appreciated.
Veiy
strongly
agree
Strongly
agree
Moderately
agree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Very
strongly
disagree
9. If people make mistakes in the organisation the emphasis is upon learning from the mistake 
rather than punishment
Very
strongly
agree
Strongly
agree
Moderately
agree
Neither
agieenor
disagree
Moderately
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Very
strongly
disagree
3Part two
Please indicate which statement in each pair below most applies in the organisation - by circling 
either the letter A or B
1.
A. People really do hold to high principles
B. Actions tend to be expedient and exploitative
2 .
A. People are careful not to take unfair advantage
B. Power is used as a weapon over others
3.
A. People are suspicious of those they do not know
B. People trust those outside their immediate circle
4.
A. People are used as pawns or tools
B. People are valued in their own right
5.
A. People in the organisation are committed to helping each other
B. The actions of the people in the organisation tend to be self-interested
6.
A. An atmosphere of goodwill pervades the organisation
B. An atmosphere of negativity and 'dysfunctionality1 pervades the organisation
7.
A. Morale is fairly high in the organisation
B. Morale is fairly low in the organisation
8 .
A. The leaders in the organisation put the interests of the organisation above their self-interest
B. The leaders in the organisation put their self-interest above the organisation's interests
4Part Three
This part of the questionnaire contains three sets of descriptions characterising different types of 
'atmosphere' that can be found in organisations. Please read the first set of descriptions which are 
arranged in six stages and then decide which stage most characterises your organisation. Place the 
number 1 by that description. Then place the number 2 by the description that next most 
characterises the organisation. When you have done this for the first set of descriptions please do 
the same for the second and third sets. N.B. Please make sure you read all sue descriptions in each 
set before making your first and second choices concerning the degree to which they characterise 
your organisation.
Descriptions - Set 1
Stage One
The onus is on carrying out orders at ail costs, so that one may maintain one's position. Fear of 
failure is so great that anything out of the ordinary, or any sign of possible difficulty, tends to give 
rise to desperate measures.
Stage Two
Greed, ambition and ruthless pragmatism hold the organisation together; action is regulated by 
the expectation of reward. Those who have staked most in the organisation's success ensure that 
others find it worth their while to contribute. No questions are asked so long as targets are met 
and budgets are kept to.
Stage Three
Life is pleasant and comfortable, so long as one fits in. One gets things done by reading the 
'unwritten rules' and following them, by being seen as proud to belong. Non-conformity raises 
doubts about one's loyalty and reliability. Known deviants are swiftly marginalised and made to 
feel ashamed. Membership is established by adopting the house style, drawing on skills of tact and 
diplomacy, being nice to colleagues, and, avoiding upsets or abrasions.
Stage Four
Decisions are governed by formal procedures, rules and regulations. Quality criteria and standards 
are set by the law, official requirement, professional regulation or strict contractual agreement. 
Performance is subject to audit. There is room for individual judgements within the bounds of set 
by the rules and procedures but bias and idiosyncrasy is deplored. The immediate answer to cases 
which would create a precedent is No', but these are referred upwards for arbitration
Stage Five
The organisation stands for a set of principles regarding justice, development, compassion, 
ecology etc. which serve to focus the actions of its individual members. Personal idiosyncrasies 
and differences in lifestyle are accepted among members, provided that these do not compromise 
core values. Rejecting the latter is incompatible with membership. A common'feeling is of guilt: 
not doing enough, letting the cause or the side down.
Stage Six
Members are expected to negotiate, explain, justify and reflect on their own principles and to 
question and challenge those of others. Learning stems from continual dialogue conducted with 
compassion in an atmosphere of curiosity and openness. There are no fixed canons 
(commandments from 'on high') and there is no set schedule for achieving results, only the 
pressure to create projects and to explain the rationale behind them. The organisation is 
characterised by an environment which is catalytic of thought and imagination.
Descriptions -  Set 2
Stage One
People are valued only in terms of their consistency and success in carrying out instructions. There 
is no room for mistakes, illness or incapacity. Personal problems are kept secret. If they jeopardise 
one's performance, one becomes disposable. A run of failure which is attributable to a person or 
persons results in the removal of the person(s). If orders conflict due to power struggles located 
in the upper echelons of the organisation, then siding with the losers is fatal; survival means 
learning to size up who has the most power. If austerity measures are needed, those with the 
weakest power base are sacrificed.
Stage Two
Subordinates cany out their bosses' most risky moves; they pay the price for mistakes. Those with 
least power, and who have outlived their usefulness, are readily jettisoned. Policies shift to reflect 
the ascendancy of different groups. Disputes are decided by the balance of power. Conflict stems 
from different material interests, and is resolved through bargaining and trade-offs. The painful 
lessons include discovering the loss of power, that one's network has been penetrated, or that 
one's base of ideas or information has been stolen or superseded.
Stage Three
Disagreements within the inner circle are rare, and are settled with everyone saving face. At lower 
levels, conflict between groups or individuals is usually calmly settled by compromise or reference 
to higher authority. People are not manipulated; they are simply respected for going along with 
what they sense is expected of them. Challenging beyond one's station or going outside the 
'envelope' of consensus is a mistake: one risks being sidelined or thought of as 'dangerous'. More 
seriously, vehement dissent or whistle-blowing is regarded as gross misconduct or betrayal: the 
heretic's career will be destroyed, not out of malice, but simply in order to preserve organisational 
'integrity'.
Stage Four
People are valued for their expertise. So long as they follow clear rules and conventions, broadly 
understandable to others, and make a tangible contribution to the organisation, they will suffer 
no ill. The most painful lessons are reserved for those in marginal positions, if they expect equal 
treatment, for in times of threat to the organisation and/or financial constraint they are the most 
vulnerable. Conflicts typically stem from disputes about resource allocation. There are established 
ways of settling them, either by reference to a professionally established hierarchy of values, or 
by coalition and majority ruling. Should the performance of particular individuals become a focus 
of concern, formal counselling and disciplinary procedures may be applied.
Stage Five
People are not just vehicles for policy: the organisation is also a supportive community. Those 
under stress and/or performing badly are helped to recover and improve. No one is 'written off. 
Those not suited to the organisation, due to values divergence, are helped to find suitable 
alternative work. Policy decisions are made in a representative forum, accountable to diverse 
stakeholders. Disputes revolve around applying and refining values rather than discarding them, 
and are resolved by seeking a wide consensus among all stakeholder groups and encouraging wiii- 
win attitudes. The most painful lesson (for visionaries) is that one will not win others over 
unilaterally - decisions emerge slowly, through dialogue. One has to learn humility. In tough 
times, the prevailing argument is for everyone to share some of the sacrifice and work for better 
times. (Continued)
<•
6
Stage Six
Disputing parties seek to help one another articulate differences, settle them by open discussion, 
discuss what they have learned in the process, and report their discoveries to a wider forum drawn 
from the rest of the member community. Where there are no signs of resolution, the case will be 
treated as an exciting opportunity for the development of the whole community, the only pain in 
learning is that of self-discovery and self-creation: realising how difficult it is to live one's values, 
and facing up to the fragility of any particular set of values. Those finding these depths too 
difficult to face are nurtured and revitalised. Those wanting to remain are helped to develop to 
the full; those who do not are helped to leave gracefully. Collective spirit governs, not the will to 
power.
Descriptions - Set 3
Stage One
Members suspect peers and fear superiors. People trust only inoffensive, predictable colleagues 
with no motive to do harm. There is constant mutual surveillance. Trust evaporates at the slightest 
sign of irregularity. Relationships are guarded; people venture only viewpoints conforming to the 
local leadership, and only if pressed - since leaders may lose favour. Implementation of decisions 
depends on chains of command, so one must show at all times a keenness to do as one is told.
Stage Two
The main questions, where trust is concerned, are: 'If I ask them to do X, will they do X?', 'If they 
promise Y, will they deliver Y?', and, 'If they say they need Z for a project, how much of Z are 
they actually using?' Trust may develop if there is a history of honouring agreements, and 
resources are allocated accordingly. Relationships sour on failure to 'deliver'. Members are rivals 
for promotion. Co-operation between departments occurs only if seen by both parties to be of 
immediate mutual benefit. More commonly, departments will dump problems and 'blameability' 
on to one another, as will individuals.
Stage Three
The place is superficially friendly and there is mutual tolerance between departments, but one 
must look the part' in order to receive favourable resource allocation. The most senior managers 
form a closed circle based on common values, interests and lifestyles. Some junior staff) if they 
have an appropriate background and manner, may earn the status of'one of us' by acts of loyalty 
and devotion over a long period. Many lack the particular style and instincts or ethnic and gender 
characteristics deemed appropriate for the highest positions - the ability to exert authority without 
issuing commands. Most 'outsiders’ get nowhere and vote with their feet - but those who try to 
fit in will eventually be found peripheral posts (e.g. Training manager, Projects co-ordinator etc.).
iStage Four
Some specialisms are 'mainstream' and others are 'marginal'. Because the 'new' is not established, 
it is not widely trusted; mainstream specialisms form a dominant coalition and tend to attract 
resources at the expense of marginal ones. One's own specialism is worthy of expansion - while 
others appear to consume more than their fair share of resources. Rivalry between established 
specialisms may thus exist, but day-to-day co-operation is not jeopardised: established people 
trust one another to operate according to the rules and procedures governing their practice. For 
marginal specialisms it is a different matter: they must continually account for their activities and 
explain mysteries. Good personal relationships may improve information flow, but are not allowed 
to distort objectivity.
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Stage Five
Goodwill can be counted on: the mission overshadows feuds or vanities. The judgement of the 
most senior members is particularly respected. Some friendships are closer than others, and there 
may be coalitions around particular values, but members do not let these obstruct organisational 
purposes. Newcomers find colleagues tough going - they will be challenged all the time - until 
they appreciate the value-driven nature of the work. Then they will accept that tough, principled 
debate is required for getting the work done. Managers give support to new members and ensure 
that counselling for established staff is readily available. They also make sure that everyone feels 
happy about the resources that they have to do the job.
Stage Six
Trust and friendship are maintained by taking an active interest in others' work, mutually 
questioning values and action. Where activities intermesh, there is the fullest co-operation. Where 
separate activities coexist, discussion ensures that there follows, at the veiy least, a sharing of 
lessons learned. Distinct roles and agreements emerge and are continually reviewed but people 
are not forced to adopt roles or make particular changes in them. Resources for activities are 
allocated on the basis of unforced consensus. Members take out just enough to sustain a self­
questioning existence; any more than that would be extortion. Any proposal that affects the 
projects of others requires consensus; vetoes are unnecessary, since members seek to minimise 
the risk, pain or inconveniences suffered by any one person.
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